Cursus Philosophicus Thomisticus

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THOMISTIC PHILOSOPHICAL COURSE ACCORDING TO THE EXACT, TRUE, AND GENUINE MIND OF ARISTOTLE AND THE ANGELIC DOCTOR.

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FORMAL AND
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ILLUSTRATIONS OF THE PRECEDING TEXT.

QUESTION I.
ON THE TERM.

ARTICLE I.
Whether Dialectic begins rightly in the order of teaching from the term.

The title supposes that in every teaching there is given an order, that is, in every science treating its matters scientifically, and that it ought not begin by chance, nor at pleasure from this or that; for thus it would produce confusion, not clarity, which depends most upon the order of treating. Moreover, the order of art, or science is like the order of nature, for they begin from the more imperfect and easier, and are completed, or terminated in the more perfect. And therefore from the more common things, that is those which pertain to more things, and from the simpler and better known to us does teaching begin, just as does nature. But those things which are better known not to us, but in themselves, on account of great perfection, and are called better known to nature, that is of a nobler and more knowable nature, like God and spiritual things, although not easier, from these knowledge does not begin in execution. On which see in Physics, Question 1.

THEREFORE I SAY FIRST: To Logic per se pertains to direct all three operations of the intellect, which are simple apprehension, composition and discourse. Concerning the second and third operation, no one doubts; concerning the first, some do. But it is clearly deduced from Aristotle. And St. Thomas, question 1 of the Posterior Analytics, lecture 1, says thus: "One action of the intellect is the understanding of indivisibles, or of incomplex things, according to which it conceives what a thing is; and to this operation is ordered the teaching, which Aristotle hands down in the book of the Categories." Nor less openly does the same holy Doctor affirm, in 1 On Interpretation, lecture 1, where he distributes the order of Aristotle's books, in Logic, according to these three operations of the intellect.

You will say St. Thomas does not teach that the first apprehension absolutely per se pertains to Logic, but per accidens, and by reason of another, namely judgment; for thus that which is first in simple apprehension, afterwards is the partial object of judgment, and under that first state does not pertain to Logic, but under the second. But contrary is first: Because St. Thomas, in the same tenor and manner speaks of one operation, as of another, nor does he make the treatise directing the first operation more per accidens than the second. Then, from the foundation of our conclusion: Because the first operation is

also per se directable, and founds its intentions, namely the relations of superior and inferior, universal and particular in predicables, and the coordinations of predicaments, in which we distinguish the confusion of things into their classes; all of which needs some art and direction, insofar as all these things are disposed orderly and distinctly, and the confusion under which things are first apprehended is removed. And this regards the first operation, not the complexion and oration, since rather complex things are excluded from predicaments and only simple things are placed there, as will be said in Logic, in the antepredicaments; nor can this be directed by any other art than by Logic; therefore, etc.

I SAY SECONDLY: Among the operations themselves, in the right order of teaching Logic begins from the direction of the first operation. This is established from what has been said. And secondly: Because the order of art ought to be proportioned and conformed to the order of nature for art imitates nature; but naturally the intellect proceeds from the first operation into the second, in knowing; therefore also the art of Logic ought to proceed from the first operation into the second in directing.

I SAY LASTLY: Within the first operation itself, most fittingly is begun, in the line and order of treating the prior resolution of Logic, from the term, or simple diction, not absolutely, but as it is a part of enunciation, and as it speaks a relation to composing that. - This conclusion depends on what will be said, in the following article. Meanwhile it is clearly gathered from St. Thomas, 1 On Interpretation, lecture 1, where he says terms, or simple dictions can be considered in three ways; either according as they absolutely signify simple intellects, and thus they pertain to the book of Categories; or "according to reason, as they are parts of enunciation, and thus it is determined concerning them in this book, and therefore they are handed down under the notion of noun and verb, of whose notion it is that they signify something with time, or without time, and other things of this kind, which pertain to the notion of dictions, according as they constitute enunciation;" or finally according as from them is constituted the syllogistic order, and thus they pertain to the books of the Prior Analytics. Therefore according to St. Thomas, the term, or simple diction, pertains to the first operation, as it is a part of enunciation, and as it is ordered to composing that. Therefore if we rightly begin from the direction of the first operation (as has been proven), we ought to begin from the term in common, as it speaks the notion of a compositive part.

It is proven by reason: In the Summulae we treat of those things, which regard the logical form, or prior resolution, but in Logic of those things, which pertain to matter and posterior resolution, because form is prior than matter in any art; and therefore Aristotle called the books Prior those, in which he treated of the form of syllogism, Posterior,

where of matter. Therefore we ought to treat in the present of the term, or simple diction, as it pertains to the prior part, and as it regards the fabric and construction of enunciation and syllogism; therefore of the term under respect to those things which it constructs, or into which when constructed it is resolved; therefore of the term first as it regards enunciation than syllogism, because enunciation precedes syllogism, since it is a part of it. For although the absolute consideration of some thing is accustomed to precede the respective; nevertheless in order to some special treatise, or end, the respective consideration can precede the absolute. Therefore we fittingly begin from the term according to its office, or respect of making enunciation, about to act afterwards concerning it under the respect of a syllogistic extreme.

The objections are solved.

Against the first conclusion you will object: Simple apprehension is not capable of logical artifice, nor of a mode of knowing; therefore Logic has no right, nor direction in it. The antecedent is proven: Simple apprehension is therefore called simple, because it has nothing of artifice, and is carried as naturally to the object proposed to it as external sense. For just as sight, for example, when color is proposed to it, sees it without artifice, or any direction, nor can it err in seeing it; so the first operation, when man, for example, or any other simple object is proposed to it, conceives it without need of art, and without danger of error; therefore it in no way pertains to the Dialectician to direct it.

I respond: I distinguish the antecedent: It is not capable of logical artifice by way of composition and division, I concede the antecedent; by way of distinction and coordination, I deny the antecedent. For there is a double artifice, double mode of knowing and double error, either compositive or divisive, which consists in attributing one to another or dividing one from another; of this the first operation is not capable, since it is simple apprehension excluding all composition. Or there is artifice or mode of knowing distinctive and coordinative, just as we distinguish between superior and inferior grades, between the intention of genus and species, between common and particular, concrete and abstract; and the first operation needs this artifice. For since in it many things are accustomed to be apprehended in an involved and confused way, to evolve, coordinate and distinguish these according to diverse intentions is an artifice required for the mode of knowing, namely for definition and division, which are accustomed to be made according to the intention of genus and difference, etc. But to correct errors of simple apprehension on the part of nature or of the thing apprehended will pertain to the Metaphysician, but on the part of form and second intention, for example, on the part of

genus and difference, on the part of concrete and abstract and similar, will pertain to the Logician.

Secondly, it is argued against the second and third conclusion: The term as handed down by us is neither simpler or more imperfect, nor better known to us; therefore one ought not begin from it. I prove the minor, as to the first part: The term is still resolvable into other simpler and more imperfect things, from which it consists, namely into signification, and voice, and syllables; therefore one ought to act first concerning sign, concerning syllables, and voice, than concerning term. As to the second part, I prove: Oration and proposition is better known than term; therefore term is not better known to us. The antecedent is proven: Proposition is a whole with respect to term, which is a part of it; therefore proposition is better known than term, at least by confused knowledge, because by this knowledge the whole is better known than the part, as is said in 1 Physics. Likewise: Term is defined through proposition, for term is a part of proposition; therefore also by distinct knowledge proposition is better known than term. The consequence is clear: Because the defining thing notifies and manifests the defined thing; therefore it ought to be more manifest and better known than it; for if we do not first know proposition, how shall we define term through it?

Which Aristotle confirms, in 1 Prior Analytics, chapter 1, first defining proposition, then term; therefore one ought to begin first from proposition, than from term.

I respond: I deny the antecedent. To the proof, I distinguish the antecedent: Term is resolvable into others, concerning which it pertains to the Logician to act, I deny the antecedent; which he presupposes as treated by other arts or sciences, I concede the antecedent. Therefore it is not simpler by absolute simplicity, I concede; by logical simplicity, or pertaining to Logic, I deny. For voice, signification, and syllables, which are the compositive elements of term, do not regard the Dialectician; for concerning voice the Physicist acts; concerning syllables, the Grammarian; concerning signs ad placitum, as to institution, the Republic, as to the communication of men, Politics. If however the Logician acts somewhat concerning sign, either it is borrowed from other sciences, or he acts concerning it as it is the foundation of second intention, of term, of oration etc. And so logical resolution properly stops at term, as constructive of proposition and syllogism; but further resolution of term, namely into voice, and signification, and similar things, is not of logical investigation. Just as the sculptor stops at wood from which he makes a statue, although wood and bronze are resolved into matter and form, not by art, but by nature.

To the proof of the second part, I distinguish the antecedent: Proposition is better known than term by confused knowledge, I concede the antecedent; by distinct and scientific knowledge, I deny the antecedent; therefore one ought to begin from proposition, and not from term, I deny the consequence. Because we do not begin by scientific order, and distinct knowledge, which supposes confused knowledge of the whole. From which appears the answer to the second proof. For in order that we may define the part through relation to the whole, as to an extrinsic term, or term through relation to proposition, it suffices to know the whole itself, or proposition confusedly, but not scientifically and distinctly. And when it is urged: That the defining thing ought to be better known than the defined: I distinguish in the same way: better known by simple and confused knowledge, I concede; distinct and scientific, I deny. For when color is defined through order to sight, it is not necessary to know sight first definitely and scientifically, but it suffices that it be known confusedly. Which teaching is especially true in things which are defined through order to something extrinsic, which are called in 7 Metaphysics, definitions by addition; for the order to that thing is intrinsic to the thing, which is defined, not that extrinsic thing to which there is such order; and thus perfect and distinct knowledge of such extrinsic thing is not required. Therefore in one word, I say that, when something is defined, it suffices that its defining elements be better known as to whether it is, not as to what it is.

To the Confirmation from Aristotle, I respond, by turning it back against the one arguing. For if the Philosopher, about to act concerning syllogism, first touched its proximate and remote matter, which are propositions and terms, into which as into the ultimate the syllogism is resolved; therefore when we proceed by way of composition, and by scientific and distinct order, we ought to begin from term, although knowledge of syllogism and proposition as to whether it is, or confused, is supposed.

Lastly it is argued: Every science begins from universals; therefore Logic not from term, but from that in which term and proposition agree in the logical genus, namely from second intention in common ought to begin. And this also agrees with the mode, by which the Philosopher begins in the Physics; for he begins from mobile being in common, then explains the individual parts in the books On the Heavens, On Generation, and Soul, etc. Therefore similarly Logic ought to begin from logical being, that is from second intention, then descend to its parts.

It is confirmed: Because the mode of knowing according to itself is easier to know, than term, because the mode of knowing itself facilitates and prepares the way to knowing, since it is an instrument of knowing; therefore one ought to act first concerning the mode

of knowing as concerning the easier, or facilitating science, then concerning knowable objects in particular, namely term, oration etc.

I respond, I distinguish the antecedent: Every science begins from universals either in predicating, or in composing, or causing, I concede the antecedent; from universals in predicating only, I deny the antecedent. But term is something most universal in composing; for it composes all logical instruments, oration, proposition, syllogism, even the mode of knowing itself etc. But it is not always necessary to begin from the universal in predicating; as when it has no special difficulty as it is conceived in common, but as it is explained through its parts. Just as the mode of knowing in common has no other difficulty, than what is explained through its parts. And to that about the order observed by the Philosopher, in the Physics, we say the same is observed in Logic; because just as the Physicist acts first concerning mobile being as concerning the object in common, and in this common thing begins scientifically from the principles and elements, by which mobile being is constituted, namely from matter and form; so Logic acts concerning the mode of knowing, or logical form, which is second intention in common, as concerning object, but nevertheless begins scientifically from the first element, and simpler constitutive of it, which is term.

To the confirmation, I respond: That the mode of knowing, as scientifically and distinctly to be known and defined, as a thing to be known as what, is not easier to know, than term; since indeed term is a part of it, and from knowledge of parts begins distinct and scientific knowledge of the composite. But the mode of knowing as condition, or as instrument of knowing in exercise, and as that by which, is easier than term and prepares the way to it, just as to all objects, which ought to be known scientifically. But for this it is not necessary that the mode of knowing itself be first known quidditatively and scientifically, but by some imperfect and confused knowledge, as a whole with respect to parts. In sum, the teaching which begins from term scientifically, also begins to know scientifically the mode of knowing itself, and proposition, and syllogism, because scientific knowledge of these begins from distinct knowledge of parts, and the first part of those is term.

ARTICLE II.
Whether the definition of enunciative term is good, and in what its formality consists.

In controversies, which are agitated concerning definitions of things, almost all things are finally reduced to a question about the name; because since definition is a principle,

which some science uses to know the natures of things, and their properties, it has no other prior principles, from which it can be discerned, except only names and diverse mode of conceiving the same thing; which perhaps happens most in those things which are accustomed to be agitated concerning the definition of term.

Therefore that we may proceed more clearly, we distinguish enunciative term and syllogistic term, founded in that teaching of St. Thomas, related in the preceding article, in 1 On Interpretation, lecture 1: That simple dictions have triple consideration, and according as they pertain to predicaments, and according as they are parts of enunciation, and according as from them is constituted syllogism as from extremities. And because we do not act concerning predicaments in the present, we consider and define term according to the two last acceptations; and according to the first we call it enunciative term, as it speaks order to enunciation, and thus we act in this article; and according to the last, we call it syllogistic term, and thus we will act concerning it in the following article.

In defining therefore term it is wonderful how much authors vary. Some extend the notion of term quite amply even to non-significative voices, provided they can be extremes in proposition. Others any simple significative diction, not caring that it can be an extreme of proposition. Others require for the notion of term both formalities, namely that it be a sign, or significative voice, as genus, and that it be a part, or constitutive of proposition, as difference. Others add a third formality restricting still more, namely that term be a part of proposition not in any way, but a principal part, which is an extreme; and thus they define term, that it be an extreme of proposition. Finally others add a fourth formality, namely that it be not only a sign, nor only a part even as extreme, for all these things it supposes, but finally that it be an actual extreme of syllogistic resolution; so that when resolution of syllogism and proposition is made, then it has the essential and ultimate difference of term, because proposition is resolved into it: but the Philosopher says term to be "that into which proposition is resolved." They add however that term thus consists of signification and notion of part, as of prerequisite and preceding formalities, that those are not verified essentially of term itself but of the substitute, or subject of term.

I SAY FIRST: Of the essential notion of logical or artificial term is, that it be significative by signification ad placitum, if it be vocal or written, not if it be a concept. - The conclusion is common of Dialecticians, who follow Aristotle defining all logical instruments, syllogism, oration, noun, verb etc., through significative voices. St. Thomas follows, 1 On Interpretation, lecture 1, acting concerning the definition of noun, and lecture 6, at the end, acting concerning the definition of oration; and he excludes voices naturally signifying although Plato sensed the opposite in Cratylus, because oration and

its parts are not natural things, but certain artificial effects, whence they ought to signify artificially, or ad placitum, just as all artificial things are caused from human will and reason; but voices devoid of signification, only naturally represent, not ad placitum, whence per se they do not pertain to constructing oration.

From which is taken the reason for the conclusion. Because a non-significative voice, like Blitiri, can represent nothing to the mind, which needs direction of art, and contributes to reasoning; therefore per se it does not pertain to a logical instrument. The consequence is clear. Because every logical instrument ought to serve some direction of reason and artifice, since indeed the formal notion of Logic, as has been said, is to regard the direction of reason to this end that the intellect proceed without error. Whether however per accidens a non-significative voice can be assumed by Logic to compose oration, we will say in the arguments.

But that term ought to signify ad placitum and not naturally, is proven first: Because in the present term is defined in common, as it comprehends every part of oration, even the copula, or verb; for we understand this by the name of term. But no voice naturally represents the copula of others (if you deny, assign it); therefore at least on the part of copula term needs signification ad placitum. Then further: Copula signifies ad placitum; therefore it cannot per se unite extremes representing naturally. For how will the verb est unite two sights, or two groans. Therefore that logical artifice be given, signification ad placitum is necessarily required, both in verb and in extremes united by verb, and consequently in term, which is something common to all those things. For if non-significative writing, for example, a line drawn with a pen does not compose logically, therefore neither will non-significative voice compose.

I SAY SECONDLY: The ultimate formality of enunciative term is that it be a part of enunciation, from which simple proposition is made, not only as predicate and subject, but according to a more common notion, comprehending verb and other parts, like pronouns, adverbs, prepositions, and similar things. - This conclusion is common among Thomists, Peter of Spain, Soto, Bañez, and others. It is proven first, by the authority of Aristotle and St. Thomas, 1 On Interpretation, in the chapter on enunciation, where the Philosopher teaching how noun and verb are excluded from oration, says: "Therefore noun and verb let it be diction alone, since it is not to say someone signifying by voice in this way to enunciate." Which words St. Thomas explaining there, lecture 8, § Excludes from unity, says: "Therefore noun and verb let it be diction alone, so let it be diction, that not enunciation; and it seems from the mode of speaking that he himself imposed this name diction to signify parts of enunciations." Therefore to noun and verb the

Philosopher imposed a common name, namely that they be diction alone; and this name he imposed, says St. Thomas, "to signify parts of enunciations." Therefore diction or term, according to Aristotle and St. Thomas, signifies the notion of part of enunciation in which noun and verb agree and common to them, and according to which they pertain to the present institute, as St. Doctor expressly asserts, 1 On Interpretation, lecture 1, saying: That "simple dictions are considered as they are parts of enunciation, and thus it is determined concerning them in this book etc." Therefore term, or diction is excellently defined through this that it be a part of enunciation, or that from which simple proposition is made; because if the Logician considers term as it is a part, he ought to define it in common through this that it be a part. And this is the constitutive formality of it, because every other formality being excluded it is understood that term, or diction remains, if it remains conceived in the notion of part of enunciation.

And if you ask whether this consideration of part includes all parts of enunciation, or only the more principal ones: It is answered that term, or diction can be taken in two ways, either in general, ample, and common acceptation, or restricted, or more determinate. In the first way term comprehends every genus of parts in the way that parts are, even adverbs, pronouns, and other syncategoremata, which are more colligations of parts of oration than parts of oration, just as nails and other things of this kind are not parts of ship, but conjunctions of parts of ship, but absolutely or commonly whatever compose it are called parts of ship, however they compose. But if term is taken in the second way and strict signification, it only comprehends the principal parts of oration, which are noun and verb, to which others are reduced. For under nouns are comprehended pronouns, under verb, participle. Note however that although verb connects extremes of proposition, as if union and ligament, but syncategoremata are called colligations of parts, nevertheless in different ways; for verb connects by signifying something by way of action and motion, and can have the notion of predicate in proposition, as when I say: Peter runs, Peter is: but syncategoremata are colligations by signifying in some way, and not something; whence they cannot have the notion of predicate and subject properly speaking, just as verb and noun, which are called principal parts of oration, and therefore Aristotle treated those alone, as St. Thomas says, in the place cited, whose entire this teaching is, because he intended to determine concerning simple oration, which of necessity demands noun and verb.

The arguments are solved.

First it is argued against the first conclusion: Blitiri is a term; and it is not a significative voice; therefore term is badly defined through this. I prove the major: The ultimate and

essential difference of term belongs to it, namely to be a part of simple proposition; for it is a part of this: Blitiri is not scindapsus; Blitiri is trisyllabic. It also supposes in proposition with material supposition. Therefore it is a term.

I respond: I deny the antecedent. To the proof, I distinguish the antecedent: it is a part, or composes proposition materially, I concede the antecedent; formally and significatively, I deny the antecedent. For term and the remaining logical instruments can be taken in two ways, either objectively for the things themselves signified, and this is materially, or formally for the signs themselves, which we use, because we cannot bring things to schools and this is significatively. When therefore proposition, or oration, is made from non-significative voices, that voice stands materially for itself, just as in material supposition; as when I say: the term 'Man' is a noun; the term 'man' is a voice: then indeed those voices stand for themselves, because they represent themselves to sense; whence they do not need signification, but representation of themselves (then indeed we have brought the thing into schools), which supplies the place of signification, for signification is not of itself, but of another, for it is a sign which represents something other than itself, not itself. Therefore properly speaking artificial composition of Logic requires signification; but per accidens it can use representation, when it does not form oration concerning signified things, but concerning the voices themselves, as in the argument, and then voices compose materially, not formally.

Contrary: Oration composed from Blitiri is formally oration; therefore Blitiri formally composes it. The consequence is clear, because a whole which is formally whole, seeks parts which are formally parts. The antecedent is proven: That is formally oration, which generates the sense of oration in the mind of the hearer; such is this: Blitiri is not scindapsus. Therefore. Moreover Aristotle formed his demonstrations from letters A, B, C alone, which signify nothing as diction, or term. And for oration he did not postulate all significative parts, but some, saying oration to be "of whose parts something signifies separately." Therefore non-significative voices formally compose oration and syllogism, and these do not demand all significative parts.

I respond to the first proof: First, consistently with what has been said, that the formality of oration, since it is a whole, consists in composition; and thus, that it be formal oration it suffices that composition be formally given, although not made through signification of extremes, but supplied through representation. But it is given through the verb est, by reason of which the composition itself of oration is formally signified; and thus it is oration formally by the formality of composition, which is taken from the verb, not by the formality of extremes, because these only compose materially and representatively. But if

all parts were non-significative voices, it would neither be formally oration, nor would it be oration.

I respond secondly: That non-significative voices do not compose oration formally and artificially through themselves, but by reason of a significative voice there understood; as when I say: Blitiri is not scindapsus, it is understood: The voice Blitiri is not the voice scindapsus; where the term 'voice' is the term formally composing, but Blitiri stands only objectively and materially. And this is simply the true and certain solution. From which appears the answer to the remaining proofs. To the first, concerning letters A, B, C: It is said either to hold themselves there materially, or that there it is understood the voice A, the voice B; or that A and B signify those first elements and first letters ad placitum, not naturally, as appears in the preposition A or Ab. To the definition of oration St. Thomas responds, 1 On Interpretation, lecture 6, the Philosopher not intending, that non-significative voices formally compose oration with verb, but that at least some part of oration ought to signify something, that is as categorema, even if the remaining only signify in some way as syncategoremata.

Secondly it is argued against the second conclusion: Diverse is the formality of part and of extreme; but term is extreme of proposition, as is taken from Aristotle, 1 Prior Analytics, chapter 1, saying term to be, "that into which proposition is resolved;" therefore it is badly said that the ultimate formality of term consists in the notion of part. The major is proven: The notion of part is more universal than the notion of extreme; for part is preserved in that which composes the whole; but extreme, in that it contains and closes the whole, so that outside it there is not, and it is related as principal part; therefore the major is true.

I respond, by explaining the minor: That namely Aristotle there spoke of syllogistic term, not of enunciative, concerning which we speak in the present; for that one consists in the notion of extreme, but this one in the notion of part, and comprehends all parts of oration, even the less principal ones. The reason for which is, that enunciative term is only ordered to constructing truth in enunciation; but syllogism, or syllogistic term to inferring: but truth is composed not only from extremes, but also from verb connecting, adverbs, or negations, on which often depends the truth of proposition. Since therefore we treat in the present of term in order to composing enunciation, hence it is that we take it generally, as it comprehends every part of enunciation. But truly syllogistic inference, because it is not considered as true, but as inferring, only requires three terms two which are extremities in the conclusion to be inferred, a third which is related as medium proving, and inferring, and by inferring conjoining, which can belong only to subject and

predicate. Whence only extremes of proposition are syllogistic terms, and concerning these the Philosopher spoke, by the words cited, but not we, but in broader acceptation.

Lastly it is argued: To be a part of proposition belongs to others than term; therefore it is not well defined through the notion of part. The consequence is clear: Because definition cannot belong to others than the defined. The antecedent is proven: It belongs to proposition and oration, since indeed proposition composes syllogism, and another hypothetical proposition, which essentially consists of categoricals.

If you say that term composes simple proposition, but categorical composing hypothetical composes composite proposition, such as hypothetical is. Contrary: Even categorical proposition composes another simple one. I prove: This proposition: the term 'Man is animal' is true, is some simple categorical proposition, and is composed from this: the term 'Man' is animal; therefore also categorical is a part composing simple proposition.

If you say that proposition composes another not as part per se first and essentially, just as term, but accidentally secondarily. Contrary: Syllogism and hypothetical are per se composed from propositions; therefore propositions are per se composing parts and constitutives of those.

I respond to all the said things, with this distinction: Proposition can compose another proposition, either simple, or composite: I distinguish: per se, I deny; per accidens, I concede; therefore to be a part, which is the notion of term, belongs to proposition, I deny the consequence, because term per se is compositive of simple proposition, not per accidens. I explain: Some things are per se parts, and per se are ordered to composition of the whole; but others per se have the notion of whole, and if sometimes they are ordered to composing another whole, it is not per se, but per accidens. For example, bones and flesh of man per se are parts of him, and per se are ordered to composing him, but man himself, because per se he has the notion of whole, if sometimes he is ordered to composing another whole, as to army, he does not have this per se, but per accidens. The same is of house, which per se is a whole, and, if it composes city, it is per accidens. In the same way in logical artificials terms are per se parts, and per se are ordered to composing simple proposition, because they do not have another essence previously constituted (for thus is understood: From which simple proposition is made, which is the difference of term); but proposition because it is a whole per se, if sometimes it composes another proposition it is not per se ordered to this, but per accidens, because it is not constituted in its essence through this.

To the last reply I respond: Hypothetical and syllogism have according to Aristotle, chapter on enunciation, unity of conjunction, or order, not unity simply, just as categorical. But those composite, or wholes, which are composed only by conjunction and order, can be composed from parts, which per se and first are not parts, but per accidens and materially, just as army, which is composed from many men, and city, which is composed from many houses.

You will ask: Term, as said above from St. Thomas, can be considered in three ways: as it pertains to predicaments, as it is part of proposition, and as it is part of syllogism. Why therefore is it not defined according to the notion common to all these formalities and considerations?

I respond: Term, as it pertains to Categories, is taken for the things themselves signified, as they are coordinated in predicament according to superior and inferior grades; as it pertains to proposition and syllogism it is taken for sign, or significative voice, and thus it cannot be defined by one definition, since sign and thing are not one. Or granted that it could be so defined, it does not pertain to the present, where we only treat of term, as it precisely pertains to logical form and prior resolution.

You will ask finally: Why is term more and only defined through this that it be a part of proposition, than of syllogism; since indeed it also most formally composes syllogism; for without verb at least conclusion will not be inferred, nor will syllogism be given?

I respond: Verb composes, and is required for syllogism presuppositively by reason of enunciation, not by reason of illation; because it is not required to conjoin extremities by way of illation and proof, but by way of enunciation; and because enunciation is prerequired for syllogism, also verb, but not formally, but presuppositively.

ARTICLE III.
Whether the definition of syllogistic term is good; and what its formality is.

We are compelled in the present to treat also of syllogistic term, although this would seem to pertain more to the treatise itself on syllogism, that we may perfectly expound the definition of term, and its difference from enunciative term; because some thus think the Philosopher handed down the definition of term, when he said: "I call term that into which proposition is resolved, as into predicate and subject," that only this definition of term is to be accepted, even according to the consideration of term to enunciation itself, and not to syllogism. Indeed some so literally adhere to those words of definition, that they deny the essence of term to term when it composes, but only when it terminates the

resolution of syllogism, or proposition, indeed only when it actually terminates this resolution, by means of the act of intellect resolving, but not when it has potency so that it can terminate this resolution, although nevertheless the words in definition do not speak of act, but of potency.

THEREFORE I SAY FIRST: The Philosopher, in 1 Prior Analytics, did not define generally every term, from which proposition can consist, as enunciation is, but as it precisely serves to construct syllogistic order. This is manifestly established to those examining the definition itself. For the Philosopher said: "I call term that into which proposition is resolved as into subject and predicate." Where manifestly in this definition he did not include all parts of enunciation, namely verb, syncategoremata and negations; and yet the Philosopher numbered verb among parts of enunciation, in 1 On Interpretation. And there, lecture 1, St. Thomas noted, "it is to be numbered among the more principal parts." And from what was said in the preceding article, it is manifestly established that, since enunciation is ordered to constructing truth, which is found in judgment and enunciation itself, it requires more parts for its construction (because truth depends on them) than syllogism, which formally does not regard composing truth, but inferring; for it supposes truth constituted in propositions, and only adds that it be inferring or inferred.

I SAY SECONDLY: Term even according to syllogistic order considered, not only has its quiddity and essence in terminating resolution of syllogism and proposition, but also in composing nor does it consist only in the exercise itself of actual resolution, but also in that upon which such resolution falls, which is to be a part, or extreme composing proposition and syllogism. And indeed the diversity of opinions is whence simple diction took the appellation of term; whether from terminating resolution, or truly from terminating construction or composition? And both as probable the Coimbrans report, on chapter 1 Prior Analytics, question 1, article 3. But this touches the etymology of the name; for we suppose term to have both functions, namely of composing and resolving that which is composed from it; and we say that it consists not only in the function or office itself of resolving, but also essentially imports the formality itself of composing: which some deny, thinking term can only be defined essentially through the termination itself of resolution, not through the notion of part.

Nevertheless we take the opposite from St. Thomas, in 1 On Interpretation, lecture 1. Where speaking of that triple consideration of simple diction related above, and coming to the third consideration of term, which Aristotle considered, 1 Prior Analytics: "Third (he says) they are considered according as from them is constituted syllogistic order, and

thus it is determined concerning them in the books of the Prior Analytics." Behold the most formal consideration itself of term, as it is treated in the books of the Prior Analytics, he says to be according as from them is constituted, is composed syllogistic order.

To these things St. Thomas, 2 Physics, lecture 5, explaining the word of the Philosopher, who had said "propositions to be matter of conclusions," and inquiring how this is to be understood, says: "Insofar as terms, which are matter of propositions, are also matter of conclusion, although not according as they are made under the order of propositions." Thus therefore terms have the notion of matter in conclusion and propositions, that is in the whole syllogism; but of the intrinsic notion of matter it is, not only to terminate resolution of the composite, but also to construct and compose it as part; therefore it pertains no less to term to be a part of constructing, than end and term of resolving.

And it is confirmed: Because nothing is resolved, except into those things from which it consists and is constituted: but it is constructed from parts, which when resolution is made are separated; therefore, if it is of the essence of definition of term that it be that into which proposition is resolved, also it is of its essence that it be that from which it is constructed, and thus it can be defined through this that it is to be a part, or extreme of proposition, because it can be defined through everything that is of its essence.

But why, you will ask, did Aristotle define term through the office of resolution alone, saying: "I call term that into which proposition is resolved." Was so great a Philosopher deficient? I respond: He who defines through resolution, also understands composition in brief; for if it is resolved into parts from which proposition consists, by this very thing he virtually signifies that it is composed from the same things. But nevertheless for excellent reason the Philosopher rather expressed resolution in the definition of syllogistic term, than composition: both because this more conducted to explaining the simplicity of term; for better and more distinctly the simplicity of part is recognized through that which remains, when the composite is dissolved, than through that which it has within the composite; and because this was expedient for knowing the analytic and resolutory mode of proceeding, which Aristotle there handed down, and which is proper to Logic; so that namely we might know that, beyond which logical resolution does not pass, for it stops at term, into which proposition is ultimately dissolved. But it pertained to knowledge of logical resolution to notify us of that, beyond which it does not pass in resolving. But if it were handed down through composition, it would not be established whether something else remained from which proposition was also composed, and to which logical

resolution could extend itself. Which solution see in St. Thomas, Opuscule 48, treatise on syllogism simply, Chapter 1.

From what has been said I gather two things. The first is that, if we speak of enunciative term, the verb est is also a term, because it is also a composing part as copula of extremes, as we already said above. But truly speaking of syllogistic term, the verb est as connecting is not a term, because it is not a major or minor extreme, nor medium, since it is not predicate or subject, which is required that something be an extremity of syllogism, or medium serving for illation. And thus the verb est is not a term in Aristotle's definition, so that it be formally a term inferring or inferred, which pertains to the formality of syllogism; but it is an enunciative term, because it is a part composing enunciation as to the notion itself of true, or false. Otherwise it is if it is related not only as connecting, but as extreme; as if I say: Peter is, that is exists, of second adjacency.

Second I gather that enunciative term, even outside proposition, actually has the essence of term, that is of part of proposition, although it does not have the actual exercise of terminating, or composing it; nevertheless outside proposition it is not predicate, or subject, but predicable, or subjectable. The reason is: Because the actual essence of term is to be part of proposition; but the notion and essence of part consists in this that it be compositive and constitutive of the whole, but not that it actually compose; whence it is one thing to actually have the essence of part, and to actually have the relation of part, another to have the actual exercise of composing; just as rational soul even when it is separated is a part, although it does not actually compose. And the same appears in parts of artificial things, as in parts of house, or chair, which are actually parts, that is actually have the constitutive entity of part, even if they do not actually compose. Therefore it is one thing to actually construct, another to be actually constructive. This second is the notion of part; but the first is exercise; just as visual potency is actually potency, although it does not actually see. Therefore to actually compose depends on application and existence in the whole; to actually be part is to have entity from which the whole can be made, or into which it can be resolved. It is one thing to be predicate and subject, and supposition, or ampliation to have, and similar things, which import the actual exercise itself of predicating, or subjecting, and not only to be predicable, or subjectable, or suppositable.

The arguments are solved.

First it is argued: The formality of part or extreme does not suffice that something be called term, but further the formality of terminating is required; since indeed only then

does it actually and formally resolve and terminate: therefore this formality alone constitutes the notion of term; but the remaining formalities, as to be part, or extreme, or sign, are necessarily supposed, but do not formally constitute the notion of term. Whence St. Thomas says, 7 Metaphysics, lecture 12, "that the whole essence of definition is in some way comprehended in the difference. Therefore the definition of term ought to be handed down through this alone which is the ultimate difference, namely to terminate syllogistic resolution."

It is confirmed: Nothing is essentially said to be that from which it is but that which it is; but term is from part; therefore it is not part. The major is known, because that from which something is is related as part of it; but no part is said of the whole. The minor is established, because from the formality of part, and the formality of termination results that that part be term; therefore term is from part, but is not part.

It is confirmed second: Because the legitimate definition of syllogistic term ought to be handed down through that which belongs to term in genus, and to this term in species; but to term in genus belongs the notion of terminating as such, and to term of resolution to terminate resolution, but to syllogistic term, to terminate syllogistic resolution; therefore term is rightly defined through this that it is term of syllogistic resolution.

It is responded to the principal argument, from what has been said: That for the notion of term the formality of terminating, or composing is required, not as to actual exercise of composition and resolution, but as to actual entity and proportion, from which composition can be made; for actual termination, or composition, supposes in the part itself, which is assumed for composing, to be the nature and due proportion that it be assumed. And although the notion itself of part speaks actual relation to the whole, of which it is part, nevertheless it is one thing the exercise of regarding, another the exercise of composing. That first is intrinsic and inseparable from part, because by this very thing that it is part it actually regards the whole, but as constructive, not as actually constructing; just as potency actually regards object as able to make, not as making, for that pertains to actual operation. Therefore term, by this very thing that it has due proportion to composing and resolving proposition, although it does not actually resolve and terminate, has the notion of term. And thus is verified the common saying: "That words placed in definition, do not speak of act, but of potency."

But in the place cited from St. Thomas, definition is not so reduced to difference alone, that genus is excluded, as is clear of itself; but to signify that differences are the form itself of genus with determination, therefore through difference alone definition can be

explained, that is the ultimate determination itself and actuality of nature, as St. Doctor explains in the same place.

To the first confirmation it is said that from the formality of part, and the formality of actual termination does not result that that part be term, but that it exercise the office of term; and this exercise supposes term constituted. But through the formality itself of part it is constituted in the notion of apt and proportioned to composition and resolution itself; even before it actually exercises this.

To the second confirmation, I respond: That the genus of term and difference is not actual exercise of termination, or composition of syllogism, but to actually have aptitude and proportion to composing and resolving. Just as the essence of soul is not to actually terminate resolution, or composition, but to be able to compose and terminate it.

Secondly it is argued: The notion of part is not found outside the whole, properly and essentially speaking; for by this very thing that it is outside the whole it is not part, but whole in itself: but that which once is whole, if afterwards it becomes part, it is accidental to it to be part; but term even in the notion of term is found outside the whole and separately outside proposition; therefore per se essentially it is not part, but some whole.

Nor does the example of separated soul, which does not lose the notion of part, stand in the way. For soul is a certain spiritual substance existing per se, and therefore remains separated from the whole; but truly term is not something existing per se therefore the notion of part is not attributed to it separately from the whole, but only within it; just as also other forms not existing per se do not have the notion of part outside the whole.

And it is confirmed: Because term is constituted in the being of term through second intention, which is the relation of part to whole. But this relation consists in the actual exercise itself of regarding, and not in potency to regarding; therefore, if it is constituted in the being of part through relation, it is constituted through actual exercise of part, not through potency to composing.

I respond: It is not of the notion of part that it actually compose, as appears in the example adduced of separated soul, and we showed the same above concerning parts of artificial things.

And to the reply, I respond: That just as rational soul exists really per se outside the whole, so term can be known separately from the whole; and because being of reason has no other being than to be known, therefore term can exist through reason outside the

whole, retaining the notion itself of part. Or second it is said: That even if some part cannot exist in fact outside the whole, on account of dependence which it has in existing from the whole, nevertheless the office of part does not consist in actual composition; as appears in prime matter itself, which can now be under one form and under one composite, now under another. And thus although it cannot be outside the whole at least naturally; nevertheless it does not consist in the actual exercise itself of composing this whole, or that, but in potency to any whatever.

To the confirmation I respond: It is one thing potency of regarding, another potency of composing, as we said above; and it well stands that potency of composing actually regard the whole itself which it can compose, although it does not actually compose; just as visual potency actually regards visible object, although it does not actually see. But the relation, or intention of part is said to constitute term itself in artificial being of term, insofar as it puts on the notion of part able to compose proposition, not as actually composing; from which relation however proposition is not composed, but from term itself, which puts on the notion of part.

Lastly it is argued: Aptitude to making proposition is accidental to term; therefore it cannot be defined essentially through it. The antecedent is proven: Because to make proposition itself in exercise is accidental to it; therefore also the proximate aptitude itself to composing for act and proximate potency are in the same genus; but term speaks proximate potency to composing, because radical and remote is also found in sign itself according to itself.

And it is confirmed: Because also the second operation is ordered to the third just as the first to the second; and yet the second is not defined through order to the third: therefore neither the first operation, in which term is found, through order to the second.

I respond: Term consists in proximate potency to making proposition, understanding by the name of proximate potency, that is of itself ultimately ordered and ready to compose. But that which is said: "Potency and act to be in the same genus," I respond: It is one thing that they be in the same genus, that is in the same predicament, another in the same genus, that is in the same predicable, or mode of predicating; so that to whom potency belongs essentially, act belongs essentially. Concerning the first we do not dispute whether act ought always be in the same predicament for this has many instances in potencies and acts per se and intrinsically not ordered, concerning which is to be disputed elsewhere. Concerning the second however it is manifestly established that well can potency belong essentially to someone and act accidentally; just as to soul essentially

belongs to be able to compose, and to eye to be able to see, but not to actually compose, or actually see.

To the confirmation I respond: That the second operation does not regard the third as ultimate and simple part element not having another essence than of part, as term has; but the second operation has composite being in itself and a certain whole, but it regards the third operation not as simple part composing, but as inferring and moving from one to another, which is not per se first to be part, as term.

ARTICLE IV.
What is the defined of term, and for what it stands.

Since term is defined, that it be a significative voice, from which simple proposition is made, in explaining its defined occurs that common difficulty, which is found in explication of any definition of accident in the concrete, namely: Whether its defined stands for the subject itself (some call substitute); or truly stands for the form itself; or truly for that which results from subject and form (some call constituted). For if it stands for the subject itself, for example for voice in the definition of term, the definition does not belong to it essentially, but denominatively and accidentally, because it is that of which it is said, but not truly that which is the notion itself of term. But if it stands for form, the subject is badly placed in definition, for example significative voice, since voice, and any subject whatever, is not the form itself, but receptive of form; and thus it would be badly said defining the form of term that it is voice itself. But if it is taken for that which results from subject and form, that is not definable, because it is being per accidens, which does not fall under definition.

Concerning this difficulty we treat many things in Logic, Question 7, on genus. In the present it suffices to note a few things.

THEREFORE I SAY: According to the teaching of the Philosopher and St. Thomas, accidental or artificial concrete cannot be defined for the constituted itself, or resulting from subject and accident; but the defined in these concretes, for example in term, in oration, in white, in statue, is the accidental form itself not absolutely and abstractly, but respectively and connotatively to the subject, so that to be in subject or outside subject pertains as if to state and mode of being, not to the substance of the defined itself, and thus enters definition as extrinsic addition and as connoted. - This is taken first from the Philosopher, in the Categories, chapter on substance, where he says that white signifies quality alone. The words of the Philosopher are: "But it does not signify qualified what

simply, just as white, for white signifies nothing other, than quality." Therefore it does not signify the constituted from subject and quality. Then St. Thomas, in the book On Being and Essence, chapter 7, near the end: "From accident, he says, and subject is not made one per se; whence does not result from their conjunction some nature, to which the intention of genus, or species can be attributed." But it is established that every definition ought to explain some nature of genus or species, which St. Thomas denies to belong to that constituted.

And the reason is at hand: Because the constituted from body and whiteness, subject and accident, is conflated from things of diverse predicaments; therefore it does not constitute one being per se: for that is one being per se, which enjoys one predicament, one genus and difference, and one definition, because definition consists of genus and difference if however it pertains to diverse predicaments, it does not have one genus, but many genera, because predicament is genus. But being per accidens is not definable, because, as St. Thomas excellently says, 7 Metaphysics, lecture: "Being per accidens does not signify something, but somehow," and consequently does not signify what or quiddity, which alone is object of definition. And therefore, in Opuscule 2, which is Compendium of Theology, chapter 211: "Subject, he says, and accident are not so united that from them some third thing is constituted." Therefore he most clearly excludes that constituted from accident and subject, that it be per se definable and considerable; whence among beings per accidens, which are established not to be definable, it is numbered by the Philosopher, 5 Metaphysics, treatise 16; and by St. Thomas there, lecture 1, and 7 Metaphysics, text 11 and 14, lecture 3.

To this also serves that teaching often repeated by St. Thomas, that artificial things are in double genus, or predicament: on the part of matter, in the genus of substance; on the part of form, in the genus of accident. And thus in 4, Distinction 44, Question 1, Article 2, Questionlet 2, to 4: he says: "That statue can be considered in two ways, either according as it is substance, or according as it is something artificial; and in the genus of substance it is placed by reason of its matter; but in the genus of artificials it is placed according as it is form, which is a certain accident." Thus St. Thomas. Whence because that which pertains to substance, constitutes something in the genus of being simply, therefore sometimes artificials are said to pertain simply to the genus of their matter, not insofar as artificial, but insofar as beings, because being simply is substance; and thus St. Thomas speaks, in 4, distinction 3, question 1, article 1.

Therefore term and oration, and remaining artificials are not the constituted itself from substance and artificial form, because no genus is given conflated from genus of

substance and from genus of accident, for they are diverse genera and predicaments, but things which differ in genus are not conflated into one genus, but according to the notion of artificial genus they are only placed in the genus of their form, which is a certain accident. Just as remaining accidents, whether they are taken in concrete, or in abstract, are always placed in the genus itself of their form, because the essence of accident is the same in concrete and in abstract the notion therefore of concrete, or abstract pertains as if to mode of being, or to state of accident itself; whence the defined of accident ought to be the same in abstract, and in concrete, although not the same state, and same connotation.

But you will say: How therefore did Aristotle, in 7 Metaphysics, text 42, say that matter is genus in these accidents, and specially voice with respect to letters, or syllables; and that such genus is never without species, nor is it distinguished from them. Therefore it is necessary that from difference, or form, and such matter, or genus some one thing be constituted. I respond: The text of the Philosopher ought to be read attentively, who said, sometimes the same thing to be genus and matter, but in diverse mode. The explication of which St. Thomas excellently hands down there, lecture 12; and we teach more broadly, in the cited place of Logic. In sum, what is gathered from his teaching is: That matter, or subject of accident, although it is placed in definitions in place and vice of genus, nevertheless does not have the notion of logical genus according to itself, as if from it and accidental form some one thing is constituted, which is per se definable; since St. Thomas so often denies that one thing results per se, but per accidens from subject and accident; but it is understood that matter, or subject insofar as formed by accidental form, has double consideration, namely as formed by accidental form itself according to common notion of such form; and according to determinate and special notion and such matter, as formed according to common notion, constitutes the notion of genus to it itself as formed according to determinate notion. Just as if we said that in white the notion itself of quale in common is genus to white, which is determinate quale, and for that reason body as quale is genus to body as white. Therefore matter according to itself is never genus, but the common notion itself of form, or matter as formed by common notion of form is said genus to the determinate notion of such form, or to such formation in particular.

To the reason therefore of doubting placed at the beginning I respond: That when accidental form is defined in concrete, the subject itself of form is signified in recto, that is by way of having the form itself; and therefore it is predicated of accidental form itself taken in concrete, not as something which is of the intrinsic notion of form, but as something extrinsic, without which accident in concrete cannot be defined, because accident speaks essential order to subject; and therefore these definitions of accidents in concrete are said to be made from addition, or through addition, in 7 Metaphysics, lecture

4, according to St. Thomas. Nor is the subject itself properly genus of such accident, but in place of genus, or as if physical genus it is placed, as St. Thomas says, 1 On Interpretation, lecture 4. Because since genus is taken from matter, and we often ignore the proper genus of accidents, we place in place of genus the matter from which it is taken, or rather we place the subject itself not absolutely, but as formed by that form of accident according to common grade, and thus it is genus to the same according to particular grade. As if I say: White is body disgregative of sight, it is understood not body absolutely, but body as colored, where the term 'colored' makes for per se definition, the term 'body', for supposition of defined thing, because it does not exist per se, but in another.

But you will still object: For the essence of concrete, for example of white is neither body, nor whiteness, but a third constituted: therefore the same will be of term, that it is neither signification, nor part, but constituted from these, and thus that will be what is defined. The antecedent is proven from Aristotle, in chapter 5 of Categories, where he says: "White is indeed said of body as of subject, but the notion of white is never predicated of body:" Therefore the Philosopher senses the essence of white not to speak body itself essentially, otherwise it would be predicated of it, but something distinct, namely constituted from body as from subject, or substitute. And by the same reason, when many forms are predicated of subject in concrete, as: White is sweet, it is not verified for their constituted things, which are distinct essences, but for substitute, or subject. Whence since in term many formalities concur, as to be significative, to be part of proposition, and to terminate resolution, term will not be any of those formalities, but that which results from them as from substitutes and presupposed, and from ultimate formality, which ultimately constitutes the essence of term. And thus it will indeed be able to be predicated of term that it be part, and that it be extreme of proposition, because these are verified of term for substitute, that is presupposed to the notion of term, but they do not enter definition, because they do not pertain to constituted. Thus the opposite opinion.

I respond: The sense of the Philosopher to be quite perspicuous, namely the notion of white is never predicated of body as notion, or as something essential to body; for he speaks in a very formal sense, the notion of white is not predicated of body as notion, that is as importing essential predication concerning body, or the essence of accident is not intrinsic to subject, since indeed it is accidental predication. But from this it is not permitted to infer that the essence of white, or of any accident in concrete is some third thing constituted from subject and form, since such constituted is not given, except being per accidens, as has been said, and will be said more amply in Logic, questions 5 and 7.

And yet accidental predication is verified of subject; as when I say: Body is white, indeed not by reason of third constituted, or rather aggregated from body and whiteness, for this cannot be predicated of body, because body with respect to this is related as part; nor by reason of subject only, because on the part of predicate namely the term 'white', something is imported beyond substitute, or subject, for accidental entity is imported, which is concretely applied to subject; but the verification of that predication is made by reason of identity of white with body imported on the part of the term 'white' by reason of its connoted. For it connotes subject having, and this is body; for having and body are identified; and thus white as having whiteness is verified of body insofar as having, for thus the term 'having' is identified with body. And thus St. Thomas explains that solution, 1 part, question 13, article 10.

On the mode of speaking in substantial concretes.

But this teaching ought to be observed more amply, and the opposite avoided in substantial concretes, as man and humanity, where some distinguish man for constituted and for substitute, and say man for constituted to be the nature itself human, but for substitute truly the supposition itself having human nature. Whence it is inferred that, just as divine supposition assumed humanity, so it assumed man, taking man for constituted. But nevertheless that inference, which is conceded in this teaching, shows its inconvenience: nor indeed ought we so use voices, that we are compelled to concede propositions in Theology very suspect and badly sounding at least in mode, for in the thing indeed we do not suspect heresy in Catholics. But to say that God assumed man, sounds so badly in Theology, that in the Expurgatory Index of Spain, in the year 1612, and 1632, and 1640, it was expunged in the Library of Ancient Fathers, tome 3, in St. Ignatius's Scholium, chapter 47; and in Ludovicus Vives, book 9, On the City, chapter 17; and in the Index it is held in the Works of St. Augustine, tome 5. For Vives wanted this locution: God assumed man not rightly to be denied by Scholastics, because Fathers sometimes use it. And St. Thomas condemns it, 3 part, question 4, article 3, because man, from mode of signification, says more than nature. But it is necessary in these locutions to attend very much to the customary mode of signifying, and to the use of Church and Wise men; for from variation of mode of signifying, and inordinate words error is incurred. For this proposition: Deity generates, is heretical, and: God generates, catholic; and yet if someone took God, and Deity for the same by reason of constituted, he could deny or affirm either, which would be erroneous. I have said these things, that in this teaching concerning concretes and abstracts, constituted and substitutes we may place mode believing common use rather than our own ingenuity. Concerning these see more broadly Question 5 and 7 of Logic.

But to that which is added in the argument, when many formalities concur to constitute one essence, only the ultimate formality can be predicated essentially, is false. For all superior grades, are as if presupposed to ultimate difference, and yet are predicated essentially of the constituted itself from ultimate difference and such grades: just as it is said that man is animal, and living, and body; and white is colored, and quale, etc., provided they are predicated according to the same mode, that is concrete of concrete, and abstract of abstract. Similarly therefore since to be significative, and to be part pertain essentially to the notion of term, however much presuppositively and substitutively, they will nevertheless be predicated essentially of term itself, because they pertain essentially to it, as generic or superior predicates. Concerning signs, or signification we discourse fully in Logic on the book On Interpretation, from Question 21.

ARTICLE V.
Whether voices signify concepts or things by priority.

We suppose as certain among all, that voices signify concepts both formal and objective (formal are the very cognitions themselves, objective, things or objects known through cognitions), since this is openly established by the Philosopher in 1 On Interpretation, chapter 1. And experience manifestly attests. For when we wish to manifest not only what we conceive, but also that which we conceive, we do this through voices, by which we speak. See St. Thomas, 1 On Interpretation, lecture 2; and question 9, On Power, article 5, where he says: "That voice signifies concept of intellect, by which mediating it signifies thing." Where he openly distinguishes between formal concept and object, and attributes both to voice. And in 4 Against the Gentiles, chapter 2, he says: "That the understood intention is conceived likeness, which exterior voices signify."

Therefore the difficulty can be in two things. First: Whether voices, by the same signification signify concepts and things? Secondly: What they signify more principally, things, or concepts? and the same can be asked concerning writing with respect to voices.

Concerning the first, some hold voices to signify things and concepts by double signification; and they cite for this opinion Master Soto, but undeservedly, since he himself did not say that noun signifies things and concepts by double signification, but that "the signifying itself of noun is taken in two ways," either for moving potency, or for expressing concepts; but nevertheless both functions can belong to the same signification.

THEREFORE I SAY: Voices by one signification signify things and concepts. The foundation is: Because they signify both by the same imposition; therefore by the same signification. And secondly: Because they signify things and concepts not equally immediately, and one separately from the other, but one by means of the other, and as subordinated to the other; therefore the same signification suffices for both. The consequence is clear: Because where there are many subordinated things, they are signified by the same signification; just as the noun man, for example, not only signifies human nature, but also individuals, for which it supposes, by the same signification. But the antecedent is established, both from St. Thomas, 1 part, question 13, article 1; and question 9 On Power, article 5, where he says: "That voices immediately signify conceptions of mind, and by those mediating things." And he has the same in 1 On Interpretation, lecture 2. And also because, if voice by diverse significations signified things and concepts, so that they would not be subordinated among themselves, every noun would be equivocal, and it would not be repugnant to be laid down from one signification of those with the other remaining, and thus it would signify concept and not thing, or conversely, which would be absurd.

But note that concept itself can be signified in two ways. First as in itself it is some thing in signed act, and as knowable by another concept reflexively. And in this way concept is signified by a special name imposed to this, as by this name concept; for it is signified just like other things. In another way concepts are signified as certain interior signs, or media of conceiving things, from which these exterior signs are derived, by which interior ones are manifested; and thus concepts are signified by voices as exercising this function.

But you will object: There is given double imposition for signifying things and concepts; therefore double signification. The consequence is known and the antecedent is proven: Because first men wanted to communicate their concepts in common; then they investigated a mode accommodated to such communication, which was imposition of voices; therefore two acts intervened, and thus two impositions.

And it is confirmed: Because voices signify things themselves as what, and doctrinally, that is as that which is signified in handing down teachings; but concepts truly are not signified, but indicated: whence voices are said to be substituted for concepts, but truly to signify things.

I respond: That argument is too deficient. Both because the same would prove concerning signification of things themselves only; for first men wanted as if in common to signify

things, then they investigated the mode, by which they would signify them by means of imposition of voices. And also, because to will, or intend to do something, and afterwards by choosing the medium by which it is to be done, to execute it, does not induce double effect; because with respect to the same effect there ought to be given intention, and election, and execution; therefore it does not follow that there was double imposition, because by double act they willed by intending and executing.

To the confirmation I respond: That all those things pertain to one signification, because by some order all this is signified; for the same signification of voice has double office, namely to substitute for things, which it manifests, and secondly to substitute for concepts, which occultly and interiorly signify those things themselves: which whole thing is done by one signification, and one imposition, because this sensible sign is imposed to manifest that interior sign, in order to thought things. Just as minister of King by the same ministry and office is substituted for king, as principal, in order to some things to be governed, as to end.

Secondly you will object: Voice cannot signify concept immediately, and thing mediately; therefore it is falsely said that by mediating concept it signifies thing, but it ought to signify it immediately, and thus by diverse signification. The antecedent is proven: First, because concept is not thing signified reflexively, for this is done through this name concept; nor is it formal reason of signifying, because this is imposition; nor is it condition required for signifying on the part of signified thing, because things are not signified as conceived, but as existing in themselves. Secondly, because voices do not signify by medium of concept of hearer, nor of speaker, nor of imposer; therefore by none. Not of hearer, because the hearer himself is not, who declares his concepts, but to whom another's concepts are declared. Not of speaker, because even if no one is speaking, as if voices are formed in air, or by one sleeping, they still signify; and besides the concept of speaker is outside the hearer, therefore it is not medium to him for knowing thing. Not of imposer: Because we do not remember through voice of imposer himself; nor do we know his concept, what kind it was; indeed voice can better represent thing to me, than imposer himself conceived; therefore concept of imposer is not reason of representing.

I respond: I deny the antecedent. To the proof I concede the antecedent. Because not all things are adequately numbered there. And I distinguish the consequent: Therefore voice does not signify thing by mediating concept, as formal reason, or as primary, and immediate signified, I concede the consequent: For formal reason of signifying in voice is imposition, and in concept is likeness. By mediating concept, as principal signifying, of

which voice is substitute, and as if instrument, I deny the consequent. For voice signifies concept, because it is subrogated in place of it, that it may supply that to which concept cannot reach, namely that it manifest exteriorly both to itself and to others. And thus voice is related as if substitute, which represents both its principal, to which it serves (which is word of mind, from which, as St. Thomas says, question 4 On Truth, article 4, to 7, it participates being and signification) and that to which it is ordered, which is signified thing. And thus voices signify concept as principal significative, but things as they signify directly. Which indeed voices represent as conceived specifically and in exercise; or the term 'as' speaking condition, for conceived things are represented, but not the term 'as' taken reduplicatively for state in which they are known. Although also sometimes voices signify things as they are subject to intention, and state, which they have in mind. And then intention itself is as if represented thing, just as in logical intentions species, genus etc.

To the second proof I deny the antecedent. For voices signify from concept of imposer, as from which they receive signification and imposition; but concept of speaker as that for which they are subrogated; for to this they are imposed, that they can be subrogated by any speaker in place of his concept. But when voices are formed by one not speaking, those voices are not speech, but material sound similar to speech; whence they do not signify from imposition, but from custom, which we have when we hear similar voices, because those are similar to voices, which are speech. Whence St. Thomas, 1 Part, Question 51, article 3, to 4, says: "That voice formed by Angel is not properly voice." And granted that these were truly voices, and did not signify concept of speaker, when they are thus formed, it does not follow that when they signify it, they signify concept and things by diverse signification, but by same signification having power of signifying both, but not always exercising both; for we do not always attend to concepts of speaker by discerning them from things. And although concept of speaker is outside hearer according to itself it is nevertheless present to him through voice, through which it is rendered sensible.

Concerning the second point, namely: What voices signify more principally, things, or concepts? It is responded: To signify things more principally, unless perhaps the thing itself signified is concept, or its intention. The reason is: Because concept itself is ordered ultimately and principally to representing thing itself, of which it is intentional likeness; therefore voice, which only is instrument of concept itself in representing, and renders sensible concept itself, will be ordered more principally to representing the same things, because concept serves to this very thing. You will say first: Instrument regards its principal from which it is moved more principally, than effect which it makes; therefore

from that that voice is instrument of concept, it is rather inferred that it principally signifies it, and less principally thing, which it makes intelligible, or knowable.

I respond: I distinguish the antecedent: Instrument considered in notion of operating and acting, I concede; in notion of representing, I deny. Because representative instrument, such as voice is, has for principal principle of its representation concept, which also is representative of thing, to manifesting which representation to others it substitutes voice to itself; and thus the chief signified of both is thing itself. Whence St. Thomas says, Question 9, On Power, article 4: "That that is formally signified by noun to which it is principally imposed, just as the noun man to signifying composite from body and rational soul."

Contrary secondly: Divine Word represents the Father more principally, who is principle expressing Word, than creatures, which are things expressed and represented through it; therefore also exterior word, or voice, will represent its expressing principle more principally, namely concept, than signified and expressed thing.

I respond first: I grant the antecedent and deny the consequent: Because voice is not natural expression of its principle, just as word or concept, but imposed and principally ordered to signifying that which concept naturally represents, namely things; and thus it is not well argued from one to the other.

Secondly I respond: That concept, or word principally represents its principal and formal object, because it is expression of its formal principle, which is impressed species representing object, of which formally it is species; but this in Divine things is Essence and Persons. But creatures are secondary and material object, and therefore are not principally represented by divine Word. But hence it does not follow that exterior word, or voice represents concept more principally, because it is not formal object represented, but principal significative of thing.

ARTICLE VI.
Whether term has some essential division.

Those who assert the essence of term to consist only in the notion of terminating syllogistic resolution, assign two divisions to term: one per se, by which it is divided into prior and posterior term, because only this double resolution is given; another accidental, namely of accident into subjects, by which term is divided into major extreme and minor extreme.

But those who constitute the quidditative and formal notion of term in the notion of part, divide it essentially according to diverse specific notion of part composing oration, or proposition. What truly this division is, is to be inquired afterwards.

THEREFORE I SAY FIRST: Syllogistic term insofar as such, is not divided by essential division through termination of prior or posterior resolution. - The foundation is: Double and opposite essence cannot belong to one and the same thing; but to one and the same simple term it belongs to terminate prior resolution and posterior; therefore these two terminations are not essential differences essentially dividing term. The minor is proven: The same term, for example man, insofar as it founds necessary connection with respect to proper properties, or essential predicates, founds posterior demonstrative resolution; with respect to contingent predicates, it founds topical. But insofar as it regards universality or particularity, affirmation or negation, it founds prior resolution, which is totally founded in Being said of all, and being said of none, whence diverse modes and figures of syllogistic form are terminated. Therefore all these respects can belong to the same term, and thus they do not divide it essentially, but are diverse respects and formalities found in the same.

I SAY SECONDLY: Enunciative term is essentially divided into noun and verb, into categorematic and syncategorematic. But remaining divisions, although they divide term according to diverse notion of sign on the part of signified thing, nevertheless do not divide the essential notion itself of term, as it is part of proposition. The first part of this conclusion is proven: Enunciative term formally consists in the notion of part composing and resolving proposition, as said above; therefore that will per se and essentially divide term, which per se and essentially divides the notion of part. Then further: But in the notion of part categorematic and syncategorematic, and noun and verb differ essentially; therefore division of term into these members is essential and per se division. I prove the minor: Those differ essentially in the notion of part which differ in mode of composing the whole, for the essence of part is to be compositive of whole; but categorematic and syncategorematic, noun and verb differ essentially in mode of composing enunciation; therefore they differ essentially in the notion of part and term. I prove the minor: Categorematic from its proper essence has to be principal part, which signifies something per se, syncategorematic has to be part by way of modifying and signifying in some way, whence St. Thomas said, 1 On Interpretation, lecture 1, "that these syncategoremata are more colligations of parts, than parts": therefore the minor is true as to this part. As to the second, it is established: Because noun composes as extreme, verb as copula and union; but to compose as extreme and as copula from its nature, is to have the notion of part in diverse way, therefore also of term. For specific distinction of parts in the notion of part is

taken according to diverse relations, and according to diverse mode of composing the whole to which they are ordered, as appears in foot, eye, ear, which differ in species in the notion of part, whatever it is whether they also differ in species in the notion of substance. Therefore diverse mode of composing enunciation, which is found in noun and verb makes them differ essentially in the notion of part and term.

The second part of proposed conclusion, that remaining divisions of term are not essential, but accidental, nor do they divide term in the notion of part, but in the notion of sign, is established by running through them. For division of term into mental, vocal and written is according to diverse subjects, and according to diverse mode of signifying. For mental signifies naturally, vocal and written, ad placitum which is related materially to the essence itself of term, which consists in second intention and relation of part. Division into univocal and equivocal, common and singular, connotative and absolute, of first intention or second, is also accidental, because all these divisions are made on the part of diverse signified thing, or diverse mode of signifying, not according to diverse orderability of one sign to another, or to composite whole in the notion of part. Indeed rather they are divisions not of logical sign, that is of sign as it is ordered to fabric and composition of discourse and judgment, and as it is fabricative of logical works, but of grammatical or political sign, that is of sign as it signifies diverse things. Therefore the whole diversity from the part of signifying or signification holds itself. Therefore these divisions do not diversify logical sign or term essentially, because all these terms differ precisely on the part of diverse signified, which is related materially to diverse mode of composing proposition, or syllogism. Just as in human body flesh, bones and nerves differ in the notion of part, because they compose in diverse way; but that this part, nose, or ear is of this figure, or color does not vary the notion of part essentially. Thus logical whole, which is proposition, regards as its principal parts nouns, or extremes from which it is conflated, and by which as if by bones verb leans as union, or nerve, syncategoremata, as colligations and modes. But that they signify univocally, equivocally, commonly, or singularly, is material to the notion of part of proposition.

I SAY LASTLY: Division of term into predicate and subject, and into major and minor extreme, is not essential, but accidental. - It is proven: To be predicate and subject, major or minor extreme can belong to the same term; therefore they are not differences or members essentially dividing the notion of term. The antecedent is established: Any term (besides syncategorema and verb as it exercises function of copula) which can be subject, can be predicate; for the essence of term is found outside proposition, and there term has to be subjectable and predicable; but to be assumed in fact within proposition into predicate and subject, major or minor extreme is something accidental and regarding

actual exercise of term as composing, and able to belong to the same at the will of intellect. Therefore these members do not diversify term essentially.

You will object first, against the second conclusion: Sign is genus of term; therefore terms which differ essentially in the notion of sign, a fortiori differ essentially in the notion of term. The antecedent is established from what was said above: for significative voice ad placitum is constituted in definition of term in place of genus. The consequent is proven: Members which divide some genus essentially, cannot only accidentally divide, or diversify species composed from such genus; but mental and vocal, common, singular etc., divide sign essentially which is genus of term; therefore they cannot only accidentally divide, or diversify term. The minor and consequent are established. The major is clear by example: For if animal, which is genus of man, were divided, or diversified essentially through some members, it would be necessary that the same members would diversify man and horse essentially. Therefore, etc.

I respond: I distinguish the antecedent: Sign is genus of term, if sign is considered absolutely and most universally, I deny the antecedent; if sign is considered as it is subject to logical intention, that is as orderable to works of reason, I concede the antecedent. And similarly I distinguish the consequent: Therefore terms, which differ essentially in the notion of sign according to that notion, by which sign is genus of term, differ in the notion of term, I concede the consequent; according to absolute notion of sign, I deny the consequent. For explanation of which observe beautiful teaching. In artificials whether real, or of reason, matter is said to be genus, or to be placed in place of genus. But matter can be considered in two ways, either according to itself and absolutely, or entering artificial order and line, for example, stone, wood, gold and silver are artificial matter of physical thing, namely of statue, and consequently genus of it. But they are not matter, nor genus absolutely and according to their essential predicates precisely considered, because thus division of statue into wooden, stone, golden (or according to diversity of stones, or woods) would be essential division, which no one will say: for these things are related materially to the notion and diversity of statue. Therefore stone, and wood, etc., are matter and genus of statue as they are subjected to artificial form, and enter artificial line. For natural and artificial things do not pertain to the same genus, and thus species of artificial things do not have for genus matter according to itself and absolutely considered, and as it is something natural, but as it enters such order; whence matter, nor division, or diversity of matter, according to itself considered does not vary artefact essentially.

Thus similarly term is some logical artefact: sign is matter of it, and therefore is placed in place of genus; but it is not matter according to common notion of sign, and absolutely considered but as it is subjected to logical artificial form. Whence, mental, vocal, common, singular etc., do not vary term essentially, nor sign as it is genus of term, but materially, just as gold, stone, wood does not vary statue essentially, nor genus of statue, but materially and accidentally only; and therefore aforesaid terms are distinguished accidentally, just as also golden, wooden, or stone statue.

Secondly it is argued: Propositions are distinguished in species according to diverse signified, or diverse truth, which they signify; therefore also terms. The consequent is proven: Because term is per se ordered to proposition; therefore term which is per se ordered to proposition specifically distinct will be specifically distinct term; therefore finally terms are diversified essentially from signification. It is confirmed: Diverse are definitions of terms; diverse logical intentions are found in them; nor can one term become another, for example, common term cannot become singular; therefore they are distinguished essentially; for these are essential signs of distinction.

I respond: I distinguish the antecedent: Propositions are distinguished in species according to diverse signified etc., in formal notion of proposition and logical artifice, I deny the antecedent; in notion of representation and sign, I concede the antecedent. And the consequent is to be distinguished in the same way. For according to signification propositions and terms are distinguished materially, not formally, or in artificial form. And thus term is not ordered per se, totally and adequately to one only determinate proposition, but to any whatever, which can be made from such term; just as prime matter is ordered to any corruptible form whatever.

To the first part of confirmation I respond by distinguishing: Diverse are definitions of terms by accidental diversity I concede the antecedent; by essential diversity, I deny the antecedent. For aforesaid definitions are descriptive, which only explain that which is accidental to term as such, although this is essential to term as such. For example, man is defined insofar as white that it is disgregating sight; this definition is accidental to man according to himself, but essential to man as white. Thus definition of connotative, common, singular etc., are accidental to term according to itself and in common; but essential to term as connotative and singular etc. For these terms include the notion of term as subject, just as white includes body and snub includes nose, not as genus. In the same way I respond to the second part of confirmation: That intentions of terms are accidental to term, essential to such term. To the third part: I concede the antecedent, and

deny the consequent: For one man cannot become another, and yet it does not follow that they are distinguished in species.

QUESTION II.
ON THE NOUN.

ARTICLE I.
How that clause should be understood: Of which no part signifies separately.

We undertake to explain in the following three articles the definition of the noun set forth above, which is essential in explaining the generic reasons of a logical sign, and the differentials by which it differs from discourse, verb and adverbs, namely: a significative utterance by convention (these clauses have already been explained in the definition of term), without time (this will be explained in the definition of verb), of which no part signifies separately, finite and direct.

Some among recent writers abandon Aristotle in this part, and say that some nouns are truly nouns, even if they have significative parts. Like this noun horse-bearing, republic, proconsul, and others of composite form, in which the parts truly and properly signify separately; therefore that part is false.

The opposite however is expressly from Aristotle, in 1 Perihermenias, Chapter on the noun; where he says: "In the noun which is horse-bearing, the term 'bearing' signifies nothing by itself; just as in the discourse, which is wild horse." The same Saint Doctor asserts there, lecture 4. And he gives the reason, which we thus reduce to form: A noun expresses from itself one and simple concept, for if it expresses several it will not be one but several nouns. Therefore even if a noun is composed of parts otherwise significative, none however should signify separately as it exists within the noun. I prove the consequent: Utterances otherwise significative, when they are assumed to compose one noun, do not enter the composition of that word as composing one signification from their own proper significations, but as receiving another imposition distinct from that by which they were first imposed, so that they have a signification distinct from the first which they have; therefore they do not compose a noun as they are formally significative; therefore they do not signify separately, because they were imposed as conjoined, and as conjoined they received signification; whence even if any one is set aside from its first signification, the conjunction nevertheless always signifies.

For example, the term 'thing' and the term 'public' signified separately and individually a public thing; they are conjoined in this word republic, and as thus conjoined they were

imposed to signify a state, or common government with one simple concept. And thus none signifies separately, nor does a noun result from them separately. For it is one thing to compose for receiving a new imposition, another to fabricate and construct from their significations a complex and composite concept. When they compose for this, they compose as formally significative, but otherwise when they compose for signifying anew some simple understanding, which the individual parts do not signify.

From these things to the argument: The parts of this noun horse-bearing, republic, etc., signify separately: I distinguish: They signify separately quasi materially and accidentally, I concede; formally, I deny. That is, they signify according to themselves taken, but not in order to composing that utterance, to which a new signification of a simple concept is to be imposed. For under this formality they do not compose as significative, and as imposed antecedently to signify, but as newly imposable, materially, and as if the first imposition and signification were not, regarding itself. Just as in this noun lord, the term 'do' and the term 'minus' signify separately, but not insofar as significative separately do they compose that term.

You will object against this: In these utterances, proconsul, proking and similar ones, the signification of each part is attended to so that the signification of the noun results; therefore the antecedent signification formally enters the composition of that one. I prove the antecedent: Proconsul is the same as vice consul, where the signification of the term 'pro' and the term 'consul' is not lost, but rather is attended to so that the office of vice consul is signified; therefore they enter as significative.

I respond from Saint Thomas, where above: I distinguish the antecedent: The signification of each part is attended to as origin and occasion for imposing that conjunction to have another simple signification, distinct from the first, which the parts had, I concede the antecedent; the signification of the part is attended to so that the same is preserved partially within the noun, I deny the antecedent. For which it should be noted, that it is one thing from which a noun is imposed, another what the noun signifies. For imposing nouns, etymology and origin of another prior signification is attended to, which does not concur in composing the signification of the noun, but in originating it, because the imposer from that took occasion for imposing another signification; as stone is said from harming the foot and signifies stone, providence from fore and seeing; prophet as speaking from afar, proconsul originates from pro and consul, republic from thing, and public; they are however diverse impositions, and one is not part of another, but origin, or occasion of that one; and thus the aforesaid nouns have etymology from others, but are not composed from the partial significations of those.

Secondly I argue: A complex noun is truly a noun; and yet it has parts separately significative; therefore that clause is badly posited: Of which no, etc. I prove the major: A complex term is truly a term; therefore a complex noun is truly a noun.

I respond: I deny the major. To the proof, I concede the antecedent, and deny the consequent. The disparity is because in a term formally and principally the nature of a part is considered, but we find composite parts, as an arm is a part of man, composed however from hand, fingers, nerves etc. Therefore a complex term is one term, because it is one part, even if it be composite and complete. But in a noun the nature of a part is not principally and formally attended to, but the nature of noun, that is that it be a notation, and designative of a thing, for thence it is called noun; for we use nouns for designating, making known and discerning things. Therefore a complex noun is not one noun, but several, because it is not one notation and designation, but several; and thus it will be one term, not one noun.

Against this: An equivocal noun is one noun; and yet it signifies several things, as is evident from its definition; therefore although a complex noun signifies several things, it will be a noun, and one noun. I respond: That an equivocal is one noun by reason of one significative utterance, because in concrete accidents the unity of subject gives unity simply and individually, although the forms are several. Just as a subject having color and heat is not several qualified things, but one qualified thing, as is said in Logic, Question 13, Article 2.

ARTICLE II.
Whether an infinite noun is a noun.

We explain here the clause finite, through which we said infinite nouns are excluded from the nature of noun: But an infinite noun is one which, with some negation attached, renders its signification indeterminate. This is to be infinitized. For which note that negation affixed to some term can act upon it in two ways: either by passing into its signification destroying it, and in place of that substituting negation of such a signified thing, which indeed belongs to all subjects capable of such negation; or not changing its signification, but removing composition, or copulation, because the force of that is affixed to the verb as it copulates extremes. When it happens in the first way, it is said to infinitize, that is to make indeterminate the noun itself; when it happens in the second way it is said to negate, and makes a negative proposition. Whence this effect of negating is only exercised within a proposition, since it regards the copula.

Hence it is that for infinitization of a noun it is required that negation not be signified through itself, and from that first imposition itself, but that affecting the noun it renders its signification indeterminate, that is not signifying what the thing is, but what it is not. Whence these nouns no one, nothing are not infinite, because they signify negation itself through itself and directly, under its determinate concept, but do not make indeterminate some positive signification from adjoined negation.

Secondly it should be noted that an infinite noun is incomplex, and connotative. The first is evident from Aristotle, and Saint Thomas, 1 Perihermenias, chapter on the noun, expressly asserting this. And from reason: Because an infinite noun does not leave its significate in that state in which it was but changes it into the opposite, namely into negation of its significate; therefore it does not leave a double significate, namely the positive which it had before, and the adjoined negation (for if it left it, it would not change it; therefore it is not complex, since there is not a double significate there. Whence in this complex: No man, infinitization is not given, because each significate remains unharmed. It should therefore be altogether changed and from double become one, and consequently incomplex. That it is connotative, is evident because an infinite noun does not signify negation in the abstract, but in the concrete; therefore it signifies connotatively, because formally it signifies a negated form, and on the part of that having it the subject of which it is verified in the concrete, which is to be related connotatively. I prove the antecedent: Because an infinite noun is verified of something positive; but it cannot be verified if it signifies negation in the abstract; therefore it should signify it in the concrete, and through the mode of being adjacent. I prove the minor: Because it cannot be verified of a stone, e.g.: Stone is negation of man, but: Stone is not man. Therefore as it is predicated, it should be signified in the concrete and connotatively.

THEREFORE LET THE CONCLUSION BE: An infinite noun is not a noun; and is rightly excluded from the nature of noun through the clause finite. Thus Aristotle and Saint Thomas, here. The first part, that it is not a noun, is commonly admitted by all. And it is proved: Infinitization takes away the proper and essential office of a noun; therefore an infinitized noun is not a noun. I prove the antecedent: The office and proper nature of a noun is to be a notation and designative of a thing, as we said above: for noun is said from noting, because we note, discern and designate each thing by its noun; but an infinite noun neither notes, nor designates, nor names anything; therefore it is not a noun. The minor is evident: Because a noun by the very fact that it is infinitized renders its significate indeterminate, and only signifies what it is not, but not what it is, as is seen in not man, and similar ones.

The second part of the conclusion, namely that it is excluded through the clause finite, and not through another, is against some recent writers, who expunge that as superfluous. However it is express in Saint Thomas, both in work 48, Chapter on the noun; and in 1 Perihermenias lecture 5, where acting concerning an infinite verb (the same however is concerning a noun) he says: "That the Philosopher had first defined verb in common, and afterwards through those clauses excludes those things, which are imperfectly verbs." Therefore the perfect and exact definition of noun and verb requires those clauses; for without them, and to speak to the matter, without that clause finite, the proper function and mode of signifying of a noun is not explained, namely through the mode of notation, or of noting what the thing is, for this is to name.

Nor is an infinite noun excluded through that clause: Of which no part etc.: Because (as we said) an infinite noun does not have parts, but is incomplex. For if it were complex, a proposition from an infinitized subject would be a negative proposition, because that negation would also be carried into the copula, and not only into the subject, since it has its partial signification there, which significatively and formally composes the proposition, and left to its nature destroys everything which it finds after itself; but the consequent is absurd, as is evident in conversion through contraposition, which is made from negative into affirmative, with infinitized terms. Therefore, etc.

Arguments are solved.

You will object first: An infinite noun is truly a term; therefore it is truly a noun. I prove the antecedent: It is an extreme, and part of a proposition, as is evident in this one: Stone is not man; therefore it is a term. I prove the first consequent from Saint Thomas, 1 Perihermenias, lecture 1, saying: That every proposition should consist of noun and verb, because these are its principal parts. Therefore if from verb and infinite noun a proposition is truly made, an infinite noun is truly a noun. I confirm: A verb which is copula in a proposition is truly a verb; therefore a noun which is a copulated extreme, or copulable is truly a noun: for just as it is of the nature of verb that it be copula, so it is of the nature of noun that it be a copulable extreme.

I respond to the argument: I concede the antecedent, and deny the consequent. For in order that it be a term, it suffices that it be a part in some way; but in order that it be a noun it is required that it be a part through the mode of notation, or of noting what the thing is; and an infinite noun does not have this. To the proof from Saint Thomas I respond, explaining that proposition: Every proposition should consist of noun etc.: That through itself and from intrinsic, or from accommodation and accidentally it puts on the

state or property of noun, I concede; that through itself and rigorously it is a noun, I deny. For many things are posited in a proposition as extremes (thus Saint Thomas, in the present lecture 5, and Work 48, chapter on verb) not because they are nouns, but because they are placed in place of noun, or are held in the force of noun; as if you say: To run is to be moved, yesterday is not today, quickly is not slowly. For these from accommodation of the understanding receive some acceptance of noun not from property of signification, but only accidentally, and thus they construct a proposition. The same is said of an infinitized noun.

To the confirmation I respond: I concede the antecedent and deny the consequent. The disparity is because, in order that it be a verb, nothing else is required except that it signify copulating, or through the mode of copula: for this is the proper office and function of verb, whence if it has that, it is truly a verb. But a noun not only says to be a copulable extreme, but through the mode of notation, or of noting, which an infinite noun does not have, and therefore it is not a noun.

Secondly it is argued: An infinite noun signifies something certain and determinate on the part of its formal significate, although on the part of the material and connotated it signifies indeterminately; therefore it is truly a noun. The consequent is evident, because each thing, in order that it be such or such, or be said, should be judged from the reason of its formal, which is principal and specificative in it, not by reason of its material, or connotated. I prove the antecedent: Because not man, for example, signifies a determinate negation, namely of man, and not of horse; just as blind signifies negation of sight, and not of hearing. Therefore just as blind is truly and properly a noun, so not man and remaining infinite nouns.

I confirm: Intelligible and imaginable signify something indeterminate, just like not man: for they are said both of that which is, and of that which is not; both of real being, and of reason, and yet they are truly nouns; therefore from the fact that an infinite noun signifies something indeterminate, it should not be excluded from the nature of noun. I confirm secondly: Transcendental nouns, or supertranscendental can be infinitized, just like others through apposition of negation; and yet thus infinitized they are truly nouns. I prove: Not being, for example, thus infinitized, either signifies something, or nothing. If it signifies nothing, therefore it does not signify, therefore it is neither term nor noun, but through apposed negation falls from its signification. If it signifies something, therefore it signifies being, and thus not being signifies being, which is contradictory.

To the argument I respond: I distinguish the antecedent: An infinite noun signifies something certain and determinate on the part of the thing signified, let the antecedent pass; from the mode of signifying, I deny the antecedent, and deny the consequent. Because in order that it be a noun it does not suffice, nor is it required that it signify a certain and determinate thing, but in a certain, determinate, designative, certificative mode, and through the mode of notation. To the proof: Not man signifies a determinate negation, I distinguish: on the part of the thing signified, let it pass; in a determinate mode, as if noting, and designating, I deny. For which note: That to signify something determinate stands in two ways: either on the part of the thing signified, this is to signify a determinate thing; or from the mode of signifying, that is in a mode designating what that is which it signifies. In order that something be a noun it is not required that it signify in the first mode something determinate, for however much something is indifferent and common, even negation itself, intelligible, imaginable, being, if it is signified in a designative and notative mode, that is saying what the thing is, or how it is, it will be a true noun which thus signifies. But if it signifies a determinate thing in an indeterminate mode however, and not designating or noting what it is, but rather what it is not, it will not be a noun, because it does not have the function and office of noun, which is to name, or designate; for by naming we distinguish and designate one from another. And something is not judged to be a noun only by reason of the thing signified, but also by reason of the mode, which mode holds itself on the part of the formal significate, and distinguishes verb from noun; for verb signifies in one mode, noun in another, although they signify the same thing like I run and running.

Hence it is evident to the proofs and confirmations. For blind, even if it signifies negation of sight, signifies as if noting and designating what it is, but not what it is not in form, as not man, intelligible, imaginable, etc., the most indeterminate things, but in a determinate mode. To the last proof I respond, denying the minor. To the proof: Not being either signifies something, or nothing, I say: to signify negation of being not in a determinate and designative mode, saying what negation of being is, but what it is not. Therefore not being signifies something, I distinguish: Insofar as it is signified through that infinitized noun not being, I deny; for thus it precisely signifies negation of being in an indeterminate mode. Insofar as through reflexive cognition that negation of being can be known in the mode of being, and become a being of reason, let it pass, because then it will signify being, or something of reason, not through that noun not being, but through another which signifies that reflexive concept of not being in the mode of being, for example, negation of reason, or being of reason.

Lastly I argue: An infinite noun has parts significative separately; therefore it remains excluded from the nature of noun through that clause: Of which no part etc., but is not excluded through finite. I prove the antecedent: Not man consists of not and man, but the term 'not' does not compose an infinite noun materially, but significatively and according to its ultimate concept; therefore mediating a diverse concept from that which it infinitizes, and consequently an infinite noun is subordinated to a double concept, and is complex. I prove the minor: The infinitization of this utterance not man does not come from the material sound of that utterance not, but from its most formal signification, for if the term 'not' signifies, it takes away or negates nothing, therefore it infinitizes by signifying and not only by materially composing.

I respond, just as was said above about republic, proconsul etc.: That in an infinite noun, just as in nouns of composite form, both there is derivation of one noun from another, and there is composition. If we attend to derivation, it is certain that from the signification of the term 'not' the significative of the term 'not man' was derived. If we attend to composition, the term 'not' and the term 'man' relate themselves materially in this utterance not man; and yet infinitization, by which positive signification of the noun is impeded, originates and is made from the signification of the term 'not', and of the term 'man' derivatively and efficiently, not compositively and formally. Therefore another new imposition and signification is given, according to which an infinite noun is subordinated to one concept and signifies negation of man in the concrete, because from poverty of nouns we do not have simple utterances to signify it; thus in infinitization, the term 'not' is not negation in some way, but negation changing and impeding signification of the noun.

ARTICLE III.
Whether oblique cases are rightly excluded from the nature of noun.

Explaining the definition of noun we said the clause direct is posited to exclude oblique cases. For that these are not nouns is evident from Aristotle, 1 Perihermenias, chapter on noun and verb. Because the proper nature and office of noun is to signify directly and through itself by naming; but oblique cases do not thus signify; therefore they are not nouns. The major is evident from the etymology of noun. I prove the minor: Because to signify something by naming, is to signify something as if noting, and designating what it is in itself; but cases whose, or to whom signify a thing as it is of another, not through itself and in itself; therefore they are not nouns: but rather they are called cases, because they fall from the proper nature of noun. Whence both Aristotle, and Saint Thomas, there Lecture 4, assert that oblique cases do not suffice through themselves alone to constitute

true or false with the verb is, just like the nominative. If therefore an oblique case is not a noun, the clause direct is fittingly posited, so that through it it is excluded from the nature of noun.

But you will ask why Aristotle first defined noun without those clauses finite and direct, and afterwards added them to exclude infinite nouns, and oblique ones? Saint Thomas responds, lecture 5, that Aristotle only first handed down the common natures of noun and verb, as if beginning to define through more common things; but afterwards he consummated more by expressing, what things are required for the nature of noun simply.

You ask secondly: Whether oblique and direct have in the intellect concepts of the same nature and species? We will briefly dispatch this doubt, because its broad explanation pertains to Metaphysics. We will find two sayings of Saint Thomas in this part. The first is had in 1 Perihermenias, lecture 4, at the end, where he says from the Philosopher, that "the nature, which the noun signifies, is the same even in the cases of the noun." This is, that direct and oblique, on the part of the thing signified, signify the same, and have the same concept quasi categorematically and logically; that is that if direct is an absolute connotative, common etc. term, so also oblique; for these are differences quasi categorematic and logical.

The second is had, Quodlibet 4, article 17, where Saint Doctor says that with diversity of utterance there can be diversity of concepts "either on account of diversity of the thing understood, or on account of diversity of the mode of understanding. And this happens whenever there is diversity of consignification, which follows upon diverse mode of understanding one and the same thing. And especially this appears in time, which is mixed through itself with the operation of human intellect, and therefore it should be said that it is not the same enunciable that Socrates sits, and that Socrates sat." Where Saint Doctor openly admits that diversification of time in verb demands diverse concepts. But it is evident that oblique cases of verb are made according to diverse declension of time, as Aristotle says, chapter on verb, and there Saint Thomas, lecture 5. Who asserts the same of oblique cases of noun, in the cited Quodlibet, to 3, saying: "That diversity of signification takes away identity of noun, so much so that obliques according to the Philosopher are not nouns."

Therefore according to Saint Thomas oblique cases have a diverse concept from the direct, not by reason of a diverse thing conceived, but of a diverse mode of conceiving the same thing. For in oblique some respect and relation of possession is expressed, whose, to whom, etc. which is not explained in direct. But where diverse relation and

respect is expressed in concept, there is diverse concept, and diverse representation, because that respect pertains to diverse mode of signifying and understanding one and the same thing. Therefore although on the part of the thing signified the concept is not varied, it is varied however in the nature and office of noun, obliquing from the mode of signifying because in the mode of whose, etc. And therefore Saint Doctor says: "that identity of noun is taken away", in nature namely and mode of naming. Which is seen more manifestly in cases of verb, because they are varied according to signification of diverse time of past, or future, which without doubt demand diverse representation.

It is argued first: To be predicate and subject, to have this or that supposition, to be changed from true into false, that concept, or knowledge be abstractive or intuitive, do not make essential diversity in concept, nor do they add diverse representation, but only diverse exercise. Therefore similarly oblique cases will only be distinguished from direct according to diverse exercise of the same representation, but will not add diverse representation.

I respond: I concede the antecedent, and deny the consequent. The disparity is, because some modes relate themselves only as application of concept, others however relate themselves as explication of concept. Those do not arise from diverse mode of understanding or representing the thing, but from application and use of intellect; insofar as understanding the relation of one to another it applies and conjoins one to another in diverse mode. And of this kind is the relation of predicate and subject, diversity of supposition, etc. Similarly truth and falsity is born from the fact that the thing is, or is not; whence the thing existing, truth arises in discourse, it not existing, falsity arises, the discourse remaining unchanged, as Aristotle said, Chapter on substance; because it is not necessary that representation be varied, but existence of object, so that diverse relation of conformity, or diversity to that results. In the same mode from coexistence of object with knowledge it becomes intuitive or abstractive, without new representation (in a probable opinion). And thus those modes cited in the argument, are application of concept only, and therefore do not vary it in representation. But the mode of obliquity, which future or past imports in verb, what, whose, to whom, in noun, pertain to diverse mode of understanding one and the same thing, as Saint Doctor says, in the cited Quodlibet. For something is understood in direct as person, or thing acting, in oblique, as suffering, or as connoting to be of another, which are diverse modifications of representation, and of represented object, arisen from diverse mode of understanding that. For the relation of person acting, possessing, or suffering, from whom, or to whom, is not signified as thing, but as mode of thing, which is signified now as from whom, now as to whom, etc. And

thus under that diverse mode of explicating concept is produced. Whence it is not application only, but explication and diverse representation.

It is argued secondly: Oblique cases vary the intrinsic representation of concept; therefore they differ categorematically from direct, which is against the first saying of Saint Thomas. I prove the consequent: Categorematic distinction and in the nature of term is had according to diverse mode of expressing one and the same thing. As I run and running signify the same: because however one through the mode of flowing, another through the mode of noun, or of standing through itself, one is noun, and another verb. And the same is to see in finite nouns; because they differ categorematically from infinite ones. I confirm: White and whiteness differ categorematically according to absolute and connotative; because although they signify the same, they differ however on the part of the connotated, or substituted; therefore the term 'whose' and the term 'what' will make categorematic diversity a fortiori.

I respond: I deny the consequent. To the proof I distinguish the antecedent: Categorematic distinction is had according to diverse mode of expressing the same thing, so that there is diversity only on the part of signification, I deny the antecedent. So that there is diversity on the part of signification and of the thing signified, I concede the antecedent. But obliques retain the same thing signified, and only make oblique the mode and relation of understanding that, and therefore do not differ categorematically. But infinite nouns transfer the noun into another thing signified, namely into negation of its positive, and thus differ categorematically on the part of the thing signified. To the confirmation I respond: I concede the antecedent, and deny the consequent. For absolute and connotative, common and singular are diversified according to mode of signifying attributed to the thing itself, which modifies the thing itself signified in itself; as absolute thing from connotation, or with it; through mode of being adjacent, or of standing through itself, imports diversity of thing in some mode. But oblique cases only express diverse mode of consignification pertaining to some deficiency of the noun itself as it is noun, insofar as noun signifies the thing in such mode that it notes, or designates what that thing is, but oblique what it is of someone, or to someone, which is to vary the mode of consignifying the thing in the nature of noun, which pertains to mode of consignification, not to mode affecting the thing in itself categorematically: for such mode can also be designated through the mode of nominative, and not only in oblique, as is evident in examples of common, connotative, absolute, etc.

QUESTION III.
ON THE VERB.

ARTICLE I.
What it is to signify with time, and to be absolved from time.

In the definition of verb it only remains to explain what it is to signify with time, and to abstract from time, because all other clauses have been explained in the definition of noun.

THEREFORE I SAY FIRST: That not only adjective verb, but also substantive has a diverse concept from extremes. Concerning adjective all concede. Concerning substantive some recent writers deny, saying that verb only explicates agreement of its extremes, and expresses in enunciations connection not having a peculiar concept, and distinct from extremes. However Saint Thomas holds the contrary, 1 Perihermenias, lecture 5, saying: That therefore Aristotle said verb is to consignify composition, because it does not principally signify it, but consequently: for it signifies that which first falls into intellect through the mode of actuality absolutely, for the term 'is' simply said signifies to actually be. Because however the actuality, which verb principally signifies is, is actuality of every form either substantial, or accidental, thence it is that, when we wish to signify any form to be in a subject, we signify that through the verb is; and thus consequently it signifies composition. Likewise, in 1, Distinction 8, Question 2, article 3, to 2, he says: "That the term 'was', and the term 'will be' signify essence through the mode of act, and signify time." Therefore Saint Doctor attributes proper concept to the verb is, but union consequently, and pertaining to the mode of signifying of verb, not to the thing signified. For it does not stand that the participle of the term 'is', namely being, has proper concept, by which it signifies entityness as such, and the verb is from which that is derived does not have proper concept.

I SAY SECONDLY, from Saint Thomas, 2 Perihermenias, lecture 4: That it is to signify time as thing signified, and this is done through the noun time, day, year, month. And it is to signify relation of one time to another, and this is done through these and similar adverbs, yesterday, today, tomorrow etc. And it is to connote time, that is to signify some thing with determination of some time in which it happens; as lunch signifies midday eating, connoting the time in which it happens, dinner, evening eating etc. And finally it is to signify with time, which is proper to verb, that is to signify action, or passion as in becoming, or through the mode of flux and motion. For since motion, and action are measured by time, as is said in Physics, and motion is the reason by which other things

are measured by time: for time is, as is said there, number of motion etc. (for substance according to itself, and from the mode of substance, is not measurable by time, but only insofar as it is subject to motion and change); thence it is that verb is said to signify with time, because it signifies through the mode of motion and flux, or which is the same, action and passion as in becoming, but noun without time, because it signifies in the mode of substance and of standing through itself or of noting. And there is no noun which signifies motion, action, or passion as in becoming; as is seen in I run and running, for they signify the same running, but I run, as in becoming and being exercised, running as if in having been done and through the mode of substance.

But to abstract, or to be absolved from time, is nothing other than that verb so unites extremes that it does not restrict them to stand for difference of time which it imports. As is evident in propositions of eternal truth, as: Man is animal, and similar ones. In which even if verb signifies with time, for this is so intrinsic and essential to verb, that it can never be absolved from it, or dispensed, because this belongs to it from the force of proper signification, as it is distinguished from noun; nevertheless it does not unite extremes dependently on time, and thus before all time it was true to say: Man is animal. And therefore these and similar propositions are called of eternal truth; not because they have positive eternity and duration, but because they do not depend on time, nor are founded in it, or changed through it, if they are necessary. "For truth perishing, Augustine said, truth does not perish." Therefore for verb to be absolved from time, is to signify truth not depending on time; for if truth signified through verb does not depend on time, neither will union of extremes depend on time; therefore verb insofar as it unites extremes does not depend on time, which is to be absolved from it as to the exercise of uniting, or copulating extremes, which have intrinsic connection, not contingent and temporal, or depending on time. Nevertheless it always signifies with time, because it should signify through the mode of action, flux, or motion, even in propositions of eternal truth; because those things which are eternal and independent of time, are understood by us through the mode of time and thus also when union, or copulation of verb is absolved or does not depend on time on the part of extremes upon which it falls, it is still understood by us in the mode of time, and therefore it signifies with time, as to the mode of signifying, although it is absolved from time as to the union and relation of extremes.

Objections are solved.

First I object: Many verbs do not signify through the mode of motion and flux; therefore they do not signify with time. I prove the antecedent: The verb is does not signify action, but being, just like being itself, which is its participle; I have, I possess, I rest and similar

ones do not signify some motion, or action but the opposite of action and motion; therefore they do not signify with time.

I respond from what was said: I distinguish the antecedent: The verb is, I have, I possess etc. do not signify action, or motion on the part of the thing signified, I concede the antecedent; from the mode of signifying, I deny the antecedent. For in order that it be verified of verb that it signifies with time, it is not required that the thing signified through verb be action, motion, passion, or becoming, but that it signify through the mode of motion, or time, this is through the mode of passing, and according to relation of present, past or future. Whence the verb is, and others numbered in the argument, signifies the act of being, and its significates, as it is subject to presence, and passes to past, and thus with time from the mode of signifying.

Secondly I object, to prove that verb is not absolved from time: Verb signifies the copula itself and union of extremes; but signification of verb never changes; therefore neither does the union which verb makes; therefore either union always depends on time, and thus is not absolved, or signification of verb changes. I confirm first: Verb always from the force of its signification unites mediating some difference of time, either of present, or of past etc.; therefore it restricts extremes to stand, and be verified according to difference of time which it imports, since according to requirement of that they are united; therefore it is never absolved from time. I confirm secondly: If verb is absolved from time all affirmative propositions will be false, in which verb is absolved from time. I prove the sequent: They will be of subject not suppositing; but an affirmative proposition of subject not suppositing is false; therefore. I prove the major: Supposition should be verified in order to copula; as if you say: Man is animal, it should be verified of man, saying: This is man, with man demonstrated. But if it abstracts from time it cannot be demonstrated that this is man, as is evident before man is created; therefore supposition is not verified.

I respond to the argument: I distinguish the major: Verb signifies copula and union of extremes immediately, principally and directly, I deny the major. Consequently, I concede the major. But signification of verb does not change, I concede the minor. Therefore neither union, I deny the consequent. Because union, or composition cannot be understood without extremes united and composing; but it depends on them as to the exercise of uniting, and thus according to connection of extremes union results depending on time, or absolved from time according as extremes depend on time, or do not depend. To the first confirmation I distinguish the antecedent: Verb always unites mediating some difference of time on the part of the mode of signifying, I concede the antecedent. On the

part of the thing signified, of the thing united, or of union consequent in extremes, I deny the antecedent. Therefore it restricts extremes etc., I deny the consequent. Because rather union is drawn to the mode of extremes, which it unites; and if these do not depend on time, union cannot restrict them, nor unite dependently on time, although it signifies, and unites from the mode of signifying in order to some difference of time, because it cannot not signify with time.

To the second confirmation I respond, denying the sequent and proof up to the major. Which I distinguish thus: It should be verified saying: This is man, with man demonstrated as to intellect, I concede the major; with man demonstrated to sense, or existing in time, I deny the major. For that supposition is natural, and verification of such supposition is not made by demonstrating subject existing in time, but essence of man, when I say: This is man, insofar as it can be found in all individuals.

You ask: Whether the verb was, and will be, which are oblique cases of the verb is, depend on time, as duration of God and angel. But past on the part of the thing signified essentially imports transition itself, and succession of time, whence union consequent from that is always depending on time. And this does not happen because the verb is has diverse significations, or is equivocal, but because was and will be fall from signification of present verb. And there are many other verbs like to exist, to be moved etc., which cannot be absolved from time.

A second solution affirms that was and will be can be absolved from time (concerning which Saint Thomas, 1, distinction 8, Question 2, article 3), if indeed they are attributed to God, as when it is said that God was from the beginning; The Word was with God; God will be forever etc. And then it should be said that that proposition: Adam was man, was true before Adam was created, taking the term 'was' not for that which is to have existed, but for that which is those two extremes to have been connected.

ARTICLE II.
Whether verb can be infinitized within proposition.

We do not speak of verb, when it is held in the force of noun, as when I say: To run is not to rest; for then it can be infinitized just like other nouns; but of verb when it exercises the nature of copula. And the difficulty consists in this: Whether negation can be so subtly affixed to verb within proposition that it infinitizes its signification, and does not effect the exercise of copulating, which is proper to verb within proposition. For if negation affects verb as it copulates, the proposition will be negative, and the verb

negated, not infinitized, because negation, when it infinitizes, consumes all its force within the term to which it is affixed, so that it does not pass to another term, as when I say: Not man is not rational, where the first negation does not pass beyond its term, otherwise it would negate the verb, and it would not be an affirmative proposition. If therefore negation affects verb both as to signification, and as to copula, it renders it negated, not infinitized; and thus the doubt consists in this that we see whether it can affect signification of verb, and not copulation, or exercise of uniting.

THE CONCLUSION IS: Verb cannot be infinitized within proposition, but with negation apposed it is negated; but well outside proposition. Thus Saint Thomas expressly, 2 Perihermenias, lecture 1, saying: "Negation affecting verb within proposition removes verb from something, and thus makes negative enunciation. Which does not happen on the part of noun; for enunciation is not rendered negative except through this that composition is negated, which is imported in verb, and therefore infinite verb posited in enunciation becomes negative verb." What more express?

I prove by reason: Verb within proposition has the nature of copula and exercises the function of uniting; therefore negation affecting verb within proposition negates it and does not infinitize. I prove the consequent: Negation affecting union destroys it, and renders the proposition negative (for proposition to be negative is nothing other, than that extremes are removed from each other, and their union, which verb exercises, is dissolved and destroyed through apposition of negation). Therefore by the very fact that negation affects verb within proposition, within which it exercises the function of uniting, it negates it and does not infinitize. You will say that negation affects signification of verb, not the function of uniting, or nature of copula, and thus infinitizes, does not negate. Against this: Either negation affects verb as to signification only, and not as to the function of uniting; or it affects verb as to both. If the second, verb is negated and the whole proposition is rendered negative, because it destroys the function of uniting, and extremes are removed. The first cannot happen, because negation affecting signification of verb cannot leave union affirmed, but it is necessary that it also invade that, and destroy. I prove: Give me an infinite verb, does not that infinitization render the significate of verb into its opposite negated and removed? For this is to be infinitized. Therefore from the force of such infinitization copula cannot be reserved affirmed. The consequent is evident: Because negation should be signified as removing and making indeterminate positive form; therefore however it is applied to verb, it signifies by removing. Therefore the reason of Saint Thomas remains firm, that because in proposition "negation removes verb from something, it makes negative enunciation", and thus verb cannot be infinitized.

But to say that negation will infinitize verb as to signification, and will negate as to the nature of copula, implies contradiction, because then the same negation would hold itself negatively and infinitively: in which there is manifest repugnance; because as infinitizing it makes one simple and incomplex concept with the infinitized term, as negating it should have distinct and complex concept with the negated thing (as was said above), but one negation cannot simultaneously pertain to complex and incomplex concept with respect to the same thing.

The second part of the conclusion: That outside proposition verb can be infinitized, is evident from what was said, since outside proposition it is not held in the force of copulating. Which Saint Doctor also teaches, 1 Perihermenias, Lecture 5, § He excludes certain things.

Objections are solved.

First I object: An infinitized verb still within proposition signifies with time; therefore it signifies by uniting: The antecedent is from Aristotle, Chapter on verb. And I prove: Because such verb is declinable through past and future. I prove the consequent: Verb has that it be union from the fact that it signifies with time, therefore where it signifies with time it signifies by uniting. The antecedent is evident: Because there is no clause in the definition of verb, which explains verb to be union, except to signify with time; for since this is to signify through the mode of action, flux, or motion, and action or motion as if rests on two terms, from which and to which, verb thus signifying is indicated to rest on two extremes, and to be their copula.

I confirm: This is a good consequence: Peter has not to run, therefore Peter does not run; therefore in the consequent the term 'does not run' is infinitized. I prove the consequent: If it is not infinitized, but negated, it is a bad consequence, because it argues in it from not distributed to distributed. And it is instanced by the case in which Peter runs, and disputes; for then the antecedent is true, namely: He has not to run, that is, to dispute, but the consequent Therefore he does not run, is false, taking the term 'not' negatively, because its contradictory is true: Peter runs. Therefore it should be taken infinitively in the consequent.

I respond to the argument: I distinguish the antecedent: Verb signifies with time etc. By removing and taking away form, which it renders negated and indeterminate, I concede. By positing some determinate form, I deny. Therefore it signifies by uniting, I distinguish: by uniting positively, I deny; remotively, I concede. And thus it makes a

negative proposition, because, in order that it be affirmative, it is required that it unite determinately, and apply something, but not by removing take away the significate of verb, because thus it will also remove from subject, if it is applied to it, which is to negate, not infinitize. And thus Aristotle is explained, when he said: "Infinite verb consignifies time, and is always of something" that is, as Saint Doctor explains there, "it is a note of those things which are predicated", that it signifies time, and is a note, not by applying, and uniting, but by making indeterminate and removing, and within proposition only by negating. To the confirmation, I respond: That that consequence is bad, and nothing is inferred against us thence. But if the term 'not to run' is taken in the antecedent negatively, the consequence is good, but proves nothing, because verb is not infinitized.

I object secondly: Aristotle made this consequence, 1 Posterior Analytics, Lecture 23, at Saint Thomas: "Stars not twinkling are near to us; planets do not twinkle; therefore they are near to us." But the minor cannot be of negated verb; therefore it is of infinitized verb. I prove the minor: If it were of negated verb, it would be a negative minor, and consequently would infer a negative conclusion, not affirmative.

I respond: Aristotle did not thus form that syllogism, but as Saint Thomas says there, when he says: "Let the syllogism therefore be formed thus: Everything not twinkling is near, planets are not twinkling, therefore they are near", where in each premise not to twinkle is taken infinitively. And even if Aristotle had said: Planets do not twinkle, it should be understood equivalently, that is they are stars which do not twinkle, or they are not twinkling.

Lastly it argues: An oblique verb also within proposition has the nature of verb; therefore also infinite verb. I respond: The reason is disparate, as Saint Thomas says, 2 Perihermenias lecture 4, because oblique verb can copulate extremes in proposition at least of past and future, because it only falls from verb as to signification of present time, but not as to indetermination of action, or nature of copula; for no verb of time besides verb of present time of indicative signifies action as in becoming, but as to be done of future, or already done of past, and therefore they are said to fall from proper nature of verb, which consists in signifying action, or motion as in becoming. But infinite through infinitization loses, or has impeded positive and determinate copulation, which is founded in signification of determinate action, as was said. But infinite verb can in the force of noun as predicate and subject compose proposition, but not by copulating positively. And when it is taken in the force of noun it does not change signification by not signifying with time, but changes acceptance, because it is accepted as predicate, or subject, which is also required in verb not infinitized, as when I say: To run is to be moved.

QUESTION IV.
ON DISCOURSE AND THE MODE OF KNOWING.

ARTICLE I.
Whether the definition of discourse is good, and what is its definite.

Not everyone accepts Aristotle's definition, but they reject it, from the fact that it seems to coincide with a complex term, which also has parts significative separately. Whence they define discourse otherwise, saying that "discourse is several words, or terms fittingly related to each other", as if this also is not found in a complex term. Others define discourse thus: "Discourse is a significative utterance by convention consisting of noun and verb mutually agreeing, or at least verb and utterance, if it is not significative." Others finally admit Aristotle's definition, but say the form of discourse is the grammatical union itself of parts.

FIRST CONCLUSION: The definition of discourse handed down by Aristotle is excellent, namely: Discourse is a significative utterance by convention, of which the separate parts signify as word, not as affirmation and negation; and in the same mode essential and quidditative, just like the definition of term, or noun. This is a common assertion, of which there is no other proof, than explanation of the definition itself. Saint Thomas hands this down, 1 Perihermenias, lecture 6. Which we reduce to form thus: A whole in common is best defined through this that it is that which has parts, or is composed from parts; therefore such a whole in particular will be best defined through this that it is what has such parts, or is composed from such parts. But discourse is a certain significative logical whole, or a certain total composite; therefore it is best defined through this that it is a significative utterance by convention of which the separate parts etc. The consequent is evident, because through this definition everything that essentially belongs to this composite, which is discourse, is explained, whatever the parts from which it is composed should have, and that in which it differs from others from the defined. I prove the minor: Discourse pertains to the second operation of intellect, which is composition, because through discourse we explain something conjoined and composed with another, just as through term something separately and simply uttered. Therefore discourse, which is a certain logical and significative whole, is best defined through this that it is of which the separate parts signify as word.

And Saint Thomas noted that Aristotle did not say of which parts signify something, but signify absolutely, on account of negations and syncategorematic terms, which do not signify something, but in some way and yet are parts of discourse, in which it is

necessary that at least some part signify something, that is be noun, or verb, although others signify in some way. Likewise he said: as word, not as affirmation. Because parts of discourse at least should signify as word, for this at minimum should be found in any discourse; if however it also has parts as affirmation, it will be better, as in hypothetical. Besides the fact that the nature of part through itself is only found in word, or term; but proposition even if it composes hypothetical is not part through itself firstly, but accidentally, as we said above.

From what was said it is inferred that other definitions are not good, nor should Aristotle be abandoned on account of them. For discourse to be several words fittingly related to each other, besides the fact that this also belongs to complex term, does not well explain its essence, which is situated in this that it is a certain composite and total conjoined whole; but a composite thing is not aptly defined saying that it is several parts, but that it is something one composed from parts. It also pleases less that discourse is utterance consisting of noun and verb. For many even of perfect discourses do not consist of noun, as: To run is to be moved. Indeed discourse can consist of verb and adverb, as: It is run quickly; it is well. Also imperfect discourse is given (which is truly discourse, although it generates imperfect sense) without verb, as: Just man, which Saint Thomas, 1 Perihermenias, lecture 4, asserts to be discourse. Therefore it is not of the essence of discourse in common, that it consist of noun and verb.

SECOND CONCLUSION: The essential form of discourse is not grammatical union of parts, but of predicates, if we speak of partial form, or the complex and composite signification itself, as it puts on intention of whole, if we speak of total formal. I prove the first part: Because union is conjunction and application of unitable things, for through union form is applied to its matter, or subject. Therefore union, insofar as union, is not constitutive form of composite, but medium or copula of extremes; therefore it supposes constituting extremes, of which that which is form is applied through union, so that it constitutes; just as in man union is not constituting form, but application of soul, which is constituting form. Therefore as in physical whole partial form is given, which is soul with respect to body; and total form is given, which is humanity with respect to supposit; so in discourse partial form is predicate, or what is posited in place of predicate with respect to subject (or rather because, as Saint Thomas says, 1 Perihermenias, lecture 8, in discourse one part should determine another, that which determines is form; and if they determine each other mutually, they are mutually forms, form as it determines, matter as it is determined; just as in contract of Marriage it is customary to say that words of contracting parties are mutually form and matter), but total form is signification of total and complex discourse, as it puts on respect and intention of whole and thus as if

relatively opposes term, which is part; just as this one has its essence in the nature of part, discourse has its essence in complex signification through the mode of whole.

Concerning the definite of discourse it should be said to be form of discourse in the concrete, conformably to those things which were said above about definition of term, and always to be said about the definite of any accidental concrete.

Objections are solved.

First I object: Complex term also belongs to have significative parts, as word etc.; therefore the whole definition of discourse belongs to complex term; therefore it is not good. The antecedent is evident from definition of term.

I respond: I distinguish the antecedent: it belongs to complex term to have parts formally, I deny the antecedent; materially, I concede the antecedent. That is called part formally which composes under the formality of part, but formality of part is in order to whole which it regards and which it composes by resting in it, so that it is not ordered to another further. But when parts so compose something, that they do not rest in that, but are further ordered to whole, then that is said to have parts materially and not under formality of part. Therefore parts can be conjoined in some one thing in two ways; in one way such that their composition terminates and rests in that, as in a certain whole; in another way so that they compose that not by resting in it, but by ordering further to whole, which that composite part also regards. You have example in arm, or foot; for these parts are ordered to composing animal, which is whole, and there their union terminates and rests. And animal is said to be composed from parts formally, or under formality of part, that is from parts regarding it as whole which they compose and in which they rest. But flesh, nerves and bones, from which arm is composed, are parts materially, because they do not compose arm as a certain whole in which they rest, but as a more principal and composite part (for in wholes both simple parts, and parts composed from other parts are given), which is ordered to composing animal itself. And yet if arm, or another organic part is separated from animal and becomes a certain whole, its parts will be ordered to it in the nature of part formally, that is under formality and relation of part to whole.

Therefore discourse, or proposition is a certain whole consisting of parts. But parts of this whole some are simple, like incomplex terms, others are composite, like complex, which is as if arm of discourse, or composite part not whole, even if it has parts, because those parts are so united in complex term, that through it they are ordered to composing some further whole namely discourse. But the same complex white man, if it is separated, and

taken through the mode of whole (as arm separated from animal), becomes imperfect discourse, but as it is in discourse it is composite part. Whence imperfect discourse and complex term coincide materially, they differ however formally, because complex is always part, even if composed from parts, but discourse even imperfect is always whole.

Against this: Imperfect discourse also as discourse is part; therefore the whole solution falls. I prove the antecedent first, from Saint Thomas, 1 Perihermenias, lecture 9, saying that "imperfect discourse is part of perfect discourse." Likewise the same Saint Doctor, Work 48, tract on Enunciation, chapter 3, holds that imperfect discourse pertains to first operation of intellect, and not to second. For he says there: "That something is lacking to sense, which imperfect discourse generates, namely composition and division"; therefore that is lacking which looks to second operation; therefore it remains within limits of first; therefore within nature of part, because whatever pertains to first operation is part with respect to others. Secondly, perfect discourse is complete whole in genus of discourse; therefore imperfect discourse, since it is something incomplete is less than that whole itself; therefore it is part.

I respond: I deny the antecedent. To the first proof from Saint Thomas, I respond that Saint Doctor called imperfect discourse part, either taking part in broad mode, for that which is imperfect whole, for that which in some genus does not arrive at perfect is called beginning, or part of that. Or, if he takes part strictly and properly, he speaks of imperfect discourse materially, that is as it is complex term, not of it formally as discourse and whole. To the second proof from the same Saint Doctor, I respond that composition and division is lacking to imperfect discourse, which is as if affirmation and negation removing suspension of mind; therefore composition and division is lacking to it, which generates perfect sense, but nature of second operation is not lacking, which is imperfect composition and division. Indeed from this that it generates suspended and imperfect sense it is convinced to differ from complex term, because this generates pure apprehension of several things, or concepts, but makes no sense even suspended, and thus remains within nature of term and part. But truly imperfect discourse, beyond nature of apprehension, generates some sense, although inchoate and imperfect, because it begins to pass to composition of whole (as when, for example, I utter this discourse: White man) and as if wants to say something further; it suspends however there, and does not consummate sense. Therefore it pertains to second operation, even if in imperfect and inchoate mode, and thus is not part, but whole.

To the second proof from reason, I respond: I distinguish the consequent: Therefore imperfect discourse is less than that whole itself within genus of whole, namely imperfect

whole, I concede the consequent; outside genus of whole, so that it is part, I deny the consequent: for imperfect discourse is as if inchoate discourse with respect to perfect, or as if becoming with respect to perfect whole, which because it is suspended, does not progress further, nor does it arrive at nature of perfect.

Secondly I argue: If the term 'A' were imposed to signify that clause: Man is white, then the term 'A' would be discourse, and would not have significative parts; therefore this is not required for discourse. Likewise in probable opinion mental proposition is simple quality; therefore then discourse does not have significative parts. I respond that in that case the term 'A' would have significative parts virtually, or equivalently, although not formally, because it would be subordinated to several concepts. To the second proof I respond: according to that opinion it should be said that, although proposition, or discourse does not have parts entitatively, it has them however objectively, because it signifies something complex. And also it has them presuppositively, because it is formed from several apprehended concepts, as from presupposed things.

You ask: How discourse, term, and other logical instruments, since they are formally beings of reason, are defined through utterance (discourse is utterance, term is utterance etc.) which is something real? I respond: All the aforesaid are defined through utterance, as through extrinsic subject, and foundation in which second intention of reason is founded. And thus Saint Thomas, 1 Perihermenias, lecture 4, said: "That this should be conceded: A shield is figured wood, and similarly: A noun is significative utterance; although also denominatively it is conceded that shield is wooden, and noun is vocal." For in artificial things matter can be predicated of whole, because it contains its whole substance, and artificial form only adds accident. And when Aristotle, 7 Metaphysics, text 35, denies that statue is gold or stone, he speaks of stone as not figured, nor subject of form of art, but taken precisely for natural substance, as Saint Doctor explains there. Whence because accident, or form in concrete supposes for subject, when subject is something real and form being of reason, it cannot be said absolutely that it is being of reason, but with addition, namely for formal; but absolutely it can be said real being by reason of that for which it supposes in concrete.

ARTICLE II.
Whether the definition of definition is rightly handed down.

Definition is commonly defined as discourse explaining the nature of a thing, or signification of a noun; where both definition of noun, and of thing is included. And as to definition what of thing, it is taken from Aristotle, who often says definition is discourse

signifying what it was to be for a thing, as in 1 Topics, chapter 4 and 7 Topics, chapter 2; and broadly in 7 Metaphysics; and in 2 Posterior Analytics, lecture 2, at Saint Thomas. Where also Saint Doctor says that "definition is discourse signifying what what is."

Concerning which definition some reject from it the nature of discourse, which relates itself as genus, because they think discourse is not found without verb. Others through another extreme think discourse is so required for the nature of definition, that definition is found actually only in proposition, namely when it is applied to its defined, of which it is verified; whence consequently they teach that definition can not only be said good or bad, but also true or false, because every enunciation is true or false. Which however others also extend, or contend belongs to definition, even if it is not enunciation, because they think that in simple apprehension true or false is given.

Concerning that however which pertains to difference of definition, namely that it is explicative of nature of thing, some add that it explicates nature, or property of thing, because they think descriptive definition declares property of thing, not defines essence.

I SAY FIRST: The definition of definition is rightly handed down through discourse as through matter, understanding by the name of discourse also complex term; and definition can be found outside proposition. The first part is commonly received. And that by the name of discourse imperfect discourse should be understood, which materially coincides with complex term, is evident from this because definition can be predicate in some categorical proposition; but the office of predicate in categorical only belongs to term. Similarly Saint Thomas often teaches that definition pertains to first operation of intellect, as 1-2, Question 90, Article 2; and Quodlibet 5, Article 2; and 1 part, Question 17, article 3; since however of discourse strictly said he said it pertains to second operation, 1 Perihermenias, lecture 6. And finally, because definition directly is mode of knowing insofar as it is manifestative of something unknown; but to the nature of mode of knowing Saint Thomas very well said in 7 Metaphysics, lecture 9, it is required "that it not be one word because one word is not manifestative, in that mode by which a less known noun is manifested through more known." Therefore it is required for the nature of mode of knowing that in that several words or terms concur conducing to explicating something unknown. But whether it is perfect discourse, or imperfect, or through the mode of complex term, or of discourse, relates itself materially. It is said however commonly discourse, because since mode of knowing is found both in perfect discourse, and imperfect, and when it is found in imperfect discourse it is materially only complex term, so that it would be defined by one vocabulary, it is said to be discourse. And it has discourse for matter, because formal nature is to be logical artifact ordered to manifesting

unknown, which instrument is made from discourse as from matter, just as syllogism from proposition.

But the second part of the conclusion is taken from Saint Thomas, in 1 Perihermenias, lecture 8, where he says from Aristotle, that definition is a certain discourse, and yet if to the nature of man, that is definition, some verb, or case of verb is not added, it is not yet enunciative discourse. And 2 Posterior Analytics, lecture 1, § Which is such: "In definition (he says) something is not predicated of something as in this definition man is bipedal animal, neither is animal predicated of biped, nor biped of animal." And lecture 5, § He introduces reason, etc., he says: "It is manifest that definition signifies one something, whence those things which are posited in definition should be posited without copula to signify unity, so that it is said that man is laughing bipedal animal, but it should not be said that he is animal and biped." And the foundation of this is: Because either definition should be in proposition so that those parts of definition are copulated among themselves, or so that those parts themselves are applied to defined subject, so that this application is required for the nature of definition. The first is openly false, for if parts of definition were conjoined among themselves through enunciative copula, since those parts are genus and difference, that proposition of definition would be rendered false, as if I said Animal (that is genus) is rational, in definition of man. If the second, it is manifestly evident that application of definition to defined does not make, but supposes definition; because this application does not render it explicative of its defined, since through that complex which is applied, definition is adequately explicated, because it contains genus and difference of that; therefore this application does not pertain to actual constitution of definition, but to actual exercise of predication of it.

I SAY SECONDLY: Even if definition can be said good or bad, nevertheless it is not said true or false through itself, but only accidentally. That it should be said good or bad, all admit, because this is common to every mode of knowing, insofar as it manifests unknown through fitting and due explication; but where there is due fittingness, something is also denominated good, and, if it is undue, bad. But that definition can be said true or false, some affirm, as we said, thinking that even in simple apprehension true or false can be given, not indeed affirmed or negated, but through simple conformity or disconformity. Others deny, because Aristotle said true or false is given only in enunciation.

But Saint Thomas settles the dispute, 1 part, question 17, article 3, where he says: "Because falsity of intellect is through itself only concerning composition of intellect, accidentally also in operation of intellect, by which it knows what what is, there can be

falsity, insofar as composition of intellect is mixed in there. Which can be in two ways: in one way according as intellect attributes definition of one to another, as if it attributes definition of circle to man; in another way according as it composes parts of definition to each other mutually, which cannot be associated together, for thus definition is not only false with respect to some thing, but also in itself. As if I form such definition: Rational quadruped animal, intellect is false thus defining, on account of which it is false in forming this composition: Rational animal is quadruped." Thus Saint Thomas. From whose words it is evident how definition can be said true or false, namely accidentally, that is through another, insofar as by this very fact that it conjoins complexly parts explicating nature of defined, it should so fittingly conjoin those that they can be predicated of such defined, both together, and each one separately; but from that predication definition participates truth, or falsity, insofar as it expresses relation and order to that.

I SAY THIRDLY: Descriptive definition, and quidditative do not differ on the part of defined thing, but on the part of defining parts, or those through which definition is handed down. We propose this conclusion to expunge a certain clause, which some add in definition, namely that it is discourse explicating nature, or property of thing: for property of thing is not explicated in descriptive definition, but property itself explicates quiddity of thing, as accident of that; and therefore descriptive definition is said to be accidental, because it is handed down through accidents; therefore property of thing cannot be posited for defined, as if in this quidditative definition, and descriptive are distinguished, that that explicates nature, this property. This understanding is absurd. For how can property be defined and explicated, since it is defining and explicating? Therefore in each definition the thing itself or nature of thing is what is defined, sometimes through genus and difference, sometimes through property in place of difference. Nor does it hinder that, when man is defined: animal apt for laughing, the term 'apt for laughing' signifies passion itself of man, or man under it. This I say does not hinder, for it is equivocated about signification of noun, and about manifestation, or explication of definition; indeed the noun laughable, or apt for laughing signifies property of thing as if representing and signifying, but laughable itself, which is signified through noun, manifests to us quiddity of man in accidental mode by defining.

I SAY LASTLY: The conditions required for good definition are very well assigned. We explained those in our text, Chapter on definition; and they all depend on the first, namely: That definition should consist of genus and difference, or something supplying the place of genus and difference. For from this it manifestly follows that definition is clearer and more explicative than its defined; and that it is not redundant, nor diminished,

since it explicates those terms within which defined is enclosed; and that it converts with its defined.

Objections are solved.

Against the whole definition of definition that common argument is usually made: Because it is repugnant for the same thing to be simultaneously defined and definition; for it would be more known and more unknown than itself. Therefore if we define definition, definition itself will be defined, since it is that which is defined; and again it is definition, because this is its nature and essence; therefore it is simultaneously definition and defined. And it is confirmed: Because definition is said to convert with its defined, but this handed down is not said to convert with definition; therefore. I prove the minor: Because this definition is a certain singular definition contained under definition in common; therefore it cannot equal it and convert with it since it is something contained under it, whence consequently it defines itself, and thus the argument returns that the same thing is defined and definition. Just as if Peter defined man it would not be said to convert with man.

I respond: I distinguish that proposition: The same thing is defined and definition: formally I deny; definition formally (because this is its essence) and defined denominatively (insofar as it is compared to its definition), I concede. For it is very common that one second intention is such formally, and is another denominatively. Just as genus formally is intention of genus, and denominatively is a certain species of predicables, as we will say in Logic. To the confirmation I respond: That definition of definition is said to convert with its defined formally, as its defined it is; but as it regards definition in common, as its genus it is, thus it does not convert with it, but is contained under it. But Peter does not regard man as his defined, but precisely as superior species.

Secondly I argue: Definition pertains to first operation of intellect, discourse to second, as we said in the preceding article; therefore discourse is unfittingly posited in place of genus. The major is evident from Saint Thomas, 1, Distinction 19, Question 5, article 1, to 7, saying: "That truth and falsity is not found in first operation, and sign of it, which is definition."

I confirm: Definition is mode of knowing; mode of knowing does not have discourse for genus; therefore neither does definition. I prove the minor: That which is posited under some genus, should be determinately posited under some species of it; but mode of knowing is not in some determinate species of discourse; therefore it does not have

discourse for genus. I prove the major: Mode of knowing can be found both in perfect discourse, and in imperfect; therefore it is not determinately in some species of discourse.

I respond: That by the name of discourse imperfect discourse is also understood, which materially coincides with complex term; for to mode of knowing nothing more is required, as was said above; and thus it is not repugnant that definition be found in first operation of intellect, when namely it is accepted in the force of complex term, and because its object is something simple, namely quiddity of thing, although it is explicated compositely. It is defined however through discourse, because it is mode of knowing, and mode of knowing is commonly defined through discourse, and because definition can be held in the force of discourse, if it is accepted through the mode of whole, although taken in the force of complex term it pertains to first operation.

To the confirmation I respond: I distinguish the major of the second syllogism: That which formally and directly is posited under some genus should be determinately posited under some species, I concede the major; that which only materially, or consecutively pertains to some genus, I deny. E.g., statue is materially posited in stone and wood, because it does not pertain to natural genus except materially, that is so that it is made from it; and thus it does not follow that it should be determinately constituted under such stone, or under such wood, because it does not regard stone or wood as genus, but as matter, and thus it can be made from any stone and from any wood, without any determination. Similarly white is determinately body, and not determinately animate, or inanimate; wisdom, or intelligibility is determinately being, nevertheless not determinately is it created or uncreated, because it can follow upon either. Therefore discourse is not genus of mode of knowing, but matter from which it is formed under another logical artifice, namely into artificial mode of manifesting unknown.

Thirdly I argue: Outside proposition definition cannot be found; therefore the first conclusion is false. The antecedent is proved: Definition and defined are relative; therefore it should actually regard and be compared to defined so that it is definition. But when it is not predicated of defined, it does not regard that actually, but potentially; therefore it will not be definition actually. It is confirmed: Definition is not actually accidental, or essential, except from actual comparison to such defined; therefore it is not absolutely definition, except from comparison to defined. The antecedent is proved: This definition: Animal apt for laughing; if it is applied to laughable, it is essential, if to man, accidental. Therefore.

I respond to the argument: I distinguish the consequent of the second enthymeme: It should actually regard and be compared to defined under the nature of subject or predicate, I deny; under precise nature of defined, I concede. And in this mode definition regards its defined even if it is not actually predicated of that. Just as noun regards its signified, matter regards form, every power its object, even if it does not actually exercise its causality and operation concerning that. For it is one thing to actually regard, another to actually cause, or be predicated. Outside proposition definition regards its defined, whence it has that it is definition even if it is not actually predicated. To the confirmation I respond in the same mode: For it is essential or accidental definition, not from predicative application to defined in the nature of subject or predicate, but from regard and simple relation to that in the nature of defined, which is found outside proposition.

Objections against conditions of definition.

Genera, differences, proper, individuals, especially incorruptible ones, are defined by their proper definitions; therefore it is not necessary that definition consist of genus and difference. I prove the consequence: For if this were necessary, only species would be definable, since only species consists of genus and difference; but all the aforesaid are defined; therefore. I respond by denying the antecedent absolutely. For properly only species is definable, as Saint Thomas teaches, 3 Metaphysics, lecture 2. For genera, if they are supreme, are not defined, but described through analogous concept determined not through difference, but through mode; if they are subaltern, they are simultaneously species, and insofar as such are defined. Difference, proper and accident are defined insofar as they have some nature, which is reduced to species. But if they are taken in the nature of part, not of integral nature, like differences, they are not defined, but described. But individuals as such formally, and as in exercise, are not definable, nor knowable, even incorruptible ones, formally as individuals; but if they are defined, it is mediating nature of their species or taking individuation in common. Whence Saint Thomas, in the cited place, lecture 15, asserts that singular lacks definition not only from this that it is corruptible and material, but from this that it is singular, because as such it does not express quiddity, which is object of definition, but mode, or modification of quiddity.

Likewise: Relatives are simultaneous by nature and cognition; therefore one is not more known than another. For what is more known, is prior by cognition; and yet one relative is defined through another; therefore it is not required that definition be more known than defined. I respond in two ways: First, that it is not required that individual parts of definition be more known than defined, but that whole definition taken together; but relative is only one part in definition of relative. Secondly, let it pass that also parts

should be more known; explain then that either more known positively, or negatively. Relative is not more known positively, nor prior to its correlative; it is however negatively more known, insofar as without it the relative itself remains obscure and unknown.

Finally demonstration and science manifest nature of thing; therefore definition of definition belongs to others. If you say that demonstration proves passions or properties, against this: Therefore it will manifest nature at least in that mode by which descriptive definition, which is concerned with properties. I respond: I deny the antecedent. For definition is one of principles, or precognized things for demonstration, as is said in 1 Posterior Analytics, Chapter 1. But demonstration manifests passions to belong to subject, not as descriptive definition, because this does not prove passions to belong to subject, but supposing this, through those in simple mode explicating, not proving and demonstrating, it manifests nature accidentally.

What is proximate and remote defined.

In the text we said the noun of thing, which is defined, can be called proximate defined, but the thing signified through that, remote defined. The reason is, because noun is sign representing and approximating, or applying definable matter; which sign indeed consequently remains declared, because with signified defined and declared, sign remains declared and explicated. Whence noun from this part can be called proximate defined, even if it is not thing proximately manifested. Others add that defined quiddity, or nature can be called proximate defined, but passion, which is conjoined and connected to essence can be called remote. They assert falsely however, because that alone is defined, which is explicated and declared through definition; for defined and definition relate themselves relatively. But in essential definition passion is not defined thing, but nature; in descriptive similarly passion is not thing which is defined and notified, but through passion nature is notified; therefore it can never be said that it is defined, except when it is defined separately from nature.

But if it is objected that also noun is not defined thing, and yet is called proximate defined; therefore even if passion is not defined thing, it can be called remote defined. You will say: noun itself is declared and explicated at least virtually, although not formally. Against this: Also with nature declared passion of that is declared virtually; therefore this will suffice so that it is said defined at least remotely. Likewise: The Philosopher, 2 Posterior Analytics, text 7, asserts that definition what of noun and what of

thing cannot be the same; therefore one cannot be defined by one and the same definition as proximate defined, and another as remote.

To the argument it has been well responded there. To the reply I deny the antecedent. For passion relates itself as consequent effect to nature, not as sign representing it, like noun. But with nature of cause declared, effect can still remain unknown; but with signified thing declared, sign cannot remain unknown, which actually and in exercise represents signified thing. To the Philosopher, I respond: He speaks of definition what of thing and what of noun, which through themselves and directly are such, and each explicates its defined. But that, with thing itself defined, noun itself can consequently and indirectly be explicated as proximate defined through the mode of sign, not through mode of defined matter, Aristotle does not deny.

ARTICLE III.
Whether definition of division and those things which pertain to division are rightly handed down.

Those things which pertain to division, we will dissolve rather through questions, than through arguments. Is the quidditative and proper definition of division: discourse namely distributing thing or noun through its parts? I respond affirmatively. For it is handed down through that which is proper and quidditative of division. For in place of genus, or for matter, discourse is posited, by the name of which we understand also complex term: for division just like definition can have the nature of predicate in categorical proposition, and thus the nature of complex term, and pertain to first operation just like definition. Distributing has the same value as manifesting by distributing, in which the specific and differential nature of mode of knowing is explicated, which is proper to division, because by distributing and distinguishing parts it manifests confusion of whole. For both definition, and division manifest something through parts; but definition manifests constitutive parts, division however quasi quantitative; because definition regards totality of quiddity, division however totality of quantity, or distribution. To have parts belongs to quiddity and quantity, although in diverse mode: whence definition explicates defined through parts by constituting, not distributing, division by distributing and removing confusion of divided through distribution and quasi enumeration of parts. Thing, or noun is said so that that double division of noun and thing is indicated, of which we acted in the text.

You ask secondly: Whether logical division only is concerned with and distributes logical whole; or whether it extends to physical, metaphysical divisions, of noun, of thing etc.

For resolution, note: That there is logical whole, that is predicable, or universal with respect to its inferiors; and physical whole, that is composed from matter and form, or from integral parts; and metaphysical whole, that is composed from genus and difference; and potential whole, that is consisting of diverse powers, or potential parts; and accidental whole, that is consisting of many accidents. Some therefore say that it pertains to Dialectician only to hand down division of logical whole.

It should be said however that in all those divisions either matter in which division is exercised can be attended to, or form, namely artifice, or mode of manifesting division and proceeding in it. On the part of matter not all divisions pertain to logician, because many are physical, or metaphysical; and thus it is true that on the part of matter it pertains through itself to logician only to consider division of logical whole, namely universal or predicable into subjective parts, as of genus into species, of species into individuals etc. But on the part of form, or artifice, or mode of dividing (which is second intention of division) it pertains to logician to act concerning every division, because whether in physical, or in metaphysical such division is mode of knowing, and is done in artificial mode. Just as also definition either physical, or metaphysical pertains to logician, because it acts concerning artifice and intention of all of them.

You ask thirdly: Whether division can be handed down through negative terms, or contradictory, e.g.: Animal one man, another not man? Some deny. Both because such division notifies nothing to us, for negative member notifies nothing, but purely negates. And also because divided should be subunderstood in any member and be participated by dividing things; but truly the term 'not man' does not participate nature of animal, because not man extends more broadly than animal.

It should be said however that the aforesaid division is artificial, and according to logical rules. I prove: Because in good division members should be opposed among themselves, otherwise they would not be separated through differences, but either would be the same, or disparate; but it is not necessary that they always be opposed relatively, or contrarily; therefore they can be opposed contradictorily. I confirm: This is good division: man one seeing, another blind; air one dark, another bright; animal one rational, another irrational, of which one member is negative, or privative, but by common use they are received. Therefore.

To the reasons for doubting I respond: That negative member is not taken absolutely, but as falling upon such divided, and restricted to it; and thus it does not extend more broadly than its divided. Whence when I say: animal one man, another not man, the term 'not

man' is not understood absolutely, and in its whole breadth, but for animal which is not man, which does not extend more broadly than animal as such. Similarly in the term 'irrational' animal is subunderstood, but not irrational absolutely, as it is found in stone. And thus negative member as adjacent to such divided notifies and manifests something, namely irrational animal every brute animal etc.

Against this: Genus is rightly divided through differences, as: animal one rational, another irrational and yet genus is not predicated of differences; therefore divided should not be subunderstood in dividing members. I respond: Genus is not divided into differences, but through differences is divided into species, as Saint Thomas says, 3 Metaphysics, lecture 4; and 10 Metaphysics, lecture 5; but genus is predicated of species; and thus when it is divided animal one rational, another irrational, it is subunderstood there: one is rational animal, another irrational animal, which are species.

You will object: In partition, by which thing is divided into integral parts, divided cannot be predicated of dividing things, because divided is whole, dividing things are parts, and whole is not predicated of part. In accidental division also, accident is not predicated of subjects themselves, nor subject of accidents, because they are not identified. Therefore. I respond: In the first case divided is not predicated of individual parts, but individuals participate something of whole, not through predication, but through dependence on it. In the second case, divided is predicated of dividing things, namely of subjects accidentally, and there accident is identified with subject and conversely, because accident is signified in concrete, and thus does not express form alone, but having form, and such having is identified with subject. Whence Saint Thomas, 1 part, Question 13, article 12, said that "man and white are the same in subject, but differ in nature", that is form and quiddity.

You ask fourthly: Whether analogous division is included in this mode of knowing? Some deny saying that in analogous division there is not given divided in which dividing members agree, except only name, nor are differences given, by which division is made. Nevertheless it should be responded affirmatively, because analogous division is artificial, and pertains to mode of knowing, because dividing members are really distinguished among themselves, like God and creature, accident and substance. And they agree in some one thing, not simply, or by univocal unity, but proportional and analogous; and although analogous does not have differences, it has however modes by which it can be divided. Which suffices for artificial mode of dividing, because it requires some ordination in making division and it looks to logician.

You ask lastly: Whether something can be divided by several essential divisions; or whether every division should be so adequate, that it totally exhausts divided, nor leaves place for another division? I respond: That when something is divided according to that by which it is ultimately and indivisibly constituted in its essence, it admits only one essential division. But if several formalities concur, of which any one is participable in diverse mode, then it will be able to be divided by several essential divisions, inadequate however. Thus human law at Saint Thomas, 1-2, Question 95, article 4, receives diverse divisions on the part of diverse principles from which it proceeds, and of diverse ends which it regards. Sins also are divided specifically into carnal and spiritual, and from the fact that they are against God and neighbor. Concerning which, and concerning this doctrine, in the cited place, and 1-2, Question 72, article 2 and 4; and below, treating of divisions of proposition.

QUESTION V.
ON ENUNCIATION.

ARTICLE I.
In what the nature of enunciation in common consists.

Saint Thomas divided perfect discourse, 1 Perihermenias, lecture 7, into deprecative, vocative, optative, interrogative and enunciative; because all these generate perfect sense. But we in the present only act concerning enunciative, which is more perfect than the others, and principally conducing to explicating truth, which the Logician intends. And we take enunciation and proposition for the same, as is commonly taken among the wise; although they can connote diverse respects, and proposition adds above enunciation to be proposed or assumed for inferring. Concerning enunciation therefore we ask what is that common thing in which categorical consists, and in which hypothetical also agrees.

Some think that proposition is judgment itself of intellect (for they do not distinguish it from judicative act), because this is properly capable of truth and falsity. But that it is significative of true or false they think only belongs to written or vocal proposition. Others distinguishing between judgment and enunciation, upon which judgment falls and is carried, think the essence of proposition in common consists in enunciating absolutely connections, or repugnances of things; from which it follows as property that it is significative of true or false. Others assert the aforesaid essence to consist in enunciating strictly one of another; and because this is only found in categorical, and not in hypothetical, they reject hypothetical from the nature of enunciation. But what it is to enunciate, they say is to signify being or not being; whence afterwards it follows that it is

true or false; for proposition does not have this from the force of its signification, but from the fact that the signified thing, or enunciated either is so or is not. Others finally constitute the essence of proposition in this that it is affirmative or negative discourse.

I SAY FIRST: Judicative proposition should be distinguished from enunciative; and of itself judgment can be posterior, and follow upon enunciation. This assertion is taken from Saint Thomas, 2-2, Question 173, article 2; and Question 12 on Truth, article 7, saying: "Sometimes light is given to someone for judging, sometimes however for receiving and ordering, or composing preexisting species." But composition, or ordering of preexisting species is enunciative composition, because it is composition of some truth complexly signified, and upon which judgment can fall; therefore enunciation is distinguished from judgment, because sometimes light can be given for judging, and sometimes for composing. I prove the conclusion by reason: Judgment is assent of intellect concerning something which is capable of such judgment; but only complex truth signified through enunciation is capable of such judgment; therefore act of judgment is distinguished from formation of enunciation. The major is evident: Because judgment is that by which intellect is determined by assenting that it is so or is not so, for this is to judge; but it cannot assent, or pronounce that it is so or is not so, except concerning something complex, which is connected with verb, as experience shows, and this is enunciation; therefore enunciation is first formed, and then judged. Which also is evident because very often we apprehend and form enunciations about dubious things without any judgment, as when we say: Stars are even, treasure is in that place, about which we do not know how to judge, and determine assertively; therefore enunciation is one thing, judgment another.

But it is true that enunciation, by reason of verb from which it consists, and has force of copulating extremes, and expressing assertive judgment; and thus sometimes by one act enunciation and judgment are formed, as when I say: Man is animal, expressing in the term 'is' both copulation and assertion, or assent. But sometimes they are separated, because the term 'is' is taken precisely in the force of copulating, not asserting.

I SAY SECONDLY: The nature or essence of enunciation in common consists in this that it is perfect discourse (through this it is distinguished from imperfect), expressing complex object about which judgment can be carried (through this it is distinguished from other perfect discourses, which cannot express object of judgment, like vocative, interrogative etc.), from which it follows that it signifies true, or false. Thus Saint Thomas, 1 Perihermenias, lecture 7, saying this is definition of enunciation: "Discourse in which true or false is." But it is said to be true, or false in enunciation as in sign, in mind

as in subject. Where the term 'in mind' is the same as in judgment of mind, for truth is not immediately in power itself, but in act of power, nor in another act than of judgment. The reason of this assertion is: because in this mode distinction of enunciation from remaining discourses is explained, and common nature of hypothetical and categorical, also nature of signifying true or false; therefore this definition should be held to, since it explicates whatever enunciation has, namely to signify complex object either through verbal copula, which unites predicate and subject in categoricals, or through hypothetical copula, which unites categoricals; for judgment is carried about each complex, in which truth and falsity is; for that discourse upon which judgment cannot fall, whether assent, or dissent, is not enunciation. And this the authors wanted to express who said enunciation is discourse, which enunciates connections or repugnances of things, or affirmation and negation. And if anything else, we do not acquiesce.

I SAY THIRDLY: Truth or falsity, as to actual exercise of conformity or disconformity, are accidents of proposition and judgment. This is evident from Aristotle saying, in Chapter on substance, that "the same discourse remaining can be changed from true into false"; as when I say: Peter sits, with him sitting it is true, with him not sitting it is false, and yet proposition is always the same, because it says and signifies the same; therefore through change of truth and falsity substance of enunciation is not changed; and thus truth and falsity is only accident consequent upon signifying complex object upon which judgment can fall, in which essence consists. Concerning these we discuss more fully in tome 2, 1 part, disputation 2.

I SAY LASTLY: One proposition is not truer than another formally; but fundamentally it is more certain and firm. The reason is: Truth consists in indivisible, and does not receive more and less; therefore one proposition is not more true than another. I prove the antecedent: Truth consists in adequation, or conformity to being or not being of thing; but between being and not being no medium is given nor breadth, since they are contradictorily opposed; therefore conformity of proposition to being and correspondence to it as it recedes from not being and does not conform to it, or conversely, does not receive more and less. And the same is concerning any relation, which consists in indivisible, like equality etc., from which however it recedes falls from equality or conformity. But firmness and certainty, which found truth, are taken from the fact that thing has firmer causes of its being, or of its connection, in this however there is more and less as is evident; for thus God is highest truth, because supremely firm, and created truths are firmer the more necessary they are.

Against this: That indivisible adequation itself in created truths is caused and participated from God; therefore such truth is more in God than in creatures even as to indivisible, and thus in him formally one truth is greater than another. I respond: I concede the antecedent, and distinguish the consequent: More on the part of breadth of object about which truth is concerned, I deny; more on the part of certainty and firmness, or on the part of being and dependence, and participation of one from another, let it pass. And so participated truth is always less than non-participated truth; but because each is concerned with being or not being, in this no breadth is given, nor more and less, and this holds itself on the part of object and correspondence to that in truth. But that truth thus attaining being, and receding from not being, is more perfect, firmer and more immutable, in this more and less is given: but between being or not being, about which truth is, there is never more or less, whether in created truth, or in divine. Just as equality is participated from equality, which is in God; and this created is less in its perfection and being, or in nature of being, not in indivisible of truth, that is in not receding from point of equality and conformity to its term; for if it fell in some mode from it, it would be of inequality.

Objections are solved.

First I object against the first conclusion: If enunciation were given before judgment, that would be true or false in signifying; but before judgment truth or falsity is not given; therefore enunciation and judgment are not distinguished. I prove the major, because essence of proposition consists in signifying true or false; therefore if enunciation is given before judgment, it will signify true or false. The minor is evident from Saint Thomas, 1 part, Question 16, article 2; and Question 1 on Truth, article 3; and 6 Metaphysics, at the end, expressly asserting this; and from reason: Because through apprehension alone of enunciation no one is said to be erring or knowing, otherwise whoever apprehended something false, and did not assent to it, his intellect would be false, which is absurd; for God apprehends many false things and is not deceived.

I respond: I concede the major and distinguish the minor: Before judgment truth or falsity is not given as asserted and judged, I concede; as signified and apprehended, I deny. And Saint Thomas does not deny that truth is given in enunciation through mode of representation, but through mode of assent; indeed rather, in 1 Perihermenias, lecture 7, he says: "Truth is properly found in second operation and in sign of it, which is enunciation." But from truth apprehended, or only represented intellect is not denominated erring or knowing, deceived or false, but only from truth judged, when namely it assents, or consents to deception or truth.

Secondly I object: To judgment, which through us is act distinct from enunciation, it belongs to express, or signify truth and falsity, as when we assent to proposition saying: It is so; therefore definition of enunciation belongs to others from defined, or judgment and enunciation are the same. Likewise in these utterances: true or false, truth or falsity is explicated; and yet it is not enunciation; therefore. Likewise: Definition should explicate determinately nature of thing; but true or false is something under disjunction, and indeterminate; therefore enunciation is not rightly defined through this, especially since there are given propositions which are determinately true, as those which are in natural matter.

I respond: I distinguish the antecedent: It belongs to judgment to express truth or falsity complexively or copulatively, or through mode of copula and union of extremes, upon which judgment can fall, I deny the antecedent; assertively, or through mode of assent, I concede the antecedent. The first is proper essence of proposition; the second can also belong to judgment. Although sometimes intellect exercises both simultaneously by signifying copulation of extremes, and simultaneously assertion about being or not being, as when I say: Man is animal, the term 'is' signifies both that extremes are copulated, and that intellect assents assertively. But sometimes signification of assertion is separated from signification of copulation of extremes, as when with enunciation uttered judgment is suspended. And what we say about copulation of extremes in categorical, proceeds similarly concerning copulation of categoricals in hypothetical. To the second proof I respond: That those utterances, true or false, signify nominally, not through mode of complex enunciable upon which judgment falls. To the third I respond: That enunciation on the part of complex object is always of determinate signification, but truth thence consequent can be varied, with discourse itself remaining unchanged. But that truth or falsity does not pertain to essence of enunciation. To that which is added about propositions of determinate truth or falsity, I respond: Not to take determinate essence from determinate truth, but from determinate signified object, whose connection is of such nature, that truth follows upon it immutably. Whence to signify true or false should not be understood precisely, that is that in any proposition precisely that disjunct of true or false should be found, but accommodatively, that is that from force of signified object sometimes true, sometimes false can result. And thus it is not inconvenient to define something through opposites not as if they belong to the same simultaneously, but because it is susceptive of them successively, just as substance is said susceptive of contraries.

Thirdly I object: To signify true or false even on the part of representation of complex object cannot be essence of enunciation; therefore it is unfittingly defined. I prove the

antecedent: Representation of complex object in mind can never be false, but always true, like simple apprehension, because it is natural representation. And Saint Thomas, 1 part, question 17, article 1, therefore said that in simple apprehension truth can be given and not falsity, because it is natural likeness, which can never be disconformed to its object, but always conformed; therefore neither will enunciation be able to be disconformed to its enunciable, because it naturally signifies that.

I respond: I deny the antecedent, and to the proof it is said: That there is broad difference between natural likeness of simple object and of complex object through mode of composition; for by this very fact that likeness of enunciation results and is formed through composition of several things, and not through natural impression of object, deception can result in composition itself, insofar as one is attributed to another which does not belong to it, for which reason also in definition itself Saint Thomas admits that deception and falsity can be given, 1 part, question 17, article 3. But likeness of simple object, since it is carried into object from natural impression itself, and does not arise from some composition, is not capable of falsity, but only of natural representative adequation. And moreover enunciation can also represent assent itself of judgment, and not only copulation of extremes, and by reason of this it is capable of falsity, if assent itself is false.

Lastly it argues: Because the given definition does not belong to all hypotheticals; therefore it is not adequately given concerning proposition in common. The antecedent is evident in this conditional: If man has wings, he flies, which does not signify truth, but consequence; therefore not every proposition signifies truth, or falsity. And I confirm: Because copulative propositions do not express truth distinct from categorical, but aggregation of truths, which aggregation, if it is distinct truth from parts from which it consists, is not hypothetical truth, but categorical, because it is one arising from two copulated, or aggregated; as if you say: Peter runs, and John reads, it is signified that each proposition is true, but to say that each is true is something categorical.

I respond: That hypothetical propositions, insofar as such, can have their truth and falsity distinct from categorical, because verification is not made through predication of one of another, but through copulation, or disjunction of several categoricals; but nevertheless it is not necessary that they always import truth itself, except when they proceed by asserting and expressing some assent of judgment; just as also simple discourse, unless it is assertive and enunciative does not have truth. Therefore if that conditional, or other similar ones are held in the force of precise consequence, they do not import truth, but illation; but illation is said good or bad, not true or false. But if under condition they

affirm something, or promise, then they will have hypothetical truth, and definition of proposition belongs to them.

To the confirmation it is responded in the following article 2. Here it is customary to dispute whether categorical proposition is simple, or composite quality. Because however it depends on things to be said in book 1 on the soul, nor was it in use in our University, we remit it to be treated at the end of Summulae where, to whom it pleases to read, it will be evident.

ARTICLE II.
Whether division into hypothetical and categorical is essential and univocal.

Various authors think this division is analogous moved by various foundations. Some seem to draw this from Saint Thomas, who seems to teach this expressly, in Work 48, tract on enunciation, chapter 6, and 1 Perihermenias, lecture 8, because hypothetical proposition is not simply one, but one by conjunction, as the Philosopher says in the same place, chapter on enunciation. But there is the same nature of being and of one being; therefore what is not simply one proposition is not simply.

Others from another foundation, because they think that at least copulative and disjunctive propositions are not rigorously hypothetical propositions, because they do not signify enunciative connection, but only contain conjoined propositions, and indeed accidentally, that is by simultaneity alone of utterance; whence consequently they can only be called propositions analogically. But hypothetical propositions in rigor will be those, which signify connection of two enunciations, like conditional, causal and rational.

I SAY FIRST: The division of proposition into categorical and hypothetical is substantially of genus into species; it has however a certain mode of analogous division. It is more common among Thomists, and is taken from Saint Thomas, Work 48, tract on enunciation, chapter 6, where first he says this division is as analogous into its analogates (where the term 'as' designates mode) but afterwards he adds: "This division divides proposition as to substance, because it divides it on the part of copulation or conjunction; but division into affirmative and negative divides as to quality, because it divides on the part of predicate, which is quasi formal part with respect to subject; division finally into universal and particular divides as to quantity, because it divides on the part of subject, which is quasi matter of proposition to which quantity follows." Therefore Saint Thomas holds that hypothetical pertains to substance of proposition, and thus proposition is saved univocally in it, because its substance is saved. Whence finally he adds: "That when we

ask what proposition is, we ask about substance of proposition, and thus we respond that it is categorical and hypothetical." Therefore whoever says hypothetical proposition, says substance of proposition. And nevertheless, because on the part of signified thing categorical and hypothetical relate themselves as one and many, and one through prior and another through posterior, it is said to have mode of analogy, as we will explain afterwards.

The foundation of the conclusion consists in this that hypothetical proposition has everything that is required for essential nature of enunciation, insofar as it is hypothetical; for as such it is perfect discourse; and not under species of optative, or interrogative, or others; therefore enunciative. The antecedent is evident: For that it is discourse is manifest, since it has significative parts, and is not word alone, but is mode of knowing. That it is perfect is evident, because it does not leave suspended sense in hearer, but perfect, as when I say: Peter runs, and John sits; If Peter runs, Peter is moved. But the consequent is evident: Both by running through species of perfect discourse, which above in beginning of this question, from Saint Thomas we posited. For neither through hypothetical proposition is optative discourse made, or vocative, or imperative, or interrogative, as is evident in this proposition: If man runs, he is moved; John reads, and Paul disputes; therefore it should be enunciative. And also because hypothetical, insofar as such, signifies truth or falsity distinct from categorical, because judgment is carried not only about any categorical, but also about hypothetical conjunction itself, not as to disposition of illation as in consequence, but as to being so, or not being; as is evident in this proposition: If man were horse, he would be capable of neighing, for concerning individual categoricals false judgment is formed, but concerning whole hypothetical, true. And similarly it is in copulative and other hypotheticals; therefore it is sign that hypothetical insofar as such pertains to nature of enunciation, since it signifies true or false distinct from categorical, which is essence of enunciation. Therefore just as complex and incomplex term agree univocally, although one signifies composite thing, another simple; so hypothetical and categorical agree univocally in signifying truth, although one is simple, another composite.

I SAY SECONDLY: Copulative and disjunctive are truly and in complete rigor hypothetical propositions. This is evident expressly from Saint Thomas, Work 48, tract on enunciation, chapter 14: "Hypothetical proposition is divided, he says, into three species, because some is conditional, some disjunctive, some copulative." And he has the same, in the same Work, tract on syllogisms simply, chapter 16. And the reason of this is: Because definition of hypothetical belongs to them, which according to Saint Thomas is defined "that it is that, which has two categorical principal parts of itself"; but this most

manifestly appears in copulative and disjunctive proposition. Likewise: Because truth of copulative and disjunctive, and judgment which is given about them is diverse from truth and judgment which is given about categorical; for more is required to verify one, than another; for to verify disjunctive it suffices that one part is verified, for copulative, it is necessary that each part is verified; but diverse judgment and diverse truth is about each categorical proposition separately, than about simultaneity of both, and about this that not only one, but also another is so. Much better this appears in disjunctive, for with one part being false, whole disjunctive is true; therefore judgment is one thing and truth of whole another and truth of part another.

Objections are solved.

First it is argued: For Saint Thomas expressly affirms that division of proposition into categorical and hypothetical is of analogous into analogates, as is evident in Work 48, tract on enunciation, chapter 6, "because categorical enunciation is simply one, but hypothetical one by conjunction." He has the same, in 1 Perihermenias, lecture 8, where he says: "That enunciation is one absolutely, which signifies one of one, or according to something, namely which is one by conjunction." Therefore against Saint Thomas we say that that division is univocal. And I confirm: Because hypothetical is said one according to something, or one by conjunction, insofar as it signifies several things, united however by some conjunction; therefore at least in nature of sign hypothetical proposition is one according to something; therefore also in nature of proposition, for proposition is essentially sign. If therefore in nature of sign it is not one simply, but according to something, also in nature of proposition, which is essentially sign, it will not be one simply, but according to something.

I respond: Saint Thomas, in that Work, did not say absolutely that this division is of analogous into analogates, but is divided as analogous into analogates, which is to have mode of analogous division, although not substance. Just as also Saint Thomas teaches, in question 9 on Power, article 2, to 6: "That division of substance into first and second is not of genus into species, but rather of analogous into analogates" and yet, as we will see in Logic, it is commonly held that this division is univocal, and Saint Thomas is explained concerning analogous division as to mode. This univocation as to substance, and analogy as to mode consists in this that in proposition two things are considered: one as to substance, that is signification of true or false, or of complex object as enunciable and judicable, and in this categorical and hypothetical agree univocally, as we said; another on the part of identity and unity of discourse as it is significative absolutely, and this holds itself on the part of matter, namely of significative discourse, just as in term

that it is complex or incomplex; and as to this mode of analogy is given insofar as hypothetical is constituted from categorical, and truth is found in categorical through prior, than in hypothetical. But not every prior and posterior infers true analogy, as is evident in numbers, of which one is prior to another and composes another, and yet they are not analogized in nature of number; but prior and posterior in participating superior nature makes analogy. And this explication is taken from Saint Thomas himself, 1 Perihermenias, lecture 8, where he says: "It is manifest that enunciation, which is one by conjunction, is also several, but several insofar as it signifies several things, and not one." And below: "Some enunciation is simply one insofar as it signifies one, some simply several insofar as it signifies several things, but is one according to something insofar as it is one by conjunction." Therefore only on the part of signified thing and of unity or identity of signification it is said to be simply one, or according to something, but in nature of asserted and enunciated truth Saint Thomas does not deny that it is simply one hypothetical truth.

To the confirmation I respond: First that, even if superior nature of sign is analogous, it does not follow that inferior nature is not univocal, as is evident in being, in which man and plant agree analogically, but not in nature of living, or substance. Secondly it is said that nature of sign is not genus of logical artifact absolutely, but in nature of artificial sign; and thus in simple and complex enunciation nature of sign can be multiplied quasi materially and absolutely taken; but in nature of artificial complex enunciable to have unity simply insofar as it signifies one truth, even if it is hypothetical. Just as complex and incomplex term are univocated in nature of term, just as house having one hall only or having twenty are univocally houses; and similar examples can be multiplied in other artifacts.

Secondly it argues: Hypothetical proposition is not one concept of mind, or simple quality, but several ordered concepts, but categorical is one simple concept, as probable opinion holds; therefore they do not agree univocally. The consequent is evident, because categorical unites its parts by one concept and consequently by one being, but hypothetical, not by one being, but by unity of order; but there is not something univocally common to that which is one through itself, and accidentally within line of same artifact, namely of enunciable proposition. It is confirmed: Because hypothetical enunciation formally and essentially is composed from categorical; therefore it is not species distinct to it. The consequent is evident, because what formally composes another is not divided as species against that, but as including and included; just as animal would be badly divided into man and into soul. The antecedent is evident: Because categorical composes hypothetical insofar as it signifies true or false; for from truth of categorical

hypothetical truth is made; therefore it composes by reason of that which is formal in categorical, namely by reason of signifying true or false.

I respond: The argument proves that in being of quality, or in entitative and physical being, hypothetical and categorical relate themselves as one and many, which are one according to something and by unity of order. For the rest artificially and logically in nature of enunciating truth they agree univocally; and thus in nature of enunciable artifact hypothetical proposition is simply one, and through itself. Just as golden vessel made from one and continuous quantity of gold, or from several divided parts compacted, agree univocally in nature of artifact, although not in physical nature of quantity and of one substance; and nature of term which is found in first operation, and discourse or syllogism, which are found in third, agree univocally in nature of logical artifact, although not in physical unity.

To the confirmation I respond that, although hypothetical is composed from that which is formal in categorical, nevertheless this formal itself is materially and not formally composing; for that is said to compose formally when its formality and essence consists in nature of composing part, like matter and form in physical things, and thus is not divided against whole, but is included in that. But when something in itself is a certain whole, although according to formal which it has it can compose another, which essentially demands that for its composition, it is not said to be formally composing, although it composes by its formal, because it is not formally part; and thus it can be divided species with respect to that which it composes, just as binary and ternary are species of number, and yet ternary is essentially constituted from binary.

Lastly it is argued against the second conclusion: Because copulative and disjunctive are not one proposition, but multiple conjoined by simultaneity alone of utterance, because they do not have other truth from their categoricals taken together, or disjunctly: but such conjunction or disjunction does not make distinct proposition, but aggregation of several; therefore they are not species of enunciation. I prove the antecedent: Because besides aggregation of categorical truths there is no other truth of copulative except to signify that each categorical is true; or if it is disjunctive, that one is true; but this proposition: Each of those propositions is true, is a certain third categorical truth. Therefore hypothetical truth will never be given, which insofar as such is distinct species from categorical, but if it has distinct truth, that is quasi reflexive, which is explicated through that categorical: Each is true, or One is true.

I respond: I deny the major; and to the proof it is said: That from that aggregation of categorical truths disjunctively or copulatively made another truth results, which, because it depends on categorical truths, is called hypothetical truth, because it has categorical principal parts of itself. And although reflexive signification and in signified act by which each is said to be true is explicated through one categorical, it does not remove that object signified through that reflexive, which is hypothetical itself, in itself is a certain truth not categorical, but hypothetical; for that reflexive categorical is not true, except because that which is signified through it is true. But it is signified that not only one, but also another proposition is true which is hypothetical and not simple truth. But if that reflexive explication through one categorical sufficed to remove hypothetical truth, also conditional itself would not be hypothetical; and syllogism would not be discourse consisting of propositions; because we define conditional reflexively through one categorical saying that it is conjunction of several propositions through particle if, and that syllogism is discourse inferring conclusion from premises; nevertheless it does not follow from this that syllogism is not composite discourse, and that conditional is not truly hypothetical.

ARTICLE III.
Whether divisions into affirmative and negative, into universal and particular are good and essential.

Some think division into affirmative and negative is accidental, because it is division according to quality of proposition, but quality supposes essence and substance of thing. But quality of proposition consists in affirming and negating, just as quantity in universality and particularity. Others think it is analogical, because it is handed down through prior and posterior; for affirmation is prior to negation.

Concerning division however into universal and particular almost all agree it is accidental.

Nevertheless the express opinion of Saint Thomas is that division of proposition into affirmative and negative is univocal, and of genus into species. Thus he has in 1 Perihermenias, lecture 8; and more evidently, Work 48, tract on enunciation, chapter 6. Where, after he said it is division of genus into species, he adds below: "That this division pertains to quality of enunciation, namely essential quality according as difference signifies what sort of thing." Therefore in opinion of Saint Thomas it is clearly evident that this division is essential and univocal.

That it is univocal Saint Thomas proves against Alexander, because both affirmative and negative participate equally in essential nature of enunciation, namely to signify true or false; for as properly and essentially does affirmative proposition signify true or false as negative, and in the same mode it can terminate judgment of assent or dissent; for it is not less true to say affirmatively: Divine Word is God, than negatively: Divine Word is not creature. Man is animal, than: Man is not stone; therefore they agree univocally in signifying true or false.

But that division is essential, not accidental, is proved from this: Because it is division according to essential form of proposition, which is copulation of extremes significative of truth, insofar as it is founded in agreement or disagreement of them among themselves; for before agreement or disagreement of extremes no substance of enunciation can be conceived; but then first and essentially the nature itself of enunciation is conceived and constituted, when extremes are understood to be united in order to truth: therefore essential difference in nature of this union makes essential difference in nature of enunciation. For by this reason hypothetical differs essentially from categorical, because it differs in nature and mode of copulating and composing; but negative copulation differs essentially from affirmative, since negation is essentially opposed to affirmation, since it destroys it totally; therefore etc.

I SAY SECONDLY: Division of proposition according to quantity, namely into universal, particular etc., is not essential, but accidental. We suppose that quantity of proposition is not found in every proposition, but only in proposition consisting of common term; for if it consists of singular subject, proposition is not quantified, because quantity in propositions is attended to according to extension of subject to more, or fewer; but singular proposition lacks extension, because it belongs to one alone, whence it is quasi indivisible in genus of quantity of proposition.

From which it is manifestly deduced that this division according to quantity is accidental. Both because it is not taken according to that which is essential in proposition, namely according to signification of truth, or copulation of extremes, but according to extension of subject in those to which predicate can belong; whence it supposes enunciation constituted, and essence of proposition signifying complex truth itself, which is constituted through copulation of extremes. And also because if whole essence of proposition can be found in individual without any quantity, as in singular proposition, therefore division according to quantity is not essential, because without those species essence is found.

And if you say: For some propositions can differ specifically only by reason of quantity, as if you say: Every man is white; some man is white, the first is false and second true, and only by reason of quantity; therefore diverse quantity makes essential and specific distinction.

I respond: I deny the antecedent. Because truth and falsity are not essential differences as we said above; whence from this precisely that one is true and another false from variation of quantity it does not follow that they are essentially diverse. And especially this is true as to essential difference of proposition on the part of form and artificial composition; for thus there is no essential difference between those two propositions. But on the part of matter, namely because signified thing is diverse, there is no repugnance that some propositions can differ specifically, because they signify specifically distinct things, but this is not by reason of quantity, but even if they are of same quantity, they differ in this mode specifically, as if you say: Every man is animal; every horse is capable of neighing.

Objections are solved.

First it is argued to prove that proposition is not rightly divided into affirmative and negative: For affirmation and negation are explicated through being and not being; for it is affirmed by saying that something is, and negated by saying that it is not; but to being and not being nothing common can be given, or any third medium between them, since they are immediately opposed; therefore this division is neither good, nor univocal; since to being and not being nothing is univocal. And I confirm: Because affirmation and negation are handed down through prior and posterior; for affirmation is prior to negation, for negation is founded in affirmation, as is evident from Aristotle, 1 Perihermenias, chapter on enunciation; and Saint Thomas, there lecture 8. Therefore it is not division of genus into species, but of analogous into analogates. The consequent is evident, because species of one genus are simultaneous by nature, as is said in Postpredicaments; therefore division of genus cannot be handed down according to species which relate themselves as prior and posterior.

I respond: In that argument some are badly twisted, but without foundation. For I concede that between being and not being no medium is given, nor can anything common be abstracted; but between signifying being or not being something common can be given abstracting from each, namely to signify complex extremes, and to unite those, which afterwards are determinately signified as united according to affirmation or negation, of which one signifies being, another signifies not being. And so being itself and not being

are contradictorily opposed, but signification itself affirming and signification negating are not opposed contradictorily, but contrarily, because each signification is positive, and they relate themselves like two species of artificial and complex signification, and this complex enunciative signification is the nature common to them.

To the confirmation I respond from doctrine of Saint Thomas, 1 Perihermenias, lecture 8; and Work 48, where he solves this same argument, that not every prior and posterior constitutes analogy, as is evident in species of number; for one number is prior to another, and yet they are univocally numbers; and potency and habit and act have nature of prior and posterior, and yet they are univocally quality; but that priority, which makes unequally participate in superior nature, so that in one it is more principally and through itself, in another according to something and accidentally, makes analogy; like being with respect to substance and accident, healthy with respect to animal and herb; for in one it is found through prior, in another through posterior. And species of one genus are said to be simultaneous by nature by simultaneity of participating in superior nature, not by simultaneity of existing among themselves.

Secondly I argue: The same divided cannot be divided by double essential division, since essential differences divide genus equally, and are adequately opposed among themselves within same genus; but proposition is divided essentially into categorical and hypothetical, as was said, in the preceding article; therefore it cannot again be divided essentially into affirmative and negative, since one division is not contained under another. And I confirm: Because of genera not subalternately posited the same cannot be species, as is said in Antepredicaments; but categorical and hypothetical are genera not subalternately posited; therefore they cannot be divided by same essential differences, but each can be divided into affirmative and negative, and again both affirmative and negative, into categorical and hypothetical. Therefore these divisions cannot be essential, but accidental.

I respond: In the first place there is no inconvenience that the same is divided by several essential divisions immediately, when they are inadequate divisions, when namely some essence is constituted by several formalities, of which any one is partible into some species. Which is doctrine of Saint Thomas, 1-2, question 95, article 4, where he says: "That there are many things of the nature of human law according to any one of which human law can properly and through itself be divided", and there he numbers diverse divisions through itself and essential of human law according to inadequate considerations. Indeed in divisions of predicaments it is not necessary that every division be made through two adequate species, but through several, by which same genus can be

divided; just as animal can be divided into walking and flying, and again into reptile and swimming and into many and various essential species. And similarly quality is divided immediately into habit and disposition, into potency and impotency etc.

Secondly it can be responded that affirmation and negation are not immediate division of proposition, but subdivision of it. For first it is divided into categorical and hypothetical, but categorical into affirmative and negative. Which Saint Thomas took from the Philosopher, in 1 Perihermenias, Chapter on enunciation, there lecture 8, saying: "That some enunciation is one simple, some one by conjunction." And immediately he adds: "Another subdivision of enunciation is that if enunciation is one, either it is affirmation, or negation." Which will immediately be explained more amply.

To the confirmation I respond: From this last solution the antepredicamental rule does not have place here, since they are subalternately posited genera division into categorical and hypothetical, and subdivision of categorical into affirmative and negative. And when it is insisted that also hypothetical is divided into affirmative and negative, I respond first that hypotheticals are not said affirmative or negative through themselves, except by reason of their categoricals, from which they consist; for hypothetical copulas themselves are not properly negated, but verbal copulas, from whose negation propositions even hypothetical are rendered negative. Whence when contradictories are made in hypotheticals, negations are posited in categorical copulas, not in hypothetical (unless perhaps negation is preposed to whole enunciation); as if you say this copulative: Peter runs, and John reads, its contradictory will be this disjunctive: Peter does not run, or John does not read, as Master Soto well notes, book 3 Summary, chapter 9, note 5, where hypothetical copulas, namely the term 'and', the term 'or' are not negated in either place.

Secondly I respond: That, if hypothetical is divided through itself into affirmative and negative, such affirmation and negation is far diverse from affirmation and negation, which divides categorical, because categorical and hypothetical copulas are far diverse, and thus are not capable of affirmation and negation according to same nature; for categorical copula is verb, but hypothetical copula is mode, like the term 'and', the term 'or', the term 'if'. Just as quality which is disposition in genus is divided into permanent disposition, which is habit, and transient, which is disposition only; and yet when quality is also divided into passion and passible quality according to this that it is permanent and transient, it is not divided by same differences of permanent and transient, by which disposition, but by diverse ones.

Lastly I argue: For some propositions are simultaneously affirmative and negative, or of mixed quality, like this proposition: Peter is, and was not white; therefore this division is not essential, because two essential differences cannot belong to same individual. Nor can it be said that that is double proposition and not one; for it is against this, because it consists only of one subject and predicate, and can be judged by one judgment; therefore it is one formally, although virtually it can be multiple, because many can be formed from it. And I confirm, because affirmative and negative proposition can be synonymous, like: Man is rational, man is not irrational, therefore they are of same species. The consequent is evident, because they regard same object, but species is taken from object.

I respond: That in propositions of mixed quality double proposition is found virtually, because it is quasi double, although it is said of same subject, because copula is multiplied; but nevertheless, because it is formally one proposition, that proposition of mixed quality which infers one affirmative will be said to pertain to species of affirmative, and will pertain to negative that which is inferred from one negative, as we said in the text, in chapter on divisions of proposition. And thus one proposition is not constituted formally in double species, but formally in one only, virtually however, because it is double, in two.

To the confirmation I respond: That those two propositions, although they are of same species on the part of matter or subject materially considered, nevertheless on the part of form and artificial mode of enunciating they are diverse; which is to be of same species posterioristically, but diverse prioristically; just as from same object and matter enthymeme and syllogism can be made, which in nature of artificial discourse and consequence are of diverse species, but posterioristically then will be of same nature.

QUESTION VI.
ON SUPPOSITION AND OTHER PROPERTIES OF PARTS OF ENUNCIATION.

The order of doctrine demands that, having explained the essence or nature of proposition, we begin to explain its properties. And we shall first treat of properties of parts, in this question; then of properties of whole proposition, in the following. Properties of parts are supposition, ampliation etc., properties of whole, opposition, conversion, equipollence.

ARTICLE I.
Whether the definition of supposition is good.

We defined in text supposition as acceptation of term for something of which it is verified according to requirement of copula; hence for its exact explication three things must be inquired. First concerning genus, how it is understood that supposition is acceptation. Second concerning difference, how verification of term is according to requirement of copula. Third, whether supposition is found only within proposition.

FIRST DIFFICULTY. Concerning the first, acceptation in definition of supposition is taken for passive use, or ordination of intellect, by which it uses some term, or orders and compares it in order to something. And it is established that supposition is distinguished from signification, since signification of term is permanent and one, but supposition can be varied with same signification remaining; because that depends on imposition, which is not changed, this on application and use of intellect, by which it applies and uses some term. And since this acceptation is passive, or passive use of term, which supposes and is accepted, it necessarily requires active acceptation, which is nothing other than act of intellect ordering and comparing the term itself, and consequently denominating it not only known, but also thus directed, and applied, and accepted; and in this passive acceptation the relation itself of reason is founded, in which formally consists intention of supposition.

Second it must be said that acceptation as such is common to multiple and various intentions, which are founded in acceptation; as is notion of predicate and subject, notion of ampliation and restriction, and appellation, and similar, which all are founded in some acceptation of intellect, that is in some ordination and comparison, by which it compares some term according to diverse considerations and notions: either comparing one term to another in notion of subject and predicate, which are respects of that of which something is said and what is said of something, or in notion of application, by which signified of one determines signified of another, as in appellation, or comparing term to that for which it is substituted, as in supposition, or to those to which it is extended, or to which it is restricted as in ampliation and restriction. Therefore this acceptation of intellect, which is placed as genus of supposition, is nothing other than ordination of intellect concerning some term, not that it signify (for imposition does this, not acceptation of term), nor that it make proposition absolutely (for this pertains to exercise of term in notion of part), but that it be coordinated and applied according to diverse respects and uses with other terms and with whole proposition.

But you object: Because if acceptation is common to every intention, which is founded in passive use of intellect, as intention of predicate and subject, appellation, ampliation etc.; therefore acceptation should be placed in definition of all these intentions as genus, and not in definition of supposition alone: indeed it should be placed in definition of sign, for also sign is accepted for that which it signifies and is substituted for that. Or if with respect to those it is not genus, neither with respect to supposition.

And it is confirmed: Because in this proposition: Divine essence is Father, the term 'divine essence' is accepted for Father; and yet it does not suppose for that; therefore the definition is bad. The major is proved: Because if it were accepted for Son, or Holy Spirit, or for whole Trinity, it would be false; therefore it is accepted for Father alone. The minor is proved: For if it supposes for Father this could be conceded: Divine essence generates, because it supposes for Father, who generates, just as it is conceded that man walks, because Peter walks, for whom man supposes, although it does not directly signify Peter, just as neither does divine essence Father. And it is confirmed second: For in closed book term supposes, since written proposition is found there; therefore also supposition: and yet there it is not accepted passively by intellect, as it were in act, because it is not known in act; therefore essence of supposition does not consist in actual use and acceptation of intellect.

I respond: That in other properties, or intentions, which are founded in passive use of intellect acceptation is always understood; as when it is said: Appellation is application of formal signified etc., sense is that it is applicative acceptation. And when it is said that ampliation is extension etc., extensive acceptation is understood. But it is expressed rather in supposition than in others because, since it is first among these logical properties which belong to term within proposition, common notion itself could not be expressed by another name, except through acceptation. But other properties, which are as it were additions, either extending, or restricting, or modifying etc., can be expressed by other names. But sign is not accepted or substituted for signified by that genus of acceptation of which we speak here, for it is substituted only in presenting, or signifying by means of imposition, or representation; but at present we speak of acceptation as it were applicative and ordinative of signifying term to some use of intellect.

To the first confirmation I respond: That, as St. Thomas says, Part 1, question 39, article 5, ad 4, Divine essence does not suppose for Father from mode of signifying (which is maximally attended to in verification of expression), since it is signified as abstracted from persons; but by reason of identity and highest simplicity it will be able to suppose for Father, or be verified of him. And therefore when identity is signified through verb

"is," divine essence is accepted and supposes for person, by reason of identity; but when notional and proper act of person is signified, the term 'essence' does not suppose for person, because then identity is not signified, but property of person, from which by mode of signifying the term 'essence' abstracts.

To the second confirmation I respond: That in closed writing proposition and supposition, and remaining logical properties are found, as it were in sign not actually known; and therefore only virtually, but not in act are such intentions there. Yet it is not to be conceded in the same mode that sign is there virtually, and not formally, because writing itself, which is in closed book formally in itself is imposed to signify, just as also voices; and thus although writing does not actually represent, yet it is actually imposed, and therefore actually is sign, because actual essence of sign does not consist in actual exercise of representing, because sign is said representative, not representation. But supposition is founded in actual application and use of intellect. Although also relation of reason of sign, which is found in closed book is not actually existing, unless it is actually known, nevertheless it is denominated sign from imposition itself and proximate foundation of this relation. Concerning which we shall say more, question 21 of Logic.

SECOND DIFFICULTY. To the second difficulty posited from beginning, which touches difference of supposition, namely that it is acceptation for something for which it is verified, to respond, it must be noted that, as we said in Text, chapter 10, verification of term is one thing, verification of proposition another; for it stands that some proposition is not verified, as this: Man is stone, and yet terms truly suppose and are verified. And thus verification of proposition is taken according to being itself or not being from part of thing, as is signified through being or not being of proposition. But for verification of term supposing it suffices that that for which it supposes, can be found and designated according to requirement of that copula and verb, to which it is applied, that it suppose, as we said more widely in cited place. And this verification, or designation, can sometimes be made to sense, as if thing is demonstrable to sense, or to intellect if it is hidden or considered in abstract, as we said in same place. Indeed sometimes demonstration cannot be made in term itself immediately, but mediately and with resolution of that made; as when I say: Every man is animal, I should not demonstrate something which is every man, but with that universal resolved into its singulars: This man is animal, and that etc., in any of those can be demonstrated: This is man.

This supposed, some recent authors do not admit supposition in this sense that it should be verified for something according to requirement of copula; hence only remains for us to prove that it is so to be admitted. And foundation is because some propositions are

given of subject not supposing, when namely some restriction is joined to some term, or term repugnant to it; as if you say: Corporeal angel is moved; Created God understands, the terms 'angel' and 'God' do not suppose, because corporeal angel is not given, nor created God. And this therefore because, that term be substituted for something, it is fitting that it not be impeded, nor something repugn to it, that it can be substituted for such thing: therefore similarly, if in order to some copula it repugns to find that for which it is substituted, it will not be able to be substituted for that with such copula standing; as if you say Adam is, Antichrist was, such Antichrist is not given, who was, nor such Adam, who is; therefore it cannot be substituted for that. Therefore verification of term according to copula is required for substitution, or supposition, that is that that for which term supposes can be found and designated, according to signification of such copula.

But you will say: For in some propositions subject supposes and is not verified according to copula; therefore etc. The antecedent is proved: First, in false propositions, as: Adam is; Antichrist was. Those propositions are false, because predicates do not belong to things, for which subjects suppose, otherwise we would not understand falsity of proposition, unless we knew to whom predicate is unconvenient, or repugnant; therefore that subject supposes for something. And in this proposition: Chimera will be, the term 'chimera' supposes, since it is ampliated by verb "will be," and ampliation is extension from lesser to greater supposition, and yet it is not verified according to copula that chimera will sometime be; therefore supposition stands well, just as also ampliation, without verification. Second, in optative and imperative propositions, terms can suppose, because they are said determinately of something, and yet they are not verified according to some copula, because there is none there. And finally in propositions of eternal truth, as: Man is animal, term cannot be verified, by demonstrating it through pronoun "this," to some difference of time, since that verb is absolved from all time; therefore supposition is given without verification. It is confirmed: Because verification of term is made through another proposition distinct from that in which term supposes, as we said; therefore such verification cannot pertain to constitutive and essential difference of supposition.

I respond by denying the antecedent. To the first proof it is said: those propositions are therefore false, because they are of subject not supposing, because according to that copula something is not found for which they suppose. But it is not always required for falsity that term suppose for something, to which predicate is unconvenient, but it suffices that it not suppose, that is not be found under such copula, and yet predicate is affirmed of that. But in that proposition: Chimera will be, either ampliation is not properly given, because true supposition is not given; or, if ampliation is there, it should not be taken for

greater extension of supposition, but for extension of supposita or times to which ampliation is made, whether term supposes, or not.

To the second proof I respond: That in those optative expressions etc., terms suppose according to requirement of copula. As in optatives, if they are concerning future the term is verified from part of subject for that which is or will be, as if you say: Would that Peter become just, the term 'Peter' supposes for Peter, who is or will be; if it is concerning past, as Would that he had been just, it supposes for that which is, or was, and so concerning others. In imperatives it supposes for present, as if you say: Peter, do this, Peter should suppose for present, to whom it is commanded; and similarly in vocatives etc. And so for supposition expression suffices in which copula is found according to whose requirement such term can be found and demonstrated, and thus we understand to suppose only in proposition, taking proposition for every expression consisting of copula. But in natural supposition, where truth abstracts from time, verification of supposing subject is not demonstrated to sense, but to intellect, because it is verified according to existence of verb abstracting from time. As if you say Peter is man, the term 'Peter' supposes by demonstrating Peter through intellect according to itself, as saying that which is Peter, the term 'is' abstracting from time; and when I say: Man is animal, by demonstrating through intellect this which is man according to itself, not by reason of singular or universal state.

To the confirmation I respond: That verification of term does not constitute supposition, according as it is made as it were in signed act, and as demonstrated through another proposition; but verification in exercised act is made in the proposition itself in which it supposes, but afterwards it is manifested and proved in another distinct proposition.

THIRD DIFFICULTY. To the third difficulty proposed from beginning, I respond: Term in no way supposes actually outside proposition or expression consisting of copula, according to whose requirement acceptation of term can be verified. Reason is taken from what has been said: Because supposition is not substitution according to reason of signification alone (for thus it is established to be found outside proposition), but with signification supposed term is substituted for something according to application and respect to another. Therefore that it truly suppose, it is required that thus that for which it supposes can be found and designated, otherwise if it is not found, nor is designable, it is also not applicable in such substitution. But from this it is established to find, or to be able to be designated that for which it supposes, if it is demonstrated through some copula, because by reason of some verb it is established that it is, or is not, or that for which something supposes is found. Therefore it is necessarily required that term be joined to some verb, that with respect to that that for which term is accepted can be found

and demonstrated. Add that with respect to one copula it can be substituted, with respect to another it cannot; as if you say: Adam was, the term 'Adam' supposes with respect to past; but if you say: Adam is, it does not suppose, because it is not found, and consequently nor is verified with respect to present time. And sometimes also supposition is varied by reason of copula not taken absolutely but with respect to predicate; as when I say: Man is name, man is species, the term 'man' does not suppose by reason of copula "is" alone, as it signifies present time, but it is known to suppose materially in one, and simply in another, because thus predicate united through such copula to term requires; therefore in order to diverse copula diverse species of supposition can be taken.

But you object: For term outside proposition truly has notion of term and part; therefore it speaks order to verb by means of whose conjunction it can compose; therefore it has notion of supposition, just as also it has proximate potency to composition. For just as for composing term does not speak act, but potency, so also for supposing, especially since supposition is property of term, and consequently is not separated from it, neither within, nor outside proposition. And it is confirmed: Because outside proposition also term speaks order to verb, or to another term. Both in imperfect expressions, as if you say: Peter white, just man, where one term can be accepted in order to another; for why would it only be accepted in order to verb. And also in perfect non-enunciative expressions, which truly and properly consist of verb, although not by enunciating, but commanding, or wishing etc. It is confirmed second: For if term only supposes within proposition, because it is substituted according to requirement of verb, it follows that all affirmative true propositions are essential, as is clear in this proposition: Peter runs, which is therefore true, because according to requirement of copula it supposes for Peter running; but of Peter running it is essential to say that he runs; therefore it is essential proposition.

I respond to the principal argument: That there is difference between notion of term and notion of supposition, that intention of term is only intention of part and substitution of signification; but both are not founded in actual exercise itself either of signifying, or composing, but in ability and potency for composing or signifying; for notion of part is not notion of composing, but compositive, and similarly notion of sign is notion of significative, not signifying. But truly intention of supposition results from actual determination and passive use of intellect concerning some term, which it determines and applies, whether in mind, or in voice or writing, for this or that for which it is verified; hence before actual application of intellect this determination is not given. But that it is said to be property of term, I respond that supposition is not property of term in every state, but as it is applied within proposition, just as property of heavy thing is to rest not absolutely, but in center.

To the first confirmation I respond: That outside proposition term speaks respect to verb, or to predicate through mode of part able to compose, but not through mode of determined and substituted act for something, which is truly found to be so substituted, because it cannot be established that it is truly so found, unless in order to some verb it is established to be found. Hence in imperfect expressions not consisting of some verb supposition is not given, because that through which it should be verified and designated how term truly and properly supposes is not yet given. Sign of which is that when terms are joined without verb, as saying: White man, that complex is indifferent to any genus of supposition; for from that complex can be formed material supposition, saying: White man is complex voice, or formal saying: White man segregates sight, or simple saying: White man is predicable of many, or natural saying White man is colored, or accidental saying White man walks. Hence if it is indifferent to all species of supposition, it is manifest that it has none in act, and thus is determined and verified by reason of copula. But in non-enunciative propositions consisting of verb, we already said supposition can be found.

To the second confirmation I respond: That although in that proposition the term 'Peter' supposes identically for Peter running, yet that proposition is not essential, because for essential proposition it does not suffice that there be identity of subject with predicate from part of supposite and from part of its supposition, but necessary connection and relation of terms is required, which is as it were formal identity. Hence in aforesaid accidental propositions there is indeed true conjunction and union between predicate and subject, yet it is not necessary; hence although they suppose for the same, yet not under that formality of necessary connection, which is required for essential proposition, as if it were formally signified from part of subject, saying: Peter running runs, for then it is essential proposition, because relation of terms not only founds truth, but signifies intrinsic necessity.

ARTICLE II.
Whether improper supposition is found in ultimate concept of mind.

Point of this difficulty arises from definition itself of improper, or metaphorical supposition, which is acceptation for that which term improperly, and by translation signifies; which we see happen in vocal terms, because one term is transferred to supposing for another thing than that, which it directly signifies, because it has some agreement, or similarity, or comparison with it; for every metaphor is founded in some comparison, or similarity. We inquire therefore whether in concept itself of ultimate mind, which is natural likeness of some thing, foundation is found that it can be applied

for that which it does not signify naturally and properly, but for that with which it can have some similarity, or metaphorical comparison. For example, in that common proposition: The lion of tribe of Judah conquered, that there be improper supposition in mind, it is required that concept of true lion, and which is natural and express likeness of lion suppose and be applied for Christ, whom it does not signify properly and directly; for if it supposed for true lion, proposition would be false but that it suppose for Christ improperly, it should not represent him equally directly with representation of true lion, otherwise that concept would be equivocal, and supposition for Christ would not be improper, but proper of both, namely Christ and lion, because it would represent both properly and naturally, just as equivocal name properly supposes for any signified.

The difficulty therefore is: Whether that concept of true lion suffices for improper supposition, as it can at least obliquely connote Christ as similar to lion; or truly another distinct concept is required for supposing, which directly represents Christ with connotation of lion obliquely, not representing Christ absolutely, but compared to lion.

In this point therefore authors are divided. For some simply and absolutely confess improper supposition to be given, because they think in aforesaid metaphor that concept of true lion represents Christ connotatively under analogy, and some similarity to lion in that first mode. But others think that concept of true lion neither represents Christ, nor supposes for him, but another concept is formed representing Christ with some comparison and connotation to true lion, in that second mode, and thus supposes properly by reason of signified thing for Christ with connotation to lion.

NEVERTHELESS I SAY RESOLUTELY: That simply this second opinion in sense of St. Thomas seems more probable; and many Thomists follow this: yet first opinion is not without probability.

First part is deduced from St. Thomas, Part 1, question 13, article 10, where he says: "That when we name God according to participation, we understand by name of God something having similarity of true God." But God according to participation is God metaphorically, just as Christ is lion metaphorically; therefore having heard name of God metaphorically, we understand that which has similarity of true God, and by name of lion metaphorically we understand that which has similarity of true lion; therefore it is not concept of true lion, but distinct concept, namely of that which has similarity of true lion; but this is concept of Christ with some connotation to lion.

And foundation is taken from what has been said. For that metaphorical supposition cannot be verified for that which is true lion, but for that which is as lion; for true lion of

tribe of Judah is not found, nor does it suppose more than if it were said corporeal angel, or roaring man; therefore it only supposes and is verified for that which is as lion. But concept of true lion cannot be concept of that which is as lion, because, as has been said, we form one concept of true lion, another of that which comparatively is related as true lion; therefore if for this second that supposition is verified, and not for first, this second concept will suppose, and not first. But that it be improper supposition, concept of true lion should suppose for that which is not lion, but as lion, not signifying that properly; just as voice lion is drawn to supposing for that which is not lion, but like lion. And it is confirmed: Because concept of true lion only signifies by natural representation true lion, under which Christ is not contained and property of fortitude, to which Christ is assimilated, because he can be compared to it, and by reason of this comparison is named by name of that to which he is compared. But this comparison supposes another concept representing Christ as compared to lion, and not absolutely; for of same to itself there is no comparison: hence metaphorical analogues are called of two concepts, as we shall say in Logic, Question 13, article 5, and God known connotatively or comparatively to creatures speaks another concept from creatures. Therefore since supposition accepts and substitutes term for some thing which is predicated, or subjected, not for that which it connotes obliquely, although it can be named from that in voice, it follows that in mind concept of true lion does not suppose for Christ, although it is connoted by Christ, but concept of Christ, as compared to lion, and this does not suppose improperly.

From which it is inferred that that concept of true lion, when someone conceives that proposition: Lion conquered, it is not necessary that it be corrupted, with that particle "of tribe of Judah" added, but intellect forms another concept of Christ according as he has connotation and comparison to concept of true lion, and thus first concept of true lion is not related as supposing thing, but as terminating comparison and connotation of Christ to himself.

Second part of conclusion, which also some Thomists hold following Master Soto, book 2, Summulae chapter 10, notable 3, is founded in this that for supposing signification of some thing is not required, but ordination and application of intellect even for that which it does not signify, but for that to which signified is assimilated. For it suffices that it signify something at least secondarily, that it be said to have capacity that it be substituted by intellect and suppose for that, and not only for that which it directly and formally signifies; just as common term signifies individuals secondarily and materially, and yet supposes for them, and connotative term for substrate which it only connotes, and one analogue for its analogates, even if it is of metaphorical attribution.

The arguments are solved.

First it is argued: Because it stands well that some concept signifies something improperly; therefore it stands well that it supposes improperly. The consequence is established, since whole reason of denying improper supposition is negation of improper signification in concept. The antecedent is proved in all concepts representing thing not as it is in itself, but after manner of another and not through proper species, but through alien; as we know God and angels through sensible things, and being of reason through real being, and through concept of one analogate another analogate; therefore it does not repugn that concept be given signifying improperly. And it is confirmed in connotatives and common terms, which suppose for individuals which they import in connoted and oblique; therefore also concept of true lion will be able to suppose for Christ signified in connoted and oblique. And same is in alienation, which is found in concept of mind, since it is certain logical property, which is second intention, and yet it is defined that it is distraction from proper to improper supposition, and so it is supposed that improper supposition is truly given in mind.

I respond by denying the antecedent. To the proof it is said: That concepts, which represent things not as they are in themselves, but through alien species, are improper concepts from part of mode of representing, yet not from part of represented thing, although after manner of another known. Just as concept which we form of God, or of angels, from part of known thing is said to be proper concept of God, because it is attributed and appropriated to him alone, but from part of mode of knowing it is not known in proper mode, as it is in itself. And same is concerning other concepts related in argument. But for improper supposition it is required that from part of thing, for which it supposes, it not signify that properly, because supposition is not for mode of signifying, but for signified thing. But analogue, if it is of metaphorical attribution, is not analogue of one concept but diverse, and therefore one concept does not suppose improperly for another, but each for its signified.

To the confirmation I respond: That in connotative, or common term, supposition is made for that which is connoted, and not only for formal signified, because that which is connoted is imported as thing, or subject, or supposite, hence it can suppose for that by proper supposition, because it is signified not metaphorically, but properly, although as material. But truly in metaphors and other rhetorical figures, that which is connoted is imported as term of comparison, because every metaphor is made through some formal or virtual comparison, hence it pertains as it were to connotation from part of mode of signifying, not from part of signified thing, and thus does not suppose for that, but

another concept is formed, which properly signifies thing with connotation to that through which metaphor is designated. But what is said concerning alienation, we deny that to be found in ultimate concept, because this cannot be alienated unless it is corrupted; but that second intention belongs to voice or non-ultimate concept, by reason of which distraction or alienation of signification is verified.

Second it is argued: These two propositions "Lion of tribe of Judah conquered," "Christ conquered," are not synonymous, but signify in diverse mode; but in this proposition: Christ conquered, Christ is signified properly; therefore in other the same cannot be properly signified, for thus propositions would remain the same from every part. If it is said that in one it signifies Christ properly absolutely and without any respect, but in other properly with some respect and connotation. Against this is: Because if there is not proper signification absolutely in that proposition "Lion conquered" etc., therefore neither is there proper supposition absolutely, because proper supposition is founded in proper signification; therefore, that it be proper absolutely, it should be founded in proper signification absolutely.

And it is confirmed: Because when I first hear those two terms: "Lion conquered," concept of true lion is represented to me; but with that particle "of tribe of Judah" coming, that prior concept of true lion within proposition is not corrupted; therefore it remains within that just as before; therefore it supposes not for itself, because proposition would be false; therefore for Christ, whom it does not signify properly; therefore it supposes improperly. That concept of true lion is not corrupted is clear: Because if it is corrupted, therefore Christ is not conceived in order to lion, but in himself absolutely without respect, since concept of lion does not remain in order to which this connotation is taken; hence it would be same proposition: Christ conquered, and Lion of tribe of Judah conquered.

I respond with given solution, which is taken from words of St. Thomas related above, that "when I name God through participation, that which has similarity of true God is understood." Hence similarly when I name Christ lion, that which has similarity of true lion is understood, and this from part of signified thing is proper concept of Christ. To the reply it is said that concept of Christ known connotatively, and not entirely absolutely, is proper to Christ from part of signified thing, although not from part of mode of signifying, because it is signified with some connotation and respect to another. But proper or improper supposition is not attended from part of mode of signifying properly or improperly, but from part of thing properly or improperly signified, for it is substituted and supposes for that as for supposite, and by same reason Christ is signified immediately

as signified thing, although under respective and connotative mode to another as to term of comparison.

To the confirmation I respond: That it is not necessary that that concept of true lion be corrupted, but nevertheless, with that particle "of tribe of Judah" coming, it is applied otherwise, because concept of Christ is formed, as he is compared to true lion as to his fortitude, or properties; hence concept of true lion remains, as term of such comparison and connotation, not as offering supposition of term from part of thing signified improperly.

Finally it is argued: For if concept of true lion is first formed, when I begin to hear that proposition, and afterwards I form concept of Christ not absolutely, but relatively and connotatively to true lion; therefore through discourse that proposition is formed, insofar as from collation and comparison of one to another we gather that we want to signify Christ by such metaphor. But if it is gathered through discourse, and discourse is formed from propositions as from premises, therefore these propositions will first be formed: Lion of tribe of Judah conquered, and that is not true lion, but having similarity of true lion, therefore Christ as having such similarity conquered. But then in premises that first proposition: Lion conquered, etc., before it infers conclusion does not suppose for true lion, for thus it would be false; therefore then concept of true lion supposes for Christ improperly which is intended.

I respond: That since in these metaphors intellect uses certain circuit and comparison for signifying things, it can also use discourse in gathering signification of such metaphor, especially when immediately from beginning it does not fully comprehend metaphor, but needs discourse that it understand that. Therefore given that discourse intervenes there, to the instance I respond that in that proposed discourse that first proposition which is assumed for premise "Lion of tribe of Judah conquered," does not concur there as it were formally, but as it were materially, and with another proposition placed in ultimate concept, namely: This vocal proposition is proposed; lion of tribe of Judah conquered, this is not verified according to signification of true lion, therefore according to signification of that which has similarity of true lion, this is Christ, therefore etc. This is discourse, which is formed for these metaphors; for proposition metaphorically represented is assumed as it were for major, and since it is not verified in proper sense, discourse is made for seeing in what sense it can be verified; hence when metaphorical proposition is assumed in major, before metaphor is fully understood through discourse, that proposition is not in ultimate concept, but in non-ultimate concept, which represents vocal proposition, and then discourses concerning its sense, and when it finds it to be

verified metaphorically, it forms in ultimate mind concept of that, who has similarity of true lion, who is Christ, and this supposes in conclusion, and it is proper supposition.

Finally if you say: Why can voice be applied for that which it does not signify directly, but in metaphorically connoted, but concept cannot? I respond, that in voice, since it is not natural representation something can be understood and not signified by it, and by reason of understood thing be accepted and suppose. But concept naturally represents and compares one to another, and thus supposes, since by reason of thing only signified it supposes.

ARTICLE III.
What is to be noted concerning other species of supposition and logical properties.

Concerning simple supposition there is wont to be difficulty: How it is distinguished from other suppositions, and first from natural supposition? For it seems that in simple supposition also necessary connection and relation of terms is imported; for when I say: Man is species, therefore it is simple supposition, because it makes this sense: Man conceived by proper concept, or in general is species, but that predicate species essentially belongs to common concept of man, therefore it imports essential connection of terms. Also from another heading definition of simple supposition belongs to natural, as when definition is predicated of defined; as if you say: Man is rational animal, the term 'man' is accepted for immediate signified, which it signifies per se and formally, for thus man is defined that Peter or Paul is not defined in singular therefore definition of simple supposition also belongs to natural, in which definition is predicated of defined.

Second difficulty is: Whether simple supposition can be found in singular term, as when I say: Peter is individual. For singular term does not seem to have immediate signified distinct from mediate, by reason of which it can suppose simply, but only has unique and adequate, for which it supposes singularly. But from other part it seems that, just as in this term man, when some term of second intention is predicated of it, simple supposition is given, because it does not pass to mediate signifieds, for it is not valid: Man is species, therefore Peter is species; so similarly when some predicate of second intention is predicated, which does not belong to nature in general, but only to individual, it also supposes simply, hence in same mode it is not valid: Peter is individual and is not predicable of many, therefore man is individual and is not predicable of many.

Finally in propositions, in which predicate of second intention repugns to subject, as if you say Peter is species, man is individual, subject should suppose simply, because predicate is term of second intention, which does not pass to mediate signifieds; and yet it is not accepted for that which it first and per se signifies, since concept of predicate repugns to concept of subject, and consequently does not appeal to proper and per se concept of that; therefore etc.

To these difficulties I respond briefly supposing simple supposition to be distinguished from material and personal: From that indeed, because simple supposition is for the signified thing itself, not for the signifying name itself; but from personal truly, because it supposes for immediate signified alone and in no way for mediate. For that doctrine of St. Thomas must be kept before eyes, question 9 on Power, article 4, that name signifies in two ways, in one mode formally, in another mode materially. Formal signified is that, for signifying which name is principally imposed, material is that in which such notion signified through name is preserved and found, as name man signifies nature of man, but it is preserved in individual. Therefore that there be simple supposition it is required that thus it suppose for one signified namely immediate, that it cannot pass, nor descend to mediate, because if it can pass to both it does not remain simple, but as it were double supposition and as it were convenient to double signified. But this only happens in predicates of second intention, with respect to their subject, or foundation; for if they are real predicates, by this very fact they can be found from part of thing, and consequently in some individual, and not only in nature; therefore it does not suffice for simple supposition that some predicate be given which belongs to immediate signified of name, but it is required that it belong with some precision so to one signified, that not to another.

To the first difficulty therefore I respond: That that proposition is in no way essential. For that propositions be essential it is fitting that necessary connection and relation be imported from force of terms themselves, not from force of some application or state, by which some term is clothed or applied, unless such application or state is explained in proposition, for then from force of term explaining state necessary connection with predicate will be able to be imported. As if you say: Man segregates sight, although subject is verified for white man and supposes for that, nevertheless because from force of that term man whiteness itself is not imported, to which it essentially belongs to segregate, therefore this proposition is not essential. But if you say: White man segregates, it is essential. Similarly if you say: Man is species, although it is verified for man conceived in general, nevertheless it is not essential proposition, because from force of that term man it is not explained that it is concept in general. But if it is expressed in

proposition man conceived by common concept, then it will be predicated essentially of that that it is species; for it makes this sense: Man insofar as species, is species.

To the instance for other part it is said: That definition, although it belongs to term by reason of nature and quiddity, nevertheless it is not simple supposition, because it does not so precisely belong to nature, which is immediate signified, that it cannot also belong to person, or individual in which such nature is found; indeed just as quiddity and nature descends to individuals, so also definition. And although when man is defined, Peter is not defined immediately and according to individuation, nevertheless he is defined mediately according to nature and quiddity of Peter.

To the second difficulty I respond: That also in singular term simple supposition can be found, because immediate and mediate signified is found, but in inverse mode to common term. For in common term immediate signified is nature, and mediate is person to whom nature belongs; but in singular terms, immediate signified is person, or individual, but mediate is nature, of which it is person, hence person is defined as individual substance of rational nature. Where immediate and direct signified is substance, or individual supposite, but mediate or indirect is nature. Therefore all those predicates, which import second intention of singularity, make simple supposition in singular term, and not personal; for example, when it is said of Peter that he is something inferior subjectable to atomic species, which is predicable of one and not of many, which is individual and similar, in which consequence is valid from singular to common term, as is said in argument.

To the third difficulty I respond: Both can be sustained in those propositions, both that subject supposes simply, and that it supposes personally. First thus: Because by this very fact that subject through copula is united to term of second intention according to requirement of such copula, it makes as it were appellation to standing under notion of proper and immediate concept; and although predicate is repugnant to subject, this only convinces that it does not belong to it, and thus proposition is rendered false, yet not that subject does not suppose according to requirement of that copula and predicate. Therefore that proposition makes this sense: Peter as conceived by proper concept is species, and therefore it is false; just as also in this: Man is stone, the term 'man' supposes because, although predicate does not belong to it, nevertheless man can be found and demonstrated according to requirement of verb "is"; otherwise it does not appear by what supposition that subject "Peter is species" supposes, if it does not suppose simply, since personal supposition does not belong with respect to that predicate of second intention. But second is explained thus, saying that it can suppose by personal supposition: because

although predicate is of second intention, nevertheless it is not signified to belong to subject, but to repugn; it repugns to subject also from part of thing. Therefore where predicate of second intention is repugnant to subject, it is not fitting that it make that suppose simply, because also in personal supposition it repugns to it, and in its mediate signified, which is from part of thing.

Concerning other species and divisions of supposition and their rules, both for absolute and relative terms, many sophisms and consequences are wont to be multiplied which, if they were exactly treated here, this work would grow immensely, therefore we omit those at present, intending to indicate principal ones in following Question, article 3.

Concerning alienation this comes to be noted at present: Whether propositions in which alienation of subject from predicate is made are in contingent, or remote, or necessary matter, as when I say Man is painted, man is dead? For if subjects are alienated they do not suppose for true man, but for painted and dead man, of which it is essentially said that he is dead or painted.

I respond: That that predicate painted and dead can be taken in two ways, in one mode participially, or in force of verb, in another mode nominally, or in force of name. Participially that proposition is verified: Man is dead, through ampliation of subject concerning true man, not through alienation for we say through ampliation concerning true man that he is dead, that is he died, or ceased to be; and this is said of true man, because it makes this sense: Man who before was, now is not, but ceased to be. Similarly if it is said: Man is painted participially it makes this sense: True man is depicted through picture, whether that man exists now, or not. And in this sense these propositions are in contingent matter, because predicates happen to their objects. And although they are present to them with corruption of subject, it is not with corruption of essential concept, but only with corruption of existence, which does not remove accidental predication, as will be said in Categories, chapter on accident. But if that proposition is considered without ampliation, precisely in force of terms, it is in remote matter, because those two terms man and dead, man and painted repugn among themselves, because something cannot be man and dead. But truly if the term 'dead' is taken nominally, thus it makes alienation of subject; for it is the same to say: Dead man, as to say: Corpse of man; painted man, picture of man. But concerning subject thus alienated it is established that that predicate is verified necessarily, because that alienation leaves term as it were in alien signification, that is of corpse of man and picture, of which the terms 'dead' and 'painted' are essentially said. Therefore then it is in natural matter.

ARTICLE IV.
Whether rules of appellation handed down in text are true.

Before difficulties are proposed, I suppose three things: First is that common acceptation of intellect, by which it uses some term, can apply two terms among themselves in double mode: first by as it were simple application and general mode, and thus that which is related as form is applied to that which is related as matter and subject; and this is called simple and absolute application, because it is not made by means of respect, or modification, but in absolute and simple mode. Second, application of one term to another can be made not absolutely and simply, but by means of some respect, or modification, or formality of one to formality of another, by reason of which one is verified of another precisely as it stands under that modification and not otherwise, hence if it is varied and changed, consequence is vitiated; and such application we call appellation in special mode, as when I say: Peter is great physician, where greatness is not applied to Peter absolutely, but respectively to medicine.

Second it follows from this that opinion of some recent authors is false, who define appellation as denomination, by which one term denominates another, and preserve that in application, by which formal of one term is applied to material of another, as when it is said: Man sits, man runs etc. But this opinion confuses general application of predicate to subject with special property of logic, which is called appellation. But that this is false is established: for application and use of term is found in diverse mode, when predicate is applied simply and absolutely to some subject held materially, and when it is applied only as it stands under some respect and modification; for this pertains to signifying truth in diverse mode, and from its variation consequence is rendered defective and vicious; therefore such appellation or application should have special consideration in Logic, and induces special logical property, which we call appellation; just as it is not valid: Peter is great physician, therefore he is great absolutely.

Third, rules of appellation placed in text must be recalled to memory, both concerning real appellation, and concerning appellation of reason. But special difficulty is added in real appellation concerning numeral terms, when they are applied to substantive, or adjective term. For when numeral term is added to substantive term, it is said to number supposites by reason of form, and thus appellation intervenes there, because supposites are not numbered unless they are numbered according to multiplication of forms; in which rule it is not said that forms are numbered, but that supposites are numbered by reason of forms. And so supposites should be numbered, and forms themselves should be reason of numbering, hence if many supposites are not given, rule does not run. And it

proceeds concerning substantial form according to its natural mode, that is as it brings with itself its supposite and subsists; and thus, that there be three men, three humanities are required, that there be three gods, three deities. But that adjectives be numbered, it suffices that supposites be multiplied, although adjective forms are not multiplied, but only their denomination; as if one whiteness were in many supposites they would be said to be many white things, because this plurality does not result from multiplication of whiteness, but from multiplication of adjection and denomination.

Therefore against first rule argument can be made: Because appellation is given even if terms are not placed from part of same extreme; therefore rule is false. The antecedent is clear: In this proposition: White is intense, or: White segregates sight, and: Christ as man is creature appellation is made to subjects from part of predicate for sense is that Christ by reason of humanity is creature; otherwise if that predicate were applied to supposite, it would be false. Similarly in that proposition: This white is intense defective consequence can be made from variation alone of appellation, as if you say: This white is intense, this white is similar, therefore similar is intense. Which consequence is not valid only from defect of appellation; therefore it is sign that appellation intervenes there. And when it is said: White segregates sight, it is understood by reason of formal imported in the term 'white', otherwise proposition would not be essential. Same argument can be made concerning this: Essence is generating, in divine things, which is therefore false, because the term 'generating' is applied to formal signified of essence not natural and identical: for if it were applied to identical and material signification of divine essence, that proposition would be true, for it would be verified of Father, who identically is divine essence. And it is confirmed: Because this rule does not hold in appellation of reason; for when I say: Man is species, appellation intervenes there, and yet terms are not placed from part of same extreme; therefore nor does rule hold in real appellation.

I respond: That rule is understood concerning formal and express appellation, not as it were virtual and equivalent. For when I say: White segregates, white is intense etc., it is one thing how application is made or signified to be made, another how verification is made in thing. From part indeed of mode of signifying application of one term to another through appellation is not signified, but only simple application of predicate to subject is signified; but because it cannot be verified, unless by means of some formal reason holding itself from part of subject, it is said virtually and equivalently to have appellation. Therefore in these consequences and similar defect of as it were virtual appellation is given, from variation of as it were double supposite imported from part of subject, namely white as white, or white as similar, which is as it were double logical supposite, although it is one material and physical, and variation from one to another varies

consequence. However appellation, when it is expressly signified and placed, is not made unless, as rule says, when terms are placed from part of same extreme. But in that proposition: Essence generates there is no appellation, but simple application of predicate to subject; but because subject does not signify person, nor suppose for her, but only essence, therefore it is false. And although identically and materially it is the same with person, it is identity from part of signified thing not from mode itself of signifying of this term essence, and thus since significatively, or from mode of signifying it does not import person, personal act is not verified of it.

To the confirmation I respond: That rule only speaks of real appellation, not of reason: because when predicate is second intention, insofar as it is said of first or of its foundation to which it belongs, subject itself, or foundation is signified under state capable of such intention, which is state of precision and acceptation of intellect, under which only such predicate can belong to it; and therefore since it imports precision itself from part of subject, it is placed in sufficient mode for making appellation, because appellation imports agreement of one term to another under some precision, or restriction. Which does not run in other terms, which make real appellation.

Second argument: Numeral term added to substantive sometimes does not number supposites by reason of forms; therefore rule is false. The antecedent is proved: For if divine Word assumed three human natures, it would not be said three men, but one man, as St. Thomas determines, Part 1, question 3, article 7. And yet many substantial forms are numbered; therefore rule is false. And it is confirmed: If conversely three persons assume same humanity, they will be said three men, and only one secundum quid, as St. Thomas says in same place, article 6. Therefore now substantive is numbered not by reason of forms, but by reason of supposites, even if they have one substantial form.

I respond: That in that case there would not be three men, because there would not be three supposites nor does rule say that substantive is plurified when forms are plurified and not supposites, but that supposites are numbered by reason of forms, which is very true; but for this it does not suffice that substantial forms be multiplied, if supposites are not also multiplied (although reason of multiplying are forms themselves), because then forms do not bring with themselves supposites, nor are they in connatural mode, subsisting in themselves.

To the confirmation I respond: That in that case St. Thomas says that those three persons would be one man secundum quid, and simply many, as is clear Part 1, question 3, article 6, ad 1: "because it could not (he says) be argued from this that three persons are one

man, that they would be one simply; for nothing prevents saying men, who are many simply, are one as to something, as one people." Therefore if three persons assumed one nature they would be said three men simply, because that they be one simply unity of substantial form does not suffice, when it does not bring with itself supposite, but comes to many supposites, and has as it were mode of connotative term. And so both plurification, and unity in substantial forms is understood by reason of substantial forms having themselves substantially, that is as they import with themselves their subsistence and supposite, but not as they are drawn to alien supposite, or supposites, and as it were put on laws and mode of connotatives.

But why, you will inquire, are three persons now said one God simply, and not many gods by reason of one nature, but in that case they would not be said one man by reason of one human nature, but many men? I respond the difference consists in this that divine nature, even if it is in three persons, is so perfect in notion of substantial form, as if it were in one person only and brought with itself its supposite; hence divine nature with respect to three persons does not put on notion of connotative term, because it is not drawn to persons, as to assuming and giving being to nature itself, but has being from itself, hence it is made existing simply and substantially independently from persons. And because unity follows being, if it has being perfectly from itself, it brings unity from itself. But truly human nature although it is substantially united to persons, nevertheless does not have in itself total perfection of substance, nor puts on mode of substantial form, but as it were connotative, receiving substantial being from persons themselves; and therefore it is not in perfect state of giving substantial unity simply independent from persons, because it has being not from itself but from persons. But divine nature independently from persons is one God on account of infinite perfection of such being and divine substance. See Cajetan, Part 3, question 3, article 6, at end of article.

Arguments which could be made against rule of appellation of reason are same as those brought in preceding article, treating of simple supposition. See them there.

QUESTION VII.
ON OPPOSITION AND CONVERSION OF PROPOSITIONS.

ARTICLE I.
Whether contradictory opposition is greatest among all oppositions.

I suppose that opposition is one thing real, another logical, that is either of things, or of propositions. And these two so relate themselves, that real or physical opposition is quasi

object of logical opposition, because that being and not being, which is given on the part of thing and in objects themselves, is signified through opposed propositions. Whence, although to act concerning real opposition pertains to Metaphysician, nevertheless because it looks to Logician to act concerning oppositions of propositions, it is also necessary in some mode to attain that which looks to opposition of things, insofar as they are objects of opposition of propositions.

I RESPOND therefore to the proposed difficulty: That contradictory opposition both in propositions, and in things, both dialectical, and physical, is greater among all oppositions. For which conclusion Saint Thomas should be seen, Work 37, chapter 1; and in 10 Metaphysics, lecture 6. The foundation is taken from this that that is greater opposition, in which there is less agreement and one opposite more destroys another: for then they are said to lack medium, because they lack all agreement, in which they can agree in some mode either on the part of subject, or on the part of some third form, which mediates between extremely opposed forms, or in any other mode of agreement. But it is evident that contradictory opposition alone absolutely and in all modes destroys its opposite, but remaining oppositions do not thus absolutely and simply destroy, but leave something of that, and thus have some agreement, and this they have less of opposition.

This is evident by running through individual species of oppositions whether on the part of things, or on the part of propositions. For in all indeed some negation opposed to affirmation is found, but not so purely and absolutely, as in contradiction: For contrary opposition, if it is physical, is concerned between two positive forms, which can be in same subject, either simultaneously, if they are in remiss degrees, or successively, if they are in intense ones; whence one contrary form does not totally destroy another, nor their agreement in subject. Similarly contrary opposition in propositions, which is dialectical opposition, does not remove in one proposition everything that is in another, because at least it does not remove universality and distribution, but contrary propositions should agree in this; and consequently neither does falsity of one destroy falsity of another, and thus it is not negation absolutely negating and removing what is in other extreme. Similarly subcontrariety does not remove particularity, and consequently neither truth, but two subcontrary propositions are simultaneously particular and can be simultaneously true. Finally privative opposition does not remove, but leaves aptitude for opposed form; therefore at least from this part it leaves some agreement with its opposite. Relative opposition also does not include negation, by which one opposite removes another, but rather relatives are simultaneous by nature and cognition, and each posits something positive and being. For which reason the place of Saint Thomas should be understood, question 7 on Power, article 8, to 4, where he says: "That in relatives one does not

remove another, nor includes negation of another." For it is understood not that in one relation there is no negation of its correlative, but that it does not include that through mode of removing and excluding from some subject, but rather supposes such correlative to be given, although in itself it is distinct from that, and is not that, but is to that.

But truly in contradictories negation of one is so pure and absolute, that it removes all agreement with its negated extreme, and thus neither leaves being, nor aptitude, nor universality, nor particularity, but quasi of malignant nature destroys everything. Whence simply and absolutely it is greater opposition intensively, and from that opposition is derived as from more principal to remaining oppositions, which have opposition insofar as they have something of contradiction, as Saint Thomas teaches in cited places, and is said in Logic, in chapter on opposites.

Arguments are solved.

You will object first: For contraries are maximally distant among themselves; therefore they are maximally opposed, because opposition is a certain distance, whence also those opposites which are more immediate seem to oppose less, because they are less distant. But contradictories are immediate because no medium is given between being and not being. Secondly: Because contrariety destroys more, than contradiction; therefore it is greater opposition. The antecedent is evident, because it is more universal in negating; therefore also in destroying. For contrary propositions consist of each universal, one negated, another affirmed; therefore negative is always universal, and consequently negates and destroys more. Thirdly: Because from contraries contradictories follow, both in logical, and in physical. In logical indeed, because it follows well: Every man is white, and no man is white; therefore every man is white, and some man is not white, which are contradictory. But in physical, because hot and cold are contrary, and yet from hot rightly follows not cold, which is contradictorily opposed to cold. Fourthly: Because all other oppositions include contradictory, and add something upon that; therefore they are greater oppositions than contradictories alone. I prove the antecedent: Because they include negation and affirmation; therefore also contradiction, which is perfected through affirmation and negation; therefore all oppositions express contradiction, and are reduced to its principles, and are regulated through it; therefore they add something to opposition of contradiction, and thus are greater.

To the first I respond: That contraries are maximally distant in same genus, and within one genus, but contradictories in every genus; because they are given through negation purely and absolutely, which is outside every genus, and thus negates every being,

whence they are maximally distant, nor do they have medium of agreement with other extreme. But opposites are said immediate to be maximally distant, because they lack medium of agreement. But those which are immediately placed lack medium of situation, and thus are less distant by local distance. But we do not speak of this distance in the present, but of distance of repugnance and opposition. And thus being and not being are more distant; but it lacks medium, that is agreement, because it leaves nothing which it does not remove.

To the second I say: That universal negation in contrary proposition destroys more quasi extensively, and as to mode of signifying through distribution, but not quasi intensively, and in order to destroying everything that is posited in its opposite, both as to truth, and as to falsity, and universality, and particularity etc. For thus contradiction removes everything, but contrariety leaves something, namely universality and falsity. Whence it is one thing to destroy more of its opposite, another to apply negation by distributing to several subjects; contrariety has this second, not the first.

To the third I respond: That from contrary opposition itself contradictory opposition is not formally inferred, but quasi materially, although from one universal proposition that particular is inferred, which is matter of contradictory opposition to another universal; and this illation is not from contrary opposition itself formally, and as contrariety is between two propositions, but from one universal proposition alone it is sufficiently deduced. But from contrary opposition subcontrary is indeed deduced, that is double particular proposition affirmed and negated, which are subalternated to those universals; but this opposition is less. Similarly from physical contrariety contradictory is not formally inferred: for neither from cold is negation of hot inferred absolutely and simply, but negation of hot in this, that is in cold as cold, which is negation in something positive; and this not absolutely, for they can well be simultaneously in same subject in remiss degrees. Secondly it can also be said: It is not inconvenient that from less opposition greater is inferred, which relates itself as origin and principle of less opposition; for from contradictory, as from principle, other oppositions arise. For also specific distinction is less than distinction primo diverse; and yet from distinction of two species distinction of differences is inferred, which are primo diverse among themselves, quasi a posteriori.

To the fourth I respond: That other oppositions add something above contradictory, which diminishes opposition, not which increases, as can be seen in Saint Thomas, Work 37, chapter 1. For since negation of contradiction is pure and absolute negation, but negation of contrariety and privation retains something of positive opposite, it is clear that it

diminishes nature of opposition, because it diminishes absolute nature of negation and removal of its opposite.

ARTICLE II.
Whether there can be given some contradictories which are simultaneously true or false.

We act only concerning contradictories, because with these known it will be easy to assign contraries and subcontraries, by changing particular proposition into universal and conversely.

Therefore in this part innumerable sophisms are customarily made, which try to weaken that inviolable rule concerning contradictories, that they cannot be simultaneously true or false: whence to pursue all would be both tedious and useless, but summarily we will touch some more difficult chapters in assigning contradictories. And that should be noted as certain before all things: that there is no proposition, which is not capable of contradiction, at least by preposing negation to whole proposition; whence in this mode of assigning contradictories there will be no labor. But difficulties are about another mode of contradicting through negation not preposed to whole proposition, but after subject next to verb. Therefore propositions either are of singular term, or of common term, or they are hypothetical. Concerning propositions of singular term there is no difficulty in assigning contradictories, provided same supposition, ampliation, and restriction, and other logical properties are preserved. But by reason of matter there is special difficulty in propositions about future contingent, among which there can be contradiction; as: Peter will run, Peter will not run: therefore then one will be determinately true, another determinately false, since it is impossible that each is true, or each false; therefore only one is true, and one false. But this repugnates contingency about future, because that contingent truth about future cannot be determinate; therefore the law of contradictories does not hold in every matter. I respond: That the law of contradictories is not that one is determinately and in singular true, another determinately false; nor from force of contradiction, which is applied to one proposition, can its truth be determined, because truth should be determined through proper and intrinsic causes, but that contradiction is made to some proposition, is something extrinsic. Therefore the law of contradictories only asks that if one is true, another is false, or conversely. But that this or that in particular is true, or false, contradiction precisely does not make: it suffices for it to save that neither each is true, nor false. But if in future contingents the term 'contingently' is added saying: Peter will contingently run, Peter will contingently not run, they are not contradictory, as we said in book 1, chapter 17. Indeed they are equivalent, because

contingent is to either, and includes indetermination to being and not being. Otherwise if mode is negated, saying: Peter will contingently run, Peter will not contingently run.

Concerning propositions therefore of common term, several difficulties are customarily involved on account of diverse mode of universality and particularity, which is posited in one way and another in diverse propositions. Where it should always be observed that genus of supposition is never changed: but we call genus of supposition those three modes of supposition, namely material, simple and personal supposition; for it is not permitted to change from one into another. And thus in this proposition: Man is species, and others similar of simple supposition, contradiction should not be made through distribution: No man is species etc., but through simple negation: Man is not species. And similarly when particle according to itself is posited, as: Man according to himself is white, man according to himself is not white: for it stands for nature neither singular, nor universal, but according to essential predicates precisely, and thus that negative is true.

This supposed, first you ask: Concerning propositions, which consist of subject having universality or particularity, not absolute but incomplete, like this one: Every animal was in Noah's ark, where the term 'every' distributes for genera of individuals, how should contradictory be assigned? For by saying: Some animal was not, it is also true, like universal negative, demonstrating Peter, who was not there. And similarly in this incomplete universal sign: Quasi any man disputes, and in this: Each man disputes, how are contradictories to be assigned? I respond: Commonly in these propositions others are included virtually, which are quasi exponents of prior proposition; whence we should not assign contradictory to them immediately, unless first with resolution made of included propositions, or with those subunderstood.

Therefore that incomplete distribution, in that proposition, makes this sense: From every species of animals some animal was in Noah's ark; where one universality is posited saying from every, and one particularity saying some; and consequently, to designate contradictory, it is necessary that conversely one particularity is posited with one universality, saying: From some species no animal in Noah's ark, and thus it is false. Therefore that sign every distributes species, not individuals. And similarly that sign some particularizes species, not individuals of that species; whence that argument does not hold: This animal was not in Noah's ark, e.g., Peter, therefore some animal was not, the term 'some' for species of animal, or for incomplete particularity, which namely includes something of universality; for it is virtually to argue from not distributed to distributed. Therefore, with that sign every posited incompletely, its contradictory should be handed down through sign of incomplete particularity (but not through complete

particularity), namely, which is carried to species, and not to individuals. Nor does it hinder that in book 2, chapter 17, we said that, if incomplete modes in each opposed proposition are negated, or affirmed, they participate in no law. For I respond that we spoke of modes, not of incomplete signs; for modes are those which make proposition modal, and incomplete mode is the term 'contingently', which if it is affirmed in both places, or negated, propositions participate in no law.

But in another incomplete sign: Quasi any man disputes, where distribution is made not for all absolutely, but for greater part, first contradictory can be signified through preposition of negation saying: Not quasi any man disputes. But if contradictory is to be signified not through preposition of negation, but in customary mode, contradictory of that cannot be formed by one negation, because that proposition virtually contains two copulative propositions, by which it is composed. For when I say: Quasi any man disputes, it makes this sense: Not every man disputes, and greater part disputes, whose contradictory is to be assigned through opposed disjunctive (for disjunctive imports quasi particularity by reason of that particle or, with respect to copulative, which imports universality by reason of particle and), saying: Every man disputes, or greater part does not dispute. But you will assign contrary through copulative negating universally, namely: Not every man does not dispute, and greater part does not dispute; and in place of the term 'not every' some not can be posited, which is equipollent; and when it is said: Not every man does not dispute, there can also be added: Some man disputes, so that same particularity is retained on account of reason of incomplete distribution. Any other mode of assigning this opposition does not expedite difficulties.

But in that incomplete sign each, other, neither, so that contradictories are assigned it should be considered that the term 'each' and the term 'neither' express distribution not absolutely, but in some binary, just as if you say: any of two, or none of two; and similarly the term 'other', expresses particularity in binary. Whence by reason of this restricted universality this consequence does not hold: Every man runs, therefore each man runs, from not restricted to restricted affirmatively, without constancy of restriction; just as if you said: Every man runs, therefore white man runs. And it is instanced by case in which there is only one man in world, and he runs; for then it does not hold that each runs, since there are not two men, of which that term each is said. Therefore contradictory of the term 'each' is to be assigned according to its exponents: for it can within nature of binary either distribute completely, or still incompletely, as if you say: Each man runs, that is: Of any binary any man runs, and then contradictory should be assigned through the term 'other', in completely complete sense: Other man does not run, that is some of some binary does not run. But if it distributes incompletely, making this sense: Each runs,

that is: of some binary any runs, contradictory should also be assigned through incomplete particularity of the term 'other', saying: Other does not run, that is: of any binary some does not run.

One thing however note, that, if the term 'each' and the term 'neither' are held incompletely, they participate in no law of opposition, because they can be given simultaneously true and simultaneously false. As if you say: Each man disputes, neither man disputes, in incomplete sense, that is: Of some binary any disputes; of some binary none disputes, they are simultaneously true, in case in which there were only two binaries, and one disputed, another not; and they would be false, in case in which only one binary is in world, and one man disputes, another not. For same reason propositions of the term 'other' in incomplete sense are not subcontrary, nor do they participate in any law.

Secondly you ask: How oppositions are made in propositions of plural number, as when it is said: All men run, distributively; All planets are seven, copulatively: It is responded that, if the term 'all' is held copulatively, contradictories are made in that just as when proposition is of singular term; as when it is said: All apostles of God are twelve, the contradictory of that is not: Some apostles are not twelve, but this one: All apostles of God are not twelve, because same collective sign should be preserved in both places. And the reason is: Because collective sign is equivalent to singular by reason of collection applied to determinate matter. Whence just as when I say: This city, this people, collective term is singular, so when I say: All apostles, all planets, the term 'all' collectively, is collection of some determinate matter, namely of these apostles, of these planets, and thus stands in singular, just as if it were said: Number of apostles is twelve, number of planets is seven.

But truly when the term 'all' in plural is taken distributively, some stick in assigning contradictory, and are divided into various opinions. But the matter is easy. For the term 'all' distributively relates itself in the same way in plural and in singular; whence if it is said: All men run, it is sufficiently contradicted saying: Some man does not run; and in case in which there is only one man, not several, if distributive is true, that other is false, but if distributive is false, in that case that particular: Some man, will be true, even if only one runs and others not, and a fortiori if several do not run, for then distributive is false, and particular true. But if you insist: For in similar proposition: All men are more than one, there is truth, in case in which there are several men, and not only one in world; and yet its contradictory cannot be assigned through negation in singular number saying: Some man is not more than one, because this also is true, as is sufficiently evident;

therefore it is not contradictory of that. It is responded: That in this case when it is said: All men are more than one, the term 'all' cannot be taken distributively, but collectively, as is evident, because we cannot descend under the term 'all' saying: This man is more than one, and that one etc. Whence its contradictory should not be assigned through term of singular number; but through sign all, also collectively only.

Thirdly you ask: Concerning this proposition: In this river there are fish, in this river there are not fish, whether they are contradictory? For it seems that yes. Because it is proposition of singular term, and whatever is affirmed in one, is negated in another. On other hand each is rendered true: for affirmative is evident; negative is proved: In this river there are non-fish, that is stones, therefore there are not fish, through rule from affirmative to negative, with predicate varied according to finite and infinite. I respond: That they are contradictory, and negative is false. Nor is it argued according to that rule, because that is understood when whole predicate is infinitized and affected by negation; otherwise it is argued from not distributed to distributed, for the sense is: In this river there are certain beings non-fish, therefore no beings are fish. Just as it does not hold: Peter is seeing not-man, that is stone, therefore he is not seeing man; because the term 'seeing', which is part of predicate, is not affected by negation.

Fourthly it is asked: Concerning propositions, in which special signs of confusion are imported, how contradiction is to be posited in them, e.g., when it is said: Eye is required for seeing, I promise you book, twice I sang mass, and similar?

I respond: That when terms are posited after those verbs I promise, is required and similar, which are signs of special confusion, then those terms are said to suppose confusedly only. But not when they precede verbs themselves, as if you say: Some eye is required for seeing, or without that sign some if you say: Eye is required for seeing; for then the term 'eye' supposes determinately, as is evident from rules of supposition.

I say therefore that, when term stands confusedly, contradiction is not to be made through universal negative, e.g.: Eye is required for seeing, no eye is required for seeing; but contradictory should be assigned through simple negation saying: Eye is required, eye is not required for seeing. The reason is: Because in these signs of special confusion like I promise, is required etc., appellation intervenes virtually, because they do not fall upon following terms absolutely, but as they are subject to that necessity or act of promise; but necessity is not of this or that in particular, but in common, and promise is not carried to this or that determinately, but to species of thing according to itself. Just as also when act of knowing is imported, e.g., when I say: I know lion, it stands well that I know no lion in

singular, because only in common, not in particular I attain. But where appellation intervenes it should remain unchanged in its contradictory. But when confusion of term arises not from special sign of confusion importing appellation, but from the fact that it immediately follows universal affirmative sign, as: Every man is animal, in contradictory it should be changed into universal, as: No man is animal.

But in numerical terms, as when I say: Twice I sang mass, thrice I ate bread etc., there is no appellation. But because those numerical adverbs virtually include universality, therefore they confound following terms; but they include universality, as is evident through their exponent: Once and again I sang mass, where that copulative and, includes universality. Therefore contradictory should be assigned by preposing negation: twice I sang: Not twice I sang, or with proposition resolved into its copulatives once and again I sang, to assign contradictory to that through opposed disjunctive: Either once, or again I did not sing etc. This is easier mode of establishing these oppositions.

One thing however note: That these are subcontrary by law: Eye is required for seeing, no eye is required for seeing; I promise you horse, no horse I promise you, because from contradictory of negative proposition, which is this affirmative: Some eye is required, some horse I promise, that prior confused affirmative is inferred, proceeding from determinate to confused, but not conversely, which is sign of subcontrariety by law, as we showed in book 2, chapter 17. Similarly these are contrary by law: Some eye is required for seeing, eye is not required for seeing, because from that affirmative, which supposes determinately, confused: Eye is required is inferred, which is contradictory of that negative, but not conversely.

Fifthly you ask: How contradictories are to be assigned to propositions consisting of complex subject, like: Any horse of man runs, Peter who flies is man, irrational man is animal, and other similar?

I respond: That in these complexes sometimes one term relates itself as restricting and determining another, sometimes not. When they do not restrict themselves, contradictories are to be assigned in customary mode, as if you say: Man and horse are animals, contradictory will be: No man, or horse are animals. But if one term restricts and determines another, either each is direct, like white man, just man, where adjective restricts substantive, and then each term is distributed by one distribution and particularized by one sign, and thus contradictory should be assigned just as if it were one term, as: Every just man prays, some just man does not pray. Or one term relates itself in direct and another in oblique, and then it can be held in two ways: in one way, so that

oblique follows direct, like horse of man, and then it is said taken by one acceptance, because it is reputed as one term, just as if it were adjective, for it is the same to say horse of man, and possessed horse. In another way oblique precedes direct, like of man horse, and then it is said taken by several, because they are reputed as quasi several terms, as we said in book 2, chapter 12; and book 3, chapter 13.

Therefore when complexes from direct and oblique relate themselves in prior mode, they should be judged like complex of substantive and adjective, so that universality, or particularity of oblique is never to be changed. As if you say: Any horse of man runs, it has this contradictory: Some horse of man does not run; and in this: Horse of any man runs, in contradictory the term 'of any' should remain unchanged, saying: Any horse of any man does not run; because that universality of any is quasi part of extreme, and has force of restricting rather than distributing.

And if you insist: Those two contradictories are true: Any horse of man is animal, some horse of man is not animal, in case in which some men have horses, others not. Affirmative is true, as is evident; negative is proved: Demonstrating Peter, who does not possess horse, it holds well: Horse of Peter is not animal (because it is of subject not supposing), Peter is man, therefore some horse of man is not animal, which is contradictory of that first. I respond: That they are contradictory, and negative is false. And in proof defect is committed, because restriction is changed on which identity of subject required for contradiction depends, since in antecedent it stands for horse of Peter, in consequent for horse of man as such. But it should have been inferred: Therefore horse of man, who is Peter, is not animal; and then it is true, but does not contradict that first: Any horse of man is animal, where it is only supposed for horses possessed by man. Which defect so that it is clearer to you evident, note that not always that consequence is bad: Horse of Peter does not run, therefore horse of man does not run, or affirmatively: Horse of Peter runs, therefore horse of man runs, but then only when negative is verified through non-supposition of extremes for horse not possessed. But in consequent it is taken for possessed horse, since it is taken as contradictory of that: Any horse of man is animal; then restriction is changed, and it is argued changing identity of subject required for contradictory, and arguing in four terms, namely horse of Peter, horse of man, animal and man.

But in complexes where oblique precedes direct, which are said taken by several, universality of oblique, or particularity relates itself as distinct from universality and particularity of direct, and therefore it is always to be changed in its contradictory; as if you say: Of any man horse runs, contradictory is: Of some man no horse runs. Nor does it

hinder that universality of the term 'horse', in negative, seems to be incomplete universality, as dependent on resolution of that oblique of some man, which supposes determinately. For I respond that that universality is not incomplete, taking incomplete for that which includes something of particularity, but because it is dependent on another prior resolution, as Master Bañez well notes, book 4 Summary, tract 1, chapter 5. But it is not inconvenient that some universality dependent on another prior resolution is posited in contradictory, when it is universality of restricted term, expressing order to another term by which it is restricted.

In other cited contradictories, in which alienating restriction, or destroying subject is posited, I respond: In those same restriction should always be preserved. For this term: Peter who flies, is the same as saying flying Peter, where that restriction is held adjectively; and they contradict: Flying Peter is man, flying Peter is not man, nor is each false, but negative is true, since it is of subject not suppositing, of which whatever is negated is true. And same judgment is of that: Every irrational man is animal, some irrational man is not animal; for this negative is true, because true predicate is negated of fictitious being, just as if you said: Chimera is not animal.

Sixthly it is asked: Concerning propositions which signify union of copula for eternity. For two contradictories seem to be verified, because in now of eternity it is true to say: Peter sits, Peter does not sit; Peter lives, Peter does not live, because in time sometimes he sits, sometimes he does not sit, but each is simultaneously in eternity. The same is concerning that common sophism: Between this and this day it will rain, designating between Saturday and Saturday; between this and this day it will not rain: because if it rains on Thursday, but not on Friday, each is true, because each can stand in that interval of time.

I respond: Some think that with respect to eternity each contradictory is true, because that now of eternity is equivalent to diverse times, but it is not inconvenient that for diverse times, Peter sits and does not sit. But it is truer that even with respect to eternity they cannot be simultaneously true, provided in each proposition copula is affirmed and negated for eternity, but not in one for eternity, in another for time. For in first mode negative totally excludes from eternity, so that the sense is: Peter does not sit in whole eternity, and thus is false, because with respect to some time he sits in eternity. But if propositions are signified not through negation, but through positive contrariety, like: Peter lives, Peter dies; Peter sits, Peter stands, then they should be conceded in same now of eternity; because with respect to diverse time included in that now, they are verified, and negation removing from whole eternity is not signified, although negation removing

from time is signified, because when he stands, he does not sit in time, but eternity embraces whole that time both in which he sits and in which he stands.

To that second sophism it is similarly said that that negative distributes for whole interval of that time: whence it is not verified unless in whole that interval it does not rain; and thus it does not hold: On this day, namely Thursday, it will not rain, therefore between this and this day it will not rain, from not distributed to distributed, or from more to less restricted, with distribution of less restricted, namely from negation of one day to negation of whole interval absolutely.

Finally, in contradictories of hypotheticals, note that there are those three hypothetical species, namely copulative, disjunctive, conditional. And copulatives by reason of the term 'and', by which they are copulated, import universality; but disjunctives by reason of the term 'or', particularity: whence through disjunctives we contradict copulatives, if they are of opposed quality, as if you say: Every milk is white and every milk is sweet, its contradictory is: Some milk is not white, or some milk is not sweet. But in conditionals, whether they are causal, or rational, or purely conditional, contradictories are made through negation of conditional particle, as: If sun shines, it is day, not if sun shines it is day; because sun shines it is day, not because sun shines it is day. See Master Soto, book 3 Summary, chapter 9, note 5.

ARTICLE III.
Whether rules of conversion are rightly assigned.

The rules which we proposed in chapter on conversion are four. First: Universal negative is converted simply, and can also be converted accidentally. Second: Universal affirmative is converted accidentally. Third: Particular affirmative is converted simply. Fourth: Particular negative is converted through contraposition.

Therefore the Philosopher, 1 Prior Analytics, chapter 2, posited as first rule, from which he proved others, that of universal negative, which he says is converted simply. But its proof is formed in this mode, according to Philosopher: It follows well: No stone is man, therefore no man is stone. If it does not follow, therefore contradictory of consequent will have to be admitted, namely: Some man is stone, from which further argument is formed: Some man is stone, therefore either this man is stone, or that etc. Let it therefore be this man, e.g., Peter, and let expository syllogism be made: Peter is man, and Peter is stone, therefore some stone is man; but this is contradictory of that first: No stone is man,

therefore two contradictories will be given simultaneously true if that is not converted simply.

You will say: That proof of Philosopher is not good: Some man is stone, therefore this man determinately is stone, or that; for it is not always permitted to descend under that particular term, as is evident in similar: Eye is required for seeing, therefore this one. I respond: The descent is legitimate, because there the term 'some' has determinate supposition, under which it is permitted to descend immediately. And that it makes determinate supposition is evident, because it is contradictory of universal negative: No man is stone. But in that: Eye is required for seeing, the term 'eye' supposes determinately, as was said, and thus descent will be good, but antecedent is false, because no eye determinately, is required, but only confusedly, and thus it should be said: Eye is required for seeing, so that the term 'eye' supposes confusedly.

With conversion of universal negative established, from that Philosopher proves others. For that universal affirmative is converted accidentally, is proved: Because it holds well: Every man is animal, therefore some animal is man. Otherwise if it does not follow, contradictory will have to be conceded, namely: No animal is man; but this from first rule is converted simply, namely: No man is animal, which is contrary of that affirmative: Every man is animal; therefore two contraries will be given simultaneously true, which is repugnant.

Similarly it is proved that particular affirmative is converted simply, as: Some man is white, therefore some white is man. For if consequence is not good, therefore its contradictory will be true, namely: No white is man; but this is converted simply through first rule: Therefore no man is white, which is contradictory of that first: Some man is white; therefore two contradictories will be given simultaneously true.

Conversion through contraposition is founded in that double rule handed down by Aristotle, 2 Perihermenias. First: "From affirmative to negative, with predicate varied according to finite and infinite, consequence is good, as: Man is white, therefore man is not not-white." Second: "From negative to affirmative, with predicate varied according to finite and infinite, and with constancy of subject posited in affirmative, consequence holds, as: Man is not stone, and man is (this is called constancy, because it is evident that such subject is given), therefore man is not-stone." Which is understood, unless some appellation, or reduplication is varied, which impedes goodness of consequence; as it does not hold: Man essentially is not white, therefore man essentially is not-white, for essentially he is neither one, nor the other, but indifferent to each. From which rules it is

proved that universal affirmative is converted thus: Every man is white, therefore every not-white is not-man; because it holds well: Every man is white, therefore every man is not not-white through first rule. Again: Therefore every not-white is not man, through conversion of universal negative. Again through second rule posited it holds: Every not-white is not man, and not-white is, therefore every not-white is not-man, which is convertent of that first: Every man is white. The same in conversion of particular negative is proved: Some man is not white, and man is; therefore some man is not-white, through second rule; therefore some not-white is man, through conversion of particular affirmative; therefore not-white is not not-man through first rule; therefore from first to last, etc.

Thus Aristotle proved these rules. Some however take first root of them from simple conversion of particular affirmative, and prove that it is converted simply because, if some man is animal, one are animal and man, because distinct is not verified of distinct, therefore one will be the other, and conversely, and thus they will be verified mutually among themselves. But this proof is entirely inefficacious, because when it is said that they are one animal and man, either it is understood that they are one adequately and mutually, or inadequately and not mutually. If the second, therefore it is badly proved that conversely one is said of another; for otherwise similarly it would be proved that universal affirmative is converted simply, because also predicate and subject are one in it; but because they are not adequately and mutually one, it is not converted. If the first, it begs the principle, for this is to be proved that in particular affirmative predicate and subject are one mutually and adequately.

You will object against conversion of universal negative: This consequence does not hold: No divine essence is generating, therefore no generating is divine essence. For it is instanced in Father, who is generating and divine essence. Likewise it does not hold: No ship is required for navigating, therefore nothing required for navigating is ship; no old man will be boy, therefore no boy will be old man. Therefore that rule is not always true.

To the first I respond: That that is not universal, since it does not consist of common term, but singular, namely divine essence; just as if it were said: No Peter is white, it is not universal proposition. But if it is said: No thing, which is divine essence, is generating, proposition would be universal, but false, and thus its convertent is also false: No generating is divine essence. But if it is said in singular: divine essence is not generating, it should be converted through contraposition, like particular negative: Therefore some not-generating is not not-divine essence, which is verified in Son and Holy Spirit.

To the second instance it is said: That that conversion is good, but consequent is verified in same sense as antecedent. For antecedent is true supposing for no ship distributively, so that under that term immediate descent can be made; whence in its convertent, nothing required for navigating should suppose for required distributively and determinately; for thus its converted is verified: No ship is required determinately, for confusedly it is evident that some is required; whence convertent should make same sense: Nothing required determinately is ship; and thus is true.

To the third it is said: That in that conversion same ampliation is not preserved. For in that proposition: No old man will be boy, the term 'boy' is restricted by the term 'will be', for future boy, but subject is ampliated to that which is or will be; and thus, if in that universal proposition: No old man will be boy, the term 'old man' is taken for that which only is old man, proposition is true, and similarly its convertent, which is this: No one, who will be boy, is old man; but if it is taken for that, who is or will be old man, it is false, because many, who are future old men, are still future boys, because they are not yet born, whence it is not wonderful that its convertent is false.

Against conversion of universal affirmative you will object: This consequence does not hold: Every white man is man, therefore some man is white man; for antecedent is necessary, but consequent can be false, in case in which no white man is in world. And similarly it does not hold: Every grammarian is man, therefore some man is grammarian; every white is body, therefore some body is white; for it is instanced by case in which no grammarian, or no white body is in world.

I respond: That that is not convertent in sense in which first proposition is verified. For when it is said: Every white man is man, if the term 'is' is taken accidentally for existing man, that proposition is false in case of argument, and similarly its convertent. But if the term 'is' abstracts from time making necessary proposition, the term 'white' should not be verified there according to existence, but according to possibility, or abstraction from time in this sense: Every man possibly white is man; nor can it make sense: Every man existing white, since case is posited in which none exists; whence convertent should be this: Therefore some man is man, who possibly is white, and thus is true.

To the second it is said: That in those propositions, if in antecedent the term 'is' is absolved from time, it stands for subject of whiteness, or grammar, and makes this sense: Every subject of whiteness is body; every subject of grammar is man; whence convertent should also be taken in same sense, and according to copula absolute from time: Therefore some body is subject of whiteness, and thus is true. But if copula is changed,

so that in one it abstracts from time, in another not, supposition is varied. But if in antecedent it does not abstract from time, but expresses existence, thus it is false in case of argument, since it is supposed that nothing is white, nor grammarian, and therefore its convertent is false.

QUESTION VIII.
ON CONSEQUENCE AND SYLLOGISM.

ARTICLE I.
Whether the difference between good and bad consequence is rightly assigned.

Good consequence is said to be that in which antecedent infers consequent. But bad is that in which consequent is not inferred from antecedent, although it is signified to be inferred. But then consequent is not inferred from some antecedent, when antecedent can be given true and consequent false; but whenever consequent is inferred by true and proper illation whether from false antecedent, or true, consequence is good. In the present therefore two things come to be discussed very briefly: First: Whether this difference between good consequence and bad is essential, or accidental? Second: How it is true that true is inferred from false, since false is never inferred from true?

TO THE FIRST IT IS RESPONDED affirmatively, namely that this division is essential and analogous, speaking of formal consequence simply, concerning which we presently act. The reason is: Because essential and intrinsic form of consequence is illative connection of antecedent with consequent; but bad consequence lacks this illative force: therefore it lacks essential form of consequence; therefore good and bad consequence differ thus, just as living man and lacking life, which agree analogically in nature of man. Nor is it possible in formal consequence, that it has some connection and yet sometimes can fail and therefore is said bad, for form, which once is defectible and sometimes at least can be instanced from force of consequence, by this very fact formally is not good, whence it lacks connection altogether formally, that is disposition required for inferring. Therefore only accidentally can consequent sometimes follow from antecedent, never however from force of form, but by reason of matter.

You will object: It is not required for nature of consequence that connection is given in reality between antecedent and consequent; therefore it does not therefore lack essential nature of consequence because connection is not given, provided it is signified to be given. I prove the antecedent: For probable consequence is true consequence, for topical syllogism is true syllogism, and yet in reality it can lack connection, because many false

things are more probable than true; therefore connection in reality is not required for essential nature of consequence, but it suffices in appearance and sign. Secondly: Because for proposition to be true or false is accidental division; therefore also for consequence to be good or bad. For good and bad in consequence relates itself thus, as true and false in proposition; since that is good consequence, in which one truly follows from another, but that is bad, in which it does not truly follow.

To the first I respond: That speaking of formal consequence, that is which infers from force of form and its disposition, probable and topical consequence is not given, but either it is good or bad, not true or false, evident or probable; and what once is good on the part of form, cannot fail, and consequently on the part of form cannot be topical; because, if it can fail, it can be instanced and vitiated, and consequently antecedent can be given true and consequent false. But form of consequence, which can be instanced, by this very fact is bad on the part of form, and, if sometimes it is good, it is only materially and by reason of matter, not by reason of form. But in this part we are deceived and equivocate, if we think consequence and argument are the same, which however differ far, because argument pertains to proof, but consequence to illation itself and form of deriving one from another: but proof can be evident or probable, and therefore syllogism considered on the part of matter and posterioristically, or on the part of proof is divided into demonstrative and topical, but not prioristically, and on the part of form. But in the present we only speak of consequence on the part of form and prioristically.

To the second I respond: That truth, or falsity does not change enunciative signification, which is constitutive of proposition, but rather, with signification unchanged, truth can be changed from the fact that thing is, or is not; but goodness, or badness of consequence changes form itself of connection and illation, and thus also essential nature itself of consequence, which does not consist in signifying truth, but in connecting those in fitting mode for inferring.

Concerning the second the difficulty is: How from true only true can follow, but from false true can follow? For it does not appear how true can be contained in false, so that it is inferred from that, but false cannot be contained in true, since true and false equally conflict among themselves.

I respond, omitting solution of some, who say every false contains in itself something true, by reason of which it can infer true, but true should contain nothing false, and therefore cannot infer false (omitting this solution I say); for sometimes each premise can be false, and yet infer true consequent, as if you say: Every stone is living and every man

is stone, therefore every man is living, where nothing is inferred in force of something true on the part of premises.

I RESPOND SECONDLY: That true is said to follow from false, not because it can be caused, or manifested through false, but because it stands well with assent of false premise assent of true conclusion. Whence it is one thing for true to follow from false, another for true to be proved through false. This second can never stand, as Saint Thomas very well notes, 2 Metaphysics, lecture 2. Whence consequently true cannot be manifested through false, nor caused by it, because, if it were caused by it, it would be proved through it; therefore only is true said to follow from false, insofar as with admission of false premise supposed, connection with true conclusion can still stand, because falsity of premises does not always destroy all consequent truth, for neither does evil destroy all good. For the rest, if once true premises are given, by this very fact that they are conceded, false consequent cannot be given, because false cannot be conceded, but negated: but with consequent negated, antecedent should be negated, with which it has connection, since it is the same to negate that consequent, and admit its opposite; but from opposite of consequent follows opposite of antecedent, and thus opposite of antecedent should be admitted, and antecedent itself negated. Whence from first to last, if false followed from concession of true, same antecedent would be conceded and negated.

Argument could also be made in the present when from necessary propositions something contingent follows, as from this one: God knows Peter will sin, therefore Peter will sin. Antecedent is necessarily true, and consequent is contingent and consequently can be false; and thus antecedent will be given true and consequent false. But see solution of this above, book 3, chapter 2; and among Theologians, 1 part, Question 14, article 13.

ARTICLE II.
Whether induction is formal consequence.

The reason for doubting is taken from what was said: Because induction is true species of consequence, since it is true species of argumentation; but argumentation and consequence are the same; therefore it should be good consequence, for bad consequence does not have essence of consequence. But if it is good consequence it should be formal, because that, which is not formal, can be instanced, and consequently is not good; whence in nature of consequence probable consequence is never given, but either it is good, or bad, and what is good, is always good, because it is formal; therefore it is the same for induction to be consequence and to be formal consequence.

I confirm: Because some inductions are given, concerning which it cannot be doubted that they are formal consequences; therefore it should not be denied absolutely that induction is formal consequence. I prove the antecedent: For copulative descent in term suppositing distributively, and disjunctive ascent with respect to term suppositing determinately are formal consequences, which in no matter can be instanced, as is evident in these consequences: This man is white, therefore some man is white; every man is white, and man is, therefore this man, and that, and that is white. And similarly when in induction itself all singulars are enumerated, or at least some with particle and so concerning singulars, it is manifest to be formal consequence, because it proceeds from collection of all singulars to universal, which can never be instanced. Finally I confirm: Because, as Philosopher says, 1 Posterior Analytics, text 31, lecture 30, at Saint Thomas, "universals, concerning which demonstration is, cannot be known without induction." If therefore induction is not good and formal consequence, all demonstration and science, which depends on it, would rest on uncertain and fallible foundation; therefore it is necessary that induction be formal and certain consequence.

Concerning this difficulty, besides those things which we said in the text, I only note in the present that induction does not only import nature of consequence on the part of disposition and form of connecting propositions, which is prioristic nature in consequence; but also imports nature of argument, or proof, insofar as it is place of arguing and proving some universal proposition from reduction of it to its singulars. And if induction is considered in force of argument and probative place, it does not always make evidence, but sometimes only probability, and from this part it admits that it is probable consequence, because it rests on experience of senses, whence intellect receives cognition of universals: but experience is not always infallible, nor can always run through whole collection of singulars, and thus cannot always found infallible proof. In which some have been deceived, thinking formality of induction requires that in antecedent all singulars are numbered, or, if all are not numbered, particle and so concerning singulars is added, which posited, induction is rendered efficacious argument and formal consequence, for it proceeds from whole collection of singulars to universal, which is from equivalent to equivalent.

For the rest this is not to make induction in precise nature of induction formal consequence, but to adjoin to it another place of arguing, namely from equivalent to equivalent, which is always efficacious proof. But nevertheless induction from its nature and proper force does not seek this; for since induction serves so that from sense experience itself knowledge of universal thing is taken, if it were necessary to number all singulars contained under universal, induction would never, or very rarely be made: for

who could experience all singulars? But if not all being experienced, for remaining ones, which we do not experience, particle and so concerning singulars even not experienced is posited, with respect to those induction remains inevident and uncertain, because it is not evident that remaining ones are so related; and thus it will only be probable argument, from those things which are experienced (although not all, but very many) inferring universal.

I say the same concerning some species of induction, in which efficacious proof and formal consequence is found; but it is not precisely in force of induction, but from another place of arguing adjoined. As when from singular not universal but determinate particular is inferred, as: Peter runs, therefore some man runs, consequence holds, not in force of induction, since only one singular is numbered, but from not ample to ample affirmatively without distribution of ample. And similarly when from universal distributed we descend copulatively to any singular, as: Every man is white, therefore this one is white, and that etc., it holds from ample to not ample with distribution of ample affirmatively. And the same is from particular to singulars disjunctively, for it holds from equivalent to equivalent, or some similar place of arguing.

Therefore, although induction with these or other similar places of arguing adjoined, is efficacious proof and consequence, nevertheless pure and mere induction does not seek this, but can be found, with singulars sufficiently enumerated. Sufficiently I say, to infer universal probably, if not all are numbered, or evidently if all; and each pertains to induction, indeed that first more frequently, because scarcely or never are all singulars enumerated, and yet induction to universal simply is given. Indeed if they are numbered not only sufficiently, but totally, it is not pure induction, but from equivalent to equivalent, just as if they are sufficiently numbered not to infer distributed universal, but only particular, as we said above. These things concerning induction as it expresses nature of argument and probative place.

But if disposition itself and form of deducing one from another is considered, thus induction (if it is taken precisely, not with another place of arguing adjoined) does not import disposition and perfect form of consequence, like syllogism, in which disposition itself and form is founded in perfect connection of terms with one third, as in medium, whence intellect is forced to confess connection of same terms among themselves. But truly induction does not use connection of extremes with one third as reason and illative form, but from singulars themselves, which it experiences, quasi from subjective parts of whole universal, it infers universal proposition itself, as we said. And this connection of experienced singulars with their universal founds consequence not absolutely formal, like

syllogism, but formally inductive. For since every consequence is a certain probative and manifestative illation of truth, but all our truth and science has two progressions, namely first in its introduction, according as it arises and depends on senses, secondly in proof from propositions already universally conceived; consequently illation itself of truth according to formal nature of consequence and illation should have double mode of connection and consequence, namely in inducing, or introducing us to cognition of universals from singulars themselves, and in proof, or discourse from propositions made universal to others. Therefore induction has disposition of consequence in first mode only; whence although it can be vitiated and fail absolutely, nevertheless it has whatever is required for formal consequence in nature of inductive, not simply and evidently probative.

To reasons for doubting I respond: To the first: That induction from precise nature of induction is true species of consequence, but not so perfect as syllogism, nor ordered to proving, or convincing intellect, but to introducing into universals from comparison and enumeration of singulars; and in this genus of inducing it has formal nature of consequence, not probative from universals, but inductive from singulars. Whence its goodness is not that it convinces fully, but that it sufficiently induces to universals from experienced singulars.

To the first confirmation I respond: That those consequences of induction hold not in force of induction precisely, but because either they are reduced to form of syllogism, or another place of arguing is adjoined to it, which has efficacious and infallible connection, as we said.

To the second confirmation I respond: That all our speculation depends on induction, as it depends on sense and experience; whence if universal propositions of some science are not so abstract and common, that from any individual truth of them can be manifested, but depends on enumeration and experience of several, like natural sciences, they are not so certain as other more abstract and common sciences, like Metaphysics and Mathematics, whose principles even in one individual have all certainty, as: Whatever is, either is or is not.

ARTICLE III.
Whether conclusion is of essence of syllogism, or only premises.

Diverse opinions litigate in this difficulty almost from same motive. For since syllogism is made through discourse, in which from connection of premises conclusion is inferred

and manifested, some think that of essence itself of syllogism are not only premises inferring, but also conclusion inferred, because discourse does not rest in premises, but in conclusion, and as long as conclusion is not inferred, discourse remains suspended and incomplete. Therefore conclusion is of nature of complete and perfect syllogism. Others on the contrary, because conclusion is inferred and manifested through discourse, infer thence that conclusion does not pertain to essence of syllogism, but is its effect, because syllogism formally is mode of knowing and argumentation, which is manifestative of something unknown: therefore whole nature of it is saved in nature itself of manifestative, but not in nature of manifested; but conclusion is manifested, not manifestative. Others finally think it only consists formally in motion itself, or illation, not in premises, nor in conclusion, although it includes those quasi materially and obliquely.

But it seems truer that syllogism in its essential concept expresses discourse composed from antecedent and consequent, and illation itself or consequence. And so it both has illative force, which is in premises, and has thing inferred in consequent, and has illation itself, which passively taken is in consequent inferred, but actively in premises inferring; and thus it is quasi organic instrument, which consists of moving part, and of moved part, just as in living things one part moves another. For it is evident that premises themselves are motive and reason of knowing conclusion, whence for nature of syllogism, by which as instrument this cognition of conclusion is made, premises are necessarily and essentially required. Similarly conclusion itself is known object; for syllogism tends to this, that it knows conclusion through illation. But cognition does not regard in connotated and materially, but most formally its object; whence syllogism cannot consist in motion alone itself, or illation, according as illation is taken precisely passively for that which follows passively from another, for thus it is only found in consequent itself inferred; and when in some syllogism we admit premises, and deny consequence, we do not deny whole syllogism, but only illation and passive deduction of that which follows; therefore it is sign that whole syllogism does not suppose for illation passively accepted, but for that composite from inferring and inferred, in which full and adequate illation, or consequence actively and passively taken is found. Just as motion, although passively only is in patient, nevertheless insofar as action emanates from agent and regards that, and thus completely and adequately regards agent and patient. But nevertheless example fails in this that syllogism is not motion itself, but logical instrument, by which intellect is moved from one to knowing another, whence it should include moving part, which are premises, and moved part, which is inferred object, or conclusion.

Whence we admit reason of first opinion, which so includes conclusion that it does not exclude premises. But to the second we say: That conclusion is effect of syllogism, not indeed of whole syllogism, but of part of it. Just as in living things moved part is effect of living thing itself insofar as moved by reason of moving part; it includes however adequately and completely whole itself consisting of moving part and of moved part; thus syllogism in its essence adequately and completely includes illuminating and illuminated, manifestative and manifested, as parts; whence although it is of essence of consequence and argumentation to be manifestative of something unknown, nevertheless unknown itself, which is conclusion, it essentially includes, as inferred and manifested and object of manifestative nature as part.

ARTICLE IV.
Whether syllogism is rightly divided into perfect and imperfect.

Some think no syllogism needs reduction to another more perfect syllogism, but all are equally immediately regulated by that principle: Whatever are the same to one third, are the same among themselves; whence immediately through this principle, but not through reduction to another syllogism, they can be shown, because, just as in first four modes of first figure identification of extremes with one third is found, so also in other syllogisms of second and third figure, as is evident from any syllogism made in those; therefore from such principle whoever denies illation of such syllogisms will be able to be convinced immediately, but reduction to first syllogisms of first figure is not necessary.

For the rest Philosopher expressly teaches that all imperfect syllogisms can be reduced to universals of first figure, as is evident in 1 Prior Analytics, chapter 7. Saint Thomas teaches the same, Work 48, tract on syllogism, chapters 6, 7 and 8. And the reason is: Because although whole syllogistic force consists in that principle, that whatever are identified to one third, are identified among themselves, nevertheless, so that this identification with one third is clearly evident, it is required that that third be distributed; because if medium is held particularly in each premise nothing follows from pure particulars. If therefore medium should be identified with extremes according to distribution, by means of which it contains and unites extremes themselves in itself, it is necessary that this identification of medium be regulated through that principle: To be said of all, and to be said of none. And this is what is not done equally evidently in all syllogisms, because not in all is it so immediately and through itself evident that some extreme is contained under medium itself distributed, as is evident in first four modes of first figure, in which medium is subject in major and predicate in minor, by reason of which, when it is posited universally in major on the part of subject, afterwards in minor

it is predicated of something, whence by this very fact that of which it is predicated is designated to be contained under medium itself, which is not so manifested in second and third figure. As is evident if we make syllogism in Barbara: Every animal is substance, every man is animal, therefore every man is substance; where that middle term animal, in which man and substance are identified, in major is posited universally on the part of subject, but then in minor, when animal is predicated of man, by this very fact it is clearly evident that man is contained under animal, and consequently that substance, which was predicated of animal through rule To be said of all, will also be predicated of man, who is contained under animal. But this in second and third figure is not so manifested through itself; whence so that it is evident that extremes are so identified with one third that To be said of all, or To be said of none is saved in that, it needs to be reduced to mode of first figure, and not only immediately proved through that principle: Whatever are the same to one third, etc., excluding principles To be said of all, and To be said of none.

Concerning fourth figure, whether it is given, some dispute at length; but for this difficulty those things which we handed down in book 3, chapter 5 suffice. For we do not deny this fourth figure, but we say it is reduced to first and therefore does not posit figure altogether distinct, but contained under first.

APPENDIX.
On simplicity or composition of categorical proposition.

Up to this point we have deferred this difficulty, lest we seem to force students to it. Its resolution although it conduces to cognition of proposition, nevertheless also pertains and depends on book 1 on Soul; whence here we will touch it briefly. The difficulty consists in this that we see whether categorical proposition is in mind one simple concept, or aggregation of several? We do not speak of act of judgment, or assent falling upon enunciation itself, for this is simple quality, and one act, by which intellect does not compose, but judges concerning composite things, saying: It is so; and thus in God and angels act of judgment is posited, but nevertheless composition is not posited. Therefore we speak of enunciation, which precedes judgment, that is of enunciation apprehended, not judged; and we ask whether there are in mind many acts forming enunciation, or whether formation of enunciation is made by one act only resulting from collation and composition of several simple concepts.

Authors are divided on this point. Some think that, just as in third operation discourse is not some quality, or concept resulting from discourses constituting syllogism, but enunciations themselves ordered among themselves, so enunciation is not simple quality,

but several ordered concepts. Others say enunciation is formed through some concept ordering simple concepts, or resulting from those ordered. Others, that one act is given, which not only directs and orders simple concepts, but which represents whole proposition. Others posit four acts, three which represent subject, predicate and copula according to themselves, and fourth which directs and orders those concepts, and in this proposition formally consists, but in others presuppositively.

For resolution it should be supposed from Saint Thomas, that second operation of intellect, in which enunciation is formed, produces concept, or word distinct from simple concepts, which are produced through first operation; whence concept produced through second not only has distinct ordination, but also distinct representation from that which concept of first has. This is evident from 3 on Soul, lecture 6; Metaphysics, lecture last; Work 13; and from Quodlibet 5, article 9, where he has thus: "Double is operation of intellect according to Philosopher, 3 on Soul, one indeed, which is called intelligence of indivisibles (that is simple apprehension), through which intellect forms definition, or concept of something incomplex. But another operation is of intellect composing and dividing (that is composition, or division) according to which it forms word. And each of these constituted through intellect is called word of heart, of which first is signified through incomplex term, second through discourse." And the reason is, because distinct representation and ordination is found in second operation, which not in first; therefore also distinct concept. I prove the antecedent: Because in second operation one is attributed and united to another, which is not done in first operation, in which simple concepts are apprehended; therefore such union and attribution is representable; therefore by distinct mode and distinct concept from that, by which according to themselves and without attribution they are represented in first operation.

THIS SUPPOSED, I RESPOND: It is more probable, in Saint Thomas, that concept of second operation, by which enunciation is formed, is one act and concept, not only by unity of order, but by unity of quality: but the opposite is also probable. The first Cajetan holds, 1-2, Question 113, article 7, § In response to 2; Ferrara, 1 Against Gentiles, chapter 55, § To evidence of these; Master Soto, chapter on Proposition; and other Thomists. Saint Thomas favors, in cited place Against Gentiles, when he says: "That when some many things are taken in any mode united they are understood simultaneously, for simultaneously whole continuous is understood, not parts after part, and similarly proposition is understood simultaneously, not first predicate, and then subject, because according to one species of whole all parts are comprehended." Note the causal. If therefore through one species comprehending predicate and subject each is known, therefore it is not repugnant that by one concept, which entitatively is one, proposition is

formed. If therefore proposition is capable of being represented by one impressed species representing whole, why will it not be able to be represented by one expressed species? For speaking through itself one species demands one concept, unless we use that inadequately. See Saint Doctor, 6 Metaphysics, lecture last; and 1 part, question 85, article 4; Question 58, article 2.

You will say first, that Saint Thomas speaks of judicative proposition, or of assent itself, not of enunciation. Secondly, that he speaks of one concept, or species by unity of order, not by unity of entity, since 1-2, question 113, article 7, to 2, he says: "That we understand simultaneously predicate and subject, insofar as they are united in order of affirmation of one, and through same mode free will can simultaneously be moved into two according as one is ordered to another." But it is evident that will is moved by double act, and only by unity of order, not simply one act to be; therefore similarly intellect when it understands predicate and subject.

But against first solution it is: Because judgment, or assent, is not composed from predicate and subject, but falls upon composed enunciation, saying: It is so, as we already proved above; but Saint Thomas speaks of that whole, which is composed from predicate and subject, and says this becomes one, as is evident in 5 Metaphysics cited, when he says: "That when from simple concepts it forms composition, or division, it understands both as one, insofar as namely from them something one is made." Therefore Saint Thomas speaks of enunciation itself, as it is formed and composed from simple concepts, that is from predicate and subject, not for judgment, which does not form proposition, but falls upon it formed and judges. Finally when he says, 1 part, question 12, article 9, to 3, that from species of mountain and gold species of golden mountain is formed in us, and from concept of genus and difference concept of species is formed, he plainly speaks of concept entitatively one, for such is one which represents species consisting of genus and difference, like man; but Saint Thomas speaks in same mode of formation of proposition, which he says is so understood just as when whole is understood simultaneously, like house, and not individual parts separately, as is evident in cited places, especially 6 Metaphysics. Therefore he speaks of species, or concept one entitatively, just as concept of house is, as it is a certain whole.

Against second solution Cajetan very well notes, above that place 1-2, that free will is not moved by one act into God and sin, although simultaneously, because one is reason of another. But example concerning intellect says more than is necessary, because it also expresses unity of act. Thus Cajetan. Whence Saint Thomas adduced example concerning intellect, in which by one act, or concept things are represented, to show that it is not

repugnant that will in instant, although by two ordered acts, can be moved, just as from premises it is moved into conclusion in same instant simultaneously, but not by same act. For from cited places it is evident that Saint Thomas posited unity of species, or concept, and not only simultaneity of time, or ordination.

The foundation is taken from what was said: Because intellect can by one concept, or species having representative unity comprehend several things under nature of one; therefore when second operation forms new concept regarding several things under unity of one composite, and having nature of whole, it has sufficient reason so that by one concept, or species it represents. And certainly when one is known with connotation and relation to another, each under that relation can be understood by one concept entitatively one, although it includes several things objectively as united; as is evident when accident is represented in concrete, like white, connoting body, or whole connoting parts. And in opposite opinion, when it represents one term, e.g. subject not absolutely, but as agreeing with predicate, and copula, as conjoining each: for unless it so represents intellect will never unite those, even by unity of order. If therefore by one entitative concept several things can be represented unitedly, one directly, another in connotated and as term of relation, why will not one concept be able, formed in compositive mode from several presupposed, to represent whole composite itself, as united and made one? And why will we not attribute to concept of second operation, which is more perfect, that which to concept of first operation representing several things as one, indeed to external vision seeing several things by one vision? Finally one science, which is one habit entitatively according to opinion of Saint Thomas, 1-2, question 54, article 4, suffices for attaining discursively all conclusions of such science, as in Logic, question 27, article 2, we will show; therefore same concept representatively suffices for attaining all terms, which are enclosed under one composition through mode of one.

Objections of contrary opinion are solved.

Nevertheless opposite opinion is also probable. And first foundation of it is taken from this that our intellect is formally compositive, and not only objectively, this is not only does it apprehend complex object (for angel also does this), but also by several acts and concepts it apprehends that which angel by one act; therefore it should not be said that by one concept it forms proposition, for thus it would not formally compose, nor formally compare one to another, but only virtually. But truly Saint Thomas explains this composition of intellect through mode of comparison, not through mode of physical unity, as is evident in 6 Metaphysics, where he says: "That that composition or division, by which intellect conjoins, or divides its concepts, is only in intellect, not in things; for it

consists in a certain comparison of two concepts, whether those two are the same according to thing, or diverse." Where he could not express more clearly that composition and division consists not in one simple quality, but in many ordered and united concepts. And the same is taken from 1 part, Question 58, article 4, to 1, where he says: "That in angels there is not composition and division, although there is multitude of concepts, because not any multitude causes composition, but that of which one is attributed to another, which is not found in angel." Therefore composition cannot be perfected through simple formation and production of one concept, but through attribution and composition of one to another. Just as also he says in 1 Perihermenias, lecture 3: "That truth and falsity is not found in composition, except according as it compares one concept to another." And 1 part, Question 13, article 12, he says: "That our intellect represents God by diverse concepts, which diversity it represents through plurality of subject and predicate." Therefore subject and predicate is not represented by one concept, by which proposition is formed. Finally discourse is that which is subordinated to several concepts, for thus it is distinguished from term; therefore it is not subjected to one concept only.

Secondly: Because syllogism, although it is composed from several propositions through mode of one, nevertheless is not formed through one quality, but through several ordered among themselves; and similarly hypothetical proposition, which is not one except by unity of order. Why therefore will categorical proposition not be sufficiently formed through coordination and comparison of concepts from which it consists? Finally vocal proposition is composed from several voices; therefore also mental. I prove the consequent: Because Saint Thomas, 1 part, question 85, article 5, from this proves that there is composition in mind, because there is composition in voices.

Lastly: Because it follows that there is not formally in intellect nature of verb, or copula, and nature of subject and predicate; because same entitative concept cannot be that of which something is said, and that which is said, and copula by which it is said. It also follows that same concept can be intuitive and abstractive knowledge, clear and obscure; as when I say: Stone is not angel, or is not God, I see stone clearly, angel, and God I do not see, but obscurely attain. Finally in negative propositions, as when I say: Man is not wood, one species cannot represent to me man and wood, since one is negated and separated from another; therefore several species should concur; therefore also several concepts.

These are things which make this part probable. But they do not altogether convince. Whence sustaining first opinion to those it is responded:

To the first foundation: We can say in one word that proposition is said formally composite not by formality of several entities and composition of ordination of concepts, but by formation of one from several presupposed, from whose collation and comparison one third species, or concept is formed and results; just as from species of mountain and gold species of golden mountain is formed, which nevertheless is not one by unity of order, but by entitative unity. And this mode of forming one species from several collated and compared among themselves, is far diverse from simple concept and species of angel. For angel not only has concept simple entitatively, but also that concept is not formed from several collated and compared among themselves; but from natural efficacy itself and indivisible light, representing one, it represents all things which belong to it, because it proceeds in comprehensive mode, not collative. And so we do not deny to all places of Saint Thomas that comparison and collation of concepts is required for formation of proposition, but we say that from such formation and collation one word, or concept is produced, which is term proceeding through second operation, in that mode by which Saint Thomas himself, 1 part, question 12, article 9, says: "That from species of mountain and gold species of golden mountain is formed." And question 13, article 12, it is expressly said: "That our intellect represents plurality of divine natures through plurality of predicate and subject, but unity, or identity it represents through composition." Manifestly therefore, besides plurality of concepts of subject and predicate, he posits unity, or identity, in which composition itself consists; and because that identity and unity of composition is formed from collation of several things, as if elaborated and formed by art from intellect presupposing several things, not from first and natural efficacity representing all those things, therefore it is far distant from concept of angel, which is simpler and more efficacious in representing proposition, because it is not formed and results from several presupposed and previously conceived things.

To the second I respond: That there is diverse reason between hypothetical proposition, or syllogism on one part, and categorical on the other. For categorical is that which second operation of our intellect forms through itself firstly; whence, since that operation produces word and concept distinct from first operation, it is necessary that it forms such composition through production of one quality, and not only by unity of order, without production of new concept, it conjoins previous concepts of first operation. But afterwards to conjoin several categorical propositions already formed, or to move oneself from one to another through discourse, it suffices to coordinate propositions among themselves, nor is it required to produce another new quality, through mode of one representation, but of ordination, or transition from one to another, which demands plurality. And further we can investigate reason of this from doctrine of Saint Thomas, 1

part, question 85, article 5. Where he teaches that composition of intellect is sign of identity of those things, which are composed; for neither does intellect attribute one to another, except by representing identity, by which predicate and subject are united in one which is signified through mode of having, "and according to this nature of identity, says Saint Thomas, our intellect composes one to another, by predicating." Which identity, both in accidental predications, and substantial Saint Thomas teaches to intervene, 1 part, question 13, article 12, and this unity, or identity to be represented through composition. From which we elicit that, in that composition, which is made through identity of extremes, or removal of identity, there is sufficient foundation so that by one representation all those identified parts are represented, just as through species of whole parts are represented. And thus it happens in categorical proposition. But in hypothetical, and much less in syllogism, predication of one of another does not intercede, nor identity of extremes, but several propositions are ordered among themselves, whence there is no foundation for attributing except unity of order among propositions themselves.

To that which is added concerning composition of voices, I respond: Voices do not represent, except from imposition: but one voice is not imposed to represent integral proposition; whence it is necessary that through continuation and ordination of voices we signify composition itself of mind. But in mind, intellect simultaneously understands predicate and subject, as we said above from Saint Thomas, but not through continuation. Whence when Saint Thomas from composition of voices proves composition in mind, he speaks of composition on the part of signified thing, but not on the part of representing concept; because although both in voice, and in mind one is attributed to another, nevertheless in mind species of whole is formed, in which those parts are attributed, but not thus is it formed in voice.

To the last I respond: First inconvenience does not follow in any way. For predicate, and subject, and copula are given formally, both antecedently to formation of proposition itself, and when from coordination and collation of those concepts of noun and verb proposition is formed, and in concept itself, or formed species, in which predicate and subject and copula are represented through mode of identity and unity of whole, just as in species of golden mountain mountain and gold are represented, and in species of whole house, windows and columns etc.

To the second I say: It is not repugnant that same quality formed from several things represents intuitively and abstractively with respect to diverse things, namely predicate and subject, not with respect to the same. And secondly: Intuitive and abstractive are only found in simple knowledge, not in composition itself, or discourse; and thus diverse

knowledge, intuitive and abstractive, clear and obscure are supposed presuppositively. But in composition itself only attribution of one to another and identity, or difference of these is attended to, under which nature they are united in one concept of identity, or difference, although never with respect to the same apprehensive and simple knowledge is clear and obscure. But that diverse impressed species can concur to one proposition presuppositively, does not argue that one third species, or concept representing those through mode of one whole cannot be formed, just as from species of gold and mountain, which are diverse, one species and concept of golden mountain is formed. For intellect, just as it can divide those things which are united, so also it is accustomed to unite diverse things in one concept.

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QUESTION IV.
ON THE UNIVERSAL CAUSE.

ARTICLE I.
Whether by the benefit of the agent intellect the metaphysical universal is represented in the species produced by it.

In order to understand what is signified by the name of agent intellect, it must be presupposed, from book 3 on the Soul, and St. Thomas, 1 p., q. 79, art. 2 and 3, and many other places, that there is in us a double intellect, one agent, the other possible, or passive. The agent intellect is so called, not from acting and producing cognition, but from acting species, which are received in the possible intellect, which is therefore named possible because it suffers, or receives these species, and with those received it operates cognition; because all cognition is generated from potency and object, but the object cannot be in the potency through its entity, but through its species, or likeness, which in our potencies is a certain accident bearing the role of the object, and representing that. And although from external objects these species are sent to the external senses, by which the senses informed proceed into cognition, and thence transmit other species to the interior senses, which experience itself manifests are given, since when the external senses cease representations are made in the internal ones, as is clear in those dreaming; nevertheless these species are not proportioned to the intellect, which, since it is spiritual, demands the representation of spiritual things, and an intelligible object, not sensible. Therefore it was necessary to posit a certain force, or potency, which from these sensible species would elicit a spiritual species, which it would attribute to the possible intellect. And this force, or potency cannot understand, because intellection is produced from potency and species, but this potency makes species; therefore when it makes it does not presuppose those, in order to understand; hence in making those it does not understand.

With this briefly presupposed, there are two things which make difficulty in this part. The first is: Whether that species, which the agent intellect produces, only represents nature, and not singularity, so that there is not given in the intellect a species directly representing the sensible singular, as proper to it. And we will say nothing of this question in the present, because it pertains to the books on the Soul, and to the beginning of the Physics, where it is treated whether the singular is directly known by our intellect.

The second is: Whether, supposing that that intelligible species produced by the agent intellect represents nature and not singularity, or individual conditions, which we will show there and here presuppose, by this very fact it represents nature with at least

metaphysical universality; or whether it only represents nature according to itself, with every state removed, both of universality and of singularity? And we speak of the metaphysical universal, because for this the exclusion of singulars and negative abstraction suffices. But for the logical universal there is also required an order to inferiors, which, since it is a relation of reason, does not follow from abstraction in any way, but from abstraction, which is cognition. But here we do not speak of universality as known, but as represented antecedently to all cognition: for the agent intellect precedes all cognition.

Many authors sustain the negative part, either because they think that species produced by the agent intellect, although they are spiritually in entity, nevertheless representatively do not abstract from singulars, as P. Mer. indicates, disp. 2, de univ., q. 1, n. 29, and from Scotus the Conimbricenses report, q. 5, de univer., art. 2. Others, because even if they represent nature without singulars, nevertheless still deny that universality is represented there, because this only comes about through cognition, but that species is a principle of knowing nature, not presupposing or constituting it as known; on which see P. Suarez, disp. 6 Met., sect. 6, num. 7, who also adds that not every universality comes about through the agent intellect, for example of the proper, difference, or accident, but only the specific.

NEVERTHELESS LET THERE BE ONE CONCLUSION: In the opinion of St. Thomas, that the species produced by the agent intellect represents nature without singularity, it must be said that the universal is represented fundamentally, which is the metaphysical universal, so that that species not only regards nature according to itself and in a state of solitude, but under the unity of precision. This conclusion is expressly taught by Cajetan, in 4 cap. De Ente et essentia, after quest. 6, § Istis prælibatis. And it is taken from St. Thomas, not only from places where he teaches that through the agent intellect a species is formed representing nature and not the material individuating conditions, as can especially be seen 1 part., quest. 14, art. 11, ad 1, and q. 79, art. 3, at the end of the body, and quest. 85, artic. 1, ad 3 and 4; and Contra Gent., cap. 77. But also in other places, where he teaches that nature thus abstracted through the agent intellect is universal, as is clear in Opusc. 55, where he says: "That one and the same nature, which was singular, and is individuated through matter in singular men, afterwards becomes universal through the action of the intellect purifying it from conditions, which are here and now etc." And Opuscul. 48, cap. 1, he says: "That in our phantasy the form representing then man acts by the power of the agent intellect on the possible intellect, and then a certain form is caused in the possible intellect, which is called intelligible species, or according to others the act of understanding, or word, which form represents man as abstracted from material

conditions, and this is said to be universal." Therefore according to St. Thomas it does not represent nature according to itself, because this is neither universal nor particular, but it represents the universal.

The foundation of the conclusion is: Because that species thus produced through the agent intellect represents nature with individuals excluded, as we now presuppose, and represents it as one; therefore it does not represent only nature according to itself, nor with singular unity, but with the unity of precision, which follows aptitude, or non-repugnance to regarding those things and being in those, which is the metaphysical universal, and foundation of the logical. The consequence is manifest, because nature according to itself is neither one nor many, as from St. Thomas has been sufficiently shown in the preceding question; therefore, if nature is represented there as one, it ought to be represented with singular or universal unity; and not singular, as we presuppose, therefore universal. And this we call the metaphysical universal, which is distinguished from the logical in this, that both regard singulars, but the metaphysical regards them as a term from which, because it abstracts from them, but the logical, as a term to which, because it regards them, so as to be said of them.

This whole discourse is legitimate, and it only remains to prove that minor, that in that species nature is represented as one. And I prove this: Because the intellect informed by that species knows nature as one; therefore in the species itself it was represented as one, for cognition attains by knowing that which the species represents by representing. But that the intellect knows nature as one, when informed by that species, is manifestly established because, if it did not know it as one, by the force of such cognition nature would not be rendered one as known; therefore if it is rendered known as one, cognition attains it as one.

You will say: Even when the intellect knows nature according to itself, it knows it as one, because it attains it by one act, but one act regards one object; and nevertheless from this that nature does not have the unity of the universal; therefore neither is it sufficiently inferred that it has that when by force of the species produced by the agent intellect it knows nature. For it can know it as one according to itself.

I respond: That, when nature is known according to itself, although from the nature itself which is the thing known it is not one, nor many, nevertheless it follows unity, by this very fact that it is known under the mode of unity, and from that there follows in such nature sometimes the unity of precision; and therefore for nature to be known according to itself does not remove the unity following from the mode of cognition, but it is only

designated that from the part of the thing known according to itself, it does not have that unity. Nature therefore according to itself is only signified from the part of the thing known; if nevertheless it is known through the mode of one, by this very fact from the mode itself of knowing it has the unity of precision and universality. And so as known it is one from the mode of knowing, and according to itself the thing known itself is not one, namely as it is considered from itself.

To the foundation of the opposite opinion I respond: In that species universality and the unity of precision are not given as actually known, but as virtually known and actually represented, in that mode by which representation befits the impressed species. For just as in memory there remain species representing the universal, not that it is actually known there, but because it is there represented in first act, by the representation of the impressed species, so we say of that species formed by the agent intellect. Hence we deliberately did not propose in the title of the question: Whether the metaphysical universal is there, but: Whether it is represented? For we treat here not so much of the universal in being, as in representing. Because nevertheless the universal is represented there, which with cognition supervening is rendered actually known and universal in being, therefore we say that that species represents the metaphysical universal, although there does not yet exist actually any being of reason, which pertains to the logical universal.

You will insist: In that species the universal is not represented formally, as it is a being of reason, but fundamentally; therefore either fundamentally proximately, or remotely. If remotely, they are the very singulars, from which the universal is taken; if proximately, this itself is a being of reason, which cannot be had before the cognition of the possible intellect. And this is especially urged concerning the aptitude itself of the universal: for through the agent intellect the act of this aptitude cannot be had; therefore neither the aptitude and potency itself. The consequence is clear because, where the act is impossible, potency cannot be given, which posits possibility to the act. But the antecedent is established, because its act is to be predicated of many; but it cannot be predicated through the agent intellect, therefore etc. There is also difficulty concerning unity, because the agent intellect does not form one nature from many individuals, because it does not have the act of conferring and comparing one to another, since it does not know, but has only negative precision, insofar as it takes one, namely nature, and leaves another, namely singularity; therefore only in one individual it takes that which is of nature, leaving that which is of the individual; but this is only to take nature according to itself, not indeed according to the unity of indifference and aptitude to many; therefore

it does not make the unity of universality, which is not only unity without one individuation, but with indifference to many.

I respond: In that species the universal is represented fundamentally with proximate foundation not yet known, but represented. And to the instance I respond: That the proximate foundation of universality is indeed a being of reason, which before the cognition of the intellect is not in act and formally, but can nevertheless be virtually and representatively, just as in the imaginative faculty there can be given a being of reason, like a represented chimera, as we said in quest. 2. Wherefore by the force of the agent intellect no second intention is had formally, but it can nevertheless be had fundamentally, because the precision itself, under which it represents nature, is not real, although it is not yet actually known, but represented so as to be known, in that mode by which that precision can be represented, not as a thing, but as a condition of the thing represented.

To the reply concerning aptitude it is said that, where the act is impossible as it were from the intrinsic, potency is lacking, but if only from the extrinsic, namely defect of application, potency is not lacking; just as fire has potency to burn wood in Rome, but not application, without which it cannot burn, so that precise nature has capacity, or non-repugnance so as to be predicated of many, but application is lacking, which is cognition.

To the instance concerning unity I respond: That the agent intellect does not take one nature comparatively, but precisely from many, or from one individual, taking that which of itself does not repugn being in many. Hence from this nature is not only rendered represented intrinsically, as to essential predicates, but represented in such a mode, namely through the mode of one, which is to take it one with the unity of precision with non-repugnance to many. And when it is said that it is purely negative precision, I respond: That that precision behaves negatively with respect to inferiors, which it leaves, but positively with respect to nature, which it takes by representing it through the mode of one, just as also afterwards when it is known from the information of such a species, and this suffices for the metaphysical universal as represented, because it expresses nature with the condition of the unity of precision, and with non-repugnance to many.

But the arguments, which could be brought forward to prove that the species abstracted by the agent intellect does not directly represent nature without individuation, from the fact that the agent intellect cannot illuminate the phantasm, which is corporeal, by spiritual action and light, we omit in the present, because they pertain to the books on the

soul. It suffices to note that phantasms are not illuminated by receiving in themselves some spiritual light, but as St. Thomas says, 1 part, quest. 85, art. 1, ad 4, "phantasms are illuminated, because by the power of the agent intellect they are rendered capable, so that intelligible species may be abstracted from them." The phantasm therefore, insofar as it is capable and suitable so as to determine the agent intellect to produce the species of this object rather than that, is said to be illuminated by it as it were intrinsically, because it uses that as it were as an instrument determining; but the species itself produced from the determination of the phantasm is spiritual illumination, but this is posited in the possible intellect. But whether the phantasm receives some mode, or impression from the agent intellect, which is not illumination, but a certain mode of capability, just as an instrument from an artificer, I do not reject, but concerning this in the books on the Soul.

ARTICLE II.
Whether the metaphysical universal when actually known comes about through an absolute act of the intellect, and the logical universal through a comparative act.

The comparative act of the intellect can be taken in two ways: in one way, as it pertains to the second and third operation of the intellect, by which it compares one to another by composing, or dividing, or also by discoursing through inference; in another way, as it pertains to the first operation, through which one is not attributed to another, or deduced from another, but nevertheless one is known as ordered to another and not in itself absolutely, just as relation itself is known through simple operation, when it is apprehended, or defined. And so through the cognition of the second operation something is attributed to a subject as predicate, and thus through such a comparative act the nature itself can be predicated of the inferiors to which it has relation, and universality itself can also be predicated of the nature, which it denominates as form, and consequently is predicated of that. But indeed through the comparison of the first operation the attribution of predicate to subject is not attended to, but nature is known as regarding the term to which it is ordered, which can be known either in a signate and reflex act, or as it were in an exercised act by knowing nature with order to its term. And note that this comparative act is not called such, unless because it regards the term to which, which properly is the term of comparison, or of relation, not because it regards the term from which, for it is not compared to that, but separated from it.

But the absolute act is said by opposition to the comparative, namely that which does not compare, nor order one to another, but knows the thing itself according to itself. But something can be absolved from order to another in two ways: in one way purely

negatively, by taking one with everything else suppressed, or omitted, to which it could be ordered; in another way privatively, or positively, because it takes one by separating from another with cognition of both terms. Hence arises a double abstraction, one negative, the other positive. Negative abstraction conceives one nature with individuating conditions omitted, and behaving negatively around those. Positive abstraction is that which separates nature from conditions not by purely omitting and leaving individuals, or individual differences, but by knowing that which it leaves and that which it assumes, and consequently by knowing the distinction between one and another.

With these things presupposed, speaking of the universal known through the possible intellect, and not only represented in species, concerning which in the preceding article, there is a double principal opinion among the more serious authors. The first teaches that the universal comes about absolutely through an act of abstraction. The second that it comes about through a comparative act, not distinguishing concerning the metaphysical or logical universal, concerning the comparison of simple apprehension, or of predication. The first was taught by Durandus in 1, distinct. 3, quest. 15, num. 27, and in 2, distinct. 3, quest. 7, num. 7; Toletus, quest. 1 de univers.; and others. The second is attributed to Scotus in 1, distinct. 3, quest. 1, sol. ad 1, Soncinas, 5 Met., quest. 27, and 10 Met., quest. 15, and others. See Arauxo, 3 Met., quest. 1, art. 5; Curs. Carm., disputat. 3, de univ., quest. 6.

Among these principal opinions, certain ones wishing to harmonize them, said that the first opinion is true concerning the metaphysical and absolute universal, the second concerning the logical, which is relative. So Father Suarez, disput. 6 Met., sect. 6, num. 8. But indeed Martinez, disp. 1, de univers., quest., 2, distinguishes universality as such and metaphysical and logical universality. And he says that universality according to itself comes about through abstraction, insofar as it gives it precise unity. But universality as metaphysical comes about through negative abstraction, insofar as it leaves, or omits inferiors. But logical universality comes about through positive abstraction, which is explained by him thus, that this abstraction, since it is made by considering positively the inferiors themselves, and nature is understood as included in inferiors as something distinct in reason from them, for everything included is included not in itself, but in another, and is understood to be separated from the differences of inferiors, from which alone, but not indeed from the inferiors themselves the separation of the universal is made. We have already related this opinion above, in the preceding quest.

Finally, some have thought that nature becomes universal through a comparative act not of simple relation, but of predication, which pertains to the second operation. So Merinero attributes to certain Complutenses, disp. 2, de univ. q. 1 and 3.

I SAY FIRST: The metaphysical universal comes about through an absolute act abstracting nature from inferiors, both by negative abstraction, and by positive. And so both abstraction is an absolute act, and does not serve to formally constitute the logical universal, which consists in relation. This conclusion is proven as to two things. First: that that act prescinding nature whether positively or negatively, is absolute. Second: that the metaphysical universal results both from negative and from positive precision. And the first is proven thus: That act is called absolute, which attains an object without respect and order to something, as to a term which it regards; but the act of precision only has to separate one from another, as from a term from which; therefore through such an act nothing is considered as ordered and as regarding a term to which, but rather as leaving; therefore it is repugnant that some act of abstraction, whose office is to remove and separate one from another, is not an absolute act, since indeed it does not compare, nor order to another from which it separates. In sum, it is repugnant that some act makes something regard as a term from which and as a term to which, since there is opposition between these two; but the prescinding and abstracting act regards that from which it abstracts as a term from which, therefore it cannot regard that as a term to which: but comparison and order is to something, and to a term to which; therefore the prescinding act is not comparative in that in which it prescinds, because that from which it prescinds it regards as a term from which, it does not order to that as to a term to which.

The second, which must be proven in this conclusion, is shown thus. Not only negative precision, but also positive leaves inferiors and separates nature from those, one through positive cognition, the other only by omitting, or not attaining those; therefore both only pertain to the metaphysical universal. The antecedent is established from what has been said, and the consequence is proven: Because it negotiates around the same effect, namely around the separation of nature from inferiors, or from differences outside which it is conceived; therefore it only has to regard these inferiors as a term from which; therefore it does not yet posit in those the respect, which is required for the logical universal, because this respect ought to be an order to being and being predicated of many, as the very definition of the universal says; therefore it is necessary that it be an ordering converting nature to regarding the inferiors themselves as a term to which, because it tends to those, so as to be in those and be predicated of those; therefore that respect does not suffice, by which nature is only averted from inferiors, or abstracted from those through positive cognition, but this whole thing will pertain to the denudation

of nature from inferiors, under which state it is attained by the Metaphysician, just as by the Logician under the state by which it is converted to inferiors, so that it can be predicated of those, because predicability and the order of reason pertain to the Logician.

You will say: This positive abstraction only posits nature outside differences, but not indeed outside the inferiors themselves: for it is one thing to be abstracted from differences, because it is outside the concept of those, another from inferiors, outside whose essence the universal is not; for we do not fittingly say that animal is abstracted from man and horse, because it always remains in them even through reason, but from something of man and horse, namely from their differences; therefore that positive precision, although it regards differences as a term from which, nevertheless does not regard the inferiors themselves as a term from which, nor does it abstract from those, but rather is included in those, which suffices so that it may be said to regard those.

But against this is: That, with the differences removed by which nature is contracted and determined, nothing remains in inferiors, in which it remains included and to which it is compared, as to a term. For in man, for example, there are only two things, from which he is constituted, namely animal as genus, rational as difference; therefore the abstraction which removes animal from rational what does it leave in inferiors, in which that animal is included? Therefore it only remains included in the animal itself, for man with difference removed is destroyed; therefore it does not stand to be prescinded from differences, and through the same act to be included in inferiors. And finally, because that act thus prescinding from differences, either only prescinds from those, or also attains something else to which as to a term it refers nature. If the first, it is not an act comparing and making to regard inferiors as a term to which, but only removing from differences. If the second, therefore this act does not have only the office of abstracting and removing differences, but also of comparing to inferiors, and thus insofar as it is abstractive positively, it still does not constitute the logical universal, but the metaphysical, but insofar as it is comparative it will do the same thing that in the opinion of others the comparative act distinct from the precisive does, and this opinion will only differ from others, that it posits that to be done by one act which another posits to be done by two, namely by the abstractive the metaphysical universal, but by the comparative the logical.

I SAY SECOND: The unity and aptitude, which are the proximate foundation of universality, are said to befit from this act of precision, even before the logical universal. This is established from what has been said, because that unity is not an essential predicate of nature, since indeed nature according to itself is neither one, nor many, but accidental befitting it through the intellect, since indeed it is unity of reason; but by this

very fact that nature is prescinded from inferior differences whether positively, or negatively, it is known by one concept; therefore it is taken as one, because one concept is terminated to one object, and in nature thus taken as one there is not found repugnance so as to be rendered individual, because it does not have opposition, but rather conformity with those differences, from which it has been assumed through the intellect; therefore it has aptitude to those, which is non-repugnance, and unity. But how this unity does not constitute the universal, unless only fundamentally, which pertains to the metaphysical universal, not to the universal as it abstracts from the logical and metaphysical, has been said in the preceding quest., art. 5.

I SAY LASTLY: The logical or relative universal, and its second intention comes about through a comparative act, not through the mode of composition, or judgment, nor through the mode of inclusion in inferiors, but through the mode of simple apprehension, by which nature is known with order and respect to inferiors. This conclusion is taught by St. Thomas and by his disciples commonly, and in the school of Scotus as common it is also accepted. See St. Thomas, 1 part., q. 28, art. 1, where he says: "That sometimes the respect signified through those things, which are said in relation to something, is only in the very apprehension of reason conferring one to another." And q. 7 de Potentia, art. 11, he says: "That a respect of reason is found through this that the order of that, which is understood, to things outside is considered, or because the order of intellects to each other is considered." And finally Periher., lect. 10, speaking specifically of the relation of universality, he says: "That the intellect attributes these relations to the understood nature according as it compares it to things outside the soul." And the same is taken from Opusc. 48, cap. 2. And it must be weighed that St. Thomas does not posit this comparative act, by which the relation of universality is found, in a comparative act, by which something is attributed to something as to a subject, but by which it is ordered to something as to a term, as is established from the words brought forward, but especially from the place cited 1 p., sol. ad 1, where he says: "That the proper notion of that, which is said in relation to something, is not taken through comparison to that in which the relation inheres, but through respect to another."

And hence is taken the foundation for the conclusion posited. For to find relation through an act of the intellect some comparison to a term is required, and not compositive comparison, and attributing predicate to subject, or making inclusion in that; therefore only ordinative relation to the term. The major is manifestly established: Because relation is not something absolute, but whose whole being is to another; therefore so as to be found through the intellect it necessarily ought to be apprehended in that, in which it differs from the absolute; but it differs from the absolute in comparison to another;

therefore it requires a comparative act, that is comparison and ordination in the known nature to the term. The minor is proven: For the comparison of composition and attribution either attributes the known nature to inferiors, or attributes relation to the known nature itself as denominated through the relation itself. The first is not to the point both because the compositive act formally can only effect the relation of predicate to subject, which is far different from the relation of universal to inferiors; both also, because the predication of nature concerning its inferiors, as it is in a proposition made through an act of composition, only makes a predicate in act; therefore it presupposes the predicable, because something is first said to be predicable, than predicate, but predicability is a property of universality, or pertains to that; therefore the relation of that precedes compositive comparison and formal composition, just as the relation of predicability precedes the relation of predicate, as potency precedes act. And in the same way it is proven not to consist in an act making inclusion. Because either this inclusion is actual inclusion in inferiors, or only aptitudinal. If the first, it is inclusion through predication, or contraction in act, which necessarily presupposes the contractible and predicable, and thus the relation of predicability and contractibility. But if it is aptitudinal inclusion, therefore it is only apt to be included, but not indeed included in act in inferiors, and that aptitude so as to be included is the same as aptitude so as to be contracted, and predicated, for inclusion comes about through contraction; therefore before inclusion the logical universal is given, namely the respect of aptitude so as to be included. But indeed if the second is said, it is established that to attribute relation to the known nature itself, as to a subject denominated through that, is not formal consideration of relation to the term, but to the subject, and in the notion in, not in the notion to; therefore it is consideration common to every accident, even absolute, which has a subject, but not indeed is it proper to relation, as relation is, and consequently does not constitute that formally, but presupposes, because it posits in the subject, it does not order to the term. Hence it is not necessary, not only in the relation of universality, but also in other second intentions, namely the relation of syllogism and proposition etc., to know that relation in a signate act and to attribute that to the denominated subject, for this already presupposes the relation formed; but it suffices that the very extremes of the relation be known comparatively one to another in the very exercise, whether when a proposition, or judgment, or syllogism is formed, or those things which pertain to the first apprehension; for by the comparison itself these intentions are known as ordered, and consequently after the manner of relation, even if they are not apprehended as an object which through a reflex act, as we said in quest. 2, artic. 4.

The arguments are solved.

First it is argued, to prove that a comparative act is not necessary for formal universality: because with the proximate foundation posited the relation immediately results; therefore it does not need another act, than that, by which the proximate foundation is posited. But this is posited before the comparative act, because it is unity and aptitude to being in many, which is had by force of abstraction; therefore from this act universality results, which is relation: for just as contraction alone suffices so that nature becomes singular, so also abstraction, so that it becomes actually universal. And it is confirmed: Because before the comparative act the abstracted nature is actually denominated universal; therefore it actually has the form of the universal, which is relation. The consequence is clear: Because denomination of form is not made unless from the form itself, since it is its formal effect; therefore if it is denominated actually universal, it actually has the form of universality. The antecedent is established: Because by force of abstraction, before the comparative act, nature is not denominated singular, since it is denuded of singular conditions, nor is it only said to be nature according to itself, because that according to itself is neither one nor many, nor contracted, nor abstracted; therefore it is called universal.

I respond: In relations of reason the relation does not result with the foundation posited, because that relation does not have being through resultance, but through cognition; but it is not known, unless in order to its term, and this is to be compared. Nor can abstraction be called virtual comparison, because those things, which have being through cognition, it does not suffice to be known virtually, so as to be said to have being actually, but they will only have being virtually, and in potency. Hence, since relation is not known actually unless through a comparative act, because it ought to be known in order to its term, to which it is compared or ordered, virtual comparison will only be virtual cognition of relation, because it is not yet known to be ordered to its term, but to be abstracted. But contraction effects the metaphysical singular, just as abstraction the metaphysical universal, not the logical, that is related to its superior.

To the confirmation I respond: That before the comparative act nature is denominated universal metaphysically not logically, or fundamentally proximately not formally. But to have the proximate foundation of universality is neither to be singular, because it is denuded of individuals, nor to take nature only according to itself, because this foundation is not an essential predicate of nature, but it is to be universal metaphysically which, although it is not the form of universality as to the second intention itself, is nevertheless form as to the proximate foundation of such relation, which is founded in

unity and aptitude to many. But these are something of reason, and thus this name universal is indifferent to the foundation of universality and to the relative form itself, just as God is denominated lord from power, which is the foundation of the relation of dominion, and judge, and teacher, and sign at will from designation and imposition, and not only from the relation of reason, which is founded in such imposition and designation. Hence if there were given on the part of the thing a universal in that mode by which Plato posited, it would be a metaphysical universal, which would consist in precise unity; it would nevertheless found a relation to the inferiors themselves, predicamental indeed if the inferiors existed, or only according to being said if they did not exist.

Second it is argued: To prove that a comparative act is required through the mode of inclusion, which some call positive abstraction, or through the mode of predication and composition. For indeed the logical universal ought to consist in the respect of abstracted nature to its inferiors; therefore it is necessary that the inferiors themselves be known, for respect cannot be known without a term. But inferiors are constituted through inclusion of their superior; therefore the logical universal necessarily requires inclusion in its inferiors, otherwise it will not have inferiors, nor regard them, since indeed through this inclusion they are constituted.

And it is confirmed: Because this comparative act either understands nature to be in many, by attributing and predicating it of those in act, or only understands it to be apt to being in those. If the first, it is a comparison of predication; for neither is it understood in act in many, unless by predicating nature of many. If the second, an act of abstraction suffices to constitute this relation because this relation is a relation of aptitude to many; therefore that act, which suffices to posit aptitude, suffices to posit the relation of aptitude. But aptitude is posited through an act of abstraction, which virtually is comparison, by this very fact that it leaves nature apt to the inferiors themselves just as indeed through aptitude it is virtually in those, so it is virtually compared to those; therefore etc. And in the opinion of those, who think that judgment only consists in the regardingness of two extremes, or concepts, it manifestly follows that this comparison comes about through an act of judgment, because this comparison is not without regardingness of extremes. But this foundation is entirely false, because even before every judgment something can be conceived relatively, just as through simple apprehension we know relations, and define those.

It is responded to the principal argument, which is the whole foundation of Martinez, by the solution given above, in the preceding quest, art. 5: that the universal regards its inferiors not through inclusion formally, but rather presupposing exclusion and

abstraction from those; hence, although inferiors in reality are not constituted unless by including the superior nature, nevertheless formally in the notion of inferior they are not constituted through inclusion, but through subjection to the superior nature, presupposing nevertheless that in reality they include that. Hence just as the superior, although it is identified with the inferior, is known in the notion of superior without that, so the inferior, although it includes, and is identified with the superior, is nevertheless regarded by the superior not through inclusion in that, but through subjection to that. Hence in the concept of the inferior, insofar as it terminates the respect of the superior, the inclusion of the inferior is not explained, although it has that in reality, but only inferiority and subjection.

But if you insist: Therefore the intention of genus cannot be given formally without the intention of species, nor species without the intention of individual, since these are correlative, and thus the respect of genus cannot stand without its formal term, which is species, nor species without individual, which is the term of species.

I respond: The argument proves that the intention of genus cannot be given formally without species known as subjectable, and similarly species without individual as subjectable, for thus they put on the notion of formal term of the relations of genus and species; nevertheless the intention of genus can be given without this that the intention of species is known as predicable, and species without the intention of individual being known as predicable of one only.

To the confirmation I respond: That aptitude can be considered in two ways, either negatively, or positively. Negatively, it is only non-repugnance to being in many; and this is not known by a comparative act, but follows from the very absolute act of abstraction. Positively, it expresses an order to those things, to which it has aptitude; and this order, or relation is not found formally, unless when the aptitude itself is conceived with some comparison and order to its term. Wherefore the comparative act formally constituting the universal is not that, by which it is attributed to many in act, but by which it is conceived as apt to being in many, not by aptitude taken for capacity alone, or non-repugnance, which is something absolute, but taken for aptitude ordered and positively regarding the many themselves. But for this it is not necessary that the relation itself be known as it were in a signate act, and as a thing known as what, but it suffices that in act some extreme be known as compared to another, and after the manner of the relative, for thus in the very exercise the comparison itself and relation is known.

Lastly it can be objected, to prove that abstraction does not render nature universal metaphysically and fundamentally: Because through that abstraction nature is only known according to that which befits it in its essence, with individuals removed; therefore nature does not become universal, but is only posited in a state of solitude, or according to itself. Likewise: Nature is not known by the intellect unless as abstracted from individuals, in the opinion of St. Thomas; therefore the precision itself cannot give universality, because this befits nature as known, and consequently as precise; therefore precision, or cognition of nature is given first, than universality. And finally: Because universality is relation according to being; therefore it is only had through an act, by which the order and relation itself is apprehended, but the act of abstraction is an absolute act, not comparing, nor ordering one to another.

I respond: All these things prove that universality for relation is not had formally unless through a comparative act; nevertheless its foundation, which is unity of precision and aptitude, is had by this very fact that nature is known as precise through the mode of one; nor does this presuppose nature as known, but the precision itself renders it known. But if it is not known through the mode of one, we do not speak in this case, nor in this precision, because such cognition not only abstracts from individuals, but also from every mode of unity, and leaves nature in a state of pure solitude and according to itself; but abstraction which knows nature through the mode of one, that makes the metaphysical universal. And perhaps it is not possible to conceive nature so that from the mode of understanding it has neither unity, nor plurality, although according to itself from the part of the thing known it is neither one nor many, as much as is from the force of essential predicates. Whatever nevertheless may be concerning this, at least that act, which abstractively conceives nature through the mode of one, provides unity to the nature itself from the mode of knowing; and nevertheless that act is not comparative, but absolute, because it does not yet regard inferiors through the mode of a term to which it is compared, but as a term from which it is separated.

QUESTION V.
ON THE ACT OF THE UNIVERSAL, WHICH IS TO BE PREDICATED OF MANY.

ARTICLE I.
What it is in universal nature to be in many and be predicated of many.

This difficulty presupposes that nature, while it is actually predicated of many, is still universal, at least metaphysically; because, if universality is lost through predication,

there is no place for the question, by which we inquire what it is in the universal itself to be predicated and to be in many. And indeed some have doubted about this, thinking that by this very fact that the universal is actually predicated of many, the relation of universal is made foreign to nature. Which the Conimbricenses attribute to Scotus, quest. 9, in Porphyr., quest. 6 Univers., n. 4. Both because nature is not predicated as indifferent and indeterminate, but as applied to this individual, of which it is predicated, and as one with that, otherwise it would not be truly predicated; therefore it does not remain universal, because with indifference removed all universality falls. Both also because nature does not have universality except in simple supposition: for when it is said: Man is a species, man is universal, the term "man" supposes simply, so that it does not descend to supposita under the formality of species, and universal; but when it is actually predicated of individuals it does not have simple supposition, but personal, for it is verified of persons and individuals; therefore in actual predication it does not have universality.

Nevertheless the opposite, as I said, must be presupposed. For it is proper to universal nature to be predicable of many; therefore predication itself of many does not repugn the universal; therefore when it is predicated, the predication itself does not remove universality. Nor can it be said that universality is destroyed through predication, although it is predicable; just as a quantity of ten palms is divisible into ten palms, and nevertheless, if it is actually divided, it no longer remains divisible into those. This, I say, cannot be said, because it is one thing that quantity actually divided in fact cannot be further divided into those parts, another that the act of dividing itself removes divisibility. This second is false: for division falls upon divisibility, and does not repugn it, although with division made it destroys that divisibility; just as actual corruption does not repugn the corruptible, but befits it, but with corruption posited in fact, it is no longer corruptible, but corrupted. So predication of many befits the predicable, but with predication made and nature contracted to individuals it is no longer divisible, or predicable of many, but plurified in those. And so in this predication: Peter is man, the term "man" remains universal, because it does not suppose with singular supposition, but common, otherwise the sense would be: Peter is this man, and thus nothing would ever be predicated of Peter, which is common to him with Paul in nature. But universality for second intention is not necessary that it be considered in actual predication, and thus it does not remain actually.

To the opposite foundations it is said. To the first: That nature, when it is predicated, is intrinsically universal and indifferent; but extrinsically it is applied to a determinate individual. For when I say: Peter is man, the term "man" does not lose universality, because so that it might lose it, it was necessary that the common concept be changed into singular; hence with that common concept not corrupted, it is not rendered

intrinsically singular, although it is applied extrinsically to a singular subject, by forming that proposition: Peter is man.

To the second: It is said that the term, even in personal supposition, retains universality because, as long as the intrinsic representation of universal nature is not removed, metaphysical universality remains, although because application and predication of the represented nature is made, but not as to second intention universality, the supposition is not simple, which is only given then, when some second intention is predicated of the thing itself, which cannot be communicated and befit the inferiors themselves, just as was said in the Summulae, in the chapter on supposition.

With these things presupposed it is inquired: What is it for nature to be in many? Whether it is the very relation of universality to many, or aptitude to existing in those, or contraction to the inferiors themselves?

I respond: Some think that for nature to be in many is nothing other than to be included in those, which inclusion requires precision from the differences themselves: for in order that something be included in something, it is necessary that it be conceived as distinct from that, at least through reason, for nothing is included in itself; it has nevertheless identification with the whole itself which is inferior, for it only prescinds from its differences, not from it itself, and thus this inclusion is relation to inferiors, in which it is included. So Martinez, disp. 1 in Porph., q. 2.

NEVERTHELESS IT MUST BE SAID: That for nature to be in many does not consist in the relation itself of universal to many, nor in this inclusion, which the related opinion requires for such relation. But to be in many, if it is taken potentially, pertains to the aptitude itself, by which nature is rendered potent so as to be in many through identification and multiplication in those. But if it is taken actually, this which is to be actually in many is not the relation of universal to inferiors, but identification and contraction to those, not positive abstraction, as that opinion posits. The reason of the conclusion is taken from what was said in the preceding quest. Because potency to being in many precedes the actual being itself, or actually befitting many, just as potency precedes its act; but this potency to being in many is nothing other than the aptitude of the universal itself to being in many, as has often been said. But it is not said to be actually in many through the relation of universality itself, because this relation is a respect of the aptitude itself, insofar as common nature positively through the mode of potency regards inferiors, in which it can be. Therefore this relation does not reduce the potency itself, or aptitude into the act of existing, and consequently is not the act of such

aptitude, but the respect itself, by which such aptitude regards those things, in which it can be. But to be in many is the reduction of such aptitude, or potency into act, and when such reduction is made that aptitude is dissolved because, abstraction is dissolved through contraction, but the respect of aptitude remains with the aptitude itself and abstraction, it does not dissolve it.

Therefore it remains that to be in many is to be explained in that mode, by which the potency itself to being in many; for just as the universal is said to be potent, or apt to be in many, because it has non-repugnance so as to be identified with many, in which it is multiplied, so it will be said to be actually in many when this potency, or aptitude is reduced into act: hence if it was aptitude to being in many through identification, or essential or accidental multiplication, the identification itself multiplied in many is to be actually in those. And if we call this identification inclusion, inclusion is so made that it does not consist formally in abstraction even positive, but in contraction and conjunction; for how will the formal reason of inclusion be precision from those things, in which it is included?

And if you ask: how does such contraction, or inclusion, or being in many, differ from this which is to be predicated of many?

I respond: That to be in many is explained through identification with many, which kind can also be made through simple representation, by which nature is understood to be identified and to be in the inferior, to which it befits; but predication is made through application of one to another in the second operation composing and predicating, as will be said in the following art. Hence this predicability behaves as a property of universality for from this that the universal is in many through identification, it follows that it can be truly predicated of those.

To the foundation of the opposite opinion it has often been responded: Inclusion of the superior in the inferior is indeed required for the constitution of the inferior itself in itself, whose nature and quiddity includes superior predicates. However this inclusion is not made through positive precision, but through contraction; for contraction is not of the same to itself, but to another, or through another at least distinct in reason. But inferiors, which are regarded by the superior, indeed include by right the superior itself, but they are not inferiors insofar as including, but insofar as subjected and lesser.

ARTICLE II.
What predication is and what is required for its verification.

Four things must be noted in this article. First: What predication is taken formally and fundamentally. Second: What is required for the verification of predication. Third: How the superior predicate ought to be a whole with respect to the inferior, so as to be predicated of that. Fourth: How manifold predication is.

Concerning the first, it must be noted that predication pertains to the second operation, in which one thing is enunciated of another; and thus predication is attribution of one to another, by denying or affirming. Hence St. Thomas says, 4 cap. de Ente et essent., at the end: "That predication is something, which is completed through the action of the intellect composing and dividing, having nevertheless foundation in the thing itself the unity of those things, of which one is said of another." Where he explains both the formal reason of predication, which is the attribution itself, or conjunction of extremes through the mode of attribution, but conjunction is relation. But the foundation of this relation, or attribution is identity, or agreement of extremes, if the predication is affirmative, or disagreement, if it is negative. Which St. Thomas explains more fully, 1 part., quest. 13, art. 12, where he shows "that in any affirmative proposition it is required that subject and predicate signify that, which in some mode is the same according to the thing, and diverse according to reason, which is clear both in accidental predications, and substantial, just as when I say: Man is white, it is established that they are the same in subject, but differ according to reason, because the reason of white is one thing, another of man. And similarly when I say: Man is animal, that very thing which is man is truly animal, hence predicate and subject are the same in supposition, but diverse in reason." Wherefore the intellect signifies the identity of extremes through the composition itself and copula, but diversity through distinct concepts of predicate and subject. And the same doctrine is taken from 1 Periher., lect. 3. And thus it is established what predication is, and in what it is founded. But how the identity of extremes, and intrinsic or extrinsic connection differ, will be said below concerning the fourth notable.

Concerning the second: The verification of predication is so founded in the identity and agreement of extremes, that not only ought that to be attended from the part of the thing signified, but also from the part of the mode of signifying, because the intellect, since it is born to compose divided things and divide united things, is accustomed sometimes to apprehend and signify one and the same thing in such a mode, that from the very mode of signifying it is not applicable and unitable to another, and to conceive in another mode, so that it is applicable and unitable. Hence St. Thomas, 1p., q. 39, art. 4 and 5, warns that in

the properties of locutions, and for their truth not only the things signified ought to be considered, but also the mode of signifying, which mode especially shines forth in the abstract, or in the concrete, through the mode of whole, or part; for since every whole is greater than its part, part and whole cannot be equally adequated and attributed. Hence St. Thomas, Opusc. 69, above the second text of Boethius, says: "Concerning whatever is considered abstractly this has truth that it does not have in itself anything extraneous, which namely is beyond its essence, just as humanity, and whiteness, and whatever are said in this mode. The reason of which is, because humanity is signified as that by which something is man, and whiteness, by which something is white. But something is not man formally speaking unless through that, which pertains to the notion of man. And similarly something is not white formally unless through that, which pertains to the notion of white. And therefore such abstracts can have nothing alien in themselves. But it is otherwise in those things, which are signified in the concrete, for man is signified as he who has humanity, and white, as that which has whiteness. But from this that man has humanity, or whiteness, he is not prohibited from having something else, which does not pertain to the notion of these, except only what is opposed to these. And therefore man and white can have something else than humanity, or whiteness. And this is the reason why whiteness, or humanity are signified through the mode of part, and are not predicated of concretes, just as neither is their part predicated of their whole." So St. Thomas.

From which doctrine you will gather that the abstract with respect to the concrete abstracts by formal abstraction, not total. Formal abstraction is called that by which form abstracts from matter, act from potency, the essential and proper from the extraneous and alien. But total abstraction is that by which the superior abstracts from the inferior, and the common from individuals, because it behaves as a whole with respect to the inferior, including those virtually and implicitly: but the formal abstract does not behave as a whole with respect to the concrete, but as part and quasi form and act, with respect to potency and subject.

Second it follows how that is true, which is commonly said, namely: That when something befits something per se, its opposite cannot befit it even per accidens, that is it cannot be found in the same subject, because, as St. Thomas says, a subject having some form is not prohibited from having something else, except only what is opposed to that; therefore the opposite of form cannot be found in the very subject having the form, which is not to be able to befit it, not even per accidens, that is, through another and by reason of the subject.

Concerning the third: How such superior predicate is a whole with respect to the inferior, its explanation is taken from St. Thomas, in the place cited above, and in cap. 3, de Ente et essent., and Cajetan, explaining there how genus both has the notion of part, and the notion of whole. For in the generic predicate (and the same is concerning the specific and differential) both something is contained which explains, and something which implicates, or includes, for example: animal expresses sensitive nature, and body expresses corporeal nature, that is it expresses that which actually constitutes the sensitive and corporeal; but it includes everything from which such notion of sensitive, or corporeal can come, or in which it can be found, whether it includes something beyond the notion of sensitive, or not. And indeed, as to that which it expresses, there is no doubt that genus, for example animal, only speaks of part of nature, and not the whole; hence if the term "animal" included nothing more than what it explains, it could not be predicated of something, in which something more is found than the very notion of sensitive nature; but because it signifies every form, from which the notion of animal comes, and in which it is found, whether from such form only that notion comes, or something else, hence it is that animal in that concept includes virtually whatever has the notion of animal, and man whatever has the notion of man, and that in which it can be found.

From which doctrine it is gathered that, so that something is genus and universal it ought not to signify its significate with formal precision, but only with total precision, that is it ought not so to signify some notion, or form that it excludes from those things, which can be adjoined and concerned to it, but it signifies everything, in which such perfection is found, even if it involves some further other perfection, although it does not explain that. And thus to be signified through the mode of whole and part is not the same as to be part, or whole: for even that which is part can be signified through the mode of whole with respect to another part, in which it is included, just as animality with respect to humanity, because it is predicated of that; but to be signified through the mode of whole consists in this that something is signified with respect to another as including that. But it is signified through the mode of part, when through the mode of exclusion it signifies something, although in reality it is conjoined with that which it excludes; and because in reality no nature or form is given so constituting some degree that it excludes further perfection, or degree, but from the same substantial form many degrees come, therefore we said above, from St. Thomas, that metaphysical degrees in the same thing are not distinguished, unless through reason.

Concerning the fourth: The division and difference of predication is manifold, which results from the diverse mode of having identity and diversity of reason, in which is the whole foundation of predication, as we said from St. Thomas. And first it is divided into

direct and indirect. Direct is when that which behaves through the mode of form holds itself on the part of the predicate; indirect, when conversely that which behaves through the mode of subject is posited on the part of the predicate. Where by the name of subject and form we understand not only that, which physically behaves as form and matter, but that which behaves in any way as actuating and actuable, or superior and inferior; for the superior is called the form of the inferior, not because the superior degree is more actual in entity and perfection, but because it is contractible, and everything which is contracted is quasi received in that to which it is contracted. But if there are equal predicates, like man and rational, or risible, then that which actuates behaves as form, and that which is actuated, as subject. Hence this is direct predication: Man is rational, man is risible; but indirect: The rational is man.

And if you ask: When the superior degree is predicated individuated, as if you say: Man is this animal, whether it is direct predication? I respond that so that direct predication is made the individuated genus ought to be posited on the part of the subject; as if you say: This animal is man, the term “this” animal demonstrates an individual of man, or that animal which is in man. For by this very fact that the superior degree is individuated from the mode of signifying individually, it behaves as having the notion of species, because it supposes for animal, which is an individual of man; therefore it regards man as superior, and consequently as formal predicate, and thus this is direct: This animal is man, but indirect: Man is this animal. Otherwise if you say: Man is some animal, if the term “some” does not demonstrate an individual, but the generic notion of animal as vaguely contracted.

Direct predication is divided into essential and accidental. Essential is when the predicate is of the intrinsic notion of the subject; accidental, when it is outside that. Where it is necessary to discern the identity of extremes, and connection. Identity pertains to conjunction, or agreement and adequation of extremes, which is required for every predication, connection to the relation, by which extremes are ordered, either essentially and intrinsically, or accidentally and extrinsically.

Disparate predication is that which consists of terms behaving disparately, which do not have a relation of agreement among themselves. And note well that it is one thing disparate or identical predication; another disparate or identical proposition. For proposition regards truth and falsity, predication the relation of terms. And there can be disparate predication and true proposition, and between identical terms there can be false proposition. As is clear in negatives: Man is not stone, is a true proposition and disparate predication, that is between disparate terms. And this proposition Man is not man, is

false, but the predication is identical, that is between identical terms, although negatively. Nevertheless in affirmative propositions, if the predication is disparate, the proposition is always false, and if the predication is identical, the proposition is true.

Identical predication is one thing materially identical, another formally. Formally identical is when by force of the signification of terms one signifies the same as another, as if it is said Man is man. Materially identical is when indeed the significations are diverse, but the reality, or entity is the same; as when it is said: Action is passion, white is substance, or body, which from the part of the signified form is disparate, but from the part of matter or subject which is body or substance, identical, if they agree in the same subject. And similarly, when two accidents are predicated by reason of agreement in the same subject, as: White is sweet, and one attribute of another in God, as: Mercy is justice, all these predications are materially identical.

ARTICLE III.
How many things are required, so that something is called universal or common.

We presuppose that it is not the same that some term, or thing signified through that, is common, and that it is universal, as St. Thomas expressly teaches, in 1 Sent. ad Annibaldum, distinct. 19, quest. 4, artic. 2, ad 2, where he says: "Universal is not the same as common: for they differ, because common of itself does not determine whether that which is communicated to many is the same in number, or not; but universal determines this, because the same in number is never in many." Similarly, 1 p., q. 30, artic. 4, ad 3, he says: "That in God there is not particular and universal, genus and species"; and nevertheless, quest.13, artic. 9, he numbers God among common terms. And this is established in the vague individual, which is a common term, like some man, which supposes not with singular supposition, but common and determinate, and nevertheless is not universal, because it cannot be distributed, and the thing itself signified does not entirely prescind from individuating conditions, but signifies common nature with a mode of individuation not perfectly singularized, by reason of which it is impeded lest it be universal, although it is common. Hence St. Thomas says, quest. 9, de Potent., art. 2, ad 1: "That just as the name which signifies nature is common and definable, so also the name which signifies nature with such mode of existing, just as the term “some” man."

To the difficulty therefore proposed I respond: That, so that something is common to many, it is not required that it have many individuals existing in reality, or possible; but it

suffices that from the mode of conceiving it is conceived as communicable to many, and the term so signifying that nature will be called a common term. And indeed that plurality of individuals actually existing is not required St. Thomas openly teaches, 7 Met., lect. 13, expounding the definition of universal delivered by the Philosopher, that "universal is that which is born to inhere in many." Where he notes that it is therefore said that "it is born to inhere in many, not that it inheres in many, because certain universals are, which do not contain under themselves except one singular, just as sun and moon, but this (St. Thomas says) is not because the very nature of species, as much as is from itself, is born to be in many, but it is something else prohibiting, just as that the whole nature of species is comprehended in one individual." Which doctrine also serves for natures in which plurality of individuals is impossible, as Thomists commonly think concerning angels, and we will say below, in the quest. on species.

But that the mode of knowing suffices to constitute something as common, is taken from St. Thomas himself, 1 part., quest. 13, art. 9, where he teaches: "That if we knew simple forms according as they are in themselves, we would apprehend them neither in reality nor in reason as common, or as communicable; but because they are apprehended after the mode of composite things and not adequately as in themselves, they are apprehended as communicable as much as is from the mode of signifying and knowing, although in reality they are not communicable." And for this reason, book 1 Summul., with many cap. 7, we said, that a common term is that, which signifies many divisively, that is communicably is in many, either by reason of the thing signified, or from the mode of conceiving. And thus this name God is a common term from the mode of signifying. For when in the things themselves multiplication of many is given, with similitude in some common notion, then something is taken as common from the part of the thing signified; when nevertheless in reality multiplication is not given, nor similitude of many, from the part of the thing signified itself directly and per se foundation is not given for conceiving common nature indirectly nevertheless, because it does not repugn such nature to be conceived inadequately and imperfectly, with the notion of singularity not apprehended, but of nature alone after the manner of those things, in which nature is multiplied, from such mode of conceiving that nature is said to be common, and the term signifying it common.

But whether this alone suffices so that some nature is called universal as genus or species, especially with predicable and logical universality? To this we will say below, in the question on species, where this will be discussed more widely speaking of angels. Meanwhile it suffices to say that, so that something is universal and predicable of many, it does not suffice that it is conceived as common, with singularity removed as it were

negatively, but it is required that it so abstracts from inferiors, that it can also be contracted to those through addition of the difference of the inferior to the superior nature, which cannot be without some potentiality of that which is conceived as contractible to that which is conceived as contracting. Therefore that created nature is apprehended with potentiality, is not repugnant to it, but most befits, and consequently logical universality does not repugn; but the divine nature cannot be conceived with any potentiality, even if its perfections are conceived inadequately, and therefore without singularity it can be conceived as common, but not as contractible and universal.

And if you say: Because it also repugns pure act to be conceived without singularity and as common to many, since indeed a concept representing nature alone, and not singularity, is conceived as multiplicable from the mode of signifying; therefore also contractible, and in potency to singularity.

I respond by denying the antecedent: Because so that divine nature is conceived without singularity it is not required that it is conceived with some potentiality, but it suffices that it is not adequately conceived by us, but only its quiddity and not the mode itself, or singularity; just as nature is conceived without persons, and one attribute without another, not because it is conceived as in potency to that, since it is actually including that, not nevertheless actually expressing that. But so that the same nature is conceived as contractible and multiplicable to many singulars, it is required that such nature is conceived not only as not expressing, but also as not including singularity itself, or as existing in potency to that, which repugns the concept of pure act. And although it is conceived as common to many from the mode of signifying, nevertheless not as multiplicable through contraction and addition of contracting difference; but it is so conceived common to many from the mode of signifying, that it does not explain the mode of multiplication according to potentiality, because so that it is universal indifference to many is required, which contract and add to the common concept, but addition presupposes that that which is added to that to which it is added is lacking, and this speaks of potentiality; but so that singularity is not expressed, and thus remains common a limited concept suffices, not representing all things.

But if you insist: Therefore analogous things will not be called universal, because they cannot perfectly abstract from their inferiors, so that they are not actually included in differences, as we will say below treating of analogy.

And it is confirmed: Because this complex term Peter and Paul has the force of a common term, with the term 'and' taken divisively, as we said in the Summulae, and

through the mode of universal distributing, because it confounds the following term in the proposition, as when I say: Peter and Paul is animal, and nevertheless it does not prescind from the individuals themselves; therefore this is not required for the notion of universal.

I respond: That analogous things, if they are of two concepts, behave like equivocal things, which are not universal, because they lack unity of concept; but if they have one concept, because they do not perfectly abstract from inferiors they are not perfectly universal, because they do not have perfect unity, but proportional; but they are reduced to the universal: for since universal is adequately divided into five predicables, and the analogous is not genus, nor species, or some other predicable, neither will it be universal per se. And nevertheless it does not contain inferior differences in act in that mode, just as God singularity and attributes, because confusedly and imperfectly, not in pure act just as God contains those.

To the confirmation it is said: That that complex term has the force of common term with respect to its parts, from which it is composed, insofar as to those divisively, or to each of those it applies the predicate, which is said of it. And thus, because it supposes for any of those, it is said to have the notion of common and universal term distributed, quasi in the mode of signifying; nevertheless it does not have all conditions of universal term, and much less of thing universally accepted, which through the mode of one nature abstracts from many, for that complex term does not signify this nature, but nevertheless in its mode abstracts from many complexly, in that mode by which the whole complexly signified and confusedly abstracts from parts, as determinately and incomplexly signified.

Lastly you will insist: Because it repugns that true God is common to many, even from the mode of signifying: for the mode of signifying, if it is true, ought to be conformed to the mode of being; but it repugns that there is a true God, who is not one and singular; therefore it repugns from the true mode of signifying that he is taken as common.

And it is confirmed: Because Peter can never be conceived as common, because he is essentially and intrinsically singular; but God is much more intrinsically singular than Peter; therefore it more repugns him to be conceived as common. For although one attribute can be apprehended in God without another, nevertheless not with the opposite attribute; just as although he can be considered without mercy, nevertheless not with cruelty. Therefore although he can be considered without singularity, nevertheless not with community to many.

I respond: That true God, as adequately known and in that mode by which he is in himself, cannot be conceived as common; but known inadequately and after the manner

of composite thing, from the mode of knowing he is conceived as common, although not as communicable in reality: but the mode of signifying and knowing is indeed conformed to the mode of being as to affirmation and negation, so as to be true or false; but as to the mode of representation, it does not follow the mode of being, which is in things, but the mode by which it is objected to the cognition itself. Hence if the intellect conceiving in a common mode should judge God to be common, it would be deceived; nevertheless by representing and apprehending him without singularity, after the manner of common thing, it is not deceived. Hence St. Thomas says, 1 p., quest. 13, art. 9, ad 2: "That names do not follow the mode of being which is in things, but the mode of being according as it is in our cognition, and nevertheless according to the truth of the thing that name is incommunicable," because namely in representing the mode of knowing does not always conform to the mode of being, unless as long as it conceives the thing as it is in itself, but in judging it always conforms to the mode of being, if it judges truly. And thus God is represented in a common mode, but is not affirmed to be communicable.

To the confirmation I respond: That singularity is more essential to God than to Peter from the part of the thing itself known, nevertheless not from the part of the mode of signifying. Because Peter signifies singularity of nature alone, hence by force of such name he cannot be conceived as common. But God does not directly signify singularity, but divine nature, to which singularity essentially befits, just as also other attributes, from which nevertheless by reason of inadequate concept he prescinds. Hence St. Thomas says, 1 p., quest. 13, art. 9, ad 2, that "the name God is an appellative name, and not proper." And art. 8, he says "that it is a name of nature"; therefore it is not a name of singularity, although that nature is singular in itself. Nor is this to apprehend nature with its opposite, because community is not attributed to it, which is the opposite of singularity, but from the mode of knowing without singularity it is represented after the mode of common thing: but cruelty cannot follow in God from the mode of knowing; but, if it is apprehended in God, it is because such form is attributed to him, which is always false.

ARTICLE IV.
How predications are verified in substantial concretes and abstracts.

In the present three things are certain among authors. First is that both in substantial concretes, and accidental, concrete is well predicated of concrete, as: Man is animal, man is white. Second is that abstracts are not truly predicated of concretes, nor concretes of abstracts by force of the mode of signifying, as St. Thomas widely teaches, cap. 1 de Ente et Essentia, and is taken from 1 p., q. 3, art. 3; although sometimes they are verified

identically, as in divine things the same is Deity and God, Paternity and Father, and in transcendentals the same is unity and one, entity and being; hence St. Thomas says, quest. 21 de Veritate, art. 4, ad 4, that general forms are not said in one mode; for being is said not only that which is, but also that by which something is; and thus being, and transcendent forms are predicated both in abstract, and in concrete, both of concretes, and of abstracts. Third is that in accidents superior predicates are predicated of inferiors in abstract, as: Whiteness is color, is quality, etc.; because in accidents abstracts signify the whole essence and intrinsic notion for accidents according to themselves are nothing but forms. Hence St. Thomas says, cap. 7 de Ente et Essent., that accidents said concretely are not posited in predicament as species or genera, like white or musical, except by reduction; but only according as they are signified abstractly, like whiteness, music. And concerning the same can be seen Opusc. 42, c. 19; and q. 3, de Veritate, art. 7, ad 2.

And the foundation of all these things depends only on this that predication ought to be made according to application of whole to whole for when one is affirmed to be another, the predicate ought not to contain less than the subject, or conversely, as much as is from the mode of signification; and therefore when both are concrete, both are signified as whole, and thus they are rightly identified through predication. But conversely the abstract with respect to the concrete behaves as part, because it abstracts from that not as superior from inferior, but as formal from material, and form from subject; hence adequation cannot be made between abstract and concrete, because every part is less than the whole, unless perhaps it is transcendent, because then it is imbibed in every whole and in every part, and thus does not behave as part with respect to the concrete. Only in this predication quantity is excepted concerning which quantum is predicated in abstract, for quantity is said to be quantified, or extended. Which is therefore because quantity even separated from subject has parts, as is established in the Eucharist; but having parts is called extended and quantified, and thus it is well predicated of quantity that it is quantified. And finally, from the same foundation it is established that abstracts of accidents are rightly predicated of similar abstracts, because accidental abstracts speak the whole notion, which is found in accidents, and thus are predicated through the mode of whole.

Therefore only two doubts remain. First: Whether predication of abstract concerning concrete, in substantials, is true according to itself, and only from defect of mode of signifying is false? Second: Whether in substantial abstracts there is true and formal predication of superior concerning inferior, as when it is said: Humanity is animality.

To the first: Some think that substantial predicate in abstract is truly predicated of inferiors, nevertheless not completely and adequately, and thus as much as is from itself it is truly predicated of inferiors in concrete. So Martinez, disp. 3 in Porphyr., quest. 1. The foundation is: Because the abstract, although it is signified as part, nevertheless in the thing itself is the same with the whole; but the truth of predication only has for object unity and identity on the part of the thing, which is in the extremes themselves; therefore by force of terms such predication is true. However it is not predicated completely and adequately, because then predication is completely and adequately when the predicate says, or does not exclude whatever is in the subject. But the abstract does not say the whole that is in the subject, since it is signified as part, but the concrete as whole; therefore it is not completely predicated. And thus this predication Man is humanity, is not verified (as they say) for the substituted, that is for the supposition itself, or subject, which is man, but for the constituted, that is for the nature itself, which is identified with man.

Nevertheless the opposite is deduced from St. Thomas, who for the truth of propositions requires not only identity from the part of the thing signified, but also from the part of the mode of signifying, as is clear in 1 p., q. 39, art. 4 and 5. And he expressly excludes this predication of humanity concerning man, 1 p., q. 3, art. 3; and de Ente et essent., c. 3, at the end; and Opusc. 69, lect. 2, always using the same reason, because namely concrete, like man, includes in its concept, or does not exclude something which humanity does not include: for humanity says that precisely by which man is man, but concrete, namely man, says that which has humanity; but it is not inconvenient that having humanity has something else which humanity is not, therefore also something of which humanity is not predicated; and therefore these extremes do not found truth, nor predication.

But they say St. Thomas only denies formal and quasi complete predication, not fundamental and from the part of identity of extremes; for this alone regards true judgment. But against this urges the very reason of St. Thomas, because for the foundation of truth identity is required with everything of which something is predicated: for if it has identity with something and not with another, for that part by which it does not have it, the predication is rendered inconvenient and incongruous, and consequently false, for for falsity, since it is evil and defect, it suffices to fail on one part. And therefore St. Thomas said, 1 p., q. 3 cited, that man and humanity are not entirely the same, and thus from that part by which they are not the same, predication limps.

And so that you may penetrate this more, note that the foundation of truth is not identity as it is only found in the thing in any way, but that, also as it is objected to the intellect, it

is objected under that notion, by which the extremes are identified, not under that by which they are not identified; otherwise appellation and precision are varied. For we see that animal and man are identified in reality, and nevertheless animal is called genus, and man is not called genus, because this predicate does not befit those insofar as they are identified, but insofar as they are virtually prescinded, and are objected to the intellect under precision. And similarly we say that the Father generates, and the divine essence does not generate, although Father and essence are identified. So therefore, so that predication of humanity concerning man is verified it does not suffice that humanity and man are identified in any way, but that they are objected to predication as identified, and not under precision by which one prescinds from another. But as it is signified by the name of humanity in abstract, it is objected under abstraction and precision from man in concrete, and as part of that, and not entirely the same with everything that the concrete of man includes; therefore foundation is not given from the part of the thing for true predication, just as foundation is not given so that it is truly said: Essence generates, although it is the same with the Father, who generates. And just as it cannot in any mode be admitted that essence generates, explaining for the substituted or supposition, but not for the constituted, that is nature, although in reality the supposition of essence generates, because from the mode of signifying that is not said; so it does not avail conversely that humanity is man for the constituted, that is for nature, although not for the substituted, that is for supposition, because from the mode of signifying man does not signify nature alone.

Hence the contrary foundation is solved. For although humanity and man are the same from the part of nature, nevertheless they prescind and are distinguished according to the mode of signifying and conceiving, and therefore they do not have foundation so as to be predicated insofar as they stand under such mode of signifying, just as concerning this proposition: Divine essence generates, has been said.

To the second doubt: Some think that those predications, in which substantial abstract is predicated of substantial abstract, are false; because they think that the abstract not only abstracts from the concrete, but from every other notion, which is not formally the abstract form itself. For humanity says precisely that by which man is man, hence it does not include even implicitly anything other than what it explains under this abstraction; and thus it does not contain another abstract, of which it is predicated, because where there is formal abstraction it in no way includes that from which it abstracts, but makes quasi appellation and reduplication of the abstract form.

Nevertheless I respond by distinction, that abstract forms can be held either specificatively, or reduplicatively. In the first mode they only explain nature with every formal constitutive under abstraction as under a mode of being. In the second mode they explain and reduplicate the office of formal abstraction. And in the first mode one common abstract form can be predicated of some less common, even in abstract, as by saying: Humanity is animality, or in the example of the Philosopher, 7 Met., lect. 12, in St. Thomas: That cutting of foot is some footness. But if it is taken in the second mode, predication of abstract concerning abstract cannot be verified. The reason of the first part is, because these forms in abstract are predicated of something; for this is true This animality is animality, this humanity is humanity; therefore also this will be true: Humanity is animality. The antecedent is established: Because the divine Word assumed some humanity in singular; therefore it is true to say that this humanity of the Word is humanity, and this animality which he assumed is animality. But the consequence is clear because, if it is true to say: some animality is animality; therefore descending under that it will be possible to show some animality, which is humanity: for one of the animalities is humanity, and another equinity. Therefore just as some animality is animality, so also humanity is animality, because humanity some animality is for animality, which is in man, is the nature of man, and consequently humanity. And we say the same concerning this: Peterness is some humanity, provided by the name of Peterness suppositalness is not understood, but singularity of humanity; for supposition is distinguished from nature.

And it is confirmed: Because humanity, and any abstract form, has some essential predicates from which it consists for it signifies that, by which man is man; but man is man through essential predicates; therefore humanity includes those; therefore they ought to be verified concerning it and predicated of it, since indeed they befit it; otherwise there would be given some predicates truly befitting something, of which they could not be predicated.

But the second part of the conclusion is manifestly established, because where appellation and precision intervene, however much identity is given in reality, predication does not follow; just as, although animal and man are the same, nevertheless animal under precision of animal is genus and not man; and although justice in God is mercy, nevertheless it is not true to say that the attribute of justice reduplicatively is the attribute of mercy. Similarly therefore, although humanity is animality, nevertheless the notion of one reduplicatively is not the notion of another for it is false to say that the notion by which something is man is animality; otherwise wherever there was animality, there would be man. And the same can be found in abstracts of accidents, if they abstract with this precision.

And through this it is clear to the foundation of the opposite, which confirms this second part. And when it is said that abstract form neither implicitly includes that from which it abstracts. I respond: That is true; but nevertheless abstract form only abstracts from its concrete and material subject, not from its essential predicates, considered also in abstract.

And if you insist: This is a good consequence: Humanity is that by which man is man, and humanity is animality, therefore animality is that by which man is man; the consequent is false, therefore some one of the premises: not the major, because it is the definition of humanity, which only says that by which man is man, therefore the minor will be false.

I respond: The appellation is varied, because the minor is verified specifically only and without any appellation, but the major is verified under appellation and precision, not indeed of the definition itself, but of the thing defined. Because when it is said: That by which man is man, humanity is signified under concept and reduplication of its precision, that is under that notion, by which it precisely regards its constituted formally: for man is man by humanity, and by humanity is not animal, although animal and man are the same. And thus when it is said: Humanity is that by which man is man, it makes this sense: The notion of humanity, as it is distinguished from animality is that by which man is man, that is as it regards man under the formality of constituting him in the notion of man; thus although it includes animality, nevertheless not under its notion does it constitute.

But if you still object: Because St. Thomas denies that the notion of species, or difference befits essences signified through the mode of part, like humanity, as is clear in 4 cap. de Ente et Essent. And universally he teaches that only that which has complete nature is in genus quasi directly; and thus hand and other parts are not in genus, as is clear in 3, dist. 6, quest. 1, art. 1, ad 1; but it is established that humanity and the remaining abstracts are signified as parts. And finally he expressly says that humanity is neither genus, nor species, in 1, dist. 23, quest. 1, art. 1, in the body. Therefore we falsely say that it is predicated of something, since it is not universal.

I respond: The sense of St. Thomas, in the first place, is only that abstracts do not have the notion of genus and species with respect to their concretes, of which they are not predicated; nevertheless St. Thomas did not deny that abstracts cannot be predicated of other abstracts, as superior and inferior. And although we could also explain the other two places in this mode, we nevertheless add that St. Thomas only wants that parts and the remaining incomplete beings are not directly in predicament; nevertheless he does not

deny that they can be reductively. And in the same mode humanity insofar as it is signified through the mode of part is not genus or species directly, but reductively. Or also in the third place he takes humanity under reduplication and precision, just as was said in the second part of the conclusion; for thus it is not genus or species, which is predicated, or of which something is predicated.

ARTICLE V.
How predications are verified in accidental concretes and abstracts.

Many things which must be said concerning the definition of accidental concretes, we will dispute in quest. 7, on genus. Now only what these concretes and abstracts of accidents are, and how they are predicated, must be indicated.

In concretes therefore of accidents we consider three things, namely the subject which receives form, and is denominated by it, which some call the substituted; the form which is received in the subject, and affects and denominates that, and finally the composite, or that third thing conflated resulting from these, which some call the constituted. For example, in white, we can take it for the subject which is denominated, and for the conflated, or composite from subject and form, where also the form itself, which is whiteness, is included.

Some therefore apprehend these concretes of accidents in a far different, or inverse order from the common mode of thinking. For commonly authors think that the abstract of accidents is the accidental form itself, taken without any connotation, or signification of the subject having that. But the concrete is the accident itself, as connoting the subject having that. Similarly from subject and accident there does not result one being per se, or one quiddity, but being per accidens. Finally the concrete itself of accident, e.g. white, does not directly signify the aggregate itself, or constituted from subject and accident, but signifies formally the very form, connoting obliquely the subject, which has that.

Against which these authors say that the accidental form itself properly is not that which is abstract with respect to the subject, e.g. that whiteness is not abstract with respect to that having it; but in whiteness that is abstract, which is the notion by which whiteness is whiteness, e.g. whiteiness, or something similar; and thus they distinguish physical and metaphysical concrete, and similarly abstract; and they say physical concerns the subject in which form is, metaphysical concerns form and the notion of form. Second they think that accident abstract even precisely taken is truly predicated of concrete, because it is identified with that, nevertheless not completely and adequately, just as in the preceding

art. concerning substantial abstracts was said. Third the concrete of accident can be taken for constituted, or for substituted. And indeed the constituted, which is resulting from form and subject, they say is predicated of its inferiors quidditatively, as first or second predicable; but for substituted, that is for the subject having form, is predicated of those things which have form denominatively, and as fifth predicable. But the constituted is not predicated of subjects to which form inheres, because thus the whole would be predicated of part, since that constituted results from form and subject. And they say this constituted is definable, when accidental concrete is defined, and it is not being per accidens, but per se, as being definable by one definition. And they distinguish between aggregate and composite. And aggregate, they say, is being per accidens, because it says nothing other than the parts themselves, namely subject and form, aggregated and conjoined; but composite is that which results from conjunction of parts.

Nevertheless, what pertains to the definable notion of these concretes, we will say in the following quest. 7. But that the abstract of accidents cannot be truly predicated of concrete, is manifestly established from what was said in the preceding article; since the abstract is signified through the mode of part with respect to its concrete, which has the notion of whole. But concerning that distinction between physical and metaphysical concrete there is not much to care about: for indeed it is established that accidental form is signified in abstract with respect to its subject, as St. Thomas speaks, 1-2, quest. 53, art. 1 and 3; and in cap. 7, de Ente et Essent., around the end; and Opuscul. 42, cap. 19; and 7 Metaphys., lect. 1. And among Authors nothing is more known than that whiteness is called abstract with respect to white, which is concrete, because that is called concrete which signifies form by connoting that which has it, which most properly is found in the subject physically receiving whiteness, or another accidental form.

But that metaphysical concrete is said to be the form itself with respect to the notion of form, is a very improper locution. For although accidental form can be said to be composed from genus and difference, because it is posited in predicament, nevertheless the form itself is not called concrete, or having the notion of form; since indeed that which is constituted in genus, or predicament of accident from genus and difference is a certain accidental form, therefore it is not properly concrete having form, or the notion of form, for form as form does not say concrete, which is properly called the very thing having such form.

Therefore it remains so that we see in the present two things: First is: Whether that constituted, or resulting from physical subject and accident is being per accidens? Second: How predication of accidental concrete is verified with respect to its subject,

which it denominates, and with respect to its constituted, of which it is essentially predicated; for this predication is denominative: Body is white, but this is quidditative: White is colored, this white is white.

And as to the first, the opinion of St. Thomas is most open: from accident and physical subject in which it is received, there does not result some quiddity per se, but being per accidens, as is established from cap. 7, de Ente et Essent., around the beginning: "From accident, he says, and subject there is not made one per se, but one per accidens, and therefore from their conjunction there does not result some essence, just as from conjunction of form with matter." And he has the same expressly in Opuscul. 2, which is compendium of Theology, cap. 211. But, what is the head, in 7 Metaphysic., lect. 3, St. Thomas posits this very question in terms from the Philosopher; for he inquires thus: "Just as some composite is fire from matter and substantial form, so there is some composition from substances and accidents, and therefore it must be investigated, since there is some definition of substances composed from forms and matters, whether also of any of these composites from accidents and subjects there is a notion that what, that is whether they have definition, which is a notion signifying what it was to be, and again whether there is in them this very that what, which definition signifies, that is whether they have some quiddity, or something which can respond to what. Just as this very thing which is white man is some composite from subject and accident, whether namely to white man there is what it was to be, insofar as such. And because perhaps someone could say that white man are two things and not one, therefore he adds that this very thing, which I say white man, has one name, which for example's sake is garment, and then the question will be concerning this one, namely concerning garment, whether it has that what is, so that we can say what it is to be garment. For then just as this name man signifies some composite, namely rational animal, so also garment signifies some composite, namely white man."

Behold the question proposed by St. Thomas from Aristotle, which inquires concerning the constituted, or composite from subject and accident. But St. Thomas solves this difficulty, from the words of the Philosopher, thus: "He says therefore first that this very thing which I say white man, or garment, which is posited to signify this, is not something of those things, which are said according to themselves, indeed it is something of those, which are said according to accident, for this which is white man is one per accidens, not per se." Which he there pursues at length, showing that that conjunct from subject and accident is one per accidens. Wherefore in St. Thomas, it is clear that it is not one per se, but per accidens, nor definable by one definition as one quiddity. But to speak of constituted and not only of aggregate, as many things, similarly of substituted, or

subject, is manifest from the words themselves, where he speaks of composite from accident and subject, not as only two things, and he says this composite is one per accidens. But concerning the subject itself, or substituted St. Thomas adds: "This which is white does not have what it was to be, but only this of which it is said, namely man, or white man." Therefore according to St. Thomas the subject itself, or substituted, namely that of which it is said, signifies something and has quiddity, but not the constituted itself from accident and subject.

But the reason of this is not difficult, because that constituted from accident and subject consists of things of diverse predicaments, namely substance and accident: but these cannot agree into one quiddity and definition because definition and quiddity consist of genus and difference. But where there are many predicaments, there are many genera, for predicament is a series of genera and species; and diverse predicaments have diverse genera and differences, and consequently diverse species, or quiddities; therefore from things of diverse predicaments one quiddity and one definable is not composed, consisting of one genus and difference; therefore it is per accidens. See more below, q. 7, art. 3, how accident in concrete is defined.

As to the second, namely how predication of accident in concrete is verified, the whole difficulty is in explaining how it can have identity with that of which it is predicated, without which true predication is not given. To this therefore:

I RESPOND FIRST: It is true that the constituted, or composite from subject and accident is not predicated of the subject itself, or constituted, but only the accident itself in concrete. Which St. Thomas affirms, 7 Metaphysicorum, lect. 1, § Excludit, etc. Where he says: "Not only this which is to be white is not the what it is of surface, but neither the composite itself from both, namely from surface and whiteness, which is to be white surface, or to be of white surface; for the quiddity, or essence of white surface is not the quiddity, or essence of surface. And if it is asked why? It can be responded: because this is present to it, that is because when I say white surface, something is said which adheres to surface as extrinsic, and not as entering its essence." Where he insinuates the reason why the constituted itself cannot be predicated of the subject itself because namely in the constituted something is imported which cannot enter quiddity, nor be identified with the subject, namely accident, which is distinguished from subject. But where there is not identity of predicate with subject, predication is not true, even if both are signified in concrete.

SECONDLY I RESPOND: That accident in concrete, since it imports form in direct and subject obliquely, can be predicated of something, either because it has identity with that from the part of form, or because it has identity from the part of connoted subject, and when identification is made by reason of form predication is essential, as if you say White is colored, white is disgregative of sight. But when identification is made by reason of connoted subject, predication is accidental and denominative, as if it is said: Man is white, the term 'white' is identified with man, by reason of the subject which it connotes, for it imports having whiteness, but having whiteness is identified with man. And for this reason St. Thomas says, 1 part., quest. 13, art. 12, that in any true affirmative proposition it is necessary that predicate and subject signify the same according to the thing in some mode, and in some mode diverse. And this is clear, both in essential propositions, and accidental; for it is manifest that man and white are the same in subject and differ in reason (that is essence), for the reason of man is one thing, another the reason of white. And 7 Metaph., lect. 5: According to that by which man is understood in white, man and white man are the same, and by reason of this, he says, that is predicated, or one is said of another. Therefore accidental predication is indeed of whole concerning whole, but is founded in identity, or unity of subject, which is imported materially and connotedly in accidental concrete. For thus sufficient identity is given for accidental and denominative predication, in which identity is not given according to quiddity or notion of form, but according to denomination and notion of subject.

But indeed if something is predicated of accidental concrete, which has connection and identity with the form itself, then predication will be essential; because indeed whiteness is essentially color, therefore when I say: White is colored, essential predication is made, because it is founded in connection and identity of the predicate itself with form, for also in accidents themselves quidditative predicates are found, but whatever is quidditative to universal form in abstract, also ought to be quidditative to form itself in concrete. But if sometimes subject is posited in definition of accident, it is not posited as intrinsic quidditative predicate, but as something extrinsic, to which the accident itself expresses relation. And therefore it is called definition by addition, as is said 7 Met., lect. 4, in St. Thomas. Concerning which we will say more q. 7, on Genus.

Arguments are solved.

First you will object: Concretes of accidents are posited by the Philosopher in predicaments; therefore they do not import something being per accidens, but per se, since indeed being per accidens, since it is not one, is not posited per se in predicament, as we said; but such concrete cannot be posited in predicaments of accidents for

substituted, or subject, because this is substance affected by accident, nor for form alone, because thus it would be abstract; therefore for the third constituted from accident and subject. The first antecedent is established from the Philosopher, 5 Met., c. 4: "Per se (he says) are said whatever signify figures of predications." But numbering these figures he says: "That some signify how much, others what kind, others in relation to something etc." Therefore according to the Philosopher the composite from accident and subject is taken as being per se posited in predicament.

I respond: The Philosopher in that text takes concrete by reason of form, just as he himself says, in the chapter on substance, that "white signifies quality alone." Hence he numbers others there in concrete, like quantum, quale etc., others in abstract, like to do, to suffer, where etc. And in 7 Metaph., text 16, lect. 4, in St. Thomas, he numbers the same predicaments in abstract, saying: "That being, this indeed this something, but another signifies quantity, or quality." And in 3 Topic., cap. 1, he says: "That just is not posited in predicament, but justice"; and thus St. Thomas teaches, that accidents in abstract are posited directly in predicament, Opusc. 42, cap. 19; and cap. 7 de Ente et essent., at the end. Therefore the constituted from subject and accident is not posited in predicament, but if concrete is posited, it is by reason of form.

Second you will object: Form of accident both denominates something and constitutes; therefore from that both something denominated and something constituted result. But the denominated is the subject itself, or substituted, for this is denominated white by whiteness, but is not constituted by whiteness, for it is not the same constitution of subject, for example of man, and of white; therefore that which is denominated is not constituted by accidental form; therefore some third must be designated, which is constituted by such form, and this will be white for constituted. Which discourse seems to be elicited from the Philosopher, 5 cap. Categories, where he says: "That of those things, which are in subject, the name indeed nothing prohibits being predicated of subject, but the notion it is impossible to predicate"; therefore subject is denominated, not constituted by accident. And similarly 1 Physic., cap. 3, he says: "That if that, which properly is, namely substance, is also the same white, but the essence of white is not, so as properly to be" therefore the essence of white is other than the substance which it denominates, namely that constituted, which results from whiteness and subject.

And it is confirmed: Because that is truly and properly predicated, which is not only one with the subject, but explains everything that is in the subject; but accidental concrete taken for constituted explains both subject, and form; therefore it is truly predicated of its inferior.

I respond: Accidental form indeed constitutes something, but not that it is being per se, or that what, as the Philosopher says, but that it is being per accidens, or such what, as in 7 Met., text 12, lect. 3, in St. Thomas is said. Wherefore with respect to the subject to which it inheres it gives denomination, but not the notion itself, or quiddity; and therefore the Philosopher says the name (that is denomination) is predicated, not the notion (that is quiddity) of subject. Therefore it constitutes with subject not quiddity, or one being which is something, but being which is such, hence it does not follow that it constitutes one third per se, but one third, which is such what, or being per accidens, as has been said.

And to the text of the Philosopher, from 1 Physic., I respond: The sense is plain, that white is not that which truly is, that is its quiddity is not substance, which truly is that which is, but its essence is such, which is such. Hence nevertheless it does not follow that white is a third constituted per se from subject and whiteness, but is the subject itself as such, which is being per accidens.

To the conf. I respond: That that whole constituted from subject and accident, since it is being per accidens, will be able to be predicated of another being per accidens, concerning which predication we do not speak here. But if sometimes per se predication is made between accidental concretes, as if you say: White is colored, that per se-ity is attended by reason of form, which has quidditative predicates, not by reason of third constituted.

Lastly it is argued: Concretes of accidents are rightly defined through things of diverse predicaments; as when it is said white is body disgregating sight; for such definition rightly explains its defined; therefore such concrete is definable; and there subject is posited in place of genus, and accidental form in place of difference, as when it is said: Snub is curved nose. Either therefore it is being per accidens, or per se if being per accidens, therefore that is definable by one definition; if being per se, therefore now being per se composed from things of diverse predicaments is given, provided one behaves as subject, another as act and form. Indeed the accident itself in abstract is also defined through things of diverse predicaments, namely through subject obliquely and form directly; as when it is said: Snubness is curvature of nose, as St. Thomas often says, in places cited from 7 Met.

And it is confirmed: Because being per accidens is that which cannot be generated by one generation, but by many; but white, or hot, or another accident in concrete can be generated by one generation; therefore such concrete is not being per accidens. The conseq. is good. But the maj. and min. are express of the Philosopher, 6 Met., text 4, lect.

2, in St. Thomas. Therefore only that will be being per accidens, which is aggregate of many, just as a heap of stones.

I respond from St. Thomas, 7 Met., lect. 4; and de Ente et Essent., cap. 7, at the beginning: Accidents, when they are defined through subject, whether in abstract, or in concrete are defined by addition, that is through something which is added outside the concept of essence, namely through subject, because accidents depend on that; but such definition which includes things of diverse predicaments is not per se one, that is explicative of one quiddity, but is one by addition, including something outside the proper genus. And when it is said that it perfectly explains its defined; I respond: That it perfectly explains by addition, not through definition alone essential and quidditative. And thus being per accidens will be definable by one definition by addition, not one simply.

Or second it is said: That such concrete, if it is defined per se, will be by reason of form alone, and then subject according to itself and absolutely does not enter the definition, but as formed by that accidental form itself according to the generic grade of such form to the same according to the specific grade. And thus, when it is said: White is disgregative body, body absolutely is not understood, but as colored, and thus it explains the notion of genus; but the term 'body' is posited as sustaining, not as entering the quiddity of white.

And proportionally it must be said, and both solutions applied to the definition of accident in abstract, when subject is posited obliquely in its definition. Wherefore from things of diverse predicaments one definition cannot consist quasi from intrinsically composing elements, but well as extrinsically terminating, or causing; just as potency and act are defined through order to object, nevertheless that which results from accident and subject is not definable per se, as has been said.

To the conf. I respond: Being per accidens is said in many ways, as is said in 5 Metaphys., lect. 9, in St. Thomas; and 6 Metaphys., lect. 2: sometimes indeed through accidental concurrence from the part of subject, or material and formal cause, because form is accident; sometimes through concurrence per accidens from the part of agent. Example of the first, like white man; example of the second, like that the builder is a doctor. Therefore those things which are per accidens from the part of agent are not made by one generation, but by many, because many disparate forms are presupposed in the agent, and concerning these the Philosopher speaks to the letter; but those things which are per accidens from the part of subject and form only, if there is one form, will be able

to be made by one generation, but accidental and secundum quid, not simply one, just as when white or musical is made by one accidental generation.

EXPLANATION OF THE TEXT OF PORPHYRY'S ISAGOGE.

The book of Predicables is simply called Isagoge, that is introduction, because it serves for understanding the predicaments, from which Aristotle's Logic begins. And because Logic is first among the other sciences in order of acquisition, therefore introduction to it is absolutely and simply named introduction.

In this introduction therefore Porphyry declares five voices signifying five predicables, that is five modes by which the universal can be predicated, namely genus, species, difference, property and accident; by which the very arrangement and series of predicaments is integrated. Concerning which division, and how they are ordered to predicaments we will speak in the following quest., and we touched on something in the preface of this work.

This little book is distributed into three parts. In the first he posits a preface, in which he explains his intention. In the second, through individual chapters he treats and explains individual predicables. In the third, which is contained in the last chapter, he compares all things among themselves, and discerns how they agree among themselves, or differ.

Sum of the preface.

In this preface, Porphyry does two things. First, he proposes what is intended and the scope of this work. Second he shows the method, which he will observe. Concerning the first he says it is proposed to him to treat of genus, species, difference, property and accident, because knowledge of such notions especially conduces to predicaments and other things, which are delivered in Logic, abstaining nevertheless from more difficult questions, which are more Metaphysical. Concerning the second he proposes that he will treat briefly and easily, and according to the peripatetic mode.

Sum of cap. 1, on genus.

Porphyry does three things in this chapter. First he proposes three acceptations of genus. Second he explains that which is proper to Philosophers. Third he declares its distinction from the remaining predicables.

As to the first: The first acceptation of genus is for a multitude of men descended from one progenitor, or common fatherland: like the genus of Heraclidae from Hercules, the

genus of Romans from Romulus. The second acceptation is for natural power, which some draw from parent, or fatherland; just as we say Pindar is Theban by genus, Plato Athenian, Orestes draws genus from Tantalus: For genus is called the principle of generation of each. The third acceptation is for predicable genus, and this is proper to Philosophers.

As to the second, he describes predicable genus in this mode: Genus is that which is predicated of many differing in species in that very what it is. Just as animal is predicated of horse and man.

As to the third, he distinguishes genus from individuals, which are said of one, because genus is said of many. But from species, because genus is said of many differing in species, but species of many differing only in number, like man of Peter and Paul. From property, because property is said of one species, and its individuals, like risible of man, understand in what kind, but genus of many in species in what. But from difference and common accidents, because they are predicated in what kind and not in what.

Sum of cap. 2, on species.

This chapter contains three parts. In the first he posits three acceptations of species. In the second he teaches how predicament is ordered through genera and species. In the third he defines individual.

As to the first: The first acceptation of species is for form, or external beauty. Second, for subjectable species, namely of which genus is predicated in that what. Third it is taken for predicable species, which is thus defined: Species is what is predicated of many differing only in number and in the question what it is.

As to the second: The ordering of any predicament consists of highest genus, lowest species, and intermediate genera. Highest genus is above which no genus is given. Lowest species, under which no species is given. Middle genera, or subaltern, which with respect to the superior behave as species, and with respect to the inferior, as genus.

As to the third: He assigns three definitions of individual. The first is: Individual is that which is predicated of one alone. The second is etymology of the name: Individual is what cannot be divided. The third is: Individual is whose all properties simultaneously cannot befit another.

Sum of cap. 3, on difference.

This chapter is divided into two parts. In the first five divisions of difference are proposed. In the second as many definitions are assigned.

The first division of difference is into common, proper, and most proper. Common difference is form, by which something differs from itself at another and another time, or from another thing, like to be moved, to be sick. Proper difference is accidental form inseparable in the thing itself, by which one differs from another, like risible makes man differ properly from neighable. Most proper is form, by which essentially one differs from another, like rational is difference, by which man differs from horse.

Second division of differences: Some make to differ per accidens, like common and proper, some per se, like most proper.

Third division: Some differences are separable, like common; others inseparable, namely proper and most proper.

Fourth division is only of inseparable difference. Because one is per se, like risible and mortal, another per accidens, like to be snub-nosed, or aquiline.

Last division: Essential difference is one thing divisive of genus, or constitutive of species, which are two offices of the same difference.

As to the second part: The first definition is thus: Difference is that by which species exceeds its genus. Second: Difference is, what is predicated of many differing in species in what kind essentially. Third: Difference is, what divides those things which are placed under the same genus. Fourth: Difference is, by which individual things differ from themselves. Fifth: Difference is, by which one species is distinguished from another, so as to be an essential part of that.

Sum of cap. 4, on property.

This chapter is consumed in explaining four acceptations of property, of which the last is preferred to all others.

Property in the first mode is that which befits some species, but not all, just as to man to be grammatical.

Property in the second mode conversely, which befits all species, but not alone, like to man to be biped.

Property in the third mode, which befits all and only the species, but not always, like to man to grow gray.

Property in the fourth mode is what befits all, and alone, and always, like to man to be risible, and this is most property, because it is convertible with species.

Sum of cap. 5, on accident.

In this chapter Porphyry proposes three definitions of accident, and one division. The first definition is: Accident is that which is present and absent without corruption of subject. The second is: Accident is what can inhere and not inhere in the same. The third: Accident is what is neither genus, nor species, nor difference, nor property; but is always in subject.

The division is: Accident is one thing separable, like to sleep, to walk. Another inseparable, like blackness of crow, or Ethiopian, which nevertheless can be separated by intellect from subjects without their destruction.

Sum of cap. 6.

In this chapter with long discourse Porphyry compares these five predicables among themselves, and clearly explains in what they agree and differ.

From what has been said nevertheless it is sufficiently known in what mode these predicables differ among themselves, and in what they can agree.

QUESTION VI.
ON THE DIVISION OF UNIVERSAL INTO FIVE PREDICABLES.

ARTICLE I.
Whether this division is good and adequate.

By celebrated consensus of all this division has been accepted in schools, by which five predicables are divided, namely genus, species, difference, property and accident. But two things can be inquired for its explanation. First is: What is the divided of this division? Second: Whether the dividing members exhaust the divided? Which is for the division to be adequate.

AS TO THE FIRST, I SAY TWO THINGS. First: That the divided of this division is universal univocally predicable. Second: That universal is divided for the formal, that is by reason of universality and predicability (for these do not posit in number at present) not by reason of nature, which underlies universality.

And the reason of the first is: Because all dividing members are predicable of many, and not of one only: for the predicable of one only, either is individual, or is predicated identically, not formally; but in the present we neither treat of individuals, nor of identical predication, but of formal, because we treat of artificial predication, but for the same to be predicated of itself is not an artificial mode. Similarly it ought to be univocally predicable, because, although the analogous is predicated of many, nevertheless not simply and in one mode, but partly in one, partly in diverse; hence it is not universal simply but secundum quid, that is in proportional mode, and thus is excluded from universal simply, concerning which we treat here. And moreover: Here only predicables are treated, as they conduce to constituting predicaments, which certainly consist of genus and difference, by which species is constituted, to which proper property befits, and accidental predicates; but the analogous constitutes none of these, and thus does not pertain per se to predicables, just as neither to predicaments.

The reason of the second is: Because to be predicable and universal happens to nature; therefore diverse mode of predicating is not division of nature itself, as nature is, but of the predicable itself, as it expresses aptitude to predicating; therefore division into various modes of predicability ought to regard for formal divided the very formal notion of universality itself, or predicability, but not indeed nature which underlies that. Besides that nature, which underlies universality, is not something certain and determinate; for it can be something real or of reason, substance or accident. But the intention of universality itself is something certain and determinate, as accident of reason with respect to nature; therefore by reason of that this division falls upon certain and determinate divided.

And if you inquire: Whether the divided is only logical universal for relation of universal, or also metaphysical universal for foundation of this relation?

It is responded: Both are divided in proportional mode; for neither is relation divided, unless its foundation is divided; indeed relation is divided through foundations. Wherefore if the mode of predicating is diverse, it is necessary that also diverse mode of identification with those of which it is predicated is given; therefore it is necessary that this diverse mode is taken not only according to the comparison itself and relation to

inferiors, as to term to which, but also according to aptitude to being, that is to being identified with inferiors, and consequently according to abstraction, which founds this aptitude in unity thus abstracted and identifiable with inferiors in such or such mode.

CONCERNING THE SECOND: This division is exact and adequate, and exhausts every notion of predicability. The reason is: Because the very formal notion of predication consists in identity and connection of one extreme with another; therefore that will be adequate division of predicability, which is adequate division of connection and identification of extremes. But every identity, or connection of extremes, either is essential or accidental, intrinsic or extrinsic, necessary or contingent. If essential: either it explains the whole and integral essence, that is everything that concurs to definition, or only part. If integral notion of essence, or quiddity, it is species. If part either potential and contractible part, or actual and contracting. If potential and contractible, it is genus, and is said in what incompletely, because it says quidditative part, that is first and substantial, or standing under others and determinable through others, not determining and quasi qualifying. If actual part, it is difference, because it is predicate quasi act, determining and qualifying. But if it does not befit essentially, but accidentally, that is not entering constitutive elements of essence either it is: predicate proceeding from proper principles and having necessary connection with those, and thus it is property, or it befits from extraneous and common things, and thus it is accident. Which divisions, since they are delivered through members immediately and contradictorily opposed, rightly and adequately divide the divided itself.

Some nevertheless in the second predicable, which is species, say that the whole quiddity is not predicated, but part, because species is part of individual and not the whole individual, and thus it is predicated in that mode by which genus, namely as part.

But this is said inconveniently: Because species explains the whole definition, or the whole that is included in definition, that is that which consists of genus and difference, therefore it explains the whole essence of thing: hence with respect to essentials of any individual it explains not part, but whole, although it does not explain the whole from the part of mode, which is singularity, for individuation does not add something pertaining to nature or essence, but to mode of nature; hence species is the whole quiddity of individual, for neither do two individuals differ in essence, but in number, and mode of being; therefore it is said inconveniently that species predicates not the whole, that is whatever pertains to quiddity.

First it can be objected: Because many things are which are predicated of many and are not contained in this division; this is clear first in the analogous, which is predicated of many analogates and nevertheless is neither genus, nor species, and much less difference etc. Similarly vague individual, like some man, person, supposition, are predicated of many, just as Peter is called individual, is called person, and Paul similarly etc.; and nevertheless it is neither genus, nor species, because genus and species abstract from individuals and only predicate nature. Finally existence, and death, and similar things are predicated neither essentially, because they do not pertain to quiddity of thing, nor as property, because they do not flow from intrinsic principles, nor as accident, because they are not present and absent without corruption of subject; therefore they are comprehended in none of these predicables.

It is confirmed especially in the mode by which human nature and its superior predicates are predicated of divine Word: for they are predicated of God neither essentially, because they began to befit him in time; nor contingently, as accident, because that union of man to God is substantial, and makes God truly and univocally to be man, just like Peter and Paul, to whom human nature does not befit contingently; nor as property, because it does not flow naturally from intrinsic principles of God, otherwise it would befit him from eternity. Therefore there is given a mode of predicating not pertaining to these five predicables.

I respond by denying the antecedent: And to the instance concerning the analogous it was said above: that the analogous is not universal simply, but reductively, because it does not say predicate simply one, but partly one, partly diverse; but the definition of universal is that it is one in many; therefore just as it fails from the notion of unity, so from the notion of universality simply.

To the second instance concerning vague individual we say: it is excluded from the notion of universal simply from almost the same principle, because it says not nature alone, but also mode of being, which is individuation, or personality, as St. Thomas teaches, 1 part., quest. 30, art. 4; hence it does not have one simple mode of predicating, but is predicated in what and in what kind: in what, insofar as it says nature; in what kind, insofar as it says mode of individuation, which is outside the concept of nature, and depends on accidental conditions, which pertain to here and now; and thus it is not reduced to one predicable only, but to many, namely accidental and essential.

Similarly definition is excluded from the notion of predicable simply, because it is complex term and not simple; but it is reduced to second predicable, because it is reduced

to its defined, for properly species alone is defined, as is said in 7 Met., because it alone consists of genus and difference.

To the third instance it will be said in quest. 12, on accident. It suffices now to insinuate that to be present and absent without corruption of subject is the same as without destruction of quidditative concept; and thus the definition of accident is understood; and thus death and existence are accidents, because, although they are not present, or absent without physical corruption, which pertains to existence, nevertheless well without metaphysical, which pertain to quiddity of subject to which they befit. Which happens otherwise in proper property, whose connection to subject if it is destroyed, essence is destroyed consequently.

To the confirmation I respond: Some think that from union of human nature to Word new predicables have resulted, which they call assumptive, because they are said of God neither essentially, nor accidentally, but substantially. However St. Thomas evidently, 3 part., quest. 16, artic. 1, thinks that human nature is predicated, with incarnation made, in the same mode as of any other individual of such nature, otherwise that person would not be univocally man, if man were not predicated essentially of him, just as of other individuals. Concerning which see Cajetan there. And when it is said that to be man befits God accidentally and from time.

I respond: That to be man befits God as subsisting in divine nature accidentally, and in time God was made man; but to God as subsisting in human nature, and with incarnation presupposed, to be man is essential, because thus he is individual of man.

And when it is insisted: Therefore he is man from eternity, because essential propositions are eternal. The consequence is denied, because of variation of appellation. Because when it is said: God is man from eternity, the term 'God' is held absolutely, and makes absolute sense, for it is applied to God without any restriction, and thus it involves God as he subsists in divine nature, but of God as subsisting in divine nature it is said temporally that he is man, and not from eternity. But if it is taken restrictively for God as subsisting in human nature, or incarnate God, thus it is a proposition of eternal truth, taking the term 'is' as to connection and agreement, not as to existence. But in these propositions, because of danger of erring, the proposition ought not to be conceded so absolutely, but with restriction.

Second it argues: Two predicables suffice, into which all others agree, namely predicable essentially, and accidentally; therefore five are superfluous. If you say those two are genera of predicables, not ultimate species, into which it is necessary that those are

divided. Against: because if five predicables are lowest species, more ought to be posited than five; for just as predication in what is divided into predication of many differing in species, which is genus, and of many differing in number, which is species, so predication in what kind essentially can be divided into that which is predicated of many differing in species, namely generic difference, and which of many differing in number, as specific. Similarly genus can be divided into supreme and subaltern. And just as predicable is divided according to predication in what and in what kind, essential and accidental, why not also according to predication separably and inseparably, intrinsically and extrinsically, possibly and impossibly, and other similar modes, which will constitute diverse species of predicability.

It is confirmed: Because the Philosopher, 1 Topic., cap. 4, names only four predicates, namely genus, definition, property, and accident; therefore there will be as many predicables, because they behave thus as predicates. But if through order to predicaments the number of predicables is taken, since there are ten modes of being, namely ten predicaments, there will be as many predicables, because mode of predicating follows mode of being.

I respond by the solution given to the argument. And to the first reply it is said: that to be predicated of many differing in species, if it is taken precisely, does not formally distinguish predicables, since the same genus is predicated of diverse species and individuals, and the same difference, and generic property similarly. But formal distinction between genus and species is that genus is predicated in what incompletely, that is not integral quiddity, but its part, but species in what completely, that is integral quiddity, but integral notion of quiddity cannot be predicated except of many individuals. And we say to predicate integral quiddity, not because it explains the whole that is in individual, even mode of singularity, but the whole that pertains to quiddity in individuals. But difference whether it is generic, or specific, always predicates essential part, not the whole; hence in mode of predicating it does not differ, but in material thing which it predicates. And similarly supreme and subaltern genus have the same mode of predicating, namely quidditative part, not whole quiddity, although one quidditative part is more universal and superior than another, for this behaves per accidens in formal mode of predicating through mode of part in what, concerning which we will speak more fully in q. on genus and on difference.

To the last instance it is said: not all modes vary per se the notion of predicability, except those, which per se vary the mode of identification and connection of extremes according to notion of one in many, just as to behave essentially and accidentally, through mode of

what or what kind. But the remaining, which do not vary per se this mode of connection and identity, neither constitute diverse predicables, unless they are reduced to these modes essentially and accidentally, just as the terms 'intrinsically and extrinsically' are reduced, and, in some things, separably and inseparably, just as if inseparable is accident, and inseparable property; when nevertheless they are found within accidental genus only, they do not vary per se the notion of predicability of one concerning many.

To the confirmation I respond: That in that place Aristotle does not number modes of predicating universals concerning inferiors, since he also numbers definition, which is something complex. But he numbers predicates, from which places of arguing are deduced to various questions. And because the same argument is taken from species and from ultimate difference of that (for genus imports more indeterminate notion), therefore Aristotle delivered species and difference in compendium by one name of definition.

And to the instance, which is added concerning number of predicaments, it is responded: that modes of predicables do not follow mode of being absolutely and according to participation of being, but comparative, by which inferiors are connected with superiors. In sum, predicaments are distinguished in accidents according to diverse mode of participating substance, but substance itself through this that it has being per se; but predicables, according to diverse order of universal to inferiors.

ARTICLE II.
Whether this division is of genus into species and immediate.

Concerning the first part of the proposed difficulty, namely whether it is a division of genus into species, it must be noted that difficulty arises from two sources. First, because among the predicables themselves some are predicated accidentally, like the two last, property and accident, some essentially, like the first three; but nothing seems to behave univocally to this that it is said accidentally and essentially.

Second, difficulty arises from the very complication of division, because if universal is genus to five predicables, and one of the dividing members is genus, the divided will coincide with the dividing member. Nor does it suffice to say that universal, which is here divided, is formally in itself universal, but denominatively genus, which is not to coincide formally with the dividing member. For against this is, because thus to the same intention of universality it would befit to be universal formally and denominatively, essentially and accidentally. For in itself it is universality essentially, and when it is denominatively genus, but genus is a certain universality, it will have universality accidentally which is in

genus, although it is essentially the very universality in common, which enters into genus itself.

The first difficulty has compelled some so that they would say this division is analogous, although with respect to the first three predicables it is univocal. But others think it is univocal, and of genus into species. Others mediate between both, saying that metaphysical universal, or for unity and aptitude to many, is analogous, but for relation of reason, which is second intention, is univocal. Nevertheless among all it is certain that universal taken materially and for substrate, is not univocal to all predicables, indeed not even with respect to one only, for genus, for example, can have for material, which it denominates, both real being, and being of reason, substance and accident. Wherefore we speak only for universal formally accepted.

But the second difficulty has tormented the minds of some no less, who divide two universalities, one per se and intrinsic, another per accidens and extrinsic. The first is, which befits natures, and is exercised in them, and denominates them, for it results from abstraction of natures. The second is, which reflects upon universality itself, and uniting diverse intentions, or modes of universality into one, gives them again another denomination of universal accidentally and denominatively; so that, just as first universality behaved denominatively with respect to natures, although in itself it was universality, so second universality behaves denominatively and accidentally with respect to first. Hence it does not repugn, in these second intentions, that one and the same predicate inheres essentially and accidentally in the same; and that the same intention can be superior and inferior with respect to the same, not the same intention, and predicate taken numerically, but specifically, or universally, because intention of universality, which essentially and formally is such, again can denominatively put on universality through reflex cognition, by which another universality is attributed to it. For example, animal through universality and abstraction is called genus. Again that intention of genus, as it agrees with another intention of genus is known reflexly and abstracted, and from that abstraction is denominated some species of universals, for this is genus.

Which whole contains no other mystery, than that common doctrine, that something can formally be genus, and denominatively species, formally universal in common, and denominatively such universal, which is genus. So Martinez, disput. 1, super Porph., q. 4.

NEVERTHELESS IT MUST BE SAID: This division of universal into five universals, or predicables is univocal, and through the mode of genus into species. This is commonly followed by authors, especially Thomists, and also the school of Scotus. And the

foundation is, because these five predicables, however much they are predicated accidentally like property and accident, are truly and univocally predicated of many; therefore they are univocally universal. The antecedent is St. Thomas's, 1 Contra gentil., cap. 33, where he says: "That everything, which is predicated univocally, either is genus, or species, or difference, or property, or accident"; therefore all these five predicables found univocal predication. But univocal predication in all things, which are predicated univocally, is simply the same, for one notion is preserved which is predicated of many, since indeed univocal things are predicated according to the same notion; therefore whatever is predicated univocally simply preserves true and proper universality, which only consists in this that it is one in many. Hence it is one thing that some predication is secundum quid, as to entity which it predicates, another that it is secundum quid, as to universality according to which it is predicated. For the first indeed accidental identity between predicate and subject suffices; but for the second it is required that that which is predicated simply is not one in many, for which it is necessary either that it does not have unity simply, or that those things of which it is said are not many simply. But whatever is predicated univocally is one simply, and is said of many; therefore it has universality univocally. Hence it stands well that some things are analogous in the notion of being, and not in mode of predication.

But that it behaves through the mode of genus is established, because it is divided into those five intentions of predicables, which do not differ among themselves by number alone, just as two intentions of genus, or species, or difference; therefore they differ specifically in genus of intention, therefore it behaves to those as genus.

To the first difficulty therefore from the beginning it is said: that the last two predicables are said accidentally, which is to be said secundum quid from the part of the thing, which is predicated, nevertheless they are not said secundum quid as to the mode of universality, because in this they retain the notion of unity, which is said of many.

You will insist: Fourth and fifth predicable are only said denominatively; but denominatives are not univocal: both because they are distinguished from univocals and equivocals by the Philosopher, in Ante-predicaments; both because they say concrete of accident, which is being per accidens, and consequently does not have the notion of one predicable; both finally because accident indeed uses the subject which it denominates, but is not identified with that, nor can one accident be abstracted from many subjects, except in that mode by which form is abstracted from matter, which is formal abstraction, but not by total abstraction, as is required for universal.

It is responded: Predication of fourth and fifth predicable is indeed denominative, but does not remove that it can also be univocal, or equivocal; for when it is distinguished by the Philosopher from equivocals and univocals, it is not so distinguished, as if both cannot befit the same, but because it does not befit under the same notion. But how it was conducive to the doctrine of the Philosopher to distinguish denominatives from equivocals and univocals, we will say in Ante-predicaments. But what is said that denominative is being per accidens: I respond: It is not formally being per accidens, or from the part of form; for white signifies quality alone, as Aristotle says, cap. de substantia, and St. Thomas, 5 Metaphysic., lect. 9. But the constituted from subject and accident is being per accidens, but this is not predicated denominatively, for only of substituted, or subject is denominative predication made, when form is predicated of that.

And to the third instance it is said that between accident and subject there is not quidditative and intrinsic identity, but denominative, and all inferiors agree in accident, as in denominating, not as in constituting, and thus universal of denominative predication results, and this is universal simply, although it is identified secundum quid with subject from the part of entity, but it is predicated absolutely from the part of universality and mode under which it is identified.

To the second difficulty it is responded from given doctrine: that in these intentions it is one thing to be formally universal, or genus, or species, another denominatively. And it can happen that some intention is formally genus and denominatively species, and formally universal and denominatively genus. Nor is this to be the same essentially and accidentally such under the same notion, but according to diverse, as we will say immediately; which happens because of reflection of intellect upon its acts and denominations. For when some intention results from abstraction of some nature, again intellect reflects upon this intention, and the intention thus newly known as some thing or nature it affects and denominates with that new abstraction and intention. And thus concerning other intentions to infinity, which consists in nothing other, than in this that one intention, which denominates nature in which it is founded, can again be known as some thing and nature, and thus newly found another intention, which denominates it.

And thus with respect to nature, in which it is founded, it is denominating form, which is formally to be universality, but it conceived as some nature is founding and denominated by another second intention resulting thence, and thus it is denominatively universal.

We say therefore: That universal in common does not coincide with dividing member, which is genus formally, and as that by which, but denominatively, and as that which that

is universal in common is not form, by which something is genus, but by which it is universal, but that form conceived as some thing receives in itself denomination of genus with respect to five predicables, and thus is denominated by its dividing member. And by the same reason one dividing member can be denominated by its opposite, just as genus can be called species, that is intention of genus is denominated to be some species of universal, and individual is species, that is intention of individual is some species of intention. And species-ness in abstract can also be denominated species, because forms of reason transcend through all things, because they are founded in all.

If you insist: Universal is included in differences contracting it both because contracting differences are also predicated universally; both because one of predicables is difference. Therefore universal is not genus to those, because genus is outside differences.

I respond by denying the antecedent: For differences by which universal is divided into five predicables are not relations of universality, but differential modes, by which this relation is contracted, and therefore formally they are not universality; they can nevertheless be denominatively, but this is not to be included in those formally and essentially as genus, but they themselves can be foundation of universality, for this can befit every abstractible being, whether it is real, or of reason. But that one of predicables is difference, does not argue that universal is included formally in differences, that is in modes contracting themselves, but in intention of difference, which is some species of universality resulting from such contracting mode, namely from mode in what kind essentially.

Concerning the second, which is asked in the title of the article: Whether this division into five predicables is immediate?

It is responded: It matters little to speak thus, or otherwise. For it can be said that universal is immediately divided into essential and accidental universal, not indeed taking essential and accidental absolutely, but as it is found in the notion of universal, insofar as namely one existing regards many in essential mode, or in accidental mode. Then indeed the mode regarding many essentially is one thing in what through mode of genus, or in what through mode of species, or in what kind through mode of difference. And similarly mode of regarding many accidentally is one thing accidentally properly, or accidentally commonly. And thus it can be said that it is division immediately into those two members as generic, and mediately into these five as into lowest species.

It can also be said that universal is immediately divided into those five species, because essential and accidental predication as such, do not per se divide the notion of

universality, except insofar as they pertain to the very notion of genus, or species etc. For absolutely essential or accidental can be found even outside universal predication; just as when I say: Peter is this man, it is accidental predication: therefore essential and accidental as such, are not per se and properly differences of universal, since they are found outside universal predication, but only accidental and essential insofar as they constitute, or are imbibed in the very notion of genus, or species, or property etc.

QUESTION VII.
ON GENUS.

ARTICLE I.
Whether the definition of genus delivered by Porphyry is good.

Logical genus is defined by Porphyry: That which is predicated of many differing in species in that what. In which definition three things are explained.

The first is the common notion to every predicable, in those words: which is predicated of many; for this is common to every predicable. Hence you will understand that universal is not defined here for the material, or substrate, but for the very notion of universal, because that common predicate, namely to be predicated of many is not of nature, but of universality.

The second, which is explained in the definition, is that which specially pertains to the notion of genus from the part of the term which it regards, for relations are specified by the term. And thus is posited that particle of many distinct in species; for this regards generic universality for its term.

The third finally, which is explained in this definition, is the mode or notion of predicating, namely in what.

As to the first particle: What it is to be predicated of many has been sufficiently explained in what is above, for this pertains to the notion of universality. But what is that, which is predicated of many as essential defined to which this definition essentially befits, we will say in the following article. Hence for exact explication of this definition it suffices to explain in the present those two particles of many differing in species, and in what.

Therefore, as to the prior particle: of many differing in species, it must be said that, although other predicables can be said of many differing in species, just as some generic

differences, and also generic properties are said of subjects differing in species, nevertheless this behaves materially in such predicables.

But to genus alone it formally and per se befits to be predicated of many differing in species; for other predicables, although they can be predicated of many differing in species, nevertheless are also preserved without this that they are predicated of many differing in species, as is clear in specific differences and properties, hence they do not have that the things which are inferiors of such predicables differ in species precisely from this that they are inferiors of those.

But genus from this precisely that it is genus has that those things which are its inferiors differ in species, because from the intrinsic notion of genus it says something contractible and divisible through differences diverse in species, which differences are contained in genus itself potentially, and originate from it, as Cajetan well noted, upon this chapter on genus, from Albert the Great, hence from the very formal notion of genus it seeks to have inferiors distinct in species.

The second particle, namely: to be predicated in what, explains the mode and formal notion of predication of genus, insofar as it is genus. For understanding which it is necessary to note that that particle in what, as St. Thomas often teaches, can ask either concerning supposition, or concerning nature: just as to one asking what swims in the sea, we respond that fish; and to one asking what is man, we respond that rational animal; and in the present, when it is said that genus is predicated in what, this is understood in the second mode, not the first.

Again second, it is necessary to see how predication in what differs from predication in what kind, not only when it is accidental, for this is manifest, but also when essential, just as difference is predicated. For we ought not to say absolutely that difference is predicated in what, as some more recent admit, but genus is predicated in what, and difference in what kind; that is genus is predicated in substantive quidditative mode, but difference in adjectival mode essentially also, as St. Thomas notes, Opusc. 48, c. de genere, at the end; and therefore difference is said to be predicated in what kind what, that is in essential or quidditative what kind, for difference, although it is essential, nevertheless exercises the duty and predication of difference through mode of adjacency, not through mode of substantive, which pertains to what.

And the reason is: Because the duty of difference is not to provide the first foundation of quiddity, but to come to genus, and determine that so that species is constituted; hence it never behaves as first foundation and first notion of quiddity, but as contracting notion,

and coming to another, and determining that, hence its mode is to determine and actuate something presupposed before and contractible, like genus, and therefore substantive mode pertains to genus, but qualificative mode, or of adjacency to difference, and that is called what, this what kind. And when the Philosopher said in 7 Topic., cap. 2, that both parts of definition are predicated in that what, the sense is that both parts are predicated essentially, nevertheless in diverse mode, genus in what, and difference in what kind.

Third is still considered in the very mode of predicating in what the difference by which genus is predicated in what, and by which species is predicated; for species is predicated in what completely, because it predicates integral and complete notion of quiddity, and genus is predicated in what incompletely, because it predicates constitutive part of essence, which is potential, and first, and as foundation of contracting difference. But both mode of signifying says substantive mode and in what. The reason of which is, because substance is signified as whole and complete being, for it pertains to substance to have the notion of whole and supposition. Similarly it pertains to mode of substance to be quasi standing, or foundation of others, and that which has notion of first in some genus. Hence similarity is drawn so that they are said to signify in substantive mode, either those things which are signified through mode of whole, or which are signified through mode of foundation and first in some order. And species indeed signifies through mode of what, or through substantive mode, because it signifies integral and complete in the notion of quiddity. But genus signifies through mode of what, and in substantive mode also, because it signifies through mode of first predicate, which is foundation and root of others. And this whole explains the definition itself by saying in the definition of genus, that it is predicated in what of many differing in species, that is quasi contractible through specific differences, but that which is contractible is first predicate, containing those in potency. But in definition of species it is said in what of many differing in number, through which is designated integral notion of quiddity no longer contractible through formal and specific differences, but multiplicable through singular, which are material.

If you inquire: Whether this definition of genus is essential, or descriptive?

It is responded: As it is delivered by Porphyry it is descriptive, as he himself signifies, and St. Thomas so calls it Opuscul. 48, cap. 2. For the essence of genus consists in the notion of universality, which in such mode regards inferiors, that they are distinct in species, and through mode of what. But its definition is delivered through predicability, which is property of universal. Therefore it explains nature of genus through property, which is to be descriptive. Nevertheless it can be reduced to essential by saying: Genus is universal regarding (or apt to regard, if it is delivered fundamentally) many distinct in

species in what. Where definition is delivered through superior or generic predicate, which is the term 'universal'. And through intrinsic difference, namely to regard in such mode, that is in what, and to have such term namely many distinct in species.

Arguments are solved.

Against the particle in what it is argued: For it befits others than the defined, even if predication in what of many distinct in species is taken; and to be predicated in what kind can befit genus; therefore that particle is badly posited. The antecedent as to the first part is proven: For being is predicated in what of many distinct in species; for it is quidditative predicate, as imbibed in quiddities themselves; and nevertheless it is not genus, since it is analogous. The definition itself also is predicated in what of the defined; for to one asking what is man, it is rightly responded: rational animal. And difference itself also, since it is nobler than genus, ought also to be predicated in nobler mode; but it is nobler mode to be predicated in what, this is to be predicated substantively, than to be predicated in what kind, which is to be predicated adjectively, and through mode of accident; therefore it ought to befit it, and not only genus. As to the second part it is proven: Because in predicament of substance genera and species are called second substances; but the Philosopher says these, in cap. de substantia, text 7, signify what kind what, and adds that genus and species determine quality concerning substance; therefore genus is predicated in what kind. Then this predication: White is colored, is predication of genus, just as this: Whiteness is color; and nevertheless colored is predicated through mode of adjacent, and consequently in what kind; therefore it is not of the notion of genus to be predicated in what.

I respond by denying the antecedent. To the first part I respond: That being is not quidditative predicate, but transcendent, and imbibed in every thing, whether it pertains to quiddity, or not; hence that which is common to quiddity and non-quiddity cannot constitute quidditative concept. And thus transcendent concept is presupposed to concept of quiddity, it does not constitute it, nor does it pertain more to what, than to what kind. For just as when we say: What is man, and it is responded that being, so also when we say: What kind is man, and it can be responded that being. And further, because being is analogous, it is not predicated in what simply and according to one notion, but according to many, and only proportionally one, but genus is predicated in what simply and as one.

To what is said concerning definition, I respond: That definition is something complex, and contains not only notion in what, but also notion in what kind; for it consists of genus

and difference, nor is it predicated in what, just as genus, but after the mode of species, through mode of integral quiddity, which it explains.

To what is said concerning difference, I respond: That, although it is nobler than genus from the part of thing signified, nevertheless from the part of mode of predicating it is not predicated in what, because mode of predicating does not follow precisely mode of being in the thing, but mode of conceiving. Which St. Thomas teaches, 7 Metaph., lect. 1; and Opusc. 42, cap. 19. But difference is conceived after the mode of determining and actuating, but genus as determinable and contractible. And therefore this founds in what, in the mode explained, but that in what kind.

To the second part of argument, I respond: That the Philosopher calls second substances what kind what, and that they determine quality, not with respect to nature and quiddity, but by comparison to first substances, which signify supposition sustaining; for with respect to supposition, both species, and genus, and remaining superior grades have notion of predicate, and notion of form sustained by supposition; but comparatively to nature and essence, which they constitute, one constituting part, namely genus is said in what, and another, namely difference is said in what kind. Concerning which solution Cajetan must be seen, upon cap. 5 Categories. Hence also the other instance is solved: because genus behaves as form with respect to inferior of which it is predicated; therefore it is not predicated in what, but as informing. For I respond that genus behaves as form not from the part of thing, which it explains, nor comparatively to nature, which it constitutes, but from the part of mode of behaving as predicate which with respect to subject puts on mode of form, and comparatively to first substance, by which it is sustained; in which sense St. Thomas, 1-2, question 18, art. 7, ad 3, says that genus is compared to species as something more formal, insofar as it is less contracted.

To the last proof I respond: That in that predication: White is colored: the term 'colored' is held substantively with respect to white, although it is adjectival with respect to body, or subject of color; hence with respect to subject it will be denominative and adjectival predication, nevertheless with respect to white, which is its inferior, it is quidditative predication, by reason of imported form.

Second it is argued: Against the particle: of many differing in species. For genus is also predicated of many differing in number, just as animal of Peter and Paul; therefore the adequate term of genus is not explained in definition.

If you say only the immediate is explained, which is species, it is insisted in predication of genus concerning generic individuals, as when animal is predicated of this animal, and

of that animal; for then it is immediately predicated of individuals, and not of species; therefore the definition is diminished.

Likewise genus can be predicated of many differing not only in species, but also in genus, just as supreme genus, which is predicated of many middle genera, which are subaltern species; therefore that particle: of many differing in species does not sufficiently explain intention of genus in common.

I respond: That genus is predicated of many differing in number mediately, namely by this very fact that it is predicated of many differing in species. For since individuals are contained under species, and whatever is predicated universally of something is predicated of everything contained under that, through the principle of being said of all, consequently genus is also predicated of many differing in number, nevertheless not just as lowest species, which is immediately predicated of those.

And to the reply concerning generic individuals, I respond: That it is also predicated of those mediately, whether they are contained in the same lowest species, or in diverse. For generic individuals express generic grade individuated, not expressing specific grade, by means of which they are contained under generic. And because they do not express the specific grade itself, nevertheless they include it, and by means of it pertain to generic, therefore they are said to be contained mediately, although it does not repugn that such generic individuals pertain to diverse species by reason of inclusion of such species, nevertheless always concerning those, insofar as they are individuals, generic grade is predicated only mediately, because it is contracted and befits individuals mediately, although sometimes generic grade alone is expressed, with specific omitted, and in this mode those generic individuals are predicated.

To the second part of argument it is said: Supreme genus is predicated of many differing in genus, not insofar as they are genera, but insofar as they are subaltern; but genus which is subalternated to another superior, is subjected to that insofar as it is some species, because it is subjected to that insofar as it consists of that and of difference, which is to be species. Hence genus is predicated of many, insofar as they differ in species, because insofar as species are subjected to it. And therefore they are not said to differ in genus, except those which differ in predicament; for those which are within the same predicament differ according to contracting differences and consequently constituting some species, for every difference constitutes species.

Lastly it is argued, proving that this definition is essential: Because intention of predicability is included in the notion of this intention, which is genus, as St. Thomas

says, in 4 c. de Ente et essent., at the end. Where he also adds that to be predicated befits genus per se, since it is posited in its definition; therefore he thinks that predicability pertains essentially to essence of genus, and especially because this treatise treats per se of predicables; therefore things insofar as they pertain to this treatise are essentially defined, when they are defined through predicability.

I respond: The sense of St. Thomas is plain, that predicability is of the notion of genus, and befits it per se, and essentially, taking predicability for root, not for the very formal intention of predicability. But the root of predicability is universality. Or, if predicability is taken formally, it is understood to befit per se genus, and to be enclosed in its intention by per se-ity of second mode, and as property, not by per se-ity of first mode, and as essential predicate. But in this treatise Porphyry treats of predicables, not as they are distinguished from universal, but as they are rooted in it, and including the very notion of universal, not excluding. Hence it is necessary that essential definitions are also delivered through the very notion of universal.

ARTICLE II.
What is defined in the definition of genus, the intention itself, or the subject, or something composed from both.

The point of this difficulty has often been touched by us, and depends on that common difficulty of defining accidents in concrete. For since there is found in concrete of accident the subject denominated by form, and form denominating it, and the constituted, or composite from both, it is difficult to assign proper and per se defined, to which definition essentially befits. For if we say, e.g. in this definition of genus, that the defined is the subject itself, or nature, to which intention of genus befits, definition does not befit it essentially; for, e.g., animal does not have for essential notion to be predicated of many, although it is that which is predicated of many. Neither can the defined be the intention itself, or generic form; for this is not that which is predicated, but by which some nature is rendered universal and is predicated of many. Neither the constituted itself from nature and intention; for this constituted is not predicated of many differing in species, because that thing conflated from real nature and of reason does not descend to species themselves, but only nature.

This difficulty has tormented the minds of many and divided into various opinions: some saying that the defined, in these definitions, is subject as it expresses order to form; others conversely, that it is form as it expresses order to subject; others finally, especially among some more recent, saying that the constituted itself from subject and accidental form is

defined, as that to which definition essentially befits, but to the subject itself, or substituted only denominatively.

In this point it has often been rejected by us as contrary to Aristotle and St. Thomas, that something conflated from subject and accident can be defined as something per se one; for in this opposing authors agree that by name of that constituted, or composite from subject and accident they understand some quiddity resulting from subject and accident, as from constitutives of one third, which has subject as part of itself, hence it is not predicated of that, because whole is not predicated of part. And when it is said: Man is white, it is verified adjectively of the substituted itself, not essentially and substantively, for the third constituted itself. We say therefore that from these two, subject and accident, there does not result something one per se and definable by one definition, but as being per accidens, as we said extensively above, q. 5, from the mind of St. Thomas.

And beyond what was said there it is explained, because from substance and accident some quiddity per se one cannot result, which is neither substance, nor accident; for between substance and accident no middle falls, for they are divided by modes explaining contradiction, namely to be per se, and to be in another; therefore that third, which results, since it has substance as part of itself, and similarly accident, cannot be some quiddity, which is substance alone, or accident alone, but middle between these two is impossible; therefore it is not some quiddity per se, but being per accidens. If you say that it is not one quiddity, which is neither substance, nor accident, but one quiddity, which is both, this is what we intend, because that quiddity, or conflated, if it is simultaneously substance and accident, cannot be through this that it passes into one quiddity per se distinct from both, which is neither per se accident, nor per se substance, since this is not given. Therefore it is only substance and accident joined by accidental union, not essential and per se; but many things accidentally united are being per accidens, although they agree in the same subject, and are not one constitutively, but denominatively.

But some respond: That concretes of accidents can be taken either adjectively, or substantively: and adjectively indeed they are subordinated to many concepts, and are not being per se, but taken substantively they are said to be one per se, because they are conceived and objected as one, but adjectively they object subject and form as many. Hence that they are being per accidens, or per se depends on mode of conceiving. Others say that one per accidens does not result from accident and subject, because they have true union among themselves and compose something true. Others that, even if it is being per accidens, it can be defined, just as republic, and army, people, and other similar things are defined, which have lesser unity.

But the first solution inconveniently distinguishes between name adjectively and substantively only as to this that it is being per accidens, or per se; for indeed that name is held adjectively, depends on this that it is signified as applying its adjacency to another, but substantively one is signified as importing with itself supposition to which in reality it is adjacent and inheres. However that it is being per accidens, or per se depends on unity and identity of that thing, which results from combination of both; but this quiddity, or unity, which results, is not per se one, whether it is signified as applying adjacency to another, or is signified as bearing with itself supposition, because in whatever mode it is signified, quiddity resulting from that form and subject arises from accidental conjunction of extremes, and does not make some middle quiddity between substance and accident, because this is impossible, nor quiddity, which is substance alone, or accident alone; therefore it does not make something per se constituted, but accidentally denominated, whether it is held adjectively, or substantively.

The second solution fails in this that from accidental union it thinks being one per se results; for although it is true union, nevertheless it is not union per se, but secundum quid and accidental; therefore that which results from it is one only secundum quid; for such as the union of extremes will have been, such will be unity resulting from it.

Finally the third solution manifestly sins in this, because definition only deals with quiddity; therefore insofar definition is one, insofar as it attains and defines one quiddity; but being per accidens does not say one quiddity simply and per se, but many, which are only one per accidens; therefore it is not definable by one definition, for definition defines through genus and difference, but where there are many quiddities, there are many genera and differences, therefore many definitions. Which reason is taken from Philos., 7 Met., lect. 11, in St. Thomas.

From these therefore I resolve the proposed difficulty.

AND I SAY FIRST: The defined of genus is not constituted from subject and intention of genus, nor can definition essentially befit it. So Cajetan, upon cap. de genere, and commonly Thomists. This remains manifest from what has been said, since intention of genus is accidental predicate with respect to subject, and consequently from that and subject there does not result some nature, or quiddity per se definable.

I SAY SECOND: The formal defined, in this definition and of other accidents, cannot be nature itself, or subject as clothed and subjected to intention. The reason is, because formal defined ought to be that which by the name itself is formally and per se designated; but white e.g., does not signify subject formally and per se, but in connoted

and consequently; therefore. The minor is proven from St. Thomas, 5 Met., lect. 9, where he says: "Nor is it true what Avicenna says, that predicates, which are in genera of accident, principally signify substance, and posteriorly accident, like this which I say white, for white, as is said in predicaments, signifies quality alone, but this name white signifies subject consequently, insofar as it signifies whiteness through mode of accident." So St. Thomas. But the reason is, because concrete of accident agrees with its abstract in formal and per se signified, for from that it draws form by which it is denominated and which it concerns; therefore concrete signifies the same as abstract from the part of denominating form, although applied to denominated subject; but formal signified of abstract is form, therefore also formal signified of concrete is form, although it adds mode of existing of it in denominated subject. But subject is only imported as sustaining and receiving form, not as pertaining to quiddity of form; but definition intends to explain to us quiddity of form received and signified in concrete, not receiving subject, much less does it intend to declare nature itself of receiving subject; for when I define white, I define not nature of body, but reason of white.

I SAY LASTLY: The formal and quidditative defined in this definition (the same is concerning other accidental concretes) is second intention of genus; but that which renders supposition to defined, or denominated by that, is subject of this intention, and thus consequently and connotedly is imported in the defined itself. This is Cajetan's, in cap. de genere; and cap. 4 de Ente et Essent.; and Thomists commonly follow. And so in these definitions it is one thing the formal defined, another that which renders supposition to defined, because in this accident is distinguished from substance that defined, in substance, has supposition and notion that what from itself, but accident begs that outside itself. And this conclusion is established from St. Thomas, where he says concrete of accident signifies form alone, as white quality, but does not have subject as part of its signification, as is clear 5 Metaphys., lect. 9; and 8 Metaph., lect. 4, § Determinat etc. And 7 Met., lect 1.

Nor does it suffice to respond that Aristotle and St. Thomas only wanted that concrete of accident does not signify determinately this or that subject, but confusedly, but signifies form determinately; for neither can it be denied that concrete of accident represents subject to us, and not only form. But this solution cannot stand, because St. Thomas does not deny that subject is signified by name of concrete, but says it does not signify that principally, but consequently, as is clear in 5 Met., lect. 9, against Avicenna, and that it does not signify that equally and as part of signification, in 7. Met., lect 1; therefore whether it signifies subject in common, or not, nevertheless according to St. Thomas that which is imported by name of white as subject (which it is certain is signified confusedly,

and not determinately this, or that subject) is not signified principally, but consequently, and as subject sustaining form; therefore it is not principal and per se defined, but rendering supposition to defined, and consequently imported.

Finally it can be seen how clearly St. Thomas teaches this conclusion, 7 c. de Ente et Essent., where he says: "Because essence is signified through definition, it is necessary that accidents have essence in that mode by which they have definition. But they have incomplete definition, because they cannot be defined, unless subject is posited in their definition, and this is therefore because they do not have in themselves absolute being per se from subject." Then St. Thomas posits difference between substantial and accidental form: "That that coming to matter constitutes some essence, and therefore form is part of complete essence; but accidental form with subject does not make one per se, but per accidens, and therefore from their conjunction there does not result some essence, just as from matter and form, and therefore accident neither has notion of complete essence, nor is part of complete essence, but just as it is being secundum quid, so it has essence secundum quid."

Therefore according to St. Thomas definition of accident is always incomplete, just as also its essence, because it is essence depending on something outside itself, namely on subject, which renders supposition to the defined itself, but does not pertain, nor enter quiddity of defined. And this is reason why accidents are said to be defined by addition, as the Philosopher speaks, 7 Met., text 17, lect. 4, in St. Thomas, because they are defined through something, which is outside essence of defined, namely through subject; for in accidents that what is distinguished from that whose it is, as there text 20, Aristotle says, and lect. 5 St. Thomas. Therefore it is one thing formal and quidditative defined in accidental concretes, another supposition of defined.

And from this is taken foundation of conclusion, because quidditative and formal predicates of accident stop in accidental form itself, nor does subject pertain to quidditative predicate, although it sustains and receives those. Therefore quidditative and formal defined in these definitions does not pass to subject, but stops in form itself, for formal and quidditative defined is that in which formal quidditative predicates are included. But because such form and such its quidditative predicates are not defined in state of separation and abstraction from subject, but with mode of existing in subject, therefore subject consequently is posited in their definition as rendering supposition to defined, not as its quidditative predicate. And thus it is one thing quidditative and formal defined, another in which this defined is found and to which it renders supposition. This is subject or nature, that form or intention in this definition of genus.

Arguments are solved.

First it is argued by argument posited above in introduction of difficulty, because intention of genus is not that which is predicated of many species essentially, since it does not descend to those, but is that by which nature is predicated; therefore definition given does not befit it. Hence also when I say in concrete: Peter is white, I do not predicate whiteness of him, but I predicate having whiteness; but this which is having whiteness, is not quality alone, but subject affected by quality; therefore that is defined, just as that is signified by the term 'white'.

I respond: Intention is not that which is predicated, as supposition of such intention and thing predicated, and therefore neither does definition befit it as supposition of definition, but only as notion, or form of predicating of many. Hence in definitions of accidental concretes the defined is not found as that what essentially, but denominatively, since it is rendered supposition to defined through something extrinsic; nor do accidents bear supposition from themselves, and therefore their definitions are given by addition, because in them it is one thing that what, another whose it is, as we said above from Philosopher and St. Thomas. But why are these definitions delivered concerning that which is denominated such, not through that by which it is such, since to this alone definition essentially befits, and it is only formal defined? The reason is because accidents have incomplete being and dependent on denominated subject, not subsisting in itself; hence this dependence and imperfection of accident is better expressed by defining those through subject, which is denominatively such, than only through what is signified by itself, as that by which. Concerning which reason see St. Thomas, 7 Met., lect. 4; and c. 7 de Ente et Essent. And then so that it would agree with the very mode of signifying. For since accident is defined in concrete, where subject is signified, as rendering supposition to defined, it would be said more inconveniently that such signified is that by which something is such, where only abstract notion is signified, than that which is such, although definition befits it only denominatively. And when it is said Peter white, the term 'white' indeed signifies having whiteness, and not whiteness in abstract; but not both equally, but whiteness formally, but subject which is having, connotedly and for material, by reason of which it is verified accidentally of subject to which it is applied, because it is identified in supposition with that, hence similarly having whiteness is defined, but not equally, whiteness formally, the term 'having' denominatively and as entering by addition in definition.

Second it is argued, by argument made above, q. 5, art. 5, which some use here: because namely white is well defined thus: It is body disgregative of sight, or is having whiteness;

therefore not quality alone, but constituted from quality and subject is definable. See solution of this in aforesaid place, last argument.

Third it is argued: In definition of genus one subject cannot be imported; therefore neither principally, nor consequently does it import that. The consequence is clear, because subject of intention of genus, if it is not imported as one, but as many, by this very fact it is not well defined through mode of one, by saying that which is predicated, but there will be many, which are predicated. But the antecedent is manifest, because that which underlies nature of genus is not one, nor can it be conceived by one concept, for both real being, and of reason, both accident, and substance underlie intention of genus; therefore it is not one subject.

I respond: Many are tormented by this argument. But nevertheless, in my view, it must be solved in opinion of all, whether subject is imported from part of principal defined, or as denominatively defined, and consequently imported. And the same difficulty can be found in any concrete importing very ample subject, like true, good, intelligible etc., whose subject is found both in real being, and in being of reason, in substance and in accident. I say therefore that in that concrete one subject is not imported by unity of nature, or being, but by unity of capacity and receptibility of that form, or intention. For whatever has capacity of that form, is signified through mode of one subject, this is one receptible, although they are most diverse natures; just as Theologians say that in those words: This is my body, by the term 'this' is understood what is contained under species, that is whatever can be under those species, whether it is living body, or dead, or bread, or man, so by name of substrate of genus we understand whatever is capable of genericity, whether it is real, or not, provided it agrees in this notion of capacity, even if it does not agree in quiddity of nature and unity.

Fourth it is argued: If we understand that the constituted itself from subject and form is defined here, everything that pertains to notion of genus is essentially explained; for both thing predicated denominatively and form, by which it is rendered predicable is explained; therefore such conflated quadrates better to whole definition itself for defined.

And it is confirmed: Because that whole constituted is subordinated to one ultimate concept; therefore it is one definable. The consequence is clear, because therefore being per accidens is not definable, because it is not one quiddity, but many; therefore in contrary sense, if it is one, as subordinated to one concept, it is definable per se. But the antecedent is proven; both because this concrete white is of one concept; therefore also the constituted itself from whiteness and body, for neither are more found in concrete

than in constituted; both also because both that accidental concrete, and constituted can be ordered to one operation, namely white to disgregating, hot to heating; therefore it can be subordinated to one concept.

I respond: That in that constituted indeed the whole, which is in genus, is explained, but not equally and as pertaining essentially to genus itself, but subject as denominated, and intention as form, by which genus is formally constituted. But that one third quiddity results from those two, which is essentially definable by this definition of genus, this is impossible, as we saw, nor does it better explain defined of genus, or definition quadrates to that, because neither is it that which is predicated, because intention does not descend with nature to inferiors, nor is it that by which it is predicated, because nature does not pertain to form by which something is rendered predicable, but to thing predicated, hence from nature and intention neither is made quiddity which is genus as that what, nor as that by which. But both are explained when it is not taken for constituted, but formally for form, and denominatively for subject.

To confirmation I respond: That concrete of accident is subordinated to one concept, importing subject and form not equally principally, but form essentially and formally, but subject materially and as denominated; and thus under this concept it can be defined, nor will it behave as being per accidens, but will be defined in that mode by which it is subordinated to that concept, namely so that form is the formal defined itself, and subject denominative. But indeed constituted from whiteness and body, and form and accident, includes both equally essentially, and as constituting one third, and in this mode it is being per accidens, because it results from extremes accidentally united, nor can one quiddity result, which is neither substance, nor accident, but both simultaneously. But concrete does not say some resulting quiddity, but the very formal quiddity of accident having subject not as part, or extreme component, but as material denominated by itself, and in which it has state of being not abstractly, but concretely.

Lastly it argues: Nature alone is, which is predicated of inferiors, or nature according to itself, as St. Thomas says, 4 cap. de Ente et essent; therefore although such nature has relation and intention of genus, nevertheless defined directly will be the substrate itself of intention, because to this alone definition essentially befits, namely to be predicated of many. Nor can it be said that to be predicated befits it denominatively, not formally and essentially, for generic nature, e.g., animal is not predicated denominatively, but essentially of inferiors.

I respond: It is most true that nature is that which is predicated essentially of inferiors from part of thing predicated, but predicability itself and state of universality, by which it is predicated of many, befits nature denominatively. But appellation is varied when it is said: It is not predicated denominatively, but essentially, therefore it does not befit it denominatively to be predicated of many; for it is one thing how predicability befits nature, another how nature is predicated of inferiors and befits them. Nature does not befit inferiors denominatively, but predicability, or universality denominatively befits nature itself so that it is essentially predicated of inferiors, not as to thing predicated, but through mode of universal and superior, without which universality nevertheless essence is found. But by reason of thing which is predicated, St. Thomas says nature according to itself is predicated of inferiors.

ARTICLE III.
How genus is called potential whole and is drawn from matter.

So that some nature is genus it requires certain conditions, which must be explained by us in this article. First, that it behaves as whole with respect to inferiors. Second, that it does not say the whole nature actually and explicitly, but part. Third, that it says more potential part of nature, by reason of which genus is called potential whole. Fourth, that it is drawn from matter, but difference from form.

How genus is whole and part.

Two things must be noted: First is that in universals the notion of whole and part is considered by double reason. First, from mode of conceiving; second, from the part of thing conceived and signified. From the part of mode of conceiving every universal says notion of whole and not part with respect to its inferiors, since indeed it ought to be conceived in such mode that it can be predicated of any inferior; but if it were conceived through mode of part with respect to those, it could not be predicated of them, because every whole is greater than its part, and every part less than its whole. Hence, if it is signified through mode of part with respect to something, by this very fact from mode of signifying it is signified as less than that, and consequently is not the whole itself, and thus is not predicated of that, for predication is signified by the verb is, insofar as this is that. Such therefore notion of whole from mode of conceiving ought to be common to every universal and every predicable, and thus does not pertain specially to notion of genus.

But from the part of thing signified, or conceived, notion of whole and notion of part is considered according as they constitute quiddity itself, or quiddity itself is considered as constituted; and in this mode only in the first three predicables is found notion of whole and part, because genus and difference concur to composing species, and therefore designate parts of that, but species is the very total and integral quiddity, constituted from genus and difference. Hence although genus and difference from mode of conceiving, as universals have notion of whole, nevertheless from the part of thing, which they explain, they do not explain the whole quiddity, but part.

Second, which we note, is that in metaphysical composition properly there are not parts, just as in physical, but grades. For in physical composition two separable parts are conjoined, just as is clear that matter now is under one form, now under another, and rational form also is without matter, hence from those parts the whole is so composed, that one part is not included in another, nor is predicated of another, nor of the whole, for we do not say that soul is body, or man, or conversely. But indeed metaphysical parts are not distinct things composing one whole, but diverse designations of the same thing according to more and less determinate, as St. Thomas teaches, in third chapter de Ente et essentia. Wherefore since these metaphysical grades only differ according to designation more or less determinate of the same thing, they cannot properly import parts, which are really distinct among themselves, but the same whole more or less designated, and more or less determinate; hence the same thing, or same whole as expressing, or designating notion of animal, which is less determinate, and same whole as it designates rational, which is more determinate notion, compose man, who expresses integral notion of human quiddity. For which reason the same holy Doctor comes to be understood, in 1, dist. 25, q. 1, art. 1, ad 2, where he says that man is not from animal and rational, but rational animal, because namely he is not from those, as from distinct parts, but well, as from grades diversely designating the same thing.

From which is gathered that genus is not called physical part, but metaphysical, which simultaneously can be whole: part indeed insofar as it explains and designates one only constitutive of specific quiddity; but whole insofar as implicitly from the very mode of signifying and conceiving it says the whole that is in inferior, of which it is predicated. E.g., animal from the part of thing signified only designates and explains sensitive notion, where not everything that pertains to essence of man, or horse, or other species is explained, but nevertheless implicitly it says whatever is in man or in horse, because it so says sensitive form by explaining notion of sensitive alone, that it does not exclude everything else that can be conjoined to such sensitive form, and thus it says any form which is sensitive, whether it is only sensitive, or has something more. And this which is

not to exclude everything else, that can be conjoined to such sensitive form, is to contain that implicitly.

But if that animal or generic form were signified with such precision that it excluded whatever else that is not sensitive form, just as when it is signified by abstract name of animality, then it could not be predicated of inferiors in concrete, as we said extensively above, q. 5.

Hence is solved that question: Whether genus is predicated as whole, or as part of inferiors. For it is established from what has been said that genus is predicated as whole from the part of mode of conceiving, but from the part of thing predicated it explains only part of quiddity of that thing of which it is predicated. For when I predicate animal of man, that which is explained by name of animal is notion of sensitive form, but mode by which it is predicated is by saying absolutely the whole that is in man, insofar as it implicitly involves not only sensitive form with exclusion of further perfection, but says whatever is sensitive, even if it has something further else, and for this reason it is simply the whole itself. And thus are reconciled opinions, which in this part seem to be opposed, nor do reasons of one and another prove more.

How genus is potential whole.

So that confusion does not arise in name of potential whole it is necessary to note that potential whole is not taken here as it is distinguished from essential whole, in which mode it is accustomed to be said that potential whole is divided into potestative parts of which it is not predicated, but essential whole is divided into subjective parts of which it is said. But genus is called potential whole, as it is opposed to actual whole, because it does not explain whole actually constituted, but part of that further actualizable and contractible, and thus behaving potentially.

Therefore concerning this potential whole two things remain to be explained. First: With respect to what genus is said to be potential and implicit, and consequently whether this potentiality befits it insofar as it is whole, or insofar as it is part? Second: What is that actual, by comparison of which genus is called potential?

To the first, I respond first, genus is called potential insofar as it imports some common notion contractible through addition of some difference, which is not actually included in that superior notion, but in potency. But this is common to every univocal, even to species itself, in difference from transcendentals and analogous things, which are imbibed in differences themselves. Hence to transcendentals nothing is added as it were

extraneous, because they are included in every thing, because they are transcendent. And for this reason they do not perfectly abstract from their inferiors, as we will say, quest. 13. But univocal, because it is perfectly abstracted from inferiors, and is not included in differences themselves, is said to remain in potency to those.

Second, genus is said in special mode to be something potential with respect to metaphysical composition, because in specific quiddity itself genus designates contractible part through difference, and thus more indeterminate and potential, but difference says contracting and determining part, and therefore is predicated through mode of what kind, although essentially, because that which determines and affects another quasi qualifies that; and thus genus behaves potentially with respect to contracting difference, just as matter with respect to form, and with respect to constituted whole, as incomplete with respect to complete.

From which is clear whether genus is to be called potential whole, or potential part. For both ought to be said according to diverse considerations. For since metaphysical parts are not properly parts, but grades, but indeed they are the whole itself implicitly and not totally explained as to quiddity, just as species explains, therefore genus when it is considered as part is also whole, but of that whole it does not explain the whole, but part, or grade designatable and completable by further actuality, which is difference. Hence from the part of quiddity, which it explains, comparatively to difference it is potential part, but with respect to inferior species, it is potential whole, that is whole which is in species not totally designated and explained, but indeterminately taken.

But to the second, which we proposed to be explained, I respond: The actual predicate, in order to which greater or lesser potentiality of genus is taken, is ultimate specific difference, which renders some quiddity so formed and determinate, that it is no longer contractible, except through individual differences, which do not make to differ formally and quidditatively, but materially and numerically, as will be explained more, quest. 9.

What it is for genus to be drawn from matter and difference from form.

This axiom is common, although it cannot be applied in the same mode to all natures, which undergo intention of genus. For some natures are composed from form and matter. Some are forms only, although depending on matter, just as accidents. Some have neither composition from matter, nor order to it, just as angels. And concerning all these, how they take genus from matter, and difference from form, St. Thomas treats, 6 and 7 cap. de Ente et essent.; and Opusc. 42, c. 4 and 5; and 1 p., q. 50, art. 2, ad 1; and q. de

Spiritualibus creaturis, art. 1, ad 24; and 7 Met., lect. 9; and 8 Met., lect. 2; and elsewhere frequently.

Therefore it must be considered that, when we say genus is taken from matter, difference from form, the sense is not that genus says matter alone, and difference form alone, but because form is principle of difference from which that is drawn; just as when we say the principle of individuation is signate matter, the sense is not that individuation consists formally in signate matter, but that it is taken thence as from root, as St. Thomas notes, 6 cap. de Ente et essent. And this is manifestly established, because genus, as has often been proven, says whole essence of that of which it is predicated; therefore it does not say matter alone, nor difference form alone. For thus physical and metaphysical parts would not differ.

Therefore in generic and specific grades, or differential, must be distinguished that which they have of potentiality, and that which they explain of actuality; just as animal, e.g., actually explains sensitive form, and potentially involves those things which are conjoined to such form.

I say therefore that in generic grade itself pure potentiality is not imported, just as in prime matter, but also something of determinate actuality and quiddity, although not entirely completely and determinate; and therefore generic notion ought not to be drawn proximately from matter alone, which is physical part, but from that which is material, or potential in each thing, whether it is composite, or simple.

Hence also in composite things we said that all grades are taken from the same form, but matter does not give grade, but receives, and is informed by that; nevertheless remotely in composite things genus can be taken from matter, insofar as it is principle of all potentiality, and thus form according to perfect grade informing matter, and leaving that informable by further grade, will be called root and principle of genus also from the part of matter itself thus informable. Thus is taken from St. Thomas, in cited place de Spirit. creat., where he says: "That genus is taken from matter, nevertheless so that by matter is not understood prime matter, but according as through form it receives some imperfect and material being with respect to specific being, just as being of animal is imperfect and material with respect to man." And similarly in cap. 6 de Ent. et essent.: "In sensible things, he says, genus is taken from that which is material in the thing; but difference from that which is formal in it. Hence Avicenna says that form, in things composed from matter and form, is simple difference, not nevertheless so that form itself is difference, but because it is principle of difference." And so genus is not taken from prime matter

alone nude, but from matter as having imperfect being from form, and matter thus having imperfect being is called material with respect to more perfect grade; for genus says some determinate nature, although not yet perfect with every perfection, but matter according to itself says no determinate grade, nor determinate actuality, for it is in potency to every substantial actuality, as will be proven more widely in Physics. And given that it itself has some substantial actuality, nevertheless it is manifestly established that it receives from form not only ultimate actuality and grade, but diverse grades and perfections more or less determinate. Hence those genera, which correspond to these more imperfect grades, cannot be drawn from nude matter, but from matter informed according to more imperfect notion and grade to it itself as informable by more perfect grade and notion.

But when St. Thomas says, Opus. 42, c. 2: "That potentiality of whole composite in material things is from matter, therefore genus is taken from it, but perfection of whole is from form, therefore difference is taken from form" and 1 p., quest. 50, art. 2, ad 1, he says: "That in material things it is one thing that determines special grade, namely form, and another that is determined, namely matter," and thus he seems to affirm that genus is taken from matter alone, difference from form alone.

I respond: The sense of St. Thomas is clear from his words. Namely that matter in composites is first root of potentiality; and thus, although generic grade is taken from form for that part, by which grade says actuality, nevertheless potentiality of genus devolves to matter, as to root, although proximately it is drawn not from nude matter, but from that which is material with respect to that which is more formal and perfect; and this material St. Thomas calls matter, that more formal, form, not nude matter, from which genus is taken.

But indeed in things not composite, namely in angels, who do not agree in matter with bodies (and therefore sometimes are said to differ in genus from those, that is matter, which is physical genus), it is not verified that genus is taken from matter even remotely, because they lack that, but is taken from that which is more potential and quasi material in such substances. But this, as St. Thomas says, 6 cap. de Ente et essentia, and 1 p., quest. 50, art. 3, ad 1, is intellectuality itself, or immateriality precisely, or indeterminately taken, that is insofar as finite and limited intellectuality, and in potency so that through greater or lesser approach and participation of pure act it is more perfect, or more imperfect: for this provides notion of difference and gradual perfection, insofar as more uniformly one intellect understands than another, and thus is more similar to God, and more approaches to him. Finally in accidents, genus also is not taken from matter intrinsic to itself, because they lack it, but from diverse relation to substance, as

we will say in ante-predicaments; just as quantity is said from this that it regards substance by measuring through mode of extension, quality by affecting through mode of power, or ornament, and thus concerning others. But differences are taken either from proper subjects, from which proper accidents arise, or we draw them from effects of such accidents, quasi a posteriori, because we are ignorant of proper differences. See St. Thomas, 7 cap. de Ente et essentia.

You will say: Genus cannot be drawn from the same principle and root from which individuation is drawn, since genus is most indeterminate, individual lastly determinate; therefore it will be said inconveniently that genus is taken from matter, since in opinion of St. Thomas individuation is taken from it.

It is responded that both befit matter according to diverse respects and considerations. For matter regards form as first and potential subject, which namely is in potency to receiving form and its grades, but matter itself does not have further another subject in which it is received. Hence, with respect to form having potentiality, it leaves indetermination and indifference to receiving imperfect grade of one form, and further another more perfect, up to ultimate, which is to be root and principle of genus. But because, by receiving form, it is so ultimate subject that it is further incommunicable to another subject, by reason of this ultimate incommunicability it is principle of individuation, which is no longer common to many, nor communicable.

What natures are capable of genus.

I respond: All those, which can directly be in predicament, whether real, or of reason, whether they are accident, or modes, or substances. And so every being, which has mode, or notion of whole, consisting of metaphysical composition, is capable of having genus and difference, which through mode of whole predicates quidditative part of that; but those which are only simple parts, whether physical, like matter and form, or integral, and similarly differences, do not have per se notion of genus, but only reductively. Which is opinion of St. Thomas, in 3, dist. 6, quest. 1, art. 1, ad 1; and Opusc. 42, c. 10; Cajetan, in cap. de specie; and others.

The reason for excluding physical and integral parts is this, because these parts cannot have supreme genus; therefore neither subaltern, because, since in genera there is not proceeding to infinity, it is necessary to stop in one, and that will be supreme. The antecedent is proven: Because if they had supreme genus, either that is complete substance, which is supreme predicamental genus, or incomplete. It cannot be complete,

because this is not truly predicated of parts, therefore neither generically. It cannot be incomplete, because this is imbibed in any difference, and thus will also be imbibed in differences themselves of parts, for they also are something incomplete, and thus it behaves transcendentally, but not indeed through mode of genus, which ought to be outside concept of differences. And similar argument can be made concerning body and living thing etc. But in accidents it is not necessary to make this argument, because they do not have parts, but are simple forms; if nevertheless they had them, the same argument would be made.

But the reason for excluding differences from notion of genus is this, because process to infinity would follow. For if rational, for example, has genus, it ought to contract that through another difference, for every genus is contractible through difference. Again that difference thus contracting would also have its genus, for there is no greater reason concerning one, than concerning another; therefore it would be contracted through another difference: and that again would have another genus and difference, and thus to infinity. Therefore differences do not directly have genus, but are reduced as to the side.

From this nevertheless do not infer that abstracts of substances are not genera and species, because, although they are signified through mode of part, they are nevertheless total forms, and have composition from genus and difference, just as humanity with respect to animality and rationality. Hence the same inconvenience does not follow, that in other parts.

But if you object: For these parts and differences have some superior quidditative predicates besides being; for they have agreement more with one part, than with another, just as form of lion agrees more with form of ox, than with form of stone; therefore they can have genus, which is superior predicate as that, in which they agree, and similarly their difference.

And it is confirmed: For celestial and sublunary matter differ in species according to opinion of St. Thomas, 1. p., q. 66, art. 2; therefore each has its distinct species; and consequently they have genus in which they agree, and difference by which they are divided.

I respond: That these parts have superior quidditative predicates, but because per se they are not some whole and complete, they do not directly constitute species. And consequently neither do they directly have genus, but they have this whole thing reductively, just as incomplete is reduced to complete; indeed rather these predications in such parts and incomplete beings are transcendental, than generic, because they are

included in differences themselves, which does not befit genus. And thus it does not suffice to have superior predicates quidditatively so that they are generic, but it is necessary that they are not transcendental, but behave outside differences.

And if you ask concerning this predication: This form is form; this hand is hand, etc., whether it is of species concerning individual? I respond: This is not, except secundum quid and reductively, just as when it is said: This person is person, this individual is individual, because there nature is not predicated, but something of nature, and, although it is essential predication, it is nevertheless incomplete, and consequently reductively pertaining to complete.

To the confirmation I respond: Celestial and sublunary matter are of diverse species in incomplete mode, because namely they do not say order and capacity to the same forms, and thus one matter does not pass from one form to another. Nevertheless this diversity of capacities does not add some difference, which through mode of actuality determines and constitutes matter, since both are pure potency, and thus in the very differences of each matter is included potentiality itself, which constitutes matter in common, and substance, which is predicated of those, is incomplete substance, which is predicated more transcendentally than generically, as has been said. And in the same mode it is understood that matter has notion of nature, and other quidditative predicates, namely in incomplete transcendental mode, not generic.

QUESTION VIII.
ON PREDICABLE AND SUBJECTABLE SPECIES.

The correlative of genus is species, of which genus is predicated, but it itself is further predicable of individuals, and therefore includes double respect, of subjectability to genus, of superiority to individuals. And therefore, to explain exactly this second predicable, both respects must be explained.

ARTICLE I.
Whether species is constituted in the notion of species through notion of subjectable, or predicable.

I presuppose that species is defined by Porphyry in both ways. Insofar as subjectable, it is called that, which is placed under assigned genus, and of which genus is predicated in what. But it is defined insofar as predicable, which is predicated of many differing in number in that what. Where one relation of it is explained, not to what is superior to

itself, but to its inferiors, with respect to which it is superior. And note in passing that there is not vicious circle in Porphyry's definitions, when he defines genus through respect to species, of which it is predicated, and species through respect to genus to which it is subjected. Both because among mutual correlatives, such as genus and species are, this mutual respect must necessarily intervene, without vice of circle, by this very fact that they are mutual, and consequently the other must be mutually included in definition of both, as we will say below, q. 17, artic. 6. Both because species is not defined by that definition only, namely through respect of subjectability to genus, but also by another, namely of predicability to inferiors, and thus it is not precisely notified through genus, but by another way. But wherever something is presupposed notified and defined by another definition, and by another way than through that, with which it is circularly defined, formal circle is not committed, but only material, which is not vicious, because the same is not notified through the same only, but what is notified from elsewhere otherwise manifests its notifying and defining, as we will say more in book Posterior., quest. 25.

Since therefore in this second predicable this double intention concurs of predicable and subjectable, difficulty is in two things. First: Which of these intentions formally constitutes the second predicable? Second: How one behaves toward another, whether entirely disparately, or as proper property and something consequent, or modifying another?

But it is certain that these respects, or intentions are diverse relations, for they have distinct terms and foundations. For the term of subjectability is the superior itself, to which it is subjected, but foundation is inferiority, or dependence on that; but indeed the term of predicability, or universality are the inferiors themselves, of which they are predicated, but foundation of it itself is taken from the very community of nature, in which those inferiors agree, which is communicable and superior to those. Therefore they are diverse foundations and terms of these relations; but relation takes its unity, or diversity from foundation and term. And although the very notion, or intention of species is not constituted by many relations, but by one, it can nevertheless have many as properties, or required conditions, just as also predicability is property of universality. And we inquire which relation is essential and constitutive of species.

To this difficulty therefore, some think that predicable species does not befit species, as species is, but is constituted in notion of species through subjectability to genus, to which predicability and its universality follows. And this therefore, because proper notion of species is to be correlative of genus, and it does not have this notion of correlative

through order to inferiors, of which it is said, but through order to genus under which it is posited. So is taken from Cajetan, in cap. de specie. But others, through another extreme, think that species is so constituted through universality, that even subjectability itself to genus befits it, insofar as it is universal and by reason of universality. This is attributed to Toletus, quest. unica de specie. But others say that subjectability and predicability behave as disparate relations, and neither one arises from another as property from essence. Concerning which see Curs. Carmel., here disput. 6, quest. 3; M. Cabero, disp. 3, dub. 2; and Merinero, disp. 3, dub. 2.

Concerning the second also authors vary. For some, like Cajetan, cap. de specie, think that subjectability to genus is first notion of species, and from it arises predicability to individuals, and this speaking of atomic species, in which one of these intentions sprouts from another, for from this that species is posited under genus immediately and directly is born that species is predicable, but in subaltern species the notion of species, which is found, properly is subjectable species, for predicability of that is not of many differing only in number, but also in species. But others conversely think that intention of predicability and universality is so first in species, that from it arises subjectability.

NEVERTHELESS I SAY FIRST: The intrinsic and essential constitutive of species, as it is second predicable co-divided from other predicables, is such universality, which expresses respect and predicability to many differing only in number. The reason is: Because species insofar is one of five predicables insofar as it participates notion of universal, since indeed these five predicables are certain species of universal, as was proven above; therefore its constitutive ought to be within latitude and notion of universal; therefore not through subjectability, but through superiority it ought to be constituted. The consequence is clear, because it is incompatible that some relation in common imports tendency to some term and relation, which is its species and contained under it, tends to opposite. Just as if relation of father in common regards son, relation of such father in particular cannot regard grandfather, but also ought to regard such son in particular. But it is established that relation of universality in common, which is genus to five predicables, regards as proper term inferiors; therefore relation of such universal, namely of species, cannot regard formally speaking, and be constituted through respect to superiors, but to inferiors; therefore it cannot be constituted formally through subjectability in notion of second predicable, but through universality, or such predicability, that is which regards such inferiors. Which reason Cajetan thought so difficult, in cap. de specie, that he leaves it unsolved.

I SAY SECOND: Predicability and subjectability cannot concur per accidens, and behave disparately in second predicable, but either according to themselves, or through their foundations one determines and modifies another. The reason is: Because second predicable does not have being universal in any way, but subordinated universal, and less than another, namely genus; therefore that, which conduces to this that it is universal less ample than another, cannot behave disparately to constitution of such universal, since indeed it is of intrinsic notion of it that it is subordinated and inferior universal. Just as it does not behave disparately to constituting second cause this, that it is subordinated to first cause; and in political order, to inferior minister it is not per accidens and disparate that he is subordinated to superior, and superior minister to King, since this is thus of notion of such minister from subordination of agent. So species essentially has to be predicated of inferiors, but it is not per accidens and disparate to it, but per se is required to be subordinated to superior universal, under which it is contained insofar as it is less universal.

Nor does it suffice to say that this, which is to be subjected to genus, befits specific nature itself; however to intention per accidens is conjoined another intention of subjectability, for subjectability and predicability is not the same relation and intention. This, I say, does not suffice; for, although there is double relation predicability and subjectability, nevertheless by this very fact that predicability, which pertains to notion of species, is not supreme predicability, but inferior, per se and not disparately seeks from the part of its foundation to found relation of subjectability, without which notion of inferiority cannot be understood, for everything inferior is subjectable. Therefore from the part of foundation predicability and subjectability are united per se, and also have connection among themselves, nor do they concur per accidens in notion of species. Just as also universality and predicability are two distinct intentions, or relations, one regarding inferiors as superior in being, another in predicating, that is in verifying that this is that through application of one to another, and nevertheless one follows to another and is connected per se with another, although it is true that, because their being consists in being known, it does not repugn that one is known without another, and actually to be without another in the knowing notion itself: for this connection of intentions is not as to actual existence, so that one follows to another in being, since being does not befit them through consequence, but through cognition; but it is connection by reason of foundation, because foundation so founds one, that it also seeks by force of that to found another.

I SAY LASTLY: Subjectability does not flow from universality precisely taken, much less predicability from subjectability; but prior and more essential intention in second predicable is limited and restricted universality, and from it itself, insofar as thus limited

and modified, arises immediate subjectability to genus. The reason of this is taken from what has been said, because second predicable per se and essentially is some universal, since universal is divided as genus into these five predicables; therefore essentially to it ought to pertain intention of universality thus determined, namely which only regards inferiors distinct in number. But from universality, in line and respect of universality regarding inferiors, only that which is of superiority can follow, not that which is of inferiority and subjection; therefore from force of universality intention of subjectability does not follow. But because universality is limited and restricted, by reason of that as limited subjectability can follow: just as in creature, other properties follow from this that created being is, or because it is such being, e.g., substance, or body; others, from this that it is from nothing, e.g., that it is defectible, peccable, annihilable etc. Similarly in cause, from this that it is causative, or from line of causality, subjection to another cause does not follow, but from this that it is limited and dependent and inferior cause in causing. Therefore in the same mode, from force of universality and from respect and line of it, even of specific universality, subjectability does not follow as proper property, but from dependent and limited universality and subordinated to another, or lesser than that, follows subjectability to superior universal which is genus.

From which conclusion is understood how these two intentions are connected, in second predicable, subjectability and predicability in one form of universality, because, since they do not concur per accidens in this second predicable, it is necessary that per se they follow from some form, and by reason of that they befit per se. Thus therefore they follow to limited and subordinated universality, from the part of subordination and limitation subjectability, from the part of universality predicability; just as to man, insofar as rational, follows inclination to virtue, insofar as defectible and from nothing, peccability.

And similarly it is established how species intrinsically and essentially is correlative of genus, insofar as it is subject and inferior to it, but it has this insofar as it is limited and subordinated universal.

From which is clear that division of species into predicable and subjectable is not division into diverse things, but into diverse properties, or modes of the same, by which it has diverse respects, to superiors namely and inferiors.

Arguments are solved.

First it is argued: Species most formally insofar as species only has being correlative of genus; but insofar as correlative it is not predicable, but subjectable; therefore formally insofar as species it is not predicable. The major is certain, because genus is defined per se relatively to species, as to proper correlative; therefore species, as species, formally is correlative of genus. The minor is established, because as correlative it regards that of which it is correlative; but it is formally correlative of genus; therefore formally as species it regards that: but as it regards genus it is not predicable, but subjectable; therefore it is essentially constituted through subjectability, rather than through predicability.

It is confirmed: Subaltern genus is more universal than lowest species, since it is predicated of that; but it is not constituted in notion of subaltern genus through predicability; therefore much less lowest species. The minor is proven: Subaltern genus is not constituted in being such, neither through predicability of many differing in species, nor through predicability of many differing in number; therefore through none. Not through predicability of many differing in species, because this also befits supreme genus, and thus it is not proper notion of subaltern. Not through predicability of many differing in number, because this also befits lowest species. Therefore through no predicability, but through subjectability it is constituted.

It is responded: There are various opinions concerning proper and per se correlative of genus, which you will be able to see in Conimb., q. 2, de specie, art. 1. For some think that genus as genus only and adequately is referred to species, but to individuals it is not referred through mode of genus. Others say that adequate correlative of genus is something abstracting from individual and species, which they call subjectable in what completely, because in this notion both individual and species agree. Others finally, and better, think that immediate and formal correlative of genus is species, but not in every mode, nor adequately; for also individual is subjected to it, but not formally just as species, for neither does it contract genus by formal division, just as species, but materially, through material namely, and individuating conditions, in which species is sustained, and through mediation of species genus. We say therefore that species is indeed correlative of genus, but formal, that is formally contracting genus, and through difference, which formally and specifically makes to differ, not numerically; from which it has not only to be correlative and subjectable of genus, but also relative properly and per se to individuals, because it is not formal and immediate correlative of genus, unless it is also universal in itself, nevertheless limited and restricted, or dependent, because

subjected to genus; and thus to be correlative of genus is not whole essence of species, but rather is condition of it, but directly and per se species is universal and predicable of individual, nevertheless with dependence of subjectability to genus.

To the confirmation it is responded: There is disparity between lowest and subaltern species, because subaltern does not have being universal in notion of species, but in notion of genus; for it has universality and predicability only in what incompletely, but it has subalteration in notion of subjectable species, insofar as namely it is subjected to superior genus, and through difference contracts that, and makes some species not lowest, but subaltern, which is also called subaltern genus, but in truth nevertheless subalteration befits it insofar as it is some species; and thus according to another notion it has universality, namely as genus, according to another, subjectability, namely as species. But indeed lowest species does not have universality in notion of genus, but in notion of second predicable in what completely, and therefore universality is prior in it, so that second predicable is constituted, than subjectability in the same notion of lowest species.

Second it is argued: Subjectable species can be given, which is not predicable, like angelic species in opinion that it only has one individual, which we will prove below. There is also given conversely predicable species, which is not subjectable, like substance, when it is predicated of this and that substance as of individuals, which nevertheless is not subjected to another superior, since above substance there is no other grade; therefore that some species is subjectable and predicable, they concur per accidens. And it is confirmed, because subjectability to genus does not conduce, or proportion species to this that it is predicated of individuals, nor conversely predicability of individuals, so that it is subjected to genus, for one relation of these is not derived from another, nor founds another; therefore they behave per accidens, and purely concomitantly.

I respond by denying the antecedent, if we speak of species properly, which is second predicable. And as to what pertains to angelic species, we will show below that it is not only subjectable, but also predicable; for it is universal, and not as genus, but as saying whole quiddity completely. But concerning substance we say that also with respect to this and that individuated substance it is not species according to predicable, since it is predicated in what incompletely, but it is generic predication, nevertheless mediate, because genus is mediately predicated of individuals, just as in preceding question we showed how genus is predicated of generic individuals, and in following question it will be said more.

To the confirmation I respond: That subjectability to genus does not conduce to predicability of individuals absolutely considered, but well to predicability as limited and dependent, and insofar as it is lowest predicability; for this cannot be without such subjectability. Just as obscurity per se does not conduce to cognition, but well to such cognition, namely to faith, which is imperfect and limited cognition, seeking that modification of obscurity.

Lastly it is argued, to prove that in species subjectability is found prior to predicability: Because subjectability of species is by which it is rendered immediately subjectable to genus; but immediate subjectability is prior to universality; therefore. The minor is proven: It is prior that specific nature is contracted nature with respect to genus, than contractible with respect to individuals; for through this that it contracts genus it is constituted in itself, but it is prior to be constituted, than to be contracted by others; but through this that it contracts genus it is subjected to genus, through this that it is contractible to individuals it is universal to those; therefore subjectability is prior to predicability.

I respond by denying the minor. To the proof it is said that contraction of genus, as it pertains to the very constitution of nature, which is made through genus and difference, is not subjectability, because constitution of nature pertains to nature according to itself, and primarily intentionally, but subjectability expresses relation, by which species is coordinated to genus, and thus pertains to second intention of nature, not to constitution. And in this genus of intention universality and predicability is prior in order to constituting second predicable, which is species, than subjectability; although with respect to nature according to itself contraction of genus is understood prior, which is foundation of subjectability, than contractibility to individuals, which is foundation of universality, but to constituting species this is prior to that.

ARTICLE II.
The definitions of species are explained.

Two things must be noted here: First concerning the defined of these definitions, by which predicable and subjectable species are defined (we posited definitions at beginning of preceding art.); second concerning particles of the definitions themselves to be explained.

Concerning the first, the same must be said concerning defined of these definitions as was said concerning defined of genus, in preceding quest.; for the same is the reason of one and another.

Concerning the second, to explain particles of definition, that seems common difficulty, because these definitions befit others than the defined. For subjectable species is said, which is placed under assigned genus, or of which genus is predicated in what; but both no less befit individual, because also individual is placed under genus, and genus is predicated of that in what. If you say species is placed immediately under genus, not individual, this is to add new particle to definition, namely the term 'immediately', which definition does not posit; and moreover it is insisted in generic individuals, like this animal, this body, etc., of which genera are immediately predicated. Similarly definition of predicable species befits others than the defined. Both because it befits genus; for genus is also predicated of individuals in what and, although it is predicated incompletely, and in another mode than species, nevertheless this is not explained in definition of species, and thus it is diminished. Both also because many things are predicated of many differing in number and are not species, like incomplete beings, e.g., motion, soul, matter, point, and similar; and God is predicated of three persons, and is not species. Both because third predicable also is predicated in what, that is essentially, and of many differing in number, like atomic species. And finally angelic species are truly species, and are not predicated of many differing in number, because those many are impossible, as we will say, following art.

I respond nevertheless that these definitions are rightly delivered. And whether they are essential, or descriptive, it is not necessary to delay. For just as we said concerning definition of genus, that it is descriptive, because it is delivered through proper property of universality, which is predicability, so definitions of species must be judged descriptive, because they are delivered through properties: predicable indeed, through predicability itself, which is property of universality; but subjectable, through property of specific universality, insofar as universality is imperfect, and dependent on universality of genus.

To the first therefore instance against subjectable species, I respond: That in all these definitions of predicables their proper genus ought to be understood, which is universal, and thus sense of definition is that species is universal, which is placed under genus, and difference universal, which is predicated of many in what kind etc., and thus concerning others. Nor is this to add some extraneous particle to definition, but necessarily presupposed; for universal is genus to five predicables; therefore it ought to be

necessarily understood in every predicable, and consequently particle immediately ought also to be understood: namely that species is which is immediately subjected to genus, because here we only treat of that which as universal, or one of five predicables is subjected, for individual is not subjected as universal, and therefore neither immediately.

And to instance concerning generic individuals I respond: That they are not subjected as universal, nor immediately simply speaking, but only secundum quid, and as to explication. Because when I say: This animal, this body, although I explain generic grade with individuation, nevertheless something is presupposed mediately between individuation and genus, which is not explained in that generic individual; for neither is animal, or singularized body found in reality, unless through mediation of some species. But indeed species is so fully and simply subjected to genus, that not only is nothing explained to mediate, but neither can something in itself mediate between it and genus, which is to be immediately subjected simply and absolutely speaking.

To second instance, against definition of predicable species, it is responded: That, as we said in preceding question, it does not befit genus to be predicated of many differing in number formally and immediately, but materially, namely because they are contained under species, of which per se, formally and directly it is predicated; and thus predication of genus ought to be understood, that it is in what incompletely. Nor is this to add something to definition, but to explain what is imbibed in it; for if it is predicated of many differing in species, it cannot predicate whole quiddity, but part, namely that which is contractible through difference, and with difference constitutive of species, and this is to be predicated in what incompletely, that is not whole and complete quiddity, but part which is genus.

To the second I respond: Incomplete beings pertain reductively and not per se to species, or genus, just as to predicament; hence they do not have many distinct in number, except reductively and secundum quid. But God is not predicated of three persons as multiplicable and contractible in those, but as one singular nature, which is predicated of many supposita of the same singular nature, and therefore neither does divine nature behave as universal, nor the persons themselves as inferiors contracting superior nature and numerically distinguishing that, because supposita are so multiplied, that nature is not multiplied, but they are three supposita of the same singular nature.

To the third we already said above, in preceding question, that difference is indeed predicated essentially, but not in what, because not substantively, but adjectively, or

qualificatively; hence although it is predicated in what as to essence, nevertheless not as to mode, that is not essentially substantively, but essentially adjectively, or in what kind.

To the last it will be responded in following article.

ARTICLE III.
Whether there can be given subjectable species which is not predicable of many, but only has one individual.

So that the point of difficulty becomes known, two things must be noted. First, that among natures not having except one individual a triple difference can be considered. For some nature is, which in fact does not have many individuals, but can have them possibly, like moon, sun and similar, which have matter divisible absolutely, but not divisible naturally, but from division of matter multiplication of individuals is born to follow. Another nature is, which neither in fact, nor possibly can have individual multiplication from the part of division of matter, because it lacks all matter, as are complete spiritual substances, like angels. Nevertheless it is posited in opinion whether from another source, than from division of matter they can have numerical multiplication, and nevertheless, although they cannot have that, still nevertheless those natures can be conceived as universal, and according to some indifference and potentiality to that one individual which they have. Finally another nature is, which not only does not have many individuals in fact, nor possibly according to multiplication of nature, but neither can the nature itself be conceived with any potentiality to individuation and as contractible through singularity, because it is pure act, namely God, and thus in being it cannot be universal, although the nature itself can be conceived not explicating individuation, and thus can be signified through mode of common term and not singular term, just as this name God is common term in signifying.

Concerning first nature there is no difficulty in the present, because it is established that that nature can be predicated of many, in which many possible individuals are, of which it is predicated. Similarly concerning third nature the present question is not; for concerning that we treated above, quest. 5, art. 2. But the whole difficulty is concerning second nature. Concerning which we do not now dispute, whether many angels distinct only in number are possible, or not possible, concerning which is treated 1 part., quest. 50; for if many distinct in number are possible, the question lacks difficulty. For it must be said concerning angelic nature just as is said concerning sun, and moon, and other natures, in which many individuals are possible. But, admitting that many individuals in angelic nature are impossible, then present difficulty arises: Whether, because from mode of

conceiving that nature is conceived as indifferent to individuation, it suffices so that it is predicable species of many, not which it has in fact, or can have in reality, but which from mode of conceiving do not repugn that nature thus indifferent.

Second note: That to have many individuals happens in two ways, either positively, or through non-repugnance, at least from the part of some principle. Which distinction is taken from St. Thomas, quest. de Spirit. creat., art. 8, ad 4. To be predicated of many positively is when positive foundation is given in the thing itself, so that predication of many is made, namely because such multiplication is found in reality. And thence foundation is taken for conceiving one nature predicable of those. Through non-repugnance it is said to be predicated of many when it is not found indeed in many from the part of the thing, but in one only, nevertheless nature so behaves to that one individual, that it can be abstracted from that, in entirely the same mode, by which it is abstracted from many, namely with nature remaining with indifference and potentiality to that individuation. And thus by force of such abstraction nature does not have repugnance to many individuals, although in reality from another source it repugns, namely because of lack of matter, without whose division multiplication of individuals is not made.

In this difficulty therefore, commonly outside school of St. Thomas it is held that, with opinion of St. Thomas presupposed concerning impossibility of many individuals in same angelic species, such species will be subjectable and not predicable; for it seems against all reason that something is predicable of many, to which actual predication itself of many repugns but this repugns manifestly, because it repugns that many themselves are given. Nevertheless these authors do not deny that angelic nature can be conceived as universal negatively and metaphysically, because it can be conceived without any singularity and individual difference, which is to remain precise from individuation.

Nevertheless Thomists commonly defend opposite opinion, and think that by this very fact that foundation is given in such nature so that it is conceived as precise from that unique individuation, and with indifference and potentiality to it, it can be conceived as universal, and as predicable species; nevertheless for this it is necessary that angelic nature is not conceived adequately and fully according as it is in itself, but inadequately, and after the manner of things composed from matter and form. And this opinion is taken openly from doctrine of St. Thomas, in quest. de Spirit.creatur., art. 8, ad 4, where he says thus: "Just as this whiteness is not prohibited from having under itself many individuals from this that it is whiteness, but from this that it is in this, which pertains to notion of individual, so nature of this angel is not prohibited from being in many from this that it is nature in such order of things, which pertains to notion of species, but from this that it is

not born to be received in some subject, which pertains to notion of individual." So St. Thomas. Which words are clearer, than that they need any weighing. He affirms the same in Opuscul. 42, capit. 5; and 1 part., quest. 13, art. 9; and there Cajetan, and 5 chapter de Ente et essentia, quest. 6, ad 2, and upon chapter de specie, in Logic.

But the whole foundation of this opinion is: Because, although respect positively tending to many individuals cannot be conceived in such nature, nor unity of nature collected from many individuals, because they are not given in truth of thing, nevertheless indifference of nature and potentiality to one individual can be conceived such that from itself would suffice for many, if they were posited in reality from elsewhere. And so indifference of nature from its proper mode is communicable to many, but from the part of those, to which communication is to be made, such communicability cannot be exercised. The reason of this is: Because it cannot be denied that individual of angelic nature posited in predicament is given, since angel, who is found in reality, is predicamental substance. And it is not posited immediately under genus; therefore it is immediately posited under some atomic species. But atomic species, under which individual is contained, is superior with respect to that; therefore universal and predicable with respect to that; for such species is not predicated of individual as equal, otherwise species would not be predicated of individual of Gabriel by predication of superior concerning inferior, but it would be quasi identical predication, just as when individual is predicated of individual; therefore it is predication of superior concerning inferior, otherwise species could not be conserved in one individual only, as we will say in following article, if having only one individual, it could not be conceived as superior. But from this manifestly follows that that nature, and species thus conceived as superior with respect to that individual, has indifference, which from itself suffices for many individuals, although in fact multiplication cannot be exercised due to defect of required condition, namely division, from the part of matter. For indeed that species thus abstracted from individuation does not include that actually, but in potency, and consequently just as neither does it include unity, or individual plurality, so neither by force of that concept does it exclude plurality of individuals; therefore, if by force of that it does not exclude, it has by force of indifference order to many not positively, but non-repugnantly.

And it is confirmed: Because repugnance to many individuals in angelic nature is not according to all predicates of nature, but according to precise notion of irreceptibility in matter, because namely it is not individuated through designation of matter, but through lack of that. Hence repugnance to plurality is not from nature, but from mode of individuating nature, because there is no other principle of individuating, than the very

irreception of form, for thence and not from elsewhere it has incommunicability, which is notion of individuation. Therefore if nature is conceived inadequately, that is as to notion of species, and not the mode itself of individuating nature, nature is not taken as repugnant to multiplication of individuals, and consequently as having many individuals non-repugnantly, although it does not regard many positively, not from defect of itself, but because those many are not.

But what some say, that angelic nature is common positively to one real individual and to many fictitious, is futile, because to regard many fictitious is not to regard many, in which it can be, and of which it can be predicated. For concerning many fictitious it is predicated only fictitiously; but to be predicated fictitiously is not to be predicated truly, nor truly to be conceived as predicable.

You will say: Therefore there is no difference between God and angelic nature; for also God can be conceived as common thing without singularity, and be signified as common term, just as we said above, quest. 5. Therefore from mode of conceiving it will have universality, and consequently grade of superior and inferior, which cannot be admitted in God.

I respond: The reason is disparate, because God, although he can be conceived without singularity, and consequently be signified in common mode, nevertheless the nature itself thus conceived does not remain with indifference and potentiality to individuation, since indeed it is conceived as pure act, which indeed, although from mode of our imperfect concept it does not always explicate singularity, nevertheless from its part it does not remain indifferent to that, just as when we conceive one attribute without another, one does not remain in potency and indifferent to another, but only does not express that. Hence divine nature is common only by one title, namely by reason of our imperfect concept, nevertheless not by reason of indifference and potentiality from the part of nature. But composite nature is universal by triple title, namely from mode of conceiving by abstracting from singulars, and from indifference of nature according to itself, and from plurality of individuals to which respect of universal can be terminated. But angelic nature only by double title, namely from mode of conceiving, and from the very indifference of nature according to itself, although from defect of many individuals this communicability to many cannot be exercised in reality, and thus it is universality without exercise. But so that divine nature is signified by common term, it suffices that from mode of signifying it is conceived without singularity; but so that it is genus, or species, it is required that it is conceived as contractible and determinable, and consequently that contracting notion is more determinate, and more actuating, which

cannot be conceived without potentiality in the contractible itself and greater actuality in contracting. Which whole repugns pure act.

Arguments are solved.

First it is argued, by argument insinuated in relating opposite opinion: For angelic species has repugnance so as to be predicated of many, and this from intrinsic of its nature itself, because from intrinsic multiplication of such nature in singulars is impossible; therefore it repugns that it is predicable species of many. For to whom predication itself repugns, predicability does not befit, just as to whom vision repugns, power of seeing does not befit.

And it is confirmed: Because formal unity, which is found in predicable species, is drawn by intellect from similitude and dissimilitude of individuals and their agreement among themselves, for neither is there another foundation of this formal unity; therefore with agreement of many individuals failing, there does not remain whence formal unity of species is taken, which is unity of agreement of many in some grade.

I respond by distinguishing the antecedent: Angelic nature has repugnance so as to be predicated of many from mode of individuation and incommunicability of form itself, I concede; from force of nature and its indifference, I deny. And, although the mode of individuation itself is intrinsic to angelic nature, nevertheless not according to concept of nature, as nature is, but as irreceptible and including mode of nature, by which it itself is individuated. Hence although nature conceived adequately with mode cannot be predicated of many, if nevertheless it is conceived inadequately without that mode, and with potency to it, it is conceived as predicable of many, not positively, because there are not many, which terminate respect of predicability, but non-repugnantly, as much as is from the part of concept of nature, as nature conceived without that mode, although that mode befits from proper notion of nature. And many things are which absolutely and simply cannot be posited in reality and nevertheless, because from force of some principle they do not repugn, under concept of such principle they are said not to repugn. Just as St. Thomas notes, quest. de Spiritual. creat., last art., ad 7, that substance can be understood without any accident, but in reality no substance can be created without some accidental predicate, at least without existence itself. So with angelic nature standing with its mode of individuation, which it has in reality, that is without that reception and division of matter, individuals do not stand to be multiplied, and nevertheless from force of nature, not as it puts on mode of individuation, but under precise concept of nature, as in potency to this individuation, it behaves non-repugnantly to many. And to whom

vision repugns, power of seeing repugns, if vision itself repugns from intrinsic; but if from some extrinsic mode, or impediment, power of seeing does not continuously repugn from force of intrinsic principle.

And when it is insisted: That it cannot be universal, except to many fictitious individuals, since in reality they are impossible.

It is responded: That from force of concept of nature, those many individuals are not impossible, nor nevertheless from force of that are they absolutely possible and in reality, because so that something is possible in reality, it is necessary that with all things attended, which concur in reality, it is possible; but in reality mode of individuating concurs in nature itself, from which they have to be impossible. But so that it is said not impossible as much as is from force of nature, it suffices that from that part, or from force of concept of nature precisely, it does not have impossibility. And therefore it is only said to regard those many non-repugnantly, and as much as is from force of nature, not positively in reality and absolutely.

To the confirmation it is responded: Formal unity in composite natures is taken from positive agreement of many individuals; but in simple natures it is not taken from positive agreement of many, but from the very unity of nature conceived without individuation and with indifference, which from itself does not repugn being communicated to many, when it is conceived without mode of individuation and after the manner of composite thing. But it is better that formal unity is taken from indivision of specific nature, than from agreement of many individuals.

Second it is argued: That mode of irreception in matter essentially befits angel, since indeed through this it is distinguished from rational soul, which is received form; therefore specific nature of angel cannot be abstracted from that mode of individuation, which is through irreception in matter. The consequence is clear, because however much angelic nature is abstracted, it cannot be abstracted from that which is essential to it, for thus it would not be abstracted, but destroyed, just as if man were conceived without animal, which is to conceive some essence without that, which is essential to it. Nor does it help that it is conceived inadequately, or after the manner of composite thing, and thus can be conceived in mode communicable to many. For against the first it is insisted: Because otherwise Peter could be conceived as universal, and similarly divine nature. Because Peter inadequately conceived only explicates nature, not individuation, and consequently if inadequate concept of thing intrinsically singular, such as angel is, suffices so that it can be denominated universal, why also Peter, who intrinsically is

singular if he is conceived inadequately, that is as to nature, not as to individuation, will not be able to be conceived as universal? And the same is concerning divine nature, which is essentially singular.

But against the second it is insisted: Because even if we conceive angels after the manner of corporeal thing, nevertheless we do not attribute to them properties of corporeal thing, but we remove from them, because they repugn them; therefore since numerical multiplication, which befits corporeal things, repugns spiritual things, we cannot attribute that to them.

I respond by admitting that angelic nature essentially is irreceptible in matter, and lacking that, and from this lack of matter it never can be prescinded. Nevertheless we deny that it cannot be prescinded from its singularity, because lack of matter, and irreceptibility is not the very individuation of angel, but root of that. For individuation in angel does not say only root and principle of incommunicability, but also formal designation, and certain determination of individual, which also in angels depends, or expresses order to extrinsic predicates, for instance to subsistence and accidents; for it is established that proper personality can be separated in angel, as if angelic nature were assumed by God, but personality is term of singularity. Hence singularity, and individuation expresses order to some extrinsic things, nor does it purely pertain to essential constitution of angel. Just as indeed in corporeal things matter has double consideration, namely to compose, or constitute the nature itself, and radically to be principle of individuation and numerical multiplication, according to itself indeed remotely, but as it is signated by quantity, proximately; and nevertheless when nature is considered in common, notion of matter is considered as constituting, not as principle of individuating; so in its opposite, which is lack of matter and irreceptibility in it, such as is found in angel, double consideration can be attended, both according as it pertains to the very constitution of simple and purely spiritual form, and according as it pertains to mode of individuation, insofar as it renders such spiritual nature incommunicable and immultiplicable; and one consideration is separated from another so that the very lack of matter, as it is required for constitution of such nature, is nothing other than the very notion of simple form, as it is immaterial form, and as such does not yet found repugnance of multiplication; but the very lack of form, as it provides mode of incommunicability, and founds subsistence and complete singularity, thus provides mode of individuation and repugns multiplication. Hence when we abstract specific nature of angel from mode of individuating, we do not prescind in such nature that which is essential in lack of matter, as to constitution of quiddity, but that which in that nature pertains to mode of individuation, which indeed radically originates in

specific nature itself, nevertheless does not formally consist in it, since it depends in its designation on extrinsic predicates.

But to instances brought forward, I respond: To the first: That Peter not only radically, but also formally explicates individuation itself, hence he cannot be conceived without individual difference, even inadequately, unless with concept of Peter destroyed and taking concept of nature. But angelic nature does not formally explicate individuation itself, although it includes root of it under formality of constituting immaterial nature, not under formality of emitting and founding individuation. But divine nature can indeed be conceived through mode of nature without singularity, nevertheless not as universal, because it cannot be conceived as contractible through differences, since it is pure act and in no way in potency.

To the second instance it is said that, when we conceive angel after the mode of corporeal thing, we do not attribute to it conditions of corporeal thing through mode of attribution and judgment, but through mode of simple representation after the manner of corporeal thing we apprehend it without individuation, not explicating the whole that is in angelic nature, not indeed from the part of predicates constituting quiddity, but insofar as it is root of individuation. For if it is conceived fully and adequately, explicating that which is radically and implicitly contained in nature, it could not be conceived as universal, because it would explicate mode of nature, which is singularity and immultiplicability. Which St. Thomas also affirms, 1p., quest. 13, art. 9.

Nevertheless you will still insist: Because angelic nature not only as it is conceived after the manner of corporeal thing, but also according to itself is in predicament, since it is finite and created being; therefore according to itself, even if it is not conceived after the manner of corporeal thing, it has notion of genus and predicable species, because without this it is not posited in predicament.

Likewise it is insisted: Because corporeal nature, with root of individuation posited, which is signate matter, cannot be conceived as universal, because universal nature abstracts from this root; therefore if the very species of angelic nature is root of individuation, by reason of incommunicability and irreceptibility in matter, it cannot even be conceived inadequately as universal. Especially because what befits something per se, its opposite cannot befit it even per accidens. Therefore, since immultiplicability befits it from the very notion of nature, multiplicability into many cannot befit it even per accidens and by reason of inadequate concept, as is required for species predicable of many.

I respond: Angelic nature according to itself is in predicament, as to coordination of superior and inferior grades: for according to itself it is quiddity composed from genus and difference; but that this species has universality predicable of many does not pertain to notion of positing in predicament, but to condition, or mode of thing, which is posited in predicament. And it does not repugn that angelic nature has such mode through this that it is conceived inadequately, and after the manner of corporeal thing, to which nevertheless nature itself provides foundation.

To second instance I respond: That signate matter is determinate and signate principle of individuation, not remote, from which signature universal nature ought to abstract; but from matter itself, which is remote principle of individuation universal nature does not abstract. So in angel lack of matter and irreceptibility in it, as it conduces to notion of spirituality and simple form in angel, is not proximate principle of individuation, but remote. But as it founds subsistence and order to extrinsic accidents designating the nature itself in singular, so it is proximate principle of individuation, and from this angelic nature abstracts when conceived in universal. And when it is said that, if something befits per se, its opposite cannot befit even per accidens, I respond: It is one thing not to befit, another not to repugn from some part multiplication indeed in many in no way befits angelic nature positively, and simply; however it does not repugn it from force of nature indifferently conceived, and therefore from force of this as such, it can be predicable of many, not indeed positively, but non-repugnantly.

But if you say: Therefore such nature is not logically universal, but metaphysically, because logical universality is made through positive comparison to many; but angelic species is not positively universal, nor can it be compared to many except fictitious; therefore it is not logically universal:

I respond: Angelic nature has logical intention, not which is actually compared to many by positively attaining those, since indeed they are only fictitious, but by actually attaining one individual positively and many non-repugnantly. And this suffices for relation of logical intention. Just as in opinion of St. Thomas, 3 p., quest. 35, art. 5, one relation of father regards many sons, if they are actual, but if there is only one son, in fact it does not attain many, but that relation, which attains one positively, attains many non-repugnantly, because it so behaves that, if many were given, it would attain those. So that relation of specific nature so regards one individual positively, that from itself it could attain many, if they were given, as much as is from force of that concept.

ARTICLE IV.
Whether species can be conserved in one individual only, and genus in one species only.

This difficulty is related to the preceding, and from it is more fully understood how species can be predicable of many, although those are not possible from mode of individuation. But since both in genus, and in species two things are considered, namely both nature which they actually explain, and many things to which they are in potency, it is certain that both genus, and species, as to nature which they actually say, can be conserved in one species and individual, because genus communicates its whole essence to any inferior, therefore in each the whole nature of genus and species is preserved. Hence St. Thomas says, 1 p., quest. 77, art. 1, ad 1: "That whole universal is present to any part according to its whole essence and power, just as animal to man and horse." Therefore whole essence of genus is preserved in any species.

Therefore the whole difficulty is reduced to this: Whether genus as to potentiality, and order which it has to many can be preserved with respect to one species, even if others were impossible; for if they are possible, although they do not exist in fact, it is certain that potency of genus to those is preserved, because it does not depend on their existence, and in fact after judgment day in whole genus of animal there will be only unique species of man, and this also could have been made from beginning. And similarly we speak of species according to potency and aptitude to existing in many. And there is no discourse concerning intentions themselves, but concerning aptitude and potency to many, which is their foundation. For intention is relation which follows nature of foundation.

Some therefore absolutely think that genus can be conserved in one species, and species in one individual, for the same is reason of both, because they are equally universal, but universal is one in many; therefore if for species multitude suffices only from the part of mode of conceiving, although not from the part of thing conceived, as we said in preceding article, similarly it suffices for genus. Others conversely think that neither genus, nor species can be preserved in one inferior only, because it is essential to any universal to be divided through many differences, since it is one of many, therefore with many failing universal fails. Others finally distinguish between genus and species, and for conserving genus in notion of potential whole they think many species are required; but for preserving species many individuals are not required. Concerning which opinions see Curs. Carmel., here, disp. 6, quest. 2.

This last opinion is more common, and without doubt of St. Thomas, in 1 Poster., lect. 12, where he says: "That it is not possible to find some genus of which there is only one species, for genus is divided into species through opposite differences, but it is necessary if one of contraries is found in nature, that the remaining also is found, as is clear through the Philosopher in 2 de Coelo, and therefore if one species is found, another is also found. But one species is divided into diverse individuals through division of matter; but it happens that whole matter proportioned to some species is comprehended by one individual, and then there is only one individual under one species." The same holy Doctor teaches, in 1, dist. 19, quest. 4, art. 3, in the body.

And foundation of this opinion is taken from two propositions posited by St. Thomas. First: That genus is divided through opposite differences. Second: That if one opposite or contrary is found in nature of things, also the remaining. And first proposition is established: Because genus is contracted through formally diverse differences, or incompatible and distant forms in same genus. But in this consists opposition, or contrariety, that there are some forms distant in same genus, and if they are maximally distant there is perfect contrariety. But that genus is divided through formally diverse differences is established. Because genus is divided through differences, which contract it to constituting species; therefore it is necessary that it says actuable nature and contractible through formal differences, which complete its actuality, and constitute formal essence. Hence if it has many differences, they ought to be formally diverse, and not only materially, that is in the very formal notion of quiddity, and thus it is necessary that they are opposed, as formally incompatible.

But second proposition is proven by the same St. Thomas, 2 de Coelo, lect. 4: Because of contraries the same is matter and subject, otherwise they would not expel each other mutually, if they were not concerned with same subject; therefore it is necessary that matter or subject of one contrary has potency to another contrary; therefore if one of contraries is in nature of things, another also is possible, because potency susceptive of that is given; but if it were impossible, by this very fact potentiality susceptive of that, which is in matter, or in genus, would be destroyed, because it would only be potentiality receptive of one. And thus potentiality of genus to many would be destroyed, because it is to many as contrary and formally opposed.

From which propositions difference between genus and species is openly deduced because genus behaves to specific differences quasi as potential matter to actual and formally opposed, or incompatible forms; but species expresses order to many only materially diverse, and only materially incompatible, and thus does not behave to

individuating differences like matter to form, but rather like form to material division. But that which behaves as matter, if it is communicable to many, ought to presuppose possibility of those, to which it is communicable; but that which behaves as form from the very notion and concept of form is communicable to many, although from defect of receiving matter communication can be impeded. And reason of this is: Because matter, and that which holds itself from the part of matter, is rather from itself principle of incommunicability, just as also of limitation and restriction, since it is ultimate subject beyond which communication is not given, but if matter is communicable to many, it is from this that those many are possible concerning such matter. Hence from possibility of forms concerning some subject, or matter potentiality of matter to many is taken. But if matter is communicated to form it is rather so that it is perfected in itself by form, than that it communicates itself, because to communicate itself is proper to good. But matter is not good in act, because it is not perfect, nor in act, and as St. Thomas says, 1 p., quest. 5, art. 3, ad 3, prime matter is not appetible, but appetent. Hence form does not so much seek matter, as to be in matter. Wherefore for matter to be communicable to many is nothing other than to be able to receive, and be perfected by many. Therefore potentiality of matter, or genus to many arises from the very plurality of forms, which can perfect it. But indeed form from the very notion of form, which is act and perfection, is communicable to many as much as is from itself, because it is perfection and act, but perfection is good, and good as good is communicative of itself; hence it does not depend on plurality of recipients that it is communicable from itself, but it has this from notion of form and act. Hence 1 Periher., lect. 10, St. Thomas says: "That every form, which is born to be received in matter, as much as is from itself is communicable to many matters." And 1 p., quest. 3, art. 2, ad 3, and 1. Metaphys., lect. 5, § Ponit aliam rationem, he universally says that any form, as much as is from itself, is born to be in many." Since therefore species is taken from form, and says essence formally completed from the very mode of conceiving it, it does not repugn to be conceived as communicable to many, although from defect of receiving and materially dividing matter, it cannot always be communicated in exercise, as we said art. preced., concerning angelic species. Therefore from itself any species, even as to communicability to many, does not depend on many individuals, but genus depends on many species.

Arguments are solved.

First it is argued to prove that genus can be preserved in one species only: Because in one species only can be taken grade, or indeterminate and potential notion, and actual and determinate notion, or grade; therefore genus and difference can be taken. The antecedent is clear, because that species would be in predicament, since it would be created thing;

therefore it would have superior and inferior grade, and consequently determinable and determined, since indeed not all predicates of that would be of equal actuality and determination.

I respond: That that species would indeed be in predicament by reason of limited nature, and would have superior and inferior grade, not indeed by superiority more extended and ample with respect to inferiors, but less determinate and actual, or more potential from the part of quiddity, than contracting difference. Hence it would not be generically universal, although it would have nature more potential than difference, just as genus has. Therefore it would be potentiality regarding only one form, not behaving indifferently to many, just as potency of soul and angel to receiving intellect, which is not potentiality to contraries and to many, but only to one.

And when it is insisted that that generic predicate would not be equal with specific and differential predicate; therefore it would be superior as genus:

I respond: That it would not be equal in actuality, because difference would actuate that, but would be equal in extension, because it would not extend to more, than species and difference. But generic universality seeks extension to many, as to notion of potential whole, although nature, which it explains, is more imperfect and more potential than contracting difference in notion of quiddity.

Second it is argued: If whole potentiality of genus could not be preserved in unique species, therefore neither in two, or ten, or in any other certain number, because there is no greater reason that that potentiality is exhausted through two species, than through twenty, or hundred; and thus any genus would require infinite species, nor could whole potentiality of genus be preserved in one species, or two by absolute power, although whole potentiality of matter can be satisfied by one incorruptible form. Indeed from this reason would follow that neither could species be preserved in unique individual, because it is in potency to many individuating conditions, which cannot be preserved in one individual alone; therefore just as genus is not preserved in one species only, because it is in potency to many differences, neither species in one individual, because not all individuating conditions can be collected in one.

I respond: That potentiality of genus is sufficiently preserved by this very fact that it has many species, whether they are in determinate number, or infinite, for we do not dispute concerning this. Therefore at least two species under one genus are required and suffice, nor can its extensive potentiality be preserved, even by absolute power, with respect to one species only, for reason given. And to example brought concerning matter we say

that, either that matter is capable of many corruptible forms, or only is capable of one incorruptible form, just as many think concerning matter of heaven. If it behaves in this second mode, potentiality of contrariety and extension to many is not preserved in that matter, but only potentiality of actuation and information, that it is through one. If in first mode, always that matter remains with potentiality to many, by which it is potent to be informed, although in fact it is not in state of transmutation to those, if it has incorruptible form, by which it is satisfied as to transmutation to others, not as to capacity of those.

And to example concerning species with respect to many individuals I respond: It is true that in unique individual species cannot have all properties, and individuating differences, if they are possible in fact, but it has in one individual nature, which from concept of form and act by which it is constituted, does not repugn being communicable to many individuating differences, although because of defect of matter, those are impossible. But indeed genus from this that it is in one species is not communicable to many species, if those are impossible, because matter from itself is not principle of communicating to many, but of receiving many. Hence if those are impossible, potentiality to receiving those does not remain. And the same is concerning genus, whose potentiality is likened to matter in order to forms, or formal differences.

Lastly it is argued: If some species is conserved in unique individual, either it has essentially annexed repugnance to many, or it does not have. If it does not have, therefore those many are possible, and thus the case is removed that only one individual is possible. If it has intrinsic repugnance, therefore neither from mode of conceiving can it be taken as communicable and universal to many, and thus there will not be difference between it and genus.

And it is confirmed: Because in that case species and individual are not distinguished, because only one individual is possible; therefore indifference to many is not preserved in that, as is required for universality of species; or if indifference is found, because it is superior predicate, we will say the same concerning generic predicate in one species only.

I respond: That even if species has essentially annexed repugnance to many individuals, notion of its universality can be preserved, if it has that repugnance not from concept of nature, as nature is, but from mode of individuation, which is radically contained in specific nature itself, as we said in preceding article. Hence it does not repugn, from mode of conceiving, such nature to be conceived inadequately and under precise concept of nature and form as communicable to many non-repugnantly, from force of such precision and inadequate concept, although in reality it repugns from another principle

also pertaining to essence itself, namely because it lacks matter, in whose diverse parts diverse individual nature is received.

To the confirmation I respond: That that specific nature is distinguished only by reason from that unique individual. But nevertheless it is said that indifference and potentiality to many remains fundamentally in such species, but not indeed in genus: not only because it is superior predicate, but because it is such superior predicate, namely through mode of formal quiddity, which according to properties of form, from the very concept of form and nature is communicable to many, although those, to which it could be communicated, are not given. But genus from force of its precise concept does not say communicability to many like form, but like matter, which, unless many possible forms are, does not have potentiality to receiving those.

From which also another instance is solved, namely how species, since it is potential whole with respect to individuals, is preserved in unique individual only, which is part of that, since every whole is greater than its part. For it is responded: That species existing in one individual only is potential whole, not with respect to that only, but with respect to many to which from force of its formal concept it does not repugn to be communicated, although in reality many are not possible to which it is communicated. Hence we do not say that species is preserved with respect to one individual only, but that existing in one individual it does not repugn that it is conceived as communicable to many, as much as is from mode of conceiving that form, or nature.

QUESTION IX.
ON THE INDIVIDUAL.

The individual is twofold: one is designated and determined, like Peter, Paul, etc. The other is vague, or in common, like some man. We will treat of the former in this article, of the latter in the following.

ARTICLE I.
Whether the definitions of the individual are correctly explained.

So that we may investigate the nature of the individual, which is quite complex, and explain its definitions, two things must be noted beforehand. First: we can speak of individuation either generally accepted, as it is found in all genera, both of substance and accident; or specially as it is found in the genus of substance, for it is individuated in a special way, because it subsists in itself, and must be individuated through itself. Hence, although in every individual one can inquire both about the principle or foundation of

individuation, and about individuation itself, in substance there is found not only the principle of individuation and the individuation itself caused by such a principle, but also the term or complement of singularity itself, by which that nature is rendered complete and subsistent, and the nature can be found without such a term and proper subsistence, as is evident in human nature assumed by the divine person. And thus St. Thomas said, question 9, On Power, article 1: "That in a particular substance there are three things to consider, of which one is the nature existing in singulars. The second is the mode of existing of such a nature, which exists as proper to this individual. The third is the principle from which such a mode of existing is caused." Where he calls singularity a mode of nature.

Second, it must be noted that the individual, or singular, which is commonly found in all genera, can be considered either according to first intention, or according to second intention. The individual according to first intention means singularity itself, as it is found on the part of the thing, which singularity or real individuation is nothing else physically and in reality than numerical unity itself, by which something is so one that it is undivided in itself and divided from anything else, as St. Thomas teaches, 1 p., question 29, article 4. And this numerical unity in reality is like a mode of nature, and renders unity absolutely, because specific and generic are unities through reason, but in reality they are agreements or similarities, and can be further divided into inferior things, which numerical unity cannot be. According to second intention, the individual consists in a twofold relation of reason. The first is subjectability to superior predicates, whether to the immediate predicate, which is the atomic species, or to mediate predicates, which are genera, as is evident in generic individuals, like this animal, this body, etc. For these individuals are taken on the part of subjectability. The second relation of reason is predicability, by which the individual is predicated, not of something inferior, but of itself.

According to these three things, Porphyry's threefold definition of the individual proceeds. The first is of the individual taken according to first intention: Individuals are so called because each of them consists of properties, the collection of which will never be the same in another. What these individuating properties are is commonly admitted according to the saying of Albert the Great, that there are seven, and they are contained in that common verse:

Form, figure, place, time, with name, blood, Country, are seven, which one and another does not have.

From the enumeration of these properties it is sufficiently evident that this definition is explained according to first intention, because properties are here enumerated which are really found, as is evident concerning form and figure, etc. Indeed, in this definition only the individual of substance is defined, because only substance is suited to have a collection of these properties. And still more restrictively, not just any individual substance, but a complete and subsistent one, which is called a supposit or person, is defined by this definition; because there are some properties which belong only to a supposit and not to parts, like name, which is imposed on the whole person, blood, that is genus or generation, which belongs only to persons, and similarly country, etc.; for neither hand nor foot is said to have a country, or to derive its genus from such blood, but the whole man.

St. Thomas otherwise gives definitions of the individual taken according to first intention; for in 1 p., question 29, article 4, he says: "That the individual is undistinct in itself, and distinct from others," or better, in 10 Metaphysics, lecture 2: "The individual is what is not further divided, neither by formal nor material difference." These definitions belong not only to substantial individuals, but also to accidents. And the first definition can be explained thus, that the individual is undistinct in itself, that is, one and undivided, and distinct from others, that is, ultimately distinct, and no longer distinguishable through other differences; which the second definition itself explains, when it says that the individual is what is not further divided. Just as unity, although it says something positive with the negation of division, nevertheless does not add anything positive beyond being, but that negation, which however does not enter into the constitution of the entity, but pertains to its property, so individuation does not say something pertaining to the quiddity of the thing, but something external, as it were, a modification or determination of it explained through the mode of negation.

But if you ask whether this definition given by Porphyry is essential or descriptive, I answer: It is descriptive, because it is given through properties, the collection or aggregation of which is so found in one that not in another; therefore it presupposes the very essence of the individual as constituted, because properties presuppose that of which they are properties. Nor is it sufficient to say that they presuppose the specific nature, because with respect to it they are not properties, but accidents, otherwise they would belong to all to whom the specific nature belongs. Or rather it should be said, and perhaps more according to the mind of Porphyry, that the individual is not defined through properties that are consequent and posterior to individuation itself. For perhaps proper passions, which are founded in necessary connection to nature, do not belong to the individual, but those which are the principle and reason of individuation, insofar as they

designate matter, so that from that designated matter individuation arises, as will be proved in the books On Generation from the opinion of St. Thomas. And the words of Porphyry seem to incline to this, when he says: "individuals are so called because each consists of properties, etc." Where he does not say that the individual consists in this, but is so called from this, because namely individuation originates from this, because by such properties matter is designated, which is the principle of individuation. Hence St. Thomas very well notes, 6 Metaphysics, lecture 15: "That the collection of accidents is not the principle of individuation, but designated matter, because any form of itself is naturally apt to be in many. Hence however much forms or accidents are aggregated, they do not individuate." Therefore matter is required, because it is the principle of incommunicability, because it is the ultimate subject, beyond which communication is not given. But it is designated by properties, either by receiving them, or by expressing an order to them, especially to quantity, whence results designation or division of matter, as will be said in the mentioned place.

If again you ask: What is this individuation formally? I answer: It is one thing to be the principle of individuation, another thing to be individuation itself, which is caused by such a principle. The principle of individuation St. Thomas takes in composite things from matter designated by quantity and accidents, or by order to that; but in things separated from matter he teaches that the very form itself, as it is incommunicable to matter, is the principle of individuation. And in this there is variety of opinions, and contrariety between St. Thomas and Scotus, and others. Because Scotus teaches that this individuation comes from some mode superadded to nature, which he calls thisness, by which namely nature is rendered formally this and designable. But others teach that each being is individuated by itself, and not from another principle, just as it is one by itself. Concerning which controversy we need not deal at present, but in the books On Generation, question 9. And Cajetan can be seen, On Being and Essence, chapter 2, near the end. But formal individuation itself, which is caused by the principle of individuation, metaphysically is the individual difference itself; physically, however, it is unity itself, or the mode of unity, as individual (or numerical unity and individual), by which some being is so one that it is no longer divisible or communicable through other contracting differences, as has already been explained above, and will be said more fully in the mentioned place On Generation.

Speaking specially, however, in the genus of substance there is found a peculiar notion of individuation, as St. Thomas well notes, 1 p., question 29, article 1, because substances are individuated through themselves, that is, without order to something outside themselves, but by subsisting in themselves. And therefore in substances themselves,

singularity or individuation, which is also found in accidents, is one thing, subsistence or suppositality is another; for in the humanity of Christ it is evident that a singular nature was assumed, that is, not a universal one, yet not subsisting and supposited. Therefore suppositality is something distinct from individuation, and is related as a term completing singularity itself and the existence of nature. Hence individuals of substance are named in a special way, for they are called supposits, persons and hypostases, first substances, things of nature, subsistences. These signify the individual, as it is a certain whole and complete in the genus of substance, which underlies others, both essential predicates of nature and accidental ones. And thus they say not only the singularity of nature, but complete and subsisting singularity, concerning which below, question 15, we will treat, and 1 Physics, question 7. Other names are common to individuals of accident and substance, whether total or partial, whether subsistent or not, like singular, individual, particular; and similarly designative pronouns, like this, that, that one and similar, as St. Thomas excellently declares, in 3 Sentences to Anibald, distinction 6, question unique, article 1; and in other Sententiarians, in the same place; and in 1, distinction 26, question 1, article 1. Where he also explains how these names are sometimes taken according to first intention, sometimes according to second intention, just as individual, particular, singular sometimes designate the reality of singularity, sometimes the relation of second intention to superior predicates; and we now use these names promiscuously to signify individuation, both according to first intention and according to second intention.

Up to this point we have explained Porphyry's definition of the individual according to first intention. Concerning the individual according to second intention, however, Porphyry gives two definitions. First from the part of predicability, saying: That the individual is that which is predicated of one alone. Second from the part of subjectability, saying: That the individual is contained under the species, but the species under the genus. Showing through this that it belongs to it to be the ultimate subjectable, as being contained under genus and species. Where note that subjectability, which is the relation of the individual as inferior to its superiors, is the principal thing that is imported in the individual, because the principal notion of the individual is the notion of inferiority to the universal; for the individual is opposed to the universal as inferior to superior. But the predicability that belongs to the individual, since it is only predicability of one, or of itself, is not so much artificial predication as identical. But nevertheless, because identical predication also belongs to things taken universally, as when it is said: Man is man, animal is animal, it must be added, so that this definition be applied to the individual alone, that what can only be predicated identically and not in another way of one, that is called individual; for things in common, even if they can be predicated identically,

nevertheless it also belongs to them to be predicated in another way, namely formally of their inferiors, that is, as a formal predicate of a distinct concept.

Arguments are solved.

First it is argued by that common argument: Because the singular is neither definable nor knowable, for there is no science of singulars; therefore the definition of the individual is given here in vain. If it be said that individuation in common is defined. Against this is: Because this individuation is not individual, but universal; for it is predicated of many and not of one only, for the notion of individual belongs to many. And that common individuation is either second intention or first. If second intention, it does not save Porphyry's first definition, which is of the singular, according to first intention. If first intention, it is not something univocal, nor definable by one definition, because individual differences are primarily diverse, and thus they have nothing univocal or common.

I respond: This argument touches a difficulty to be discussed in the following article concerning the individual in common, or concerning the vague individual, which can be conceived in common. See there the solution to the first, where we will show that the individual in common is denominatively universal, not formally.

To the other part of the argument: It is answered that individuation taken according to first intention can be conceived in common analogically, and thus defined, as will be said in the following article. But according to second intention, for the relation of reason of subjectability or predicability, it can also be conceived in common univocally.

Second, it is argued: When it is said in the definition of the individual: whose whole collection of properties is not in another, either it is understood of those properties taken in common, or of singular and determined ones. If in common, it is false that the whole collection of them cannot be in another, for it is evident that the same country, the same blood, etc., can belong to many individuals; similarly figure and form commonly taken belongs to many. If in the singular, for example, of this form, of this figure, etc., first the principle is begged, because we define the individual through an individual property, when nevertheless that property is individual and singular from the subject itself. And then, because it would be said in vain that the whole collection of properties is not in another, if indeed not only the whole collection, but not even one single individuated and singular property can be in another, e.g., this figure, this form, this place, etc.; for although one extrinsic denomination can belong to many, like the same country to

denominate many individuals, and one real accident can by divine power be placed in many subjects, nevertheless in the natural way it cannot be except in one subject only, by the very fact that it is an individuated and singular accident.

I respond: The definition is understood of a collection of properties not in common, but in the singular; for any accident in common can belong to many. And to the reply it is said that the begging of the principle is not committed, because the individual is not defined through properties insofar as they are individuated and singular, but insofar as they are the principle of individuation; because namely they so designate and determine this individual, that they cannot be found in another. And although they cannot provide this unless they are in themselves singular and individual, nevertheless not insofar as they are in themselves individuated, but insofar as they are the principle of individuating, and of rendering the individual itself incommunicable to another, are they placed in the definition of the individual, because from them, as from conditions, depends the designation and determination of the individual. Hence it is understood in passing how true is the opinion of St. Thomas, that the principle of individuation is matter designated by quantity and accidents; not because accidents formally constitute individuation, but because individuation depends from matter, as from a principle per se, but from accidents, as from conditions of designation, otherwise the individual would be defined in vain through a collection of properties, etc.

And to the last reply it is said: That among these properties of individuation some belong to many individuals, namely those which denominate extrinsically, like country, name, blood, place, etc. But others only to one, like this form, this figure, etc. Hence it was necessary to say of the whole collection, not however of some property separately, that it cannot be in some other individual.

Finally, it is argued against the definition of the predicable individual: For some individuals are predicated of many; therefore the definition is false. The antecedent is proved: For the same matter numerically is in one individual, afterwards in another, as in Peter and in his corpse, the same action numerically denominates the first and second cause, the same knowledge many known things, the same place many located things, at least successively. Finally, the same water numerically can be divided into many waters, each of which is one individual. Therefore it is badly said that the individual is undivided in itself and not divisible into others.

It is answered: It does not repugn that some extrinsically denominating accident belong to many as inadequate and particular subjects, or that one matter or subject can receive

diverse forms, whether simultaneously or successively; but this is not for an individual to be predicated of many numerically distinct, as of inferiors, or for one form to be in many adequate individual subjects, which is required for an individual to be predicated of many simply and adequately. Therefore an accident or form denominating many subjects has those as partial and inadequate, not as wholes in respect of its denomination, although it is true that an inherent form cannot be in many really distinct and separated. But when water is divided into many waters, this is not done through multiplication and predication of itself, but rather through corruption and division, because it ceases to be one individual of water, and from that one many are made through division. But we do not speak of this mode of dividing at present.

ARTICLE II.
What is the individual in common, or the vague individual.

St. Thomas, 1 p., question 30, article 4, dealing with the individual in common, or with the vague individual, says that the vague individual, like some man, signifies the common nature with a determinate mode of being, which belongs to singulars, namely that it be subsisting per se distinct from others. Concerning this individual, however, three things can be controverted. First, whether the individual so conceived imports some common notion to individuals, which is real or of reason? Second, whether this common notion is univocal or analogous? Third, to which predication it pertains from the five predicables.

Concerning the first, some think that individuals have only community of negation or intention, because all individuals agree in some negation or intention. In negation indeed, because all individuals are not universals, nor do they have common properties. In intention, however, because all individuals contract the species and constitute the individual, which has a relation of subjectability to superiors. But these authors deny that individuals agree in something real, which is common to them, because individual differences are primarily diverse, hence they agree in nothing; as Peter and Paul do not have anything within the species of man, in which they agree. Thus Martinez, on the chapter On Species, question 3.

These authors fight diametrically with the opinion of St. Thomas, who in 1 p., in the cited place, relating the opinion of some, who said that the term 'person' has only community of negation or intention, excludes both of these, because the term 'person' is neither a name of negation nor of intention, but a name of a thing. "And therefore (he says) it must be said that, even in human things, the term 'person' is common with community of reason, not like genus or species, but like a vague individual"; therefore St. Thomas feels

that the same judgment is given concerning the community of person and individual; but person says something common by way of a thing; therefore so does individual. The same he teaches, question 9 On Power, article 1, to 1; and question 8 On Power, article 3, to 2; and in 1, distinction 25, question 1, article 3, where it can be seen, especially to 3.

And the reason is: Because individuation is the mode by which nature itself is rendered singular and individual; but this mode can be signified in common, just as subsistence itself and personality, although it is not found except in singulars determinately and designedly; therefore it does not repugn to give a common concept of the individual itself not only from the part of nature, but also from the part of individuation. The minor is proved: For hearing the term 'individual', or person, I conceive something signified by such a name; not nature, as is evident of itself, because individual does not signify nature in universal, but signifies the individuation of nature, and does not signify it particularly determined and designated, for it is not the same to say individual as such, and to say Peter, or Paul determinately, for the notion of individuation belongs to many, but to be Peter or Paul only to one.

And it is confirmed: Because when I say: Some man, the term 'man' is not rendered singular, but is a common term; otherwise it would be the same to say, some man, and this man, nor could the term 'some man' serve to constitute a contradiction with the term 'no man', if both were not concerning a common term; but the term 'some man' is a vague individual, and does not signify only nature, but nature with the mode of individuation; therefore the mode of individuation is conceived in common; for if it were signified in the singular, the term 'man' would be singularized, just as when we say: This man.

You will say: The mode of individuation is indeed conceived in common, but not as something real, but of reason, namely either some negation, e.g., incommunicability in person, or the negation of the collection of all properties of one individual in another, or some second intention of predicability or subjectability.

But against this St. Thomas urges: Because person is not a name of negation or intention, but a name of a thing; and we can say the same of singularity and particularity. And in question 9 On Power, article 2, to 2 and 5, St. Thomas expressly distinguishes the notion of intention in person, from the notion of the mode of being individually, which is sometimes designated by the name of intention; and it is evident that the mode of singularity itself is found in reality, and is something positive, for it has a positive effect, which is to render nature perfectly one undivided in itself, and divided from others. And similarly it renders nature capable of a positive effect, namely of existence and accidents,

which inhere in it insofar as it is singular; and the exercise of all real actions or passions belongs to the singular alone; but that numerical unity is not pure negation, but includes something positive, otherwise multitude, which is composed of numerical unities, would not be something positive. That personality or subsistence are something positive, and not pure negation, must be proved in the chapter on substance, and in question 7 of the Physics.

Concerning the second difficulty, whether namely the individual in common is univocal or analogous. It seems that, since the individual differences themselves are primarily diverse, nothing univocal can be given to them in the notion of individual difference. For neither in simple differences can something common be considered, as contractible through differences, as St. Thomas very well deduced 1 p., question 3, article 8, to 3; and question 90, article 1, to 3. And thus it could be answered not improbably that the concept of the individual is analogous to all individual differences, and that it is contracted and abstracted in the way that analogs from their analogates, namely not through resolution of two concepts, of which one abstracts from the other, but through the same more or less explicit, and thus through transcendence in the determined differences themselves. Which St. Thomas seems to insinuate, 1 p., question 30, article 4, when he says: "That the vague individual signifies the common nature, with a determinate mode of being, which belongs to singulars, namely that it be subsisting per se distinct from others, but in the name of the designated singular a determinate distinguishing is signified." Therefore, according to St. Thomas, the individual in common and the determinate individual differ only according to determinate distinguishing and non-determinate.

Nevertheless in this part three things seem to me to be said. The first is: That, if we abstract the concept of individuation from the individual differences themselves, such an incomplete concept of individual difference in common to all individual differences is not univocal, but analogous. The reason is, because it is like a transcendent, and imbibed in the differences themselves; for it is not contracted through other differences, otherwise there would be a process to infinity. And since those individual differences are primarily diverse, they are not resolvable into two concepts, of which one abstracts from the other, and is included in it. Therefore it is an analogous notion, since it is included in the differences.

The second is: That, if in each genus and predicament we abstract in common not the difference itself of individuation, which is something incomplete, but the individual itself constituted from difference and nature, by way of a whole and complete being, thus it is not properly universal and univocal, but reductively and according to something, but

simply analogous. And the reason is: Because that concept of the individual is conflated from nature, and the mode of individuation taken in common, which mode is not univocal, but analogous with respect to this and that individual difference. Therefore, although from the part of the concept of nature it contains individual differences in potency, and can found univocation to them, nevertheless from the part of the concept of individuation it does not relate univocally with respect to differences in the singular. Therefore simply that concept does not remain univocal, except according to something, and simply analogous, because it does not abstract from differences in every part, so that it is not imbibed in them. But for univocation it is required that the concept be simply one; if however it is one only from one part, but from another does not prescind simply from differences, but actually includes them, it remains partly one and partly diverse, which is to be analogous. Just as if animal were constituted not through the notion itself of the sensible, but through rational and irrational conceived in common, animal could not be simply univocal to man and horse, since it would actually include their differences, and would not abstract from them. Thus since the individual in common includes individual difference, which does not perfectly abstract from the individual differences themselves, consequently the individual in common cannot abstract from them, and thus does not remain simply one. It is different concerning the specific difference constituting nature itself according to quiddity and concept of nature, for example rational. For the nature which is composed from that and from genus, simply contains inferior differences in potency, and thus abstracts univocally from them. But the individual difference in common does not constitute nature in the being of nature, but in the state of individuation, with respect to which individuation in common cannot constitute nature abstracting perfectly from singular differences, but a mode of nature including them. But if the vague individual, like some man, is taken as something complex in virtue of two concepts, thus properly it is neither analogous nor univocal, because it is not one concept, but many, of which one signifies nature, namely the term 'man', the other signifies the mode of individuation in common, namely the term 'some'.

Third I say: That, if individuation is taken for the second intention of the individual, namely for a relation of reason, it is simply univocal to all relations of individuation. For the relation of individuation is a certain species of relation of reason, namely infimal subjectability, which can be divided univocally into this and that relation, which is found in this and that individual, through the mode of subjectability conceived. Hence it has a distinct foundation from the remaining relations, and a distinct species, which is divided into its individuals, just like other relations.

Concerning the third question, namely to which predication the vague individual pertains, Cajetan in the present felt that the individual is predicated not in what, but in of what quality, because it is predicated as a mode, which can properly be said to be predicated in of what kind, not in what; and he says this predicable is distinct from the rest, just as also definition is predicated of its inferiors, and nevertheless is not any of the five predicables. Thus the vague individual is not any of the five predicables. However, definition, as we said above, is not any of these five predicables, because it is something complex, but predicables are simple. If therefore the vague individual is something complex, it will also be excluded from the five predicables, like definition. But if it is taken in virtue of an incomplex term, it remains to explain why the vague individual does not pertain to any of the five predicables, but is predicated in a mode distinct from all of them. For if it is a univocal predicable, and constitutes another mode of predicating from these five, Porphyry was deficient, omitting that and positing only five.

But we are easily freed from this difficulty, saying: That the vague individual is not univocal, but analogous, and therefore is not contained in these predicables, in which only univocal predicates are contained. Or certainly only those are contained in them, which are properly universals in predicating, since the universal is that which is divided into five predicables. But the individual, even if it is conceived in common, nevertheless is not rendered universal even by way of difference and the third predicable, because the individual is, but the universal abstracts from all individuation, even taken in common, because the abstraction of the universal renders nature contractible through differences, but individuation in common is not contractible through differences, but is the individual difference itself taken in common, which we showed above not to abstract from particular differences univocally. Nevertheless this predication of the individual is reduced to the predication of species, not because it is predicated in what, just as the species itself, but because it predicates the mode of specific nature, which is individuation, but the completing mode is reduced to the thing of which it is the mode, just as subsistence to substance. Nevertheless the individual does not signify a proper passion of being, as Vasquez says, 1 p., question 31, article 4, disputation 130, chapter 2, because proper passion follows upon some nature through necessary connection, and founds predication of eternal truth with it, and therefore belongs to the whole species, but the mode of individuation does not so relate to the nature of the species. And although unity as transcendental is a passion of being, because it abstracts from formal or individual unity, nevertheless individuation itself of unity is not a proper passion of nature or species, but with respect to the individual itself it is not a proper passion, for it would be a passion of

itself. Therefore it is the complement of nature through the mode of ultimate determination and indivision of it.

Arguments are solved.

First it is argued: It repugns for the individual to be conceived in common, because communicability and division into many repugns to it much more than to angelic nature, since from its intrinsic concept the individual is predicable only of one; therefore no vague individual is given.

Nor can it be said that it is common denominatively, but formally individual and as that by which, because that denomination of universality is contrary to and repugns the formal notion of individual: for to be in one, and to be in many are opposed; therefore it cannot receive that denomination. For when some subject has repugnance with some intention, it cannot be denominated from it, just as man cannot be denominated from the intention of genus. Therefore, if the individual formally repugns this, which is to be in many, it will not be able to receive the denomination of being predicated of many.

And it is confirmed: Because the Philosopher says in the chapter on substance, that first substance is predicated of nothing, because it is neither said of any subject, nor is it in any subject; but first substance is the singular in the genus of substance; therefore it cannot be conceived in common, so as to be said of many. And finally: Because, as we were saying, individual differences are primarily diverse; therefore they cannot have something common in which they agree, because if they had, the concepts of individual differences would be resolved into that, and consequently they would not be primarily diverse, but would agree in something, and differ through something added.

I respond: That communicability repugns to the individual designated and determined, but not to the vague individual taken in common; just as the term 'Peter' or this man cannot be communicated to many, because they are determinate individuals; but some man can be conceived as communicable to many, although not universal, and thus is not a subject to which such communication repugns.

Or second it is said: That the individual is what is predicated of one only as that by which, or the form of such predicability; but this form conceived as a certain thing and in designated act, can denominatively and as that which receive the intention of being predicated of many. Hence such individuation, although it has repugnance to being predicated of many formally and in exercise, because it cannot be the form and reason of predication of many, nevertheless conceived materially as a certain thing, does not have

repugnance to such denomination. But man even materially and as a certain thing conceived cannot receive the intention of genus, because he does not abstract from many species.

To the confirmation I respond similarly: That first substance taken determinately and designedly is not predicated of any subject, but well conceived in common with respect to this and that first substance. Or what it has formally and as that by which, denominatively however and as that which can be said of many.

To the other part of the argument I respond: It proves that individual differences do not have some univocal common concept, which is simply one and abstract, but not that they cannot have some common concept, at least analogous, and by way of a transcendent imbibed in differences, as has been said.

Second it is argued: All individual differences and all individuals are signified in common under one and the same notion, namely according as they agree in the office of singularizing; therefore the notion common to them is univocal and the same. The antecedent is proved: Because it does not repugn to conceive the mode or office of singularizing by way of one in common and confusedly; therefore at least under that indetermination that concept is univocal.

I respond: That office or mode of singularizing cannot actually prescind from determinate and individual differences, because those are primarily diverse, and not resolvable into two concepts, of which one is contracting, the other contractible, as has been said, and each contracting difference participates that office of singularizing. And although it is conceived confusedly and in common, nevertheless it is conceived as not perfectly prescindig from the differences themselves, but as actually included in them, although it does not actually explicate them, when it is conceived in common, and thus prescinds from them in the way that analogous and transcendentals from their inferiors, as is said more fully in the treatise on analogy.

QUESTION X.
ON DIFFERENCE GENERALLY TAKEN, AND AS IT IS THE THIRD PREDICABLE.

Since Porphyry, about to treat of difference, which is the third predicable, prefaced divisions of difference into proper, common and most proper, interpreters are accustomed here to discuss much about the very notion of difference in general, and its divisions, which however are properly treated in Book 5 and Book 10 of the Metaphysics.

Therefore we shall briefly dispatch ourselves from those matters. We note this about the notion of difference, and its relation, that we ought to treat conformably to the notion and relation of similarity, or agreement, which is opposed to the notion and relation of difference.

ARTICLE I.
Whether difference is well divided into common, proper and most proper.

Difference taken in general seems to be nothing other than a form making to differ, or insofar as it has the office of making to differ. And thus Porphyry says, in the chapter on difference, that universally every difference when added makes alteration. Hence in whatever form making to differ there arises a double respect, or order, namely to the subject, or thing, which it makes to differ, and to the term, or extremes, from which it makes to differ. For difference is like a certain segregation and separation, and thus it has a subject, which it segregates, and a term, from which it separates. And necessarily some relation must be understood in the very notion of difference, just as in the notion of agreement, which is its opposite, some relation is understood with respect to the agreeing and similar terms. Therefore the respect of difference to the subjects, to which it belongs, constitutes difference as predicable of those, and thus contributes to difference logically, or predicably accepted. But the respect of difference to those things, from which it differs, constitutes the notion of difference as to the office of segregating and separating from another, which pertains to the quiddity of difference metaphysically considered, or commonly said.

And because it is said that difference is a form making to differ, it must be noted that to differ is one thing, to be diverse another, and diversity is one thing, difference another. For those things are said to be diverse, which differ not through something superadded, but by themselves, like those things which are primarily diverse. But those things are said to differ, which differ from another through something superadded, and thus they do not differ by their wholes, but agree in something and differ in another. Hence every difference supposes some agreement, and those which have no agreement are primarily diverse, according to the doctrine of Aristotle, Book 10 of the Metaphysics, text 12, and St. Thomas, in the same place, lecture 4, and Part 1, question 3, article 8, ad 3, and question 90, article 1, ad 3. And the most general genera, or categories, are said to be primarily diverse, and the differences themselves, which properly do not differ, but are reasons of differing, and differ by themselves without any univocal superior, in which they agree.

These things being posited, concerning the proposed division three things must be explained. First: Whether the division is adequate? Second: What is the thing divided, and what are the dividing members? Third: Whether the division is analogous, or univocal?

Concerning the first. It is established among almost all that the division is adequate, with very few exceptions. And the reason is manifest: Because this division is made through members exhausting and equaling the whole divided. For every form making to differ is either essential and intrinsic, or accidental. If essential, it is most proper. If accidental, either that accident is separable, or inseparable. If inseparable, it is proper and makes to differ properly. If separable, it is common also to others and makes to differ commonly. For it is therefore called common difference, because it is not so affixed to one and proper to it, that it cannot be found in another, or because we commonly apprehend difference through sensible accidents, which are common, like motion, color, figure etc. But difference is called proper of inseparable accident, understanding through that not only the property, which flows from intrinsic and quidditative principles, but also concerning accident immovably inhering, although it does not flow from the principles of essence; indeed Porphyry brought examples of these explaining proper difference, as he says, like a scar of a wound, snubness of nose etc.

Hence what some seek about proper passion, which makes to differ, is easily solved, and yet neither essentially, since it is not essential and constitutive difference, nor accidentally, since those which have diverse passions differ essentially. Also individual differences in substance make one to differ from another, and not essentially, because otherwise they would differ specifically, nor accidentally, because two individuals differ substantially; therefore the division into essential and accidental is not adequate.

But response to the first: That proper passion formally only makes to differ properly, but virtually, or illatively makes to differ most properly, as Cajetan well notes, in this chapter on difference, because it is an effect following upon the most proper difference, and from difference through proper passion essential difference is well inferred, yet formally it only makes to differ accidentally properly.

To the second indeed it is said: That Porphyry among the examples, which he brings for common difference, places difference between Socrates and Plato, which is individual difference. And St. Thomas, Book 5 of the Metaphysics, lecture 12: "Those, he says, which agree in species, are not distinguished except through accidental differences, like Socrates white, or just, Plato black, or musical." Nevertheless, although some common

differences intervene between two individuals, like those which St. Thomas assigns, it must not be denied that individuals of substance also differ through proper differences, because they differ inseparably, not indeed through proper differences, which speak proper passions of nature, since two individuals are of the same nature and species, but through proper differences, that is inseparable. And it stands well that they differ substantially, and yet not essentially, but accidentally, not with categorical accidentality, but with accidentality of the fifth predicable, because the difference itself intrinsic in these individuals is substantial, because it is the singularity of first substance, which constitutes the substantial individual. But individual difference although it divides substance, yet does not divide formally and essentially, but materially. And although this division is made in substance, it is nevertheless dependent on accidents, through whose connotation and respect matter is rendered signed, from which as from a principle individuation is taken. Hence also the individual requires that the collection of its properties (which certainly are accidents) cannot be found in another.

Concerning the second difficulty: First it is certain that difference, which is the divided in this division, is not difference, which is the third predicable, for this is one of the dividing members, namely the most proper difference, which alone is predicated in quale essentially. Hence it also follows that what is divided is not any second intention of any of the five predicables whether third, or fourth, or fifth. Because the intention of the third predicable is the intention of differing essentially, of the fourth and fifth, is the intention of differing accidentally. Therefore none of those is the divided embracing all these dividing members.

The difficulty therefore is: Whether the divided of this division is something real, or of reason, or some form, or intention? Which is the same as asking what is this office of making to differ. For, as Cajetan well notes in this chapter, difference is not taken in this division materially, for the form itself which makes to differ, but for the formality itself, or office of making to differ, which some call the intention of difference, because just as the agreement of many in one is a certain notion, or intention, so also difference insofar as such; lest however we involve logical intentions with metaphysical formalities, we do not call it intention, but formality, or office of making to differ, which consists in some respect to those things, from which separation, or difference is made, just as on the contrary agreement consists in respect to those things, which have similarity, or agreement.

Therefore some think this office of making to differ is something of reason, resting on this foundation, because to differ supposes agreement, for those which are distinguished

by their wholes are diverse, not different; but agreement between two individuals, or between two species is a relation of reason, for they agree in something common, which is common only through reason; therefore also actual difference, which necessarily supposes such agreement, cannot be a real respect, but of reason.

Some add further that also common and proper difference, although it is made through accidents, which are distinguished from the subject, because nevertheless they make to differ not by reason of their genus, in which they agree, but by reason of their differences, which necessarily suppose agreement in genus, therefore also the formal notion of difference, which is made by means of such accidents, is something of reason, as, for example, whiteness and blackness make Peter and Paul to differ accidentally, not through the very notion of colored, which is the genus of white and black, but through the segregative and congregative, which are the differences of those; therefore they make to differ insofar as they suppose generic agreement, and are taken precisely through the intellect in the notion of difference, which whole is something of reason.

Nevertheless it must be said that in real forms, and which really make to differ, this formality, or office of making to differ is not only intention, or relation of reason, but true and real formality. Nor do I see how anyone can doubt this, unless one who denied that real relations of dissimilarity and diversity, similarity and agreement, or equality are given. But who would deny that two white things have from the part of the thing a real relation of similarity, whatever it may be, which they lose when one white thing is lost? But the relation of similarity, relation and formality of real agreement is in real forms. And it does not repugn that the same entity with respect to diverse things founds a relation of similarity and dissimilarity, as white with respect to white similarity, with respect to black dissimilarity.

And the foundation is manifest: Because the effect of difference making to differ is real, and founds a real relation, if the term exists from the part of the thing; therefore it is not something of reason. The antecedent is established: Because from the part of the thing distinction and segregation is given between those things which are not entirely diverse, but retain some agreement and similarity, as Peter and Paul, retaining similarity in nature, are really distinct and separated; therefore just as the agreement and similarity, which they retain, is real, so the difference and distinction, which they have in the thing, is real, since one really is not the other. Therefore agreement and real similarity can well be supposed, and real distinction, or difference can be given. And although this difference and agreement is made according to diverse formalities, nevertheless some formalities also are given in the thing, as real relations, according to which something is said to be

formally similar, or agreeing with another, or dissimilar and diverse, and similarly the proximate foundations of these relations are given in the thing.

From which it is clear how weak the opposite foundation is. For first it fails because it says that actual agreement between Peter and Paul, horse and man, is something of reason, when from the part of the thing they are similar and by reason of similarity they agree, but similarity is a real relation. But those authors were equivocated, not discerning between agreement and unity; for Peter and Paul are one through reason, but they have agreement and similarity in the thing. And then it fails because, although the formality of difference supposes agreement, nevertheless it is not required that it suppose agreement through the mode of actual relation, or be founded in such relation, but it suffices that it suppose fundamental agreement, and with that supposed formal difference is exercised, whether the relation of agreement is also otherwise exercised, or not.

From this however is explained what is the divided of this division. For the formality itself, or notion making to differ is divided into the mode of making to differ essentially and accidentally (for these are the immediately opposed members); and again accidental difference, into the mode of differing separably, which is common difference, and inseparably, which is proper; where also difference through proper passion is included, which is accidental difference, although it infers, or presupposes essential, from which it is derived. And individual difference is also included, because it is impossible that individual difference not be essential, or accidental, since these members are immediately opposed. And although some reduce it to essential, because it is substantial, concerning which we have already said above, others to accidental, because it is material and dependent on accidents signing matter, nevertheless it is certain to be contained under some of these members, just as it is certain to be essential difference, or non-essential. Hence it cannot be denied that this division is adequate, which some wrongly deny.

Concerning the third controversy, or difficulty, namely whether this division is analogous, or univocal, there is a double opinion. Some think this division to be univocal, when it is taken according to the office itself of making to differ, as can be seen in Master Cabero, treatise 3, disputation 4, doubt 2, because this office is exercised univocally and simply, from whatever difference it is made, whether essential, or accidental; but if difference is taken for the thing itself, or form making to differ, thus it will be a division of accident into subjects, because the mode itself of making to differ is like a certain intention and notion, which happens to things, it does not constitute them.

And this is urged further because, if for any reason this division were analogous, it would be maximally because one difference makes to differ essentially, another accidentally; this does not prevent; therefore. The minor is proved: for, even this not preventing, essential and accidental predicable agree univocally in the notion of predicable as such; and similarly accidental and essential agreement, or similarity agree univocally in the notion of assimilating, and under the same genus of relation; therefore similarly essential and accidental difference will agree univocally.

Nevertheless Thomists commonly defend the opposite opinion, concerning which see Cajetan, and Soto, in the commentary on the chapter on difference, and the Carmelite Course, here disputation 7, question 1. And without doubt the foundation is more solid. For we can consider four things in difference itself: First is the form, which makes to differ. Second, the segregation itself, or division, which results from such form making to differ. Third, the relation itself of difference, or dissimilarity. Fourth, the very notion of the third predicable. And the first three pertain to difference first intentionally, or physically accepted; the fourth indeed to logical difference and second intentionally. If we attend to the first, it is established that form essentially, or accidentally constituting, or making to differ, is not univocal; for essential form simply constitutes the being of the thing, accidental however, secundum quid. But in the same mode, in which it constitutes, it makes to differ; therefore, just as in constituting essential and accidental form do not agree univocally, simply constituting and secundum quid, so similarly neither in making to differ.

But if we consider the second, similarly it is established that segregation, or essential division is division simply, accidental however secundum quid for those things, which only differ accidentally and agree essentially, differ secundum quid and agree simply; therefore the notion of making to differ does not belong to them simply, but secundum quid. And whatever it may be, whether some accidental differences make some two things to differ really and simply, as two individuals under the same species differ, nevertheless it is established that many accidental differences do not make to differ simply, because they do not make simply other and other, or one and another, even if the same subject remains in number, as in the examples, which Porphyry brings, in which the same from itself differs otherwise and otherwise, as Peter healthy from himself sick.

But if we consider the third, namely the relation of difference, that indeed will agree univocally in the category and genus of relation, whether it is a relation of essential difference, or accidental. But here we do not speak of the division of difference, for

categorical relation, but for the effect itself of differing and the notion of making to differ, which is made simply in essential difference, secundum quid in accidental difference.

Finally if we attend to the fourth, much more it is established that accidental and essential difference cannot agree univocally; for essential alone constitutes the third predicable, which is predicated in quale essentially. The rest do not constitute that, because they are predicated in quale accidentally. Therefore in the notion of constituting the third predicable they cannot agree univocally.

To the foundations of the opposite opinion it is responded: To the first, it is said that the office of making to differ is not found in the same mode in essential and accidental difference, as has been shown, because essential removes identity, which is the opposite of difference simply; accidental however secundum quid, because it can be exercised in the same subject according to another and another state, or accident of it.

To the second: It is responded by denying the minor. To the proof: It is said that there is a disparate reason between being predicated essentially and accidentally, and making to differ: because predicability does not follow the thing itself, according as it is in itself, but as it is in the intellect. But the intellect univocally and simply applies the predicate to the subject, whether it is an essential predicate, or accidental, in which application predication consists. Similarly in the same mode it abstracts one from many, whether they agree essentially, or accidentally. But in this unity segregated from many universality is founded. But in all five predicables this is found univocally, which is to be one in many, as we said above, question 6. But truly to make to differ is not an effect agreeing through the intellect, but distinguishing in the thing and making one to differ from another, because we speak metaphysically here of that; but the form, which essentially makes to differ, removes identity simply, which is in essence; but accidental difference does not remove that, but leaves it.

To that, which is brought concerning the relation of similarity and agreement: I respond that the relation of similarity and agreement in the genus of categorical relation is univocal, whether the agreement is accidental, or essential, just as has been said of the relation of difference. However the notion itself, or form making agreement in the notion of agreeing, is not univocal in essential and accidental agreement, as to the effect of making unity, or agreement simply, just as has been said of difference.

ARTICLE II.
Whether the definitions of difference of the third predicable are good.

The notion of difference commonly said being explained, and as it pertains to the metaphysician, it remains to descend specially to logical difference, which constitutes the third predicable, which only belongs to the most proper difference, which is essential; for the remaining differences are not predicated in quale essentially, nor do they constitute a predicable under the notion of difference, but under the notion of proper, or accident, to which accidental difference follows.

But of this difference, which is the third predicable, Porphyry handed down five definitions. First: Difference is that, by which the species exceeds the genus. Second: Difference is that, which is predicated of many and differing in species in this very quale quid. Third: Difference is, which by its own nature separates those things which are under the same genus. Fourth: Difference is that, by which single things differ, namely according to quiddity. Fifth: Difference is, which not only separates those things, which are placed under the same genus, but contributes to the substance and notion, and is a part of that, of which it is said to be the difference. From these definitions we gather that three respects concur to constitute logical difference. Namely respect to the genus, which difference contracts and over which it adds something. Second to the species, which it constitutes by contracting the genus and segregating the species from the rest. Third to the inferiors, of which it is predicated in quale quid, which are the very inferiors of the species; for it is predicated in quale only of those. And because that definition, by which difference is said to be predicated of many, etc., explains rather the very notion of predicable and universal, we commonly use that in the explanation of the third predicable. And in these definitions there is no treatment of individual differences, because these are not universal, but individual, and therefore do not pertain to the third predicable, which is universal. And although individual difference is conceived in general as such, nevertheless it is not predicated in quale essentially, because it is individual and supposes the whole constituted nature.

Therefore concerning these three respects, which concur to the notion of the third predicable, their difficulties occur, which must be examined in this, and the following articles. For concerning the respect to inferiors a difficulty occurs, how in the definition of the third predicable it is said that it is predicated of many differing in species, which only belongs to subaltern difference, not indeed of those differing in number, which belongs to atomic difference. Concerning the respect to species there is a difficulty, whether difference is universal with respect to the species which it constitutes, or with

respect to the inferiors, which are contained under the species. Concerning the respect to genus the difficulty is, whether differences are contained under genus, so that inferior differences are contained under superior differences. And we shall dispatch the first difficulty in this article; the second, in the following; the third, in the last.

Concerning the first, in which that particle is explained: of many differing in species, a common difficulty occurs, why that is placed in the definition of difference in general, which comprehends both atomic difference and subaltern, when to be predicated of many differing in species belongs to subalterns alone. Nor can it be said that Porphyry and Aristotle and other ancients were ignorant, or denied atomic differences; for since they were not ignorant of atomic definitions and species, since so many are defined in the sciences, how could they be ignorant of atomic differences, without which specific quiddities are neither constituted, nor understood?

Indeed Aristotle expressly inquires how definition is to be handed down through genus and difference, and what is the ultimate difference, as is clear in Book 2 of the Posterior Analytics, lecture 13, according to St. Thomas; and lecture 14 and 15, at the end, and Book 6 of the Metaphysics, lecture 12; and Book 8 of the Metaphysics, lecture 2. But why in that definition, in which Porphyry explained difference, which is the third predicable, he only treated of difference, which is predicated of many differing in species, which is subaltern difference, I judge the question not of so much moment, as the anxiety it produces in some, especially since Porphyry himself, in other definitions of atomic difference, did not omit explanation, as when he says: Difference is, by which species exceeds genus, by which single things differ, which separates those things, which are contained under the same genus, and the rest, which fit atomic difference very well.

And indeed Cajetan, on this chapter 3 of Porphyry, thought that definition could be adapted to atomic differences, explaining it not positively, but through non-repugnance, or negatively; because namely from the very notion of difference it does not repugn to be predicated of many differing in species; just as to quantity, from the very notion of quantity, it does not repugn to be divided into infinity syncategorematically, and yet to natural quantity, namely as it is subject to the form of some natural thing, that repugns, because the form and natural thing is destroyed, if it is divided into such small parts. So to atomic difference it does not repugn of itself to be predicated of many differing in species, although it repugns by reason of the atomic species, which it constitutes. Which can be understood further, if we consider that any difference whatever, in the notion of predicable in quale of many, does not have other many, nor other inferiors, than those, which the species constituted through such difference has; hence of itself it neither says

to be predicated of many differing in species, or in number, but is determined to this by reason of that, which it constitutes; for if the quiddity, which it constitutes, will be an atomic species having under itself inferiors differing in number alone, the difference, which constitutes such species, will have the same; but if what it constitutes will be a subaltern species, having under itself inferiors diverse in atomic species, it will be predicated of the same differing in species. If however the species constituted through difference does not have many inferiors distinct in species, but in number, then it will repugn to it not by reason of itself, but by reason of the species constituted by it, which does not offer it other inferiors.

Yet still Cajetan's explanation seems to me to need further softening; and adhering to the very letter of Porphyry, I say the very words of Porphyry must be well attended to. For he said that difference is, which is predicated of many, and differing in species in quale. Where I weigh that Porphyry did not say "Which is predicated of many differing in species," but "of many, and differing in species." For why did he interpose that particle "and," unless to distinguish between being predicated of many absolutely, and being predicated of those differing in species; and thus in that particle: "Of many," he included all predicable differences, whether atomic, or subaltern; but in that addition: "And differing in species," he specially indicated subalterns, as if he said: Difference is, which is predicated of many in quale, even if those many are differing in species; and thus the particle "and" is equivalent to the particle "even." And this was necessary to explain perfectly the nature of difference, insofar as it is predicated in quale for since difference is therefore predicated in quale, because it is predicated through the mode of actuality and form determining, for this pertains to the mode of qualification, it was fitting to explain that, even if the differences are generic, or subaltern, and therefore do not seem to have the notion of act, but rather of potentiality with respect to their species, still nevertheless they are predicated in quale, because they are predicated by reason of the generic form, which they import; and therefore the sense of Porphyry is: Difference is, which is predicated of many in quale quid, even if such many are differing in species. For this particle "and," interposed in the definition, has this force, when it is said: "Of many, and differing in species," that is even differing in species.

Thus understood in the mind of Cajetan, whom many and distinguished authors follow, it has nothing of harshness, or difficulty, but very much of subtlety, and accommodates itself maximally to Porphyry's mind. Others more easily, and not improbably say that Porphyry only defined subaltern differences, because they are more common and better known, but atomic ones are multiple and scarcely known; but with subalterns defined, atomic ones remain virtually defined, substituting in place of that particle "differing in

species": "differing in number." And especially, because in other definitions of difference handed down, he had also included atomic species, as we noted above. And finally that seems a sufficient cause for omitting atomic differences, because those are explained in definitions of species, with which they are convertible. Hence just as in the treatise on predicables he does not treat of definition, but of the definable species itself; so neither of atomic difference, which is convertible with the definition itself, and is proper to it; but well of subaltern difference, because this constitutes genus, which is not convertible with the definition of species.

I omit the solution of others, who say that in that definition "of many differing in species," it should be understood of many differing in species, not among themselves, but from others, from which they are specifically distinguished. By which reason this definition also fits atomic differences; for rational, for example, is predicated of Peter and Paul, as they differ in species not among themselves, but from horse and ox, from which rational specifically distinguishes Peter and Paul. But this solution seems forced; for things are not said absolutely to differ in species, if they do not differ in species among themselves, but from others, otherwise it can also be said that they differ generically, because just as they differ in species from others, from which they are specifically distinguished, so Peter and Paul differ generically from those, from which they are generically distinguished. Hence one falls into a similar inconvenience, why Porphyry only placed in the definition of difference that "of many differing in species," and did not add "of many differing in genus," according to this explanation.

But you will object against the first solution. For it is inconvenient that some definition is handed down only through that, which is related non-repugnantly to another. Both because definition should positively explain the notion of the defined, and not only through non-repugnance. And because otherwise it could be handed down through terms repugnant to itself; as if man were defined as irrational animal, because, although irrational repugns to man insofar as man, but not insofar as animal; and one lowest species could be defined through another, because, although it repugns to itself according to special notion, yet not according to common and generic; therefore similarly it is inconvenient that difference is defined through that, which does not repugn to it, comprehending both atomic and subaltern, only because it does not repugn to difference in general to be subaltern.

And it is confirmed: Because, if that particle: "of many," signifies both of many in species, and in number, why when Porphyry defined species, did he express "of many differing in number," and when he defines specific difference does he not express this,

but only "of many"? Also in this, which is to be predicated of many, all predicables agree; therefore through that this third predicable is not specially explained.

I respond: This argument does not militate against our exposition, because we showed according to Porphyry's text that that particle: "Differing in species," belongs only to subaltern differences; but in that particle "Of many," absolutely is included, both atomic and subaltern, which are predicated of many, whether distinct in number, or in species. But that particle is added: "And differing in species," to show how it also belongs to generic differences to be predicated in quale.

But remaining in Cajetan's rigorous sense, it is said that definition given of some species through non-repugnance of another opposed to itself is vicious, when truly such opposite is given in that species, as is established in the examples brought. But when some nature, or species of itself has non-repugnance to something, but that it actually has, or is impeded from having, depends on something extrinsic, it is not vicious to define through non-repugnance, as quantity is defined: That which is divisible into infinity, although it repugns to natural quantity. So since difference, and proper, and accident, which are predicated in quale, do not have other inferiors, than those which are permitted to be had by their subjects, which they constitute, or affect, it is fitting that to be predicated of many differing in species, or in number, is understood in these permissively, or non-repugnantly and as much as is from itself, although to differences, as affected, and bound to atomic species, which it constitutes, that repugns, just as to quantity, as it is in natural subject it repugns to be divided into infinity. Hence in this solution it must be said that atomic and subaltern difference are not species of difference as such, nor is difference itself genus to those. But this diversity of atomic and subaltern comes to difference itself from the very thing, which it constitutes; for if it is generic nature, it will be subaltern, and will be predicated of many differing in species; if specific, not except of those differing in number.

But if you inquire: If difference is related permissively to both, namely that it be predicated of many differing in species, or in number, why did Porphyry place only "of those differing in species"?

I respond: This is done because, when something is defined through non-repugnance and permission, always that must be placed, which is greater and more principal, because through this that the more principal does not repugn to it, it is better known that the less principal does not repugn. Just as quantity is better defined through this that division into infinity does not repugn to it, than through this that the opposite does not repugn to it.

To the confirmation: It is said that in that particle: "Of many," is understood not only of many in number, but absolutely of many differing in number, or in species, which however would be said incongruously in the species the second predicable, because the second predicable is predicated only of those differing in number, but the third admits both, and of many in number, and of many differing in species as the species, which it constitutes, will be.

To the other confirmation it is said: That to be predicated of many is common to every predicable, but to be predicated of many in quale quid is proper to the third predicable alone. Which then can be divided into being predicated of many differing in number, or in species. And Porphyry not only placed the first particle, but also added the second.

Concerning the ultimate particle: In quale quid, note two things: First is that, when it is said: In quale quid, the term 'quid' is the same as essentially, or quidditatively, not the same as substantively; for that particle quid designates both, from the part of the thing signified the essential and quidditative notion, from the part of the mode, that it be related substantively and not adjectively, as we shall explain in the question on genus.

Second is: That, just as in natural things form, or act, is compared both to matter, as to potentiality from which it is educed, and to the whole, which consists of matter and form, so also difference first respects genus, as the potential, which it actuates, and from whose power it is educed not by physical eduction, as form from matter, but by metaphysical eduction, as determined and actuating notion from indeterminate, and confused, and actuable. Then it respects species as a certain whole constituted and formed through difference itself; hence with respect to genus difference is related in quale, because it determines the confusion and potentiality of it; but with respect to species it is not said in quale, because it determines the potentiality of it, but because it is a constitutive part of that more actual and more determined. Which doctrine you will find in St. Thomas, Part 1, question 50, article 4, ad 1; and question on Spiritual Creatures, article 8, ad 9. And from that it is established that difference must always be more perfect than its genus, as act than potency, and the determined than the indeterminate, and quality than the qualifiable.

ARTICLE III.
Whether difference is said to be universal with respect to its species, or with respect to the inferiors of such species.

Since difference is convertible with the species, which it constitutes, and is predicated of individuals by means of it, but the species is universal, and from this very fact that difference is said of species equally and convertibly, it is fitting that it be universal, just as the species itself; nevertheless the difficulty is, whether from this formally because it regards species it is universal, or truly from formal respect, by which it regards the individuals of such species?

From the part also of the inferiors of difference itself there can be doubt: what are directly and per se the inferiors of difference; for some are inferiors, as it were immediate of difference itself, others are immediate inferiors of the species itself, and mediately are also inferiors of difference; for example, rational can both be predicated of Peter and Paul, as of inferiors of man, and can be predicated of this and that rational, as of inferiors immediately to itself. We inquire therefore with respect to which inferiors difference is constituted in the notion of the third predicable?

I RESPOND AND SAY FIRST: Difference does not have the notion of logical universal formally through respect to species, but to inferiors, although concomitantly it has order to species, as to a universal with which it is convertible. The reason is manifest, because the formality of universality is taken through order to its correlative; but the correlative of universal formally are the inferiors, for universal is related as superior to many and as contractible to inferiors. But it is established that difference with respect to species is not superior, nor contractible by it, since it is equal to it; therefore it cannot have universality formally with respect to that and be superior to it.

And it is confirmed: Because that is universal and superior with respect to something which, when it is communicated to it, is contracted by it; but that is contracted to something which through contraction loses universality and abstraction. But truly difference through this that it is communicated to species is not rendered singular, nor does it lose universality, but rather conserves it; therefore with respect to that it is not contractible, nor superior. Hence it cannot be said that it is predicated of species as logical universal, because it is not predicated as something superior of it, but as equal of equal. Therefore this equality supposes universality concomitantly, as the second part of the conclusion says, it does not formally constitute universality; just as from this that

someone is equal to the king he is not formally said to be king, but from this that he has a kingdom he commands others, by reason of which he is equal to the king.

If it is said: That through order to species it is not formally universal, because species is not inferior, yet it is radically, because from this that it regards species and is convertible with it consequently it regards individuals contained under species.

Against this is: Because the root of universality is the same as the foundation of universality, which is unity of abstraction and aptitude to many; but unity abstracted from many and aptitude to them does not have for root respect to species, because this respect is of convertibility and equality, not of superiority to the many themselves; therefore from this that it regards species difference is not radically universal, but from abstraction and aptitude to the many themselves, which are inferiors.

I SAY SECOND: Difference does not regard as inferiors of the third predicable this and that difference, for example rational, this and that rational; but inferiors contained under the species which it constitutes, for example rational regards as inferiors Peter and Paul. The reason is manifest. Because the predicability of the third predicable is in quale quid; therefore only those are to be constituted as its inferiors, with respect to which difference is related as something superior, and in quale, and can be predicated in quale. But with respect to this and that difference it is not related in quale, but well with respect to individuals of species; for when I say: This rational is rational, it is not predication in quale, because some difference of it is not predicated of this rational, but its whole and integral nature, whatever that may be, complete or incomplete; therefore it predicates not quality of it, but quiddity, although it is not per se genus, or species, as we said above in the question on genus, because it is not contracted through other differences, otherwise there would be process to infinity. But with respect to inferiors of its species, which it constitutes, it is predicated in quale, because it is predicated as the reason qualifying their nature, and is related as superior; therefore those are inferiors of difference, as the third predicable is.

The arguments are solved.

First it is argued against the first conclusion: This predication: Man is rational, is predication of the third predicable; therefore with respect to man universality of the third predicable is given, just as predicability is given; but man is not conceived there as individual, but as species. The antecedent is certain because that predication cannot pertain to another predicable, than to the third.

And it is confirmed: Because the third predicable has as immediate correlative species, and by means of it regards the individual contained under it; therefore it is said to be universal more through order to species, than through order to individual. The consequence is proved: Because relation is more denominated through order to immediate correlative, than in order to mediate. But the antecedent is proved: Because the third predicable formally insofar as such regards its correlative in quale; but it does not immediately qualify individuals, but the nature of individuals, which is species, otherwise it would not be essential quality, if it did not immediately qualify essence; therefore its immediate correlative is the species itself, or constituted essence. For that is immediate correlative, which is immediately constituted and qualified by difference.

I respond: That that predication: Man is rational, is of the third predicable as it were materially and metaphysically, not formally and logically; for that thing is predicated of man, which is the third predicable, yet not under the formality and relation of the third predicable, or third universal; and thus it is more third predicate, than third predicable, although concomitantly there it retains the universality of the third predicable, which it exercises not with respect to species, but with respect to individuals; just as genus, when it is predicated of individual, as: Peter is animal, there it retains the notion of genus, although not through order to that it is genus, but through order to species. And proper passion, when it is predicated of specific nature, as: Man is capable of laughter, does not exercise the notion of universal, although it predicates nature, which is susceptive of the fourth predicable through order to individuals.

To the confirmation the antecedent is denied. And to the proof, it is said that species is the immediate constituted through difference, and in the notion of constituted it regards that immediately through the mode of metaphysical difference, not in the notion of universal and logical difference, for thus its immediate correlative are the inferiors; but because it regards those according to predicability in quale, it is fitting that order to the specific nature itself as constituted in such mode through difference be supposed, which founds predicability in quale. Nor is it inconvenient that other is the relation of difference to species in the notion of constitutive, other in the notion of universal to inferiors; for just as difference regards genus, as contracting it and as co-part to constitute species, so by the relation of constituting it regards the constituted itself, which relation however is of reason, because genus, difference, and species are not really distinguished. But the relation of difference to its inferiors in quale is the relation of superior to inferiors, which however presupposes relation to species in the notion of constituted.

Second it is argued: Difference as the third predicable regards species and individuals by the same relation, or intention; but this relation, as it touches individuals, is universal; therefore also as it touches species. The consequence is established, and the minor was conceded above. But the major is proved. Both because regarding species it regards all things contained under it; for whatever is said universally of something and adequately, is said of everything contained under that. And also because difference under the same concept, and predication, is predicated of species and individuals; therefore under the same intention and relation.

And it is confirmed: Because difference is predicated of species as equal, and convertibly with it; therefore as universal, because species cannot be equaled except by universal, since it is universal in itself.

I respond by distinguishing the antecedent: If the relation of difference is taken for the relation of constitutive to species as constituted, thus by the same relation it regards species and individuals, because it constitutes nothing other in individuals, than in species, namely nature. But if the relation of difference is taken for the relation of universal and predicable formally and logically, thus by diverse relation it regards individuals and species, because individuals, as superior, species as equal. And to the proof it is said: That regarding species, individuals are also regarded, under the notion indeed of constituting, by the same relation; but under the notion of superiority and equality, by diverse, although one has connection with the other. And thus predication of individuals is universal, but of species not.

To the confirmation: It is said that by this very fact that difference is equal to species, it indeed has being universal, but not with respect to species, to which it is equal, but with respect to individuals, to which it is not equal, but superior.

ARTICLE IV.
Whether superior and generic differences are included in atomic differences and are predicated of them.

It is certain, supposing that metaphysical grades are not distinguished except by reason, as we determined above, that the thing, which is difference, and which is genus are not distinguished really and materially among themselves, and consequently generic difference is not distinguished from specific in the same subject. But the difficulty is, whether according to formal predication, superior and generic difference is so related to inferior, that it is predicated of it, and is included in it as its constitutive predicate.

The resolution is negative. And more common among Doctors. Concerning which see Sanchez, here, book 2, question 28; and Cabero, treatise 1, disputation 4, doubt 3; Carmelites, disputation 7, question 4. And it is taken from St. Thomas, in Book 3 of the Metaphysics, lecture 8, section "He objects to the purpose"; and in Book 1 Against the Gentiles chapter 17, because genus cannot be predicated of difference, for difference does not participate genus, as is said in Book 4 of the Topics. For thus genus would be included in differences, and would be rendered analogous, as we shall prove in the treatise on analogy. But the same reason is concerning generic difference, because this constitutes genus, and is its quidditative part. And it is explained further: Because specific difference by contracting genus, also contracts the generic difference itself from which the quiddity of genus is constituted; but difference contracting genus is outside the concept of genus; therefore it is also outside the concept of generic difference, since it contracts that by contracting genus. The minor is proved from the Philosopher, Book 3 of the Metaphysics; and St. Thomas there, lecture 8. Because, if genus were included in differences, it could not be included in them as contractible part, but as whole and integral difference, because difference, since it is simple, is not composed from genus and difference, nor from some contractible and contracting, otherwise there would be process to infinity; because, if difference consisted of genus and difference, again that difference through which it is constituted, would also consist of genus and difference, and concerning that another would again be inquired, for there would be the same reason concerning it. Therefore if genus, or generic difference is included in specific, it is not included as contractible and generic part, but, since difference itself is simple and without part, it will be the whole difference itself. And thus genus would be analogous, as partly the same, insofar as it says one nature, in which species agree, and partly diverse, insofar as it says the difference itself integrally, by which species differ among themselves; and similarly, if generic difference is included in specific, not as part (for difference, since it is simple, lacks parts) generic difference would be the whole and integral specific difference, and thus it would follow that one lowest species would differ from another through the very same generic difference, without anything superadded, which is repugnant; for thus the same difference would constitute genus, insofar as it is generic difference, and would divide it, because it would totally and integrally be specific difference.

The arguments are solved.

First it is objected from Aristotle, who in Book 7 of the Metaphysics, text 43, lecture 12, according to St. Thomas, says that common differences are divided into other differences; as having feet, which is difference of certain animals, is divided into having cloven feet,

or not cloven. Indeed concerning the difference of cloven footedness he says that superior difference is predicated; for it is true to say that cleavage of feet is a certain footedness. Therefore superior differences are predicated of inferiors.

Also, Book 10 of the Metaphysics, text 23, lecture 9, according to St. Thomas, at the end, he shows that in genera, under which contraries are found, middle differences are composed from contrary differences. Therefore our foundation is destroyed, by which we say that generic differences are not included in specific, because they are not composite.

It is confirmed by that common syllogism: Every man is sensible, every man is rational, therefore some rational is sensible; which is in good figure, namely in Darapti, and the premises are true, therefore also the conclusion.

If you say: It does not follow in the conclusion that rational is sensible formally, but materially, or identically. Against this is: Both because that predication is formal: Rational is sensible, just as also the predications of the premises. And because a syllogism can be made adding the particle formally: Every man formally is sensible, every man formally is rational, therefore some rational formally is sensible.

I respond: To the first place of Aristotle, that common differences are divided into others not formally, but materially, that is not by reason of themselves, but by reason of genus constituted through superior differences. For genus cannot be divided through inferior differences, unless also the differences themselves constitutive of genus are divided. But Aristotle rather said that superior differences themselves are divided, than genus constituted through them, to show which are differences per se of some genus, and which are differences per accidens. For when some genus is divided through inferior differences, according as such genus from intrinsic notion, by which it is constituted, is in potency to those, such genus is divided by differences per se, and not per accidens. As biped animal from the very notion of biped is in potency to have cloven feet, or not cloven, and therefore biped animal is divided per se into such differences. But when genus is in potency to inferiors, not by reason of its constitutive difference, but from elsewhere, such division is not through differences per se, but per accidens; as if biped animal is divided into white and black. However from this it cannot be concluded that common differences themselves are predicated of inferior differences formally; indeed rather they are divided through those, they are not predicated of them; and because they are divided through those, rather genus itself, as constituted by such difference, is that which is divided, and with it its difference itself. And this is the plain explanation of that text, which St. Thomas hands down there, in the cited lecture 12, where he says: "That in

this mode this difference is to be divided: having feet, namely, of such animals one is having cloven feet, another not cloven." Where not only the very notion of biped, or difference of having feet, but also animal itself is divided; and thus when it is said that cleavage is a certain footedness, it is the same, St. Thomas says, "as being contained under this, which is to have feet," and so much is contained under footedness, as differences are contained under genus, of which generic difference is part.

In the same mode it is responded to the second authority from Book 10 of the Metaphysics: middle differences there are not taken for differences, which are the third predicable, but for species opposed under the same genus, not by contrary opposition, or extreme, but middle; but such species are called middle differences, because they differ or are opposed not extremely, as contraries, but as middle contraries.

To the confirmation I respond: That in the first syllogism there is no difficulty; for the conclusion inferred is verified: rational is sensible, identically, not formally. Nor is it necessary that from premises verified in formal sense a conclusion true also in formal sense be inferred, but it suffices that in identical sense, as frequently happens in this third figure. As if you say: Every milk is white, every milk is sweet, therefore some sweet is white; this man runs, this man is just, therefore just runs. Which conclusions are only true in identical sense. But in the second syllogism, where that particle formally is added, manifestly appellation is varied from diverse application of that particle formally. Because under the respect under which it is applied in premises it makes formal predication; but in the conclusion the extremes are verified identically, and therefore that particle formally does not have place there. But for the goodness of syllogism it suffices that, if the antecedent is true, also the consequent; but it is not required that it be verified in the same sense and respect, but the antecedent can be true according to formal predication, and the consequent according to identical, as we have seen.

And the reason is because that particle formally must always be understood respectively, and under some appellation; for what is formal with respect to one can not be with respect to another. Hence always that respect under which it is related formally must remain invariant, as often as the particle formally is applied. And because it is verified that man is rational and sensible formally, because he receives these predicates as formal, but that rational is sensible is not verified except from identification in the same subject, therefore they cannot be verified under the same formality, but if the particle formally is applied, appellation is varied.

But if you insist: This syllogism is good in Celarent: No rational formally is sensible, every man formally is rational, therefore no man is sensible. Where there is no variation of appellation, and yet, even if the particle formally is removed from the conclusion, it is false; therefore the solution given is not sufficient.

I respond: In the same mode appellation is varied from the part of that particle formally, which always makes not absolute sense, but with some restriction and dependence, or respect, insofar namely as it is subject to that formality, and respect of extremes. But it happens that those things, which under one formality and respect are not joined, nor agree, under another agree, hence from negation under one respect to negation under another, or to negation absolutely it is not valid. And thus from this that rational formally, that is under the concept and formality of rational, is in no way sensible, it is not licit to infer that under the concept and formality of man, man, who is the same with rational, is not sensible. Which variation of formalities and appellations in many other matters is very much to be observed. As it is not valid: Christ, given the precept, here and now can act and not act, because he acts freely; and if he did not act he would sin, therefore he can sin and not sin. It is not, I say, valid, because he can not act under the respect and formality of operation, as is required for the notion of free, not under the formality and concept of sin, as it would be from the notion of free deficient.

Finally it is argued: Inferior specific difference has some common and superior predicates, for example, rational is living and is substance etc. Therefore it has something common to itself as generic and superior; therefore such generic difference, or genus can be predicated of inferior difference.

And it is confirmed: Because the concept of difference admits some composition, since it has something of potentiality, as created thing, but pure act alone is entirely simple; therefore it can be resolved into common, or generic concept, and special, or differential. But that superior concept is subaltern difference, because inferior difference has nature and operation subordinated to generic difference; for example neighing in horse is a certain sensible operation, and consequently subordinated to sensible in general, which is generic difference of animal.

I respond: That those superior predicates belong to difference not in formal and direct line, but reductively and according to a certain relation, or connotation. For rational is said to be substance, or living, not because in itself it is substance, or living, but because the form from which it is taken is principle of substance, or living, or of another grade; for form is not that which is, but that by which something is, just as also matter and form

are substances, as it were principles of substance, or incomplete substances. In the same mode differences are something incomplete in their category. And thus not the superior notion itself, which is complete, is predicated of them, nor generic differences themselves, but incomplete notion of that category, for example substance as it abstracts from complete and incomplete, which in transcendental mode is included in everything, which pertains to such category and is reduced.

To the confirmation I respond: That difference is not composite from these, but composite to this, because it is part, or is related through the mode of part; but part is not simple, as pure act, with simplicity of perfection, but with simplicity of negation, because namely it is not fully perfect. But simplicity of negation has more potentiality, because it is composable to another, by which it is perfected, yet it is not composite through resolution into many concepts, from which it consists, unless perhaps analogically, because being is included in all, even in differences, nor is inferior difference subordinated to superior formally and directly as to genus, although it presupposes it, just as it presupposes genus which is constituted from it. And thus neighing is principle of sensible operation; I distinguish, suppositively and materially sensible, granted; formally and directly sensible, I deny. That is, that it be neighing sensible is presupposed, but it is not formally that.

QUESTION XI.
ON THE PROPER.

ARTICLE I.
The nature of the proper is explained, and its divisions are examined.

Porphyry, in the chapter on the proper, placed four acceptations of the proper, and by that division itself seems to have defined each one. For the proper is divided in four modes. First, the proper is said to be that which belongs to the species alone, but not to every individual of it, as being a grammarian, or physician, to man. Second, that which on the contrary belongs to every individual, but not to the species alone, as being biped belongs to man. Third, that which belongs to the species alone and to every individual, but not always, as turning gray in old age belongs to man. Fourth, that which is most proper, which belongs to the species alone and to every individual and always, as man being capable of laughter. And it is most proper, because it is fully convertible with its subject.

Where Porphyry explained every notion of the proper in some mode through order to species, that is to some nature of a thing, whether it be a lowest species, or subaltern,

because the proper can follow to any in some mode. And then he draws the perfect notion of the proper from perfect agreement and adequation with the species itself, or nature, and things contained under species. But then it is said to be convertible, when it accompanies the nature itself wherever it may be, and is not found outside it; for by this very fact that it is found in others it is not perfectly proper to it, but also common to others, but to it alone it will be as it were appropriated, or accommodated, in that mode in which we see very many accidents found outside their proper subject, like heat, cold, whiteness etc. But for some accident to perpetually accompany some subject and not be outside that, it is fitting that it have some root in such subject, or principle, by which it is connected to it and from which it flows. But accidents, which also belong to those subjects in which they do not have root, are called common, because they lack a principle by which they belong to those alone.

Hence it happens that, when some accident has principle and root in some nature, and is communicated to another from it, for example light, which has root in the sun from which it flows, but is communicated to air, and heat has root in fire, but is communicated to water, or another body, that accident has the notion of proper with respect to that subject from which it flows, not with respect to that to which it is communicated. However such accident, which is communicated outside its proper subject, is not in the same mode in other subjects as in the proper, because in others it is as it were participatively and imperfectly, but in the proper subject, fully and perfectly, as connected to its own proper principle. Hence under that perfection, and mode, in which it is in the proper subject, it is never communicated outside the proper subject. Which is the reason that some authors say that proper accident cannot grow and be augmented, even intrinsically, in the subject itself, of which it is proper passion, because there it has the highest perfection which is naturally suited to belong to it. But it can only be augmented in an alien subject, just as light cannot grow in the sun, nor heat in fire. Which will be discussed more widely in Physics, and Theologians treat, acting on the fullness of Christ's grace, Part 3, question 7, article 11.

Therefore two things remain for us to explain. First: What is the divided of this division of the proper, and what is the division itself into four modes? Second, how is the definition of the proper itself in the fourth mode to be explained?

Concerning the first, I respond.

AND I SAY FIRST: The divided of this division is not the proper fourth predicable, but the notion of the proper commonly said, which consists in the relation of agreement to

one, with exclusion of partnership, or communication of another: for what is proper to me, is so peculiar that it is not of another, nor common to it. And so we proceed in this division as in the division of difference into common, proper and most proper.

And the reason of the conclusion is because the notion of the fourth predicable consists in this that it is predicated in quale necessarily accidentally; for through this it is distinguished from the remaining predicables: through the term 'in quale,' from genus and species, through the term 'accidentally,' from difference, which is quale essentially, through the term 'necessarily,' from common accident, which is the fifth predicable; but these conditions do not belong to the divided of this division, but only to one dividing member, namely the proper in the fourth mode. Therefore the fourth predicable is not the divided in this division, since it is a dividing member; and consequently the proper commonly said is divided. And this is therefore because this division is placed so that among many things, which can take the name of proper, that may be investigated, which is proper passion, to which fourth predicability is assigned; therefore the fourth predicable itself should not be taken as divided, but sought among the dividing members and discerned from others, which although they seem to have the notion of proper, nevertheless do not attain the notion of proper passion.

I SAY SECOND: The proper commonly said is divided by analogous division into these four modes of the proper. There is not great dissension of authors in this conclusion, but they commonly follow it, especially Thomists. And we call the proper commonly said, that which is proper as it were physically, or metaphysically considered, as it is opposed to that which is common, not for the proper fourth predicable, as we said. For here we only treat of the nature of the proper, not of intention. Just as therefore we rightly say that the common absolutely taken is that, which has the conditions required for the notion of common, so the proper commonly said is that which has the conditions required that something be proper; and just as the common speaks a relation of communicative, or agreement to many, so the proper speaks a relation of agreement to one, with exclusion of communication to the foreign. And thus these two things are generally required for the notion of proper. And according as these two conditions are simply observed, the notion of proper is simply found; but if they are found secundum quid it will not be proper simply. But these four modes are so related, that only in the fourth mode are these two conditions found simply, not in others. For the first condition is that it belong to one not separating itself from that, as to agreement; the second that it not belong to another foreign. And that the first condition be observed, it should belong wherever such thing is found and always, that is firmly and inseparably: but then something firmly belongs to something, when it has root and principle in that; for if it does not have root there, it

belongs transiently and separably, as much as is from the force of connection, although per accidens from something extrinsic conserving it can remain as to existence, not as to agreement. But for the second condition it is required that it belong alone, because it should not belong to another outside itself. Hence, with some of these conditions lacking, the proper is not given simply, nor integrally, because it does not have the very notion of proper and conditions essentially required. But they are lacking in the first three modes of proper. For the first mode belongs alone, but not to all, nor always, hence it is separable, and thus is not proper. In the second mode it belongs to all, but not alone, and thus is common to others. In the third mode it belongs to all and alone, but not always, and thus neither permanently, but separably, which is not to possess, and to have it as proper, not only because it does not sometimes exist in it, but because it does not always belong to it.

But if you inquire: Why therefore are those things called proper, which are proper in these modes, when they are not truly proper?

I respond: That they are proper secundum quid. First, because at least they participate some conditions of proper, as that they belong either alone, or to all. And second, because, although they are not proper absolutely, nevertheless they are proper comparatively; for example, being biped, although it is not proper to man absolutely, nevertheless comparatively to quadrupeds it is proper to him.

Hence finally it is established that the division is adequate, because from the three conditions, which are required for the proper, namely to all, alone and always, either all agree, or some is lacking. If all agree, it is proper simply and in the fourth mode; if some is lacking, either the first is lacking, namely that it not belong to all, and thus it is proper in the first mode, or the second, namely that it not belong alone, and thus it is proper in the second mode, or the third is lacking, and thus it is proper in the third mode. But if all are lacking it is in no way proper.

Concerning the second: The definition of the proper simply from what has been said remains explained. And it is handed down in two ways: in one mode by Porphyry, that the proper in the fourth mode is that which belongs to all alone and always; in another mode by Aristotle, Book 1 of the Topics, chapter 4, that the proper is, that which does not indicate the being of the thing, but belongs to it alone, and is predicated convertibly. Where rather the substratum itself of the fourth predicable is explained, that is the proper passion itself, than the notion itself of the fourth predicable. And in Porphyry's definition, if the term 'belongs' is the same as 'is predicated,' or 'can be predicated,' and the term 'to all' is taken distributively for inferiors, that definition will be rendered second intentional,

and for logical predicable, and can thus be reduced to form: The proper is, that which is predicated of many in quale, accidentally, and necessarily. Which definition we shall explain in the following article. But if the term 'belongs' is the same as 'to be in,' or 'to be fitting,' or 'to be owed,' then the term 'belongs' is taken first intentionally, for that which founds universal predication through the mode of the fourth predicable. And the definition will be reduced to this form: The proper is, that which necessarily follows to some nature, and belongs to it accidentally, but convertibly. And thus we also comprehend the definition of the Philosopher, as it speaks accidental and convertible agreement.

But if you inquire: What is to follow and flow from essence, or to have that as root, and what causality is this flowing?

I respond: This belongs to Metaphysics. But briefly we say that flowing is properly not effective causality, that is, which acts through action; but it has the mode of efficiency. For substance by itself alone without accidents does not properly effect, and therefore the accidents themselves, by which it effects and operates, are said to flow from substance not because they are produced by it, for they are produced by an agent together with the substance itself, yet dependently on the substance itself, of which they are proper passions, and from which they have participation, as secondary and less principal forms from radical and primary; but what is participatively such, depends on that, which is principally and radically such. And such dependence is called flowing, because it is participated from it as from a principle, and thus has a quasi active notion, or reductively active, not formally, insofar as it is a certain participation and connection with nature. Concerning which can be seen St. Thomas, Part 1, question 77, article 6, ad 3; and article 7, ad 1; and Opusculum 48, chapter on the proper, at the end. Can also be seen Cajetan, chapter 7, On Being and Essence, question 16, section "There is added," where he treats how proper passion is caused by subject in the genus of material, efficient and final cause. And we explain more widely in Physics, question 12; and in the book on the soul, question 2.

The arguments are solved.

Against the given division it is argued, to prove that the proper is not divided in it first intentionally accepted and physically, but second intentionally. For the proper, as it is found in the thing, is individual and singular. Either therefore it is proper insofar as singular, or according to itself. If insofar as singular, it is not proper in the fourth mode, since it does not flow from essential principle, but individual. If according to itself, it

does not belong to any singular subject, as proper, but as common, because it belongs to many individuals. Therefore in the thing the proper is never given, but only as to second intention. But if property is taken in the singular, for example this risibility with respect to this individual, for example Peter, such property is individual, concerning which we do not treat at present, but concerning that which is proper to nature, and can be the fourth predicable.

And it is confirmed: Because the proper so divided is said of many, namely that which belongs to all, etc.: therefore not the proper, as it is physically in the thing, but as it is in the intellect. And thus it is the proper logically accepted.

I respond: That the proper, as it is found in the thing, is indeed singular, because nothing except singular is given in the thing, yet it is not proper by reason of singularity of subject, but by reason of nature. And thus it belongs to any singular, as proper not of its singularity, but of nature, which is found in it; just as also predicates constitutive of nature are found in the thing singularized, and are not quidditative and essential by reason of singularity, but by reason of nature, which they constitute essentially in the thing as nature, individually as this. In the same mode passion is related, which flows from nature in the thing.

To the confirmation I respond: That the proper, which is said of many, as to the thing substrate to this predicability of many is found in the thing; as to the mode of predicability, not. Just as also genus and species for second intention are not in the thing, but for nature substrate, they are in the thing, although under another mode. So the proper, as to the relation of property, and the thing itself, which is proper passion, is found in the thing. And this fundamentally has to belong to all, and to be predicated of many; but formal intention of predicability belongs through the intellect; and in this division the very notion of proper according to itself is considered, not intention.

Second it is argued: The divided of this division must be some accident. Either therefore abstracting from fourth and fifth predicable, or determinately fourth, or fifth. If the first, the divided of this division is not proper, but abstracting from proper and common. If the second, therefore we wrongly denied that the divided of this division is the fourth predicable. If the third, how is one of the dividing members the fourth predicable, namely the proper in the fourth mode, which is opposed to the fifth predicable?

It is confirmed: Because the proper in the second mode is common accident; for it belongs to all, but not alone; therefore it in no way pertains to the notion of proper, but is

opposed to it; for of whatever proper intention, whether of first, or second mode, it should not be the intention of the fifth predicable.

I respond: That the divided of this division is not accident as it abstracts from proper and common accident, because in this division division is not considered formally in the notion of predicable fourth or fifth, although in the thing the dividing members are predicated in some of those modes. But the divided is accident, as it can induce and found the conditions of proper, and relation of agreement to something under the formality of property, just as the notion of difference, which is divided into common, proper and most proper, is not difference under the concept of predicable, but under the concept of making to differ. And because that formality of proper, and conditions required for it, are not equally found in every proper, therefore this division is made analogically according to diverse modes of having property.

To the confirmation I respond: That the proper in the second mode, in the genus of predicable and universal pertains to the fifth predicable, because it is simply common accident; yet in the notion of agreement of property and proper physically considered, it takes on the notion of proper not simply, but as to some condition, namely because it belongs to all; nor absolutely, but respectively and comparatively, as being biped absolutely indeed belongs to others than man, yet with respect to quadrupeds, it is proper to man. And in this mode reductively it pertains to the proper in the fourth mode, as to principal analogate. Nor is it inconvenient that it pertain simply to one predicable, and secundum quid and reductively to another, just as rational with respect to Peter and Paul is difference, with respect to this and that rational, it takes on the mode of species.

Finally it is argued against the definition of the proper in the fourth mode: For that particle 'always' does not belong to all proper passions; therefore it is badly placed. The antecedent is proved: For first God can separate proper passion from subject, as quantity from body in the Eucharist, or conserve subject without it, as sun without light; indeed naturally proper passion can be impeded, as downward motion in stone, cold in water, sensitive powers in animal, which nevertheless flow from soul. Finally existence belongs contingently to every creature, nor can it be proper passion, otherwise the same would effect itself, if existence flowed from itself; and yet it belongs per se to form, as roundness to circle, as St. Thomas says, Book 2 Against the Gentiles, chapter 55; and therefore, if form is subsisting, by this very fact it is incorruptible, because existence belongs to it per se; therefore proper passion does not consist in flowing and perseity to subject.

I respond by denying the antecedent. And to the proof: What pertains to separation of proper passion from subject is not the business of logic to dispute; but we admit that real passions can be separated from subject, although modal ones, which consist in mode alone, or which mix some privation or negation required from the part of subject, cannot exist separated, because they are not really distinguished from subject. Because therefore only real ones can be separated, we say that in the definition of proper, which belongs always, the term 'belongs' does not say to exist or to be present to subject; but the term 'belongs' is the same as is owed, or connected, and postulated by subject, although it does not always actually exist in it. And thus St. Thomas is understood, when he says, in the question on Spiritual Creatures, last article, ad 7, that for subject to be without proper passion is not even intelligible, that is not to belong, or not to be connected proper passion. Which agreement we assign in this that subject cannot of itself not exact and postulate that proper passion, so that proper passion can be denied of subject, or not belong to it, although through the first operation of intellect it can be separated from subject; but common accident, which is distinguished from proper, also through the second operation can be denied of subject, with it not destroyed, as St. Thomas well notes, Opusculum 48, chapter on accident; and in Book 1, distinction 26, in exposition of the letter.

To the other part of the argument concerning proper passions, which are impeded. I respond: That, although all proper passions flow from subject, and are connected to it, but not all in the same mode. For some flow absolutely and without any other dependence, than from subject from which they flow, as risibility and intellect from man, transparency from heaven, light from sun. Others flow supposing some connatural state, as it belongs to stone to rest not absolutely, but in center, nor to be moved absolutely, but outside center; and to grace in consummated state to have light of glory, in state of way, faith and hope; and to water to have highest cold in its connatural state; and to animal to have sensitive powers, supposing temperament of organ; and finally, it belongs to heavy to be moved through medium not impeded, but free. We say therefore these passions can be impeded from outside, because they do not flow from subject absolutely, but supposing some state, or something extrinsic. But the first, which flow absolutely from subject, with it posited cannot be impeded naturally. And some properties also belong to subject not determinately, but vaguely, as some figure to quantity, some color to mixed; if however they are properties.

To what is added concerning existence. I respond: With respect to any creature not to have necessary connection, but to belong contingently; otherwise it would belong always and from eternity, on account of connection of eternal truth, when nevertheless it depends

on free efficient, namely God. But it is said to belong per se to form not with logical perseity, which is founded in relation of intrinsic connection, but with physical perseity, which is founded in the thing as produced and as it is subject to physical influx of agent. And existence is said to follow to form as splendor to light, because existence receives determination and specification from form, of which it is, and thus as determined and specified it will be from form; for existence of man, as specificatively it is of man and not angel, follows to form of man, because of itself existence is not determined and specified, but by reason of that whose existence it is. And in form dependent on matter, through segregation of form from matter existence is dissolved, because form is lost, but if it is not dependent on matter, it cannot be taken from form, except through suspension of action of agent, on which alone such form depends, which is to cease through annihilation.

ARTICLE II.
What is the proper fourth predicable, and with respect to what it is taken.

There are two things, which in this fourth predicable, insofar as it is universal, need explanation. First: Whether the notion of the fourth predicable belongs only to the proper in the fourth mode, or also to others. Second: With respect to which inferiors this universality of the fourth predicable belongs to it.

Concerning the first not few doctors think that the intention of the fourth predicable belongs not only to the proper in the fourth mode, but also to the proper in the second mode, or even to all. And the whole foundation seems to be reduced to this because these proper things, at least what is proper in the second mode, are predicated in quale accidentally, and in distinct mode from the fifth predicable, which only says being able to be present and absent, and they belong necessarily, because what is proper in the second mode, as man being biped, belongs to it necessarily, although not alone, therefore it pertains to the fourth predicable.

And it is confirmed: Because there is no accident, which does not flow from some substance, although it can also belong to other subjects, from which it does not flow. Hence St. Thomas, in chapter 7 On Being and Essence, absolutely teaches that all accidents flow from substance. Which is established, because every accident is a certain participation of substance; therefore under that notion, by which it flows from substance, it should pertain to the fourth predicable, although insofar as it is communicated to others, from which it does not flow, it fails from perfect notion of proper.

Nevertheless the opposite must be held. AND I SAY: Only the proper in the fourth mode, or what is reduced to that, is substrate of the intention of the fourth predicable. Which opinion is more common among Thomists, concerning which can be seen Soto, Masius, Arauxo, and others with the Carmelite Course, disputation 8 question 1.

The reason is taken from things determined by the Philosopher, Book 1 of Posterior Analytics, chapter 4, lecture 10, according to St. Thomas. Where assigning four per se modes, and explaining the second, namely when subject is placed in definition of predicate, he says this is the difference between proper and common accident, that, when subject is placed in definition of some predicate, it is proper accident. But if some predicate is not placed in definition of subject, nor subject in definition of predicate, such are common accidents, and are predicated per accidens. But when something is not signified as proper in the fourth mode, which belongs to all alone and always, subject is not placed in definition of the accident itself; as man is not placed in definition of biped, nor swan in definition of white; therefore that is not proper, as it is discerned from the fifth predicable. And that subject is not placed in definition of such predicate is clear: because it is preserved outside that subject, because although it belongs to all, but not alone.

You will say: By this reason it would be proved that risible would not be proper in the fourth mode with respect to Peter and other individuals, because also Peter is not placed in definition of risible, just as neither man in definition of biped.

I respond: That Peter not by reason of singularity, but by reason of specific nature which is in Peter, is placed in definition of risible; for everything which pertains to specific nature of Peter is placed in definition of risible, but not what pertains to singularity of Peter; but not the whole nature of man is placed in definition of biped. And this is the cause that from generic properties proper things in the second mode are made more with respect to species, than from specific ones.

Then, as St. Thomas very well notes, Opusculum 48, chapter on proper, common accidents only have relation to subject, as to material and receptive cause, because material cause as such does not place necessary connection with accidental form. But proper does not regard subject only as receptive cause, but as principle from which it flows, because it has cause of connection with that. Which also St. Thomas notices, Book 1 of Posterior Analytics, in the cited place. Therefore that something be proper fourth predicable, as it is discerned from fifth, it is fitting that subject not only have to receive, but also have to be root of such accident and necessary connection with that. But if it

does not belong to it alone it does not have necessary connection with that, since it is common to others, and cannot have for essential and radical principle diverse essences as they are diverse; therefore that it be fourth predicable it should belong to all alone and always. Hence St. Thomas says, in Book 1, distinction 8, question 1, article 1, ad 1: "When something is said to belong properly from the part of subject, it is fitting that through property everything foreign to nature of subject be excluded, as when it is said proper to man to be risible, because it belongs to no one foreign to nature of man." Therefore what belongs to all, but not alone, belongs to something foreign to nature of subject, and thus does not belong properly.

To the foundations of the opposite opinion I respond: That other proper things, even those which are proper in the second mode, are not predicated necessarily with quasi formal necessity, and intrinsic connection, but with quasi material necessity, or necessity of individual matter, as is taken from St. Thomas, Opusculum 48, chapter on accident, as we shall say concerning inseparable accident, in the following question. But what is predicated necessarily with quasi formal necessity, and from principles of nature, and not only from individual principles and necessity of matter, this is proper fourth predicable. But fifth predicable is said, which can be present and absent, because it does not have intrinsic connection, nor root in proper things of nature, although from some extrinsic cause it cannot be separated as to existence. But in man being biped, if it is proper in the fourth mode with respect to some subaltern grade, with respect to that it will be fourth predicable, and only secundum quid will it be in the second mode of proper, insofar as it is not said convertibly with respect to man.

To the confirmation I respond: All accidents are caused by substance, as St. Thomas says there, but some according to formal principles, and these are proper passions, because they have connection of formal necessity; some from material principles, and these are common accidents, or accidents of individuals, as St. Thomas says there. But those which are caused from formal principles, if they are communicated to another subject, will be common accidents with respect to that, to which they are communicated, as heat with respect to water or wood, but proper with respect to that from which they are caused.

Concerning the second point, namely with respect to which subjects the notion of the fourth predicable belongs: whether with respect to species with which passion is convertible; or truly with respect to inferiors, of which it is said, the reason for doubting is, because proper in the fourth mode neither belongs to individuals necessarily, nor convertibly, therefore with respect to those it is not predicable as proper. The antecedent is clear, because proper does not belong to individual alone, but to others; therefore it

does not have necessary connection with individual insofar as such: nor is it convertible with that, because mutual consequence between individuals and proper is not valid; for although it is valid: Peter exists, therefore risible exists, yet not conversely: Risible exists, therefore Peter exists; therefore it is not related convertibly with individuals.

And it is confirmed: Because proper passions of genus with respect to inferiors are not related as proper in the fourth mode, but second; therefore fourth predicable is not said with respect to inferiors, but with respect to nature with which it is convertible. The antecedent is proved: Because biped is proper passion of animal distinguished against quadrupeds, which is unnamed genus with respect to all bipeds, and yet with respect to man it is proper in the second mode; indeed all common accidents, as whiteness, and blackness, and similar, with respect to some subject are proper in the fourth mode, and yet of singular bodies they are said as common accidents; therefore fourth predicable is not said such with respect to inferiors. And finally a similar argument can be made as above concerning difference, because this predication: Man is risible, is of the fourth predicable, since it does not pertain to another mode of predicating, and is universal, because it is predicated of universal convertibly, namely of man, therefore it is universal of the fourth predicable with respect to species.

I omit reasons for proving that inferiors of proper should not be the proper things themselves singularized, for example with respect to risible, this and that risible, because in similar matter we already resolved this in the preceding question, concerning difference.

To the proposed difficulty therefore I respond according to the said preceding question concerning difference, that proper does not take on the notion of the fourth predicable, except with respect to individuals of the species itself, with which it is convertible. And so as to the metaphysical notion of proper passion, namely the notion of necessary connection and convertibility with that, of which it is proper, it has all this with respect to species with which it is said convertibly, and is rather fourth predicate, than fourth predicable. But as to the notion of fourth logical universal, thus it must necessarily regard inferiors of the species itself, with which it is convertible.

And the reason is, because proper with respect to its singulars, for example, risibility to this and that risibility, is indeed superior and universal, but not in quale, but in quid, as species and individuals. For proper accident also has its quiddity and nature, which it predicates of its inferiors. But with respect to species, or nature, from which proper flows, taken in general, it is indeed predicated in quale, but not as superior, but as equal and

convertibly. Hence concomitantly it will be universal, but not formally with respect to it, since it is not superior with respect to that. Hence when proper is predicated per se, and of all, per se indeed will be said with respect to subject, or nature from which it flows, but of all, with respect to things contained under such nature, as St. Thomas excellently noted, Book 1 of Posterior Analytics, lecture 9, section "He interposes" etc.

To the opposed foundations I respond: To the first, the antecedent is denied. To the proof it is said: Proper to have necessary connection with individuals mediately, and by reason of nature from which it flows, not by reason of individuation to which it is communicated. Similarly it is mutually convertible with those by reason of their nature, not by reason of individuation; but that it is common to many does not remove the notion of proper with respect to nature, because this commonality is not to foreign things, but to individuals of proper nature. Nor is it required that necessary connection be founded in something by reason of all things, which are in it, or contained under it, but by reason of nature, or root, and principle in which it is founded. Hence it is not required that there be mutual consequence between proper of some nature and any individual, but it suffices that between the nature itself and proper there be mutual connection and consequence.

To the confirmation I respond: That those which truly are passions of genus belong to all inferiors as proper in the fourth mode, no less than specific proper things to individuals of such species, as tactile, which is property of animal, and quantity with respect to body, if however it follows to form of body and not only to matter. For that quantity is property of body St. Thomas sufficiently signifies, question on Spiritual Creatures, article 3, ad 18. But others doubt concerning this; concerning which Cajetan, On Being and Essence, chapter 7, question 16, ad 1. Yet this does not regard the present.

But what is said concerning biped, it is not entirely established to be proper in the fourth mode; for it is placed among essential differences by St. Thomas, Book 5 of the Metaphysics, lecture 16, in the beginning, but nevertheless it is absolutely numbered among accidental differences, Book 1 On the Soul, lecture 1, at the end. And it is said to be taken as essential difference, because we use accidental differences better known to us for essential ones.

To what is said concerning other accidents I respond: Not all are proper passions, because not all arise from formal principles of nature; but some arise from material ones, as we said above from St. Thomas, chapter 7 On Being and Essence. And the same he has in Book 1, distinction 17, question 1, article 2, ad 2. And such are not proper passions of

some nature, although from outside they can have cause of inseparability in some subject, as blackness in crow.

But to the argument concerning predication of proper of species, I respond: It is indeed predication of universal thing, but nevertheless not having universality with respect to species, which is equal to it, not inferior; but universal formally is only with respect to inferiors.

Finally note that sometimes proper passion is not determinate accident, but disjunct, as odd or even with respect to number, masculine and feminine with respect to animal, and then each of them determinately is accident, but that disjunct is what belongs per se. Concerning which see St. Thomas, Book 1 of Posterior Analytics, lecture 10, at the end.

QUESTION XII.
ON ACCIDENT THE FIFTH PREDICABLE.

ARTICLE I.
Whether the definitions and divisions of accident are rightly handed down by Porphyry.

We suppose the difference between categorical accident and predicable accident, which consists in this that categorical accident is opposed to substance, which is the first category, and thus only stands for inherent accident; but predicable accident is opposed to essential predicate, and thus whatever does not belong essentially, or necessarily, is called predicable accident, whether it is something real, or of reason, whether inherent, or subsisting.

Therefore at present Porphyry handed down three definitions of accident. The first is: Accident is that which is present, and absent, without corruption of subject. Second: Accident is, that which can be in and not be in the same thing. Third: Accident is, that which is neither genus nor species, nor difference, nor proper, but always belongs to subject. Concerning which two things must be explained in the present article. First: Whether accident is defined here first intentionally, or for second intention of this fifth predicable? Second is: How those particles of definition are to be understood: that which is present, and absent without corruption of subject?

Concerning the first, some think, like Martinez, here on the chapter on accident, that second intention is defined, because something is defined, which belongs to accident through the intellect, not in the thing; for although being present to one and absent from

another really belongs to accident, nevertheless being present and absent from the same subject does not belong in the thing, but through reason, especially to inseparable accident. And others prove from this, because if accident were defined here for first intention, it would not belong to every predicate which can be present and absent; for it would not belong to beings of reason, which are not first intentions, but second, and yet many of those are predicated with predication of the fifth predicable, as when I say: Animal is genus.

NEVERTHELESS I RESPOND: The definition handed down belongs to the substrate, or first intention of this fifth predicable; yet it can be accommodated to second intention by adding something. And we understand for substrate of this fifth predicable not only real first intention, but whatever accidental predicate, even if it is being of reason.

The reason is manifest: Because what these definitions explain, is also found in singular accident and individually accepted; but whatever is found in singulars and descends to those does not pertain only to second intention of predicability and universality, because this does not descend to singulars; therefore here accidental first intention is defined. The major is proved: Because being present and absent in subject also belongs to singular accident, as is clear both in separable accident, which sometimes is present, sometimes absent in singular, without corruption of subject, and in inseparable accident, which also individually accepted does not depend on it the subject, or nature in which it is, although individual conservation sometimes depends; therefore what these definitions explain belongs also to singular accidents.

But if someone wishes to accommodate the definition of accident to second intention of accident, it is fitting to understand the particle "of many," saying that accident is that which is predicated of many, as predicate, which is present and absent besides corruption of subject.

Hence the solution of the contrary foundation is clear. For we say to the first, that being present to one and the same subject, belongs to accident in the thing, both in separable accident itself, and inseparable, because it is connected to subject contingently, and not necessarily. But those words signify nothing other, than contingency of agreement.

To the second it is said that also in beings of reason first intention can be found, as are many negations and privations and extrinsic denominations; also one second intention can be materially substrate, and be denominated accidentally by another second intention. And thus it takes on as it were the mode of first intention with respect to that to which it is substrate.

You will insist: Being present and absent in the aforesaid definition is taken second intentionally, for that which is to be affirmed or denied without corruption of subject; therefore it is handed down through that which is of second intention, namely affirmation and negation.

It is responded first: This does not convince that this definition is handed down through second intention of universality of this fifth predicable, but through second intention of affirming and denying, which pertains to the second operation of intellect. Then it is said that to be affirmed and denied can be taken in both modes both fundamentally which is of first intention, and is found in every accident even singular; and formally for second intention of affirming and denying, as we shall immediately explain.

Concerning the second point, there is controversy among authors, how that particle should be understood: is present and absent, etc. Whether it is understood of real presence and absence, or truly of affirmation and negation. For that it cannot be understood of real presence and absence this seems to convince, because inseparable accident cannot really be present and absent, otherwise it would be separable. But if it is said to be understood second intentionally, for being affirmed and denied, it would follow that every accident is separable, because there is none, which cannot be separated through intellect, even proper itself, without which subject can very well be understood. Nor is this evaded by this, but real presence and absence is supposed, because affirmation and negation is either true, or false. If false, therefore it is false that accident is present and absent without corruption of subject. If true, therefore it is so from the part of the thing, that it is present and absent in the thing, therefore real presence and absence of accident is given.

If it is said that being present and absent is not understood of affirmation and negation through mode of composition, but through mode of simple precision of intellect understanding one without another.

Against this is: Both because this expressly opposes St. Thomas, question on Spiritual Creatures, last article, ad 7; and Opusculum 48, chapter on accident. And because in this mode also proper can be present and absent from subject, namely through simple cognition by precinding, or understanding one without another.

On account of this some have followed a singular way, saying that in this definition it should be understood that the same accident can be present and absent with respect to diverse subjects, within the adequate sphere of those to which it can belong, and thus it belongs to every accident however inseparable; for example, whiteness has many bodies for adequate subject, namely snow, stone, man, etc.; it cannot be absent from total

adequation, yet within that adequation it is absent from some determinate thing but present to some. Thus Martinez, on the chapter on accident.

However this mode of thinking is not true. Both because Porphyry speaks of separable and inseparable accident as of diverse; but in this opinion every accident is inseparable from adequation of all its subjects, but is separable from inadequate subjects. And also because then the sense of definition will be, that accident partly is present and partly absent without corruption of subject. But with respect to which subject? If with respect to total and adequate, it can never be absent from this; if with respect to partial, sometimes some determinate subject is given from which it cannot be absent, as whiteness with respect to snow. Therefore this does not avoid, but increases difficulties. Finally because some accident separable from the whole adequation of its subject can be given; therefore at least with respect to that it suffers the same difficulties, how the definition is to be understood, that it is present and absent without corruption of subject. The antecedent is established; for being a grammarian is accident, and can be separated from every man, as is clear if only there are two men in the world not grammarians; and similarly sleeping is accident which can be separated in such case, if each man were to watch.

THEREFORE IT MUST BE SAID: Through those words, is present and absent without corruption of subject, nothing other is signified, than contingency of accident, which is predicated, and harmlessness of subject in its quiddity from agreement or disagreement of such accident. Which those commonly seem to think who explain the definition of the fifth predicable thus, that it is that, which is said of many in quale contingently. Hence it neither consists in this which is to be present or absent through real presence, or to be affirmed and denied through predication of intellect precisely, but in such foundation of negation or affirmation, that without dissolution of quiddity and nature of subject something accident can agree, or disagree to subject.

Which resolution and explanation must be taken from St. Thomas, question 2 on the Soul, article 12, ad 7, where he resolves the whole difficulty thus: "Three, he says, are genera of accidents, some are caused from principles of species, and are called proper, as risible to man; some are caused from principles of individual, and this is said either which have permanent cause in subject, and these are inseparable accidents, as masculine and feminine, and other similar; but some have cause not permanent in subject, and these are separable accidents, as sitting and walking; but it is common to every accident that it is not of essence of thing, and thus does not fall in definition of thing, hence we understand what quid without this that we understand some of its accidents. But species cannot be understood without accidents, which follow principle of species, yet it can be understood

without accidents of individual even inseparable; but without separable ones not only species can be, but also individual." Thus the Holy Doctor.

From whose doctrine we gather that that particle: is present and absent without corruption of subject, is the same as saying: It belongs to subject without dissolution of quiddity and nature of it in essential predicates. But that accident is separable, or inseparable, is not taken with respect to species and nature of subject, but with respect to individuals in which sometimes it has permanent cause, sometimes transient. And thus accident can agree, or be absent from subject with corruption of individual, yet not with corruption of species, but with harmlessness of that. In which it is distinguished from proper, which if it is absent, that is if it does not agree, nor is connected with species, species is dissolved. And from this it is established that individual can depend in its conservation and existence, indeed in individuation itself, on accidents; but species and quiddity depends on no accident. And thus whatever affirmation or negation, agreement or disagreement of accident to subject is always without corruption, but with harmlessness of quiddity.

And note well that that being present and absent is not taken here for that which is to inhere, or not inhere, for that belongs to categorical accident alone, but is taken for that which is to agree, or disagree accidentally. Nor do we deny that the terms 'being present and absent,' signify being affirmed or denied, but not only this, but also the foundation of that, which is to agree, or not agree to specific nature without this that it dissolve essential connection of its predicates. From which it follows that it can be affirmed or denied with harmlessness of quiddity in subject; and in this consists contingency of accident in agreeing, or disagreeing to subject.

To the opposed foundations it is said to the first: That inseparable accident cannot be present and absent according to real absence and presence with respect to individual, in order to which this distinction of separable and inseparable is taken. Yet with respect to species, or quiddity, in the subject itself it can be present and absent, that is agree, or disagree without destruction of subject in its quiddity, although it is destroyed in its existence.

To the second it is said: That every accident can be separated from the species itself, or quiddity, granted; from the individual itself and its existence, which follows individuation, I deny: because it can have permanent cause in that; but separable and inseparable is said in accidents with respect to subject from the part of individuation, but being present and absent without corruption of subject with respect to quiddity. And thus it can be understood of being present and absent really, and being affirmed and denied

truly without corruption of subject from the part of quiddity, although not without corruption from the part of individuation, or existence, which follows individuation. Or second being present and absent is taken conditionally, that is whether accident is present or absent, this will be done without corruption of subject from the part of quiddity.

But if you insist: Because separation, or agreement with respect to species, as it is distinguished from individual, is second intention of reason, because species is not distinguished from individual except through reason, therefore this definition is understood second intentionally.

I respond: That by name of species we do not understand the state itself of abstraction from individuals, but specific nature itself, which is also found in individuals, hence we rather use the name of quiddity, saying that accident is present and absent without corruption of quiddity even individually taken in subject.

Yet still you will inquire: How through this accident is distinguished from proper, since also proper can be understood and separated from essence without corruption of its quiddity, since it is outside definition of that?

I respond from St. Thomas, question on Spiritual Creatures cited, last article, ad 7, where he says: "That there is double operation of intellect, one by which it understands what quid is, and by such operation essence of thing can be understood both without proper, and without accident, since neither of them enters essence of thing. Another is operation of intellect dividing and composing, and thus substance can be understood without accidental predicate, even if according to thing it is inseparable, as crow can be understood white; for there is no repugnance of concepts there, since the opposite of predicate does not depend from principles of species, which is signified by name placed in subject. But by this operation of intellect substance cannot be understood without proper; for it cannot be understood that man is not risible, or triangle does not have three angles equal to two right angles; for here there is repugnance of concepts, because the opposite of predicate depends from nature of subject." Thus St. Thomas. From which is gathered not only solution of argument, but also that, although proposition in which inseparable accident is denied of subject and in which proper is denied, both are false, because it is not so in the thing, nevertheless falsity of one destroys more than of another. For from this that inseparable accident is denied to agree quiddity is not destroyed; but if proper passion is denied to agree and be rooted in nature, essence is destroyed. Which however does not remove that God can in fact separate proper passion from subject, not as to agreement, but as to existence.

You will say: Death is accidental predicate with respect to animal, and yet it not only corrupts individual, but also nature, because concept of nature of animal is not compatible with concept of death; therefore some accident is given which destroys subject, even as to quiddity. And I omit this predicate "existing," which is said indeed contingently of created being, and yet is not absent without corruption of it, however absence of existence does not induce corruption of quiddity, as conjunction of death, when it is predicated.

I respond: That that predicate death, either can be taken for death in completed being, or in becoming, as when man gives up soul, he is said to die. If it is taken in this second mode, it is accidental predicate with respect to man, and is verified for that time in which he approaches death, nor does it remove essence of man, but supposes it, but disposes to corruption. If it is taken in the first mode, thus it is not predicate of the fifth predicable: Man is dead, because with respect to man it is repugnant predicate, with respect to corpse it is essential predicate. And thus the term 'man' is alienated in that proposition from that predicate dead, and stands for man not living, who is equivocally man; thus it is essential proposition. But if it is not alienated, but remains in its proper signification the term 'man,' thus the predicate is not verified of subject, but repugns to it, and thus does not pertain to the fifth predicable. But if it is taken through ampliation, so that the sense is: Man is dead, that is: Who was man is dead, thus also the proposition is essential, because that which was man now is corpse, and thus such predicate belongs to it essentially. Some also say this proposition is verified through synecdoche, that is by reason of part, because body, which is dead, is the same, which was in man, by reason of matter.

Finally you will inquire: Whether every accident is proper passion with respect to some subject, to which it follows?

Some respond affirmatively. But it is truer that not all accidents are proper passions, nor follow from formal principles of nature, but some follow to material and individuating principles; which is express opinion of St. Thomas, chapter 7 On Being and Essence; and in Book 1, distinction 17, question 1, article 1, ad 2; and Book 1 of Posterior Analytics, lecture 14. And it is manifestly established in some accidents, which do not immediately follow to substance, but to some other accidents, as immanent acts, representing species, supernatural habits, and in bodies beauty, health, sickness and similar, which are accidents contingently agreeing, and not necessarily, nor from principles of nature. And such accidents first belong to individuals than to species; on the contrary however proper passions first belong to species than to individuals, although as to inherence they are first substrate by individuals, which are first substance.

And if you say: That everything which belongs per accidens must be reduced to that which belongs per se. I respond: That it is reduced to that which is per se not as to necessary connection with some subject from which it flows, but as to efficient, or final causality, because it is not caused per accidens by some cause, but per se; for it is not necessary that everything which belongs per accidens be reduced to every mode per se, but it suffices that to some, as is to causality per se, although not to connection per se with subject.

ARTICLE II.
How accident is said to be the fifth predicable, and with respect to which inferiors.

Three things must be treated briefly in this article. First: How accidental predicate is verified of subject, whether by reason of name, or by reason of thing, which inheres to it? Second: With respect to which inferiors the fifth predicable is said, whether with respect to its singulars, as white with respect to this and that white; or with respect to subjects? Third: Whether the fifth predicable is predicated only with respect to existing subjects, or also with respect to possible ones?

To the first some affirm that, when accident is predicated of subject, naked name is predicated; for the Philosopher says, chapter 5, in Antecategories, that of those things, which are in subject, nothing prevents name from being predicated of subject, but it is impossible for notion to be predicated. The reason of which is, because predication through substantive verb speaks identity of predicate with subject, but this is not given between subject, which is substance, and accident.

Nevertheless the opposite must be said entirely, namely that in these accidental predications not name itself is predicated, but thing signified through name, yet denominatively. And this opinion fails greatly, because it does not distinguish that denomination is made in two ways: first from the part of name, as white from whiteness; second from the part of form signified, even if they do not participate in the same name, as from office this name "officious" is derived, not as to name, but as to thing signified from effect, or diligence, hence it does not predicate name, but thing; and it is manifestly established that, when I say Peter is white, I do not verify this by reason of name, but by reason of thing signified; for if that name is verified of Peter, it is fitting that it be verified by reason of its signified, not by reason of voice itself; for it would be ridiculous to say that Peter is that voice white, but signified is thing itself, namely having whiteness; therefore this is predicated and verified in these accidental predications. And this is what

we intend to signify through these predications, namely that those accidents belong and agree to those subjects, not truly only names.

And we said more of these above, question 5, treating of predication of accidental concretes.

Hence to the contrary foundation I respond: The common exposition of Aristotle is that accidents are said of subject according to name, and not according to notion, that is not quidditatively, but denominatively, because there the term 'notion' signifies essence, but essence of accident does not belong to essence of subject; otherwise if they were predicated only according to name, and not according to thing signified, they would only be common as to name, and not as to thing, and so would be equivocal.

To the argument from reason I respond: That accident is the same according to thing with subject, with denominative and concretive identity, not essential and intrinsic, because, as St. Thomas says, Part 1, question 13, article 12: "In true affirmative proposition it is fitting that predicate and subject signify the same according to thing in some mode (note according to thing, and not according to name), because also in accidental predicates predicate and subject are the same in supposition." Therefore accident in concrete, for example white, because it says having whiteness, by reason of the term 'having' is the same with subject. And because other is predication through identity, other through denomination, as St. Thomas says, in Book 3, distinction 5, in exposition of letter, we indeed concede that for every predication some identity is required, but denominative and accidental suffices, as is found between accident in concrete and subject, but it is not necessary that it be complete and essential.

Concerning the second difficulty I respond: The inferiors of the fifth predicable are the subjects themselves, of which it is said denominatively and accidentally, not the things themselves constituted from accident and subject, of which it is said per se and quidditatively; for example white will be predicated essentially of this and that white, but as fifth predicable of subjects in which it is, whether they are distinguished among themselves in species, or not. And the reason is manifest: Because the fifth predicable is predicated in quale accidentally; therefore it is fitting that its inferiors be those to which it is compared in quale accidentally only with respect to subjects is it compared in this mode, because it belongs to them accidentally, and through mode of form actuating and qualifying. But with respect to proper inferiors, as white with respect to this and that white, it is predicated essentially, because it speaks their whole quiddity. Therefore when white speaks whiteness in concrete, either it can regard inferiors of whiteness itself,

which are inferiors from the part of form, or inferiors from the part of subject, which is connoted by white. If it regards inferiors of form, it is said essentially of them, because just as this and that whiteness essentially participates whiteness, so this and that white essentially participates white from the part of form. But if inferiors from the part of subject are considered, thus they accidentally participate the notion of white, and consequently with respect to those it is predicated in quale accidentally, which is the fifth predicable.

But you will object: White, for example, cannot be universal with respect to Peter and Paul, unless it abstracts from them, not as they are subjects, but as they are white; therefore the subjects themselves according to themselves are not inferiors of this predicable. The consequence is clear. Because those are inferiors, from which it abstracts; therefore if it does not abstract insofar as subjects, but insofar as white, insofar as white they will be inferiors. The antecedent is proved: Both because abstraction of accident from subject, as subject is, is formal abstraction, for form abstracts from matter; but universal abstraction should be total. And also because this universal, which is the fifth predicable, should abstract from inferiors, insofar as they are similar, or insofar as they agree in something, and not insofar as they agree accidentally. But they agree accidentally in white, insofar as they are white, therefore white in general abstracts from those insofar as white.

And it is confirmed: Because the subjects themselves are inferiors to white per accidens, because Peter and Paul are identified in white per accidens; therefore with respect to these subjects white is universal and predicable per accidens, and so is not one of the species of predicables, because predicables are universals per se.

I respond: That white can abstract in both modes, both from this and that white, and from its subjects. But from subjects in two ways: In one mode as physical form from subject and as abstract from concrete; in another mode as denominative from denominated. If abstraction is made as form from subject, or as abstract from concrete, it will be formal abstraction, nor then will white be abstracted, but whiteness. But this is not predicated of subject, because it is signified as part with respect to whole which is white. But if abstraction is made as denominative from denominated, thus white is abstracted as fifth predicable from this and that subject, which is inferior to white itself from the part of connoted, not from the part of form; and thus for formal abstraction it is required that accident not be abstracted in concrete, but in abstract and as form from matter; but if white is abstracted in concrete, it is related through mode of total abstraction, and compared to subjects is fifth predicable, compared to inferiors of form is quidditative.

And thus also you will understand that that, which is present and absent according to physical inherence, is not white, but whiteness; but that which is present and absent according to denomination is white in concrete.

To the second proof it is said: That white is not abstracted from Peter and Paul, or other subjects insofar as formally white (for thus they are inferiors of form imported by white), but insofar as denominatively, or rather insofar as denominable by white. And as such they agree in white accidentally, or denominatively, and white is contained in them, not formally, but denominatively, because thus they are considered not as formally white subjects, but as denominable by white, and thus they agree in something, which is extrinsic to them, namely in white, and consequently are inferiors to that accidentally, as to fifth predicable.

To the confirmation I respond: That inferiors are subjects per accidens from the part of thing which is subjected, but intention of subjectibility and predicability per se is true intention of predicating and subjecting, as is required for universality. And so intention of the fifth predicable per se is intention of universal, and per se postulates inferiors; but not inferiors which have perseity in nature and form which is predicated, but contingency. And thus to that which is predicated accidentally of many universality belongs per se, or respect to many, just as to opinion per se belongs to be concerned with contingent propositions, and to freedom per se belongs to operate contingently.

Concerning the third difficulty. It is established as certain that accidental predicates, to actually exercise affirmative predication, require as condition existence of subject. The reason is, because in accidental predications the verb "is" is not absolved from time; therefore it is verified dependently on existence of extremes, and with subject not existing it is not verified. And I understand that existence is required as predication will be past for past things, and future for future things.

But the difficulty is: Whether not only exercise of accidental predication, but also universality itself, which is aptitude for predicating accidentally, only regards existing inferiors? And some affirm, moved by this reason, because non-existing subjects cannot be regarded by accident, except through mode of possible things, in which it can possibly be; but possible existence is not predicated accidentally, but essentially, as if you say: Adam possibly walks, or possibly is white; therefore universality of the fifth predicable does not regard possible things.

And it is confirmed: Because with respect to non-existing subjects predication is rendered impossible, since it is contingent, which requires existence as condition: but if predication is impossible, universality, or predicability cannot be given.

Nevertheless the opposite seems truer: universality of the fifth predicable is not destroyed from destruction alone of existence of subjects, because universality consists in aptitude as much as is from the part of nature, that it be predicated of many. But that those many are not given in fact, is not intrinsic impediment of that aptitude, nor is opposed to it, but only is opposed to exercise itself of predication. But what is opposed to act, or exercise does not destroy aptitude and potency, for opposition to act is not opposition to potency.

And it is confirmed in physical and real accident: That from this that it is separated from subject it does not lose aptitude for inhering in that, because this follows nature of accident; therefore similarly concrete accident metaphysically considered does not lose power that it be predicated of many contingently, because this ability is not removed from defect of existence of subjects, but only application of them, that it be in those.

You will say: The notion of concrete is removed, because every subject is destroyed, which it can concern, and thus only accident remains in abstract.

But against: Because only singular subjects are destroyed through defect of existence, but subject in general can still be conceived; but concrete of accident in general is not singular subject, but subject accepted in general, just as white as such does not have for subject of its concretion only this, or that body, but body in general.

To the opposed foundation I respond: That accident with respect to non-existing subjects only has possible respect, that it belong to them. However this existence, and possible respect is not that which is predicated, but condition from the part of predicable thing. And if possibility itself were predicated, it would not be predicated accidentally, but essentially of subject. For every modal proposition, if it is true, is essential proposition. And thus the examples brought proceed. But we say that accident in general, with existence of subjects removed, has aptitude that it be predicated of them contingently, not as to possibility by predicating it, but as to form, which can contingently agree when subjects will have existed.

So in one word: Possibility as predicated makes proposition essentially; but possibility from the part of subjects, of which accidental form can be predicated, does not make predication essential, but leaves it with its aptitude and potency, that it can be predicated contingently, although its exercise cannot be done without existence of subjects.

To the second foundation it is said: That such predication is impossible to non-existing subjects, not from defect of accident according to itself, but from defect of application from the part of subjects, just as separated accident retains possibility of inhering, although it does not actually inhere, nor is applied with such state remaining.

BOOK OF CATEGORIES.

From this book the beginning of peripatetic doctrine is taken, whose author and chief is Aristotle. But who he was, and whence he drew origin, or how he passed his life, is not our concern, who have not woven the history of this man, but explain doctrine. Therefore Aristotle initiated the principles of Logic, and of his whole doctrine, from this book, led by this reason, because hence Logic begins direction of works of reason from the part of matter of its art. For since its proper office is to direct three operations of reason, of which the first is simple operation, which apprehends simple things, it is fitting that Logic first apply hand to this operation. And although this operation, because simple, does not seem per se to need regulation, just as neither simple vision of external power, nevertheless, as Cajetan well notices, in prologue to this book, from the part of its object, or proposition of its object it greatly needs ordering, because things proceed from senses to intellect very much involved and confused; for for example, through eyes colored is proposed with figure, quantity, relation, substance, motion, and six hundred others, which are presented together involved: but that intellect arrive at quiddity of things, and know how to form definitions, and from definitions elicit properties through demonstrations, it was fitting to segregate these things, and distribute into their genera as it were into classes, which we call categories, in Greek categories, that is series, or coordinations of superior and inferior predicates in each genus, and class, that thence we assign to each thing its own proper essential predicates, and properties.

Therefore this book considers simple genera of things, by segregating and discerning them; not because it considers their natures, which belongs to metaphysician, but coordination of superior and inferior predicates, which is logician's business. But this is not consideration of Logic from the part of form and prioristic resolution, but from the part of matter and posterioristic resolution in this art, as we have often noted; and therefore simple concepts, which in this book from the part of object segregable and distinguishable into various genera the Philosopher considered, again in the book Peri Hermeneias, where he treated of speech and proposition, he undertakes to consider according to relation of parts of speech, namely of name and verb, or simple, diction, and term, as we said in Part 1, in Summulae, and St. Thomas wisely notices, in beginning of Book 1 Peri Hermeneias.

Therefore about to treat of these genera, or categories, by which all created things are distributed and contained, Aristotle divided the whole book into three principal parts. The first is called Antecategories, and is as it were the head of book, and contains four chapters, in which Aristotle treats of certain necessary and requisite things for the notion of categorical being, and for its coordination in its genera; for example, because categories, or supreme genera contain above themselves only analogous, or equivocal things, and below themselves contain only univocal things, but considering comparatively one category to another they are related denominatively, therefore it was necessary to premise as it were antecategories concerning equivocals, univocals, denominatives, and concerning other rules requisite for coordination of categories, as we explained question 13 following, article 1.

The second part is called Categories, as it were the body itself of book, where through five following chapters up to chapter 9, inclusively he explains ten genera, or categories, to which he reduces all created beings knowable and distinguishable by simple concept, namely substance, quantity, relation, quality, action, passion, where, position, when, habit, or clothing.

In the third part, as it were in clausula of whole book, he treats of Postcategories, that is of certain modes, which either follow to all, or to many genera, and are like certain general passions, just as antecategories are certain prerequisites and preambles for founding categories, or coordination of them. But these modes are five, namely opposition, prior, simultaneous, motion, having, and are handed down in five chapters. The reason of which is because, since ten genera are distinguished for discerning and coordinating all things, opposition necessarily follows, on which distinction is founded. Also coordination follows prior and posterior, and similarly admits simultaneity of some things, at least in time, just as prior and posterior is given in order, causality and nature. And these three, namely opposition, prior and simultaneous, follow all genera. But motion, or change, per se follows to four genera, namely substance, which is changed by generation, quantity, which by augmentation, quality, which by alteration, where, which by local motion. But per accidens all other genera are moved to change of these. Finally all genera, which are accidents, either have something, that is properties and accidental predicates, or are had by substance, which receives them, and thus having follows to all genera, either actively, or passively. And these are the things, which summarily are treated in this work.

But whether principally in this book the Philosopher treats of things signified, or of voices signifying, or concepts? Many ask. But the thing is not of great moment. For he

treats of things not according to their nature, for thus it belongs to Metaphysician, but as they found intentions of coordinability, by which superior and inferior predicates are ordered in their genera, and of voices and concepts, as expressing ordered and distinct things; for thus Logic treats of signified things, which also orders concepts and voices, which it uses as instruments for coordinating things by simple operation in categories, by composition truly in propositions, by discourse in syllogisms. Hence it does not treat here of voices and concepts otherwise, as instruments ordering categories, than there, as ordering propositions, and syllogisms.

Summary of chapter 1, on equivocals, etc.

This chapter contains three definitions. The first is of equivocals, in this mode: Equivocals are said to be those things, of which the name is common, but the notion of substance accommodated to the name is diverse; as dog is said of animal and of star, man, of true and painted. The second definition is of univocals, and has thus: Univocals are said to be those, of which the name is common, and the notion of substance accommodated to the name is the same; as man with respect to Peter and Paul. The third definition is of denominatives: Denominatives are said to be those, which have appellation of name from something, differing only in case; as from grammar grammarian is denominated. These definitions are handed down concerning equivocal equivocated things, and univocal univocated things, that is signified things, not names signifying equivocally, or univocally; therefore it is placed in definition "are said," not "signify," or "are."

Summary of chapter 2, on complex things, etc.

This chapter contains two parts. The first contains two divisions. The second contains one definition. The first division is of those things, which are said: Some things are said complexly, as "Man runs"; some incomplexly, as man, stone, etc. The second division of those things which are, or: Of categorical things some are said of subject, and are in no subject, that is inhere, as universal substances, which are predicated, or said of inferiors, but do not inhere. Some are in subject, and are not said of subject, as singular accidents. Others neither are in subject, nor are said of subject, as singular substances. In the second part he places definition of those things, which exist in subject: "I say that to be in subject, which is in something not as part, but cannot be separate from that, in which it is."

Summary of chapter 3, on rules.

He hands down two rules, which serve for knowing lines of categories, both as to progress from superiors to inferiors, which pertains as it were to depth, or height of category, and as to progress to those things, which are placed to the sides, namely differences, which pertains as it were to breadth. First rule: When anything is predicated of anything as of subject, those things which are said of predicate, are also said of subject; as if man is said of Peter, and animal is said of man, also animal is said of Peter, and again what is said of animal, will be said of man and of Peter.

Second rule: When genera are not subalternly posited, that is one coordinated under another, their differences are diverse; but when they are subalternly posited, differences can be the same; as animal, which is in substance, and science, which is in quality, do not have the same differences, but well animal and body, which are in the same coordination.

Summary of chapter 4.

He does two things in this chapter. First he divides those things which are incomplex, or simple into ten categories, namely substance, quantity, etc., which we numbered above. Second he proves these voices to be simple, because every speech is either true, or false, but none of these incomplex voices is true or false, therefore it is not complex but simple.

QUESTION XIX.
ON THE SIX LAST CATEGORIES.

ARTICLE I. Whether these categories are absolute or relative forms, or extrinsic denominations.

Cajetan notices that there are four opinions concerning the quidditative notion of these categories, on this chapter concerning the six last categories. Some said these categories signify something absolute with respect, for example, where signifies place with respect to the located thing. Others say they consist only in extrinsic denomination, as the located thing is denominated from place; and St. Thomas favors this, in Book 3 of Physics, lecture 5. Others say they consist only in respect. But because relation is another category from these, they are divided in explaining how these categories are distinguished from that of relation. And some say the category of relation is founded on absolute things, both spiritual and corporeal; but these categories are founded on respective modes and only corporeal ones. Others distinguish relations into those coming intrinsically, or extrinsically: and they call the first those, which with extremes posited in act necessarily

arise, and these pertain to the category of relation. They call the second those, which with extremes posited in act do not immediately result; and in these they place the six last categories; for example, with generator and generated posited, the relation of father and son necessarily results; but with agent and patient posited, even when approximated, action does not necessarily result, as in contingent or free agents.

For resolution it must be distinguished that there is a twofold extrinsic denominating thing. One, which immediately denominates by itself without any change, as from vision a thing is denominated seen. Another, which denominates by means of some explication and mode of itself to another, from which change or application something as it were changed is necessarily left in that to which it is adjacent, or on which it depends, which some explain through respect, others through mode. For truly that mode, or change is not something absolutely complete from outside, but dependent on that, although it is not to that as to term, for this is proper to relation according to being; and thus the principal denominating thing is the extrinsic form itself as it were originatively, but applicatively it is that mode, by which it is applied to informing. Hence it comes that sometimes Authors attribute this denomination to extrinsic form, sometimes to the mode itself left from its adjacency, just as sometimes habit is called the extrinsic clothing itself, sometimes something intermediate between clothing and clothed, as we shall see below.

LET THE CONCLUSION THEREFORE BE: The six last categories do not consist in extrinsic denomination, nor in relation according to being, even if it is said to come extrinsically, but in the mode left of extrinsic application, by which it depends in denominating.

This conclusion is of many authors, and is taken from St. Thomas, both in Opusculum 48, treatise on six principles, where he denies these categories consist in respect, otherwise they would be of the category of relation, and because in Book 5 of the Metaphysics, lecture 15, he says these last categories are determined to some genus of natural things, and lecture 17, he adds that they are something following from relation rather than causing relation. Hence it is inferred that he neither constitutes them in relation, nor in purely extrinsic denomination, because this is not a genus of natural things. But specially concerning habit he teaches that it is intermediate between clothing and clothed, Part 1-2, question 49, article 1; and Book 5 of the Metaphysics, lecture 20, from the Philosopher. Therefore if it is intermediate, and not relation, nor purely extrinsic denomination, it remains that it is some mode left. The same he insinuates concerning where and when, in Book 4, distinction 16, question 3, article 1, question 1, treating of circumstances. But

concerning action and passion, how it speaks something in agent and patient, we shall say more widely in Book 2 of Physics, God willing.

The reason of this, as to the first part that they are not pure extrinsic denomination, is taken from this that such extrinsic denomination, as it extrinsically touches denominated things, does not speak any real nature, since it places nothing in them, but as it truly holds itself from the part of denominating form, which is intrinsic in another subject, it is already supposed to be in its category, as vision as it is act of eye has its category, for example, of quality. Therefore it cannot again be placed in another category by reason of extrinsic denomination, both because that denomination as extrinsic does not add new real nature, therefore nor new reason of being placed in another category; and finally because form itself, by reason of information and intrinsic denomination, is not placed in another category distinct from form, because form and information do not speak two categories. Therefore much less by reason of formation, or extrinsic denomination, which is much lesser, since it adds no reality above form.

As to the second part, concerning relation according to being even coming extrinsically, it is proved first: because that relation comes extrinsically, or intrinsically, and necessarily results with extremes posited, or does not result, does not vary the essential notion of relation, because it changes nothing of its definition, which consists only in this that its whole being is to another; but this is preserved in both relations; therefore there is no reason why this second, if it is true relation and this definition belongs to it, should be excluded from the category of relation. But if this definition is not preserved in that, it will not be relation according to being but according to saying. Second, because it is false that with foundation and term posited in these extrinsic relations, if foundation is proximate, relation does not immediately result. For the reason of founding action and passion is not only position of thing which is agent, and thing which is patient, and application of both, but beyond this position of effect is required; for from that agent is denominated, and from body not anyhow, but circumscribing, where is denominated, and from clothing as surrounding the clothed is denominated. But with circumscription posited where necessarily follows, and with effect posited denomination of action necessarily follows, no less than with double white posited relation of similarity follows, because not only extremes are posited, but also proximate foundation, which is agreement; but with proximate foundation removed, however much extremes are posited, relation also does not result. And therefore the response of authors of opposite opinion is not valid that, with both referable extremes posited in intrinsic relations, for example, double white, relation cannot be impeded, but with both extremes posited in extrinsic relations, for example, agent and patient, relation does not immediately follow. For in this

there is not equal comparison because, when double white is posited, remote and proximate extremes of relation are posited, for identity also is posited, or agreement, which is proximate foundation. But truly agent and patient, even when applied are only remote extremes, for proximate reason of denominating agent is position of effect (for without this neither term is given, and consequently nor action), not only application of patient; but with effect posited that denomination is not impedible.

But that these categories are not formally relations, but those modes left from some adjacency of extrinsic thing, is clear because none of them formally consists in to as to. For action is from another as emanation, passion in something as change, where in place absolutely, position in place with disposition of parts, when in time, habit in clothing from adjacency of clothing. Therefore none formally regards pure term in notion of to, which relation essentially seeks, whether it comes intrinsically, or extrinsically; but only depends on something extrinsic in denominating, by reason of which they are not entirely absolute modes, although they are absolute from term.

The arguments are solved.

First it is argued by authority of St. Thomas, Book 3 of Physics, lecture 5, where he affirms that these last six categories are taken from extrinsic mode of predicating, and thus he proceeds there, showing that they are extrinsic denominations. And in the same mode he speaks Book 5 of the Metaphysics, lecture 9, in collection of categories. Similarly he teaches that local motion is terminated to something extrinsic, namely to place, as Part 1, question 110, article 3; therefore against St. Thomas it is denied that they are extrinsic denominations.

It is confirmed: Because that which formally denominates in these categories is something extrinsic, although its application places some extrinsic mode, not which is form, but which is application of form: otherwise St. Thomas is not preserved when he says these do not denominate intrinsically, nor is something intrinsic acquired, when those are acquired. And it is established that place in where, and time in when concur to these denominations, not effectively, nor in another genus of cause than formal; therefore it is simply extrinsic denomination, because that it is extrinsic, must be taken not from application, but from form.

I respond: St. Thomas speaks, according to the distinction placed above, of that which extrinsically denominates by means of some mode, or intrinsic change, not purely extrinsically, as we said these categories denominate. And similarly he teaches that local

motion acquires something extrinsic, to the difference of motion of alteration and augmentation, which produce some form purely intrinsically denominating, but local motion acquires place, which is not understood without extrinsic thing, nor denominates, although it leaves where intrinsic.

And to the confirmation I respond: That denominating form is not only extrinsic form as it remains extrinsically, but as it leaves from its exterior adjacency some change in the thing, which is not only application and condition, but reason of denominating with order and essential dependence on extrinsic thing concurring to denomination itself. And so if form by means of inherence informs, intrinsic form results in the notion of informing. If by means of some mode, which is not inherence, but change left from adjacency, it is form not purely intrinsically denominating, nor purely also intrinsically, but extrinsic thing by means of intrinsic change, which is denominating reason. But if it denominates, with all inherence and mode of changing removed, it is purely extrinsic denomination, as vision denominates seen thing.

Second it is argued: These six last categories, as to their intrinsic notion, speak respect to something extrinsic as existing, so that with its existence removed denomination is removed, as with effect removed action is removed, and with place and clothing removed where and habit are removed: therefore they are not transcendental relations because they depend on existence of term, nor entirely absolute things, because they depend on something extrinsic.

It is confirmed: For if they are absolute entities, they necessarily have being through action, when they are newly made, and thus to action there would be given action; indeed the subject of action and passion would not be assignable, because if action were in agent, agent would be changed according to absolute form for acting, and patient could not immediately suffer from form, for example, quality, or quantity, but would immediately suffer from that absolute form, which is passion.

I respond: these categories depend on some extrinsic existing thing, not as on term, as relation according to being, but as on principle and form from which it originates, or around which denomination is concerned; and this respect is according to saying, or transcendental, because although it depends on existence of that extrinsic thing, that it actually existingly denominate, nevertheless because it essentially and per se depends on such extrinsic thing, as where on place, action on effect, etc., therefore that relation is called transcendental and according to saying. But relation according to being does not

consist in this alone that it depends on existence of term that it actually exist, which is common to others, but that it is to that only as to pure term.

To the confirmation I respond that it is not necessary that per se action be given to every absolute entity, when either it is action itself, or some mode, or reason essentially connected, or following to something prior, as subsistence, union, and other modes, indeed also proper passions. And yet to where per se local motion is given in these categories. But in Scotus's opinion, who posits that to extrinsic relations, which are these categories, per se action is given, it manifestly follows that either to action per se action is given, or action is not relation coming extrinsically, or such relation does not require action beyond position of foundation and term.

To the last part of argument concerning subject of action, we refer to Book 3 of Physics that difficulty to be treated, whether it is in patient or in agent; and for present we only say that, since denomination of this category of action is taken from effect produced as from something extrinsic, as St. Thomas teaches in Book 3 of Physics, lecture 5, and Opusculum 48, treatise on action; and will be seen in the following article, it is not difficult to understand that effect denominates agent by means of egression itself, which leaves agent itself determined and applied, not for acting through mode of virtue, but in second act agent; just as place by means of where leaves located thing subject to itself, and similarly passion is mode, by which form itself inhering, as proceeding from agent, changes patient not by means of another form, but by means of another mode of form. And thus quantity, or quality in notion of form are immediately received, although something follows in notion of mode.

ARTICLE II.
What is categorical action and passion.

Almost all things, which can be disputed concerning quiddity of action and passion, must be treated in Book 3 of Physics: concerning subject of action, concerning distinction of transient and immanent, and concerning specification of action from term, or from principle. But at present it is only fitting to see how this category is constituted, insofar as it depends on something extrinsic in its denomination.

It is therefore to be supposed that, beyond operating supposition and principle, or operative power, in the very exit, or process of effect from cause there is also found proceeding effect, and motion or change by which it proceeds, and relation which effect founds to cause and cause to effect. But neither effect, nor relation suffice to constitute

cause in act of agent, but further some formality is required, which is called second act, which both regards cause itself as from that, and term or effect, as to that, not only regarding, but changing or producing, hence it is not absolved from something extrinsic. And this is called causality of efficient cause. For effect does not suffice, because this is the caused thing itself in completed being, not reason of causing. Not motion, because this is effect itself in becoming, and just as effect in completed being is not reason of causing, so neither in becoming. Hence motion under concept of motion is postcategory, and denominates moved thing, not agent, which is done by this category. Nor finally is it relation, because this is founded in action and effect produced, and thus supposes action. Therefore it remains that it is that second act, by which cause is actually causing.

But as St. Thomas notices, Opusculum 48, chapter 1, on action, second act can be compared to first either according to relation of having form, or according to relation of passing, or emitting form from itself, which is done through transient action, for example, to be hot is the same as to have heat in act, to exist the same as to have existence, but to heat is the same as to produce heat. But second act as emitting, as emitting or producing, is what specially pertains to this category, as St. Thomas says there. For second act of having pertains to any form whatever, which gives being formally. And I say producing, whether thing is newly made in being, or newly united, or changed in any way, although it is not newly made.

From which two things follow concerning action, and two others concerning passion. It follows first concerning action that, although action goes out from agent and speaks notion of to, nevertheless agent is not denominated in virtue of egression of action, but in virtue of egression of effect, which goes out by means of action. For as long as effect does not go out, action alone does not denominate agent, that is producing, for it should produce something; so that without extrinsic thing from which denomination of agent is derived, second act does not denominate in genus of action; and thus in God action does not go out from power, but effect, as St. Thomas teaches Part 1, question 25, article 1, but second act is the same with power, and yet God is not denominated agent unless when effect is produced. And because effect itself as proceeding, whether it subsists in itself, or inheres in patient, is something extrinsic to agent, therefore this denomination of acting is said to be made from something extrinsic, as St. Thomas says, cited Opusculum 48, and Physics, lecture 5; and the author of six principles defines action: "That it is form or act, according to which that which is subjected (that is patient) is denominated to act." But egression itself of effect from agent leaves in agent sufficient determination and mode, or application, by which such denomination is made from effect produced. It follows second that immanent action, as immanent, is not formally action of this category, but virtually,

insofar as it virtually imports production, which however does not belong to every immanent action, for understanding is preserved without production, as divine understanding not as in Father, and in us contemplation after formed word, and sight, or touch, and other exterior senses within themselves do not produce term, and the same is probably said of beatific vision. But we shall say of these in books on the soul, and can be seen St. Thomas, cited Opusculum 48, chapter 1, on action, where he openly says this. And Part 1, question 34, article 1, ad 3, he says: "That understanding, as it is distinguished from saying, which is producing word, only imports relation of understanding to understood thing, in which no notion of origin is imported, but only some information in our intellect, as our intellect is made in act through form of understood thing." Therefore if it imports act with itself through mode of informing and having in act, not through mode of originating something and emitting, consequently from force of proper concept most formally it is not action of this category, but second act, by which power is rendered in second act knowing. And therefore understanding is assimilated by St. Thomas to existence itself, or being, Part 1, question 54, article 4; and thus directly these acts are qualities through mode of disposition. Because nevertheless also to immanent act it sometimes belongs to produce, it is called virtually action, as when through understanding word is produced, insofar as it is a certain saying.

But concerning actions, which are called simple emanations, we said in question 2, on proper, and immediately below we shall say, that they are not actions, but connections between essence and proper passions, or some dependence through mode of connection. For action, which is egression itself of effect dependent on agent, is said to emanate not to be made; properties also are made through generative action of substance, but insofar as they are connected with substance, they are said to emanate from it.

Concerning passion, it follows first that passion is related in opposite mode to action; for it denominates patient not as it is precisely reception of form, for thus it would denominate purely intrinsically, but as it is in patient from infliction of agent, as producing from presupposed subject; for from reception of form, as it were innate (as when proper passion is received in nature) subject is not said to suffer, but from reception inflicted by agent, and therefore passion is defined by St. Thomas, cited Opusculum 48, that "it is effect, and infliction of action." Or, as others define, "it is form, by which patient receives something from agent."

It follows second by what reason action and passion are said to be identified with motion entitatively. Which some from disciples of Scotus deny; but it is openly asserted by St. Thomas, cited Opusculum 47, chapter 1, on action; and chapter 1, on passion, and will be

said more fully in Book 4 of Physics. For motion is called act of being in potency, that is form, or effect as in flux, or to be changed and made from one to another. Hence it necessarily consists of double formality, namely from something and in something, for every motion is from agent and is in patient, or receiving thing. Hence motion cannot be understood without this double formality of action as from something, and passion as in something.

But how, if they are one and the same thing, is passion said to be effect of action? St. Thomas responds, chapter 1 on passion cited: "That effect can be said in two ways, in one mode properly, when something is caused, or has been caused by something, and in this mode passion is not effect of action: in another mode because when both are made, thus they are made together that one is understood to be after another by necessary connection, and thus one is said in some mode to be efficient cause with respect to second, as was said in treatise on proper." Which doctrine very well confirms what we said concerning emanation, which properly is not action with respect to essence, but connection not only of one with another, as quidditative predicates, but of one after another; for thus it is connection of sequel, or emanation. And in this mode passion is effect of action.

The arguments are solved.

You will object: Action and passion agree in some common univocal thing, namely in notion of motion or way: therefore they are not diverse categories, for these agree in nothing univocal. Nor can it be said that they agree identically and physically, not in some superior predicable. For against this is because those things which are really the same cannot constitute diverse categories, because categories are primarily diverse: therefore they agree in nothing. And much less such great agreement that they are identified entitatively.

I respond: That many stick to agreement of these two categories in that superior notion of way and tendency. For some want them to agree in that as in something transcendental. Others that it is common univocal notion, because they do not think it inconvenient that something superior can be univocal to double category. But it is better responded with given solution, that motion is not common predicate through mode of superior grade, but through mode of postcategory. For it is numbered in those, and thus motion is common through identity and in thing, not through universality and notion. And to the reply it is said that some formality can well be identified with something, from which it is distinguished categorially, as mode with its subject, and sitting with sitting person, where

with located thing, and yet mode is in one category, and thing in another; for it suffices for diverse categories that they be primarily diverse formally and quidditatively, although they are the same materially and entitatively.

Second it is argued against the definition of action handed down, that it is form by which we are said to act on subjected thing, both because creation is true action and not from presupposed subject, and because that according to which or by which we are said to act is principle of acting, but causality or action is not principle of acting. It is confirmed: Action is something incomplete insofar as action; therefore it does not constitute category. The antecedent is proved because as action it is and is distinguished from passion it does not inhere; but inherence completes accident, as subsistence substance; therefore.

I respond to the first proof that active creation is not action of this category, since it is the very substance and power of God with respect of reason to creatures, and real dependence of creatures on God: for neither does action proceed from God, as we said, but effect; for it is of itself the very power pure and ultimate act. But passive creation, that is procession of creature is not action, but effect of action, that is dependence of term on God with newness of being. To the second proof it is said that action is not said according to which we are said to act as principle, but as causality and reason of proceeding; for neither from principle alone, but also from second act itself and causality, indeed from this alone are we denominated agents in act.

To the confirmation I respond: That action also inheres, although as action it is not signified as inhering, as St. Thomas expressly teaches, Book 7 on Power, article 9, ad 7, and in Book 1, distinction 32, question 1, article 1. Hence it is one thing that action not inhere absolutely, for this would be to exclude from it notion of accident; another that insofar as action it not explicate inherence, because it is considered as from another, although it there includes being in another, just as relation under concept of to does not explicate inherence, although it includes it. But you will say: Relation, although in notion of to it does not explicate inherence, nevertheless nor also does it constitute distinct category according to notion of to from the very notion of in. But truly action by the very notion of to constitutes distinct category from passion itself, which speaks the very notion of in: therefore the same difficulty remains, how action is complete accident, as it constitutes distinct category, if it does not speak notion of in.

I respond: That passion does not consist in inherence of action itself, but in reception of effect, which is form from which passion is made according as it is from agent, but mode

itself which is action, is inherent by itself, because it is identified by itself with motion, and not by reason of passion, although it is not signified as inherent.

It remained to treat of term of action as to its formality: in which either general conditions of action are considered, for example, that it is term produced, educed, induced, transmuted, concerning which some dispute which of these conditions constitutes term in notion of term. But others are special reasons specifying actions, as that it is to quality or to place, or some formality is considered in mode of acquiring, as that the same place is acquired through ascent or descent concerning which, because they involve difficulty of specification, must be treated in Book 2 of Physics, and in book on Soul.

COORDINATION OF CATEGORY OF ACTION AND PASSION.

Action most general genus is first divided into transient and immanent, according to opinion that immanent is properly action. Immanent into cognitive and volitive. And both into corporeal and spiritual. Corporeal cognitive into actions of internal and external senses. Spiritual cognitive into intellectual, such as is in angel, discursive, such as is in us, supernatural, as beatific vision. And any of these into various species according to diverse objects. Corporeal appetitive into various passions. Spiritual appetitive into various species of natural and supernatural acts, and each of those according to diverse objects into various species.

Transient action seems first to be divided into artificial and natural. Artificial through infinite species of art, as building, painting etc. Natural into substantial, and accidental substantial is generative, which is varied through diverse terms of its production. Accidental into augmentation, alteration and local motion, and each into various atomic species; as local motion into circular, and direct etc. Alteration into intension, remission etc.

In category of passion the same species must be placed, which are in productive action from subject.

ARTICLE III.
What is the category of where, and position.

Also difficulties which pertain to place are not of present treatise; but pertain to fourth book of Physics. At present therefore only two things must be explained. First: Whether where is intrinsic or extrinsic mode of located thing. Second, concerning species of where which pertain to this category.

Concerning the first some distinguish double where. One intrinsic, which is the very presence of thing independent from all extrinsic surrounding which local motion acquires; another extrinsic, which is place itself surrounding, and is also acquired through local motion, but secondarily and mediately, for it can be preserved without it. Concerning which see Coimbra, on chapter 9 of Categories, question 2, article 1, and Suarez, disputation 51 of Metaphysics, lecture 1. Principal foundation is deduced from local motion itself made in vacuum, or outside heaven. For I suppose that body can be moved in vacuum, for concerning body of Christ St. Thomas teaches Part 3, question 51, article 4, and Quodlibet 6, article 3, that it is above total containment of celestial bodies, so that it is not contained by place. But for this it was necessary that by ascension and its motion, at least some parts of Christ's body were moved outside ultimate surface of heaven, so that it only touches that surface with feet, but remaining body is outside place. And thus head and arms through motion are placed outside all places of world: but that motion of head and other members acquired some term, because it is action, and not dependent on extrinsic surrounding, therefore intrinsic; and this is where, because every term of local motion is where. The very same argument is made concerning last body of world, which is in place, and has where: since it is somewhere, and yet is circumscribed by no extrinsic thing. Therefore where is given not coming from extrinsic surrounding.

And on this depends second difficulty. For if where is intrinsic presence coming from no extrinsic thing, there is no reason why such intrinsic presence should be denied to angel: and thus it will pertain to this category, which however would not be, if where of this category were only that which depends on circumscribing thing, because angel is not circumscriptively in place but contains place as our soul its body.

To these difficulties we cannot fully respond at present, because many things touch from books of Physics and from matter concerning angels. It suffices to notice now that presence of place includes two things. One which pertains to distance or indistance, another which pertains to passive or active containment: for if two men are near, they have notion of indistance of one to another and have to be contained by surrounding surface. But if surrounding air is removed with another body not succeeding, those men will remain indistant as before, because they neither approached more nor receded, yet they will not remain contained in place. But if they are moved, they will be able to acquire greater distance or nearness than they had before, although they do not acquire circumscription and containment. And this distance, or nearness formally is relation, but fundamentally is some mode or position, or determination of this body toward another by reason of which it is related otherwise and otherwise toward that, and founds diverse relation of distance. Which is gathered a posteriori, because between two bodies in

vacuum there can be distance, or nearness: but this relation cannot be founded in substance alone of body, therefore in some new determination toward another body, or mode and position. And motion acquires this mode or determination. Hence St. Thomas says, Opusculum 52, near the end: "That local motion is not only in place, but around place." But in place it acquires circumscription, but around place it cannot acquire circumscription, but diverse distance, or nearness. Therefore, with place removed, it can still be moved around place or around another body.

But if you say, if with whole machine of universe removed as before first creation, stone were created and moved, what would it acquire, if it acquired nothing entirely intrinsic. I respond: It seems more probable that that body would not be moved in any way, because neither in place, nor around place, nor according to distance, or nearness toward another, because there is no other around which these are exercised positively, but negative distance, or indistance which is purely negative, cannot terminate positive motion. And thus from defect of matter, and per accidens that body would be immobile, just as if fire were placed there, it would not heat, because matter would be lacking. Nor then would it have or acquire definitive where, because although it would not be everywhere, and thus negatively would be definite, yet it would not be in some part determinately, because no part would then be given in which it would be. But definitive where if it is positive, should occupy determinate part with negation of ubiquity. And this is declared from another principle, because motion is only found per se between contrary terms, as is said Metaphysics, lecture 12, according to St. Thomas, who adds that contrariety according to place is greatest distance according to straight line, but then there would be no contrariety between terms of motion, because all would be nothing; therefore there would be no motion.

From what has been said it is gathered that no presence can be given, which is entirely intrinsic absolute mode from all extrinsic thing, whether surrounding or distant, or near. It is clear because such mode is only to itself, since there is nothing else outside itself but that something be present to itself, existence suffices, by which it is in nature of things. For presence can add no other effect to self besides existence: but this is had through production, not through motion.

It follows second that where considered completely and adequately does not speak only mode of distance or nearness, but also circumscription and containment in place. It is taken from St. Thomas, Opusculum 48, chapter 1 on where, and Book 9 of Metaphysics, lecture 12, where he says: "Where signifies nothing other than being in place, and to be moved according to place is nothing other, than to be moved according to where." Hence

also ultimate sphere is said not to be in place according to itself whole, because it lacks exterior container, as he says in Book 4 of Physics, lecture 7, and Opusculum 52. But reason of this can be taken in some way from this that in connatural mode no distance or nearness is sought for itself, but that thing be contained in something, in which it is conserved, or flees contrary, or acquires something convenient, which whole local motion intends. For we see local motion given by nature to heavy things that they seek conservative place, to animals that they acquire convenient things of appetite, or flee harmful things; therefore in local motion acquisition of distance or presence is ordered to containment of place, just as also violent motion is ordered to opposite. Since therefore whole that local motion acquires is where, but not precisely distance, it is clear that where principally and completely speaks containment and circumscription in place, yet supposing distance or indistance, which is principally ordered to circumscription. And therefore categorical where is defined through circumscription by author of six principles namely "Passive circumscription of located thing coming from active circumscription of place." And just as one cannot be said clothed unless by clothing, so nor located unless by circumscribing place. But if local motion is given in vacuum, it will be imperfect and secundum quid, and will acquire not where simply, but mode of distance or presence which is required for where, or if there is no body to which it is present, or distant, it will acquire nothing.

It follows third what must be said concerning spiritual definitive where, what concerning sacramental, and concerning presence of substance denuded of quantity? For definitive where is said according to St. Thomas, Opusculum 48, chapter 1 on where, which is not everywhere, but has determinate part of its presence, as it were finished to certain term. And in this generality definitive where also belongs to bodies, that is, of certain and determinate part; but it is applied to spiritual things, because we lack proper name of spiritual presence. Yet definitive where does not belong to body of Christ in Sacrament, as some wrongly think, because although body of Christ is not everywhere, nevertheless from force of that it is not defined to certain part. For it is not so in these species of bread, that it cannot be in others, although it can be said defined secundum quid, because it cannot be in other than in species of bread. Hence it is not called definitive where, but sacramental. Finally substance spoiled of quantity lacks where, because it lacks positive presence of place, because neither does it contain place, nor is contained by place, unless radically and virtually. Concerning which we said more in question 16.

Yet there is difficulty: Whether angelic where, which is active containment of place, and sacramental where, which is presence of body in indivisible mode, agree with circumscriptive where in this category of where? Certainly St. Thomas rejects where of

angels from this category, Opusculum 48, chapter 1, and Part 1, question 52, articles 1 and 2, he teaches that angel is equivocally in place with body. And indeed rightly, for where is not presence alone as such, because this formally is relation, and pertains to another category, but foundation of presence does not always make where. For there is multiple presence, just as also multiple union. For there is objective presence, as object is present to angel by this very fact that it exists, although it is distant; there is also informative presence, as soul in body, which in notion of informing does not found where, and clothing is present to body which it clothes, and as such does not found where, but habit, which is another category. But angel does not found local presence except in notion of agent and operating, and therefore neither is contained by place, but contains place: so that just as soul is present to body by informing, so angel by acting and through application of power is said to be applied to place. Therefore just as information and application of soul to body does not found presence which is where and of this category, so neither does power of angel applied found presence which is where, but which is presence of action. Nor also is angel properly distant, since it is not quantified, nor measurable by magnitude of space, so that from that to body some measure of distance can be taken; therefore in no way does its presence pertain to where of this category. But we refer these to Theologians, for they are not of this place.

Similarly that sacramental presence of body of Christ, is of another notion from where, because it cannot be acquired through local motion immediately and per se, but only by means of species, to which it is bound, it is moved per accidens by motion totally subjected in species, just as in man motion of body is not subjected in soul per se, but in whole by reason of body, and per accidens in soul. Hence with species removed body of Christ no more has where than substance denuded of quantity; therefore that presence is of another notion. Concerning which in matter on Eucharist.

If you ask whether any accident has its where distinct from substance? I respond that just as all are quantified by the same quantity, so they are located by the same where; for they are contained under the same space and place, and thus, just as they are extended in order to place by the same quantity, so they are commensurated to place by the same where of whole. Nor does it prevent that with consecration of bread made, quantity remains in place, and not substance. For it is responded that just as quantity remains commensurated to place by the same extension as before, although not affecting substance as before, but sustained per se by God, so definitive where remains, which through medium quantity inhered in substance, affecting only quantity and also other accidents which are in quantity.

To the reasons for doubting from the beginning it is established from what has been said what is acquired through motion in vacuum, and how ultimate body is in place.

Concerning the category of position, its definition must be noted from author of six principles, according to St. Thomas Opusculum 48, chapter 1 on position; and Part 1-2, question 49, article 1 ad 3: "That it is position or ordering of parts in place, as sitting, standing, lying etc. For parts are ordered comparatively to place through position formally, just as through quantity they are ordered in whole." But how it is distinguished from where, authors vary. Some distinguish only by reason, perhaps because position is order of parts in place, which does not seem to add above being in place except only existence in place ordered, which substantially is where itself.

But the opposite is more efficaciously proved. Both from general reason, because diverse categories cannot be distinguished by reason alone, otherwise they would not be primarily diverse ordinations and quiddities of things. And specially, because position can remain invariant with where varied, as in one who sitting or standing is carried, without variation of sitting changing diverse places; and similarly with whole place invariant position can be varied according to parts, as in the same place one can sit, or stand, or lie. For from this St. Thomas takes diversity of this category from category of where in Opusculum 48, chapter 1 on position. See also Book 4 of Physics, lecture 7, where he shows that there is no per se motion to position, because its species are indivisible: for with anything added or subtracted species is varied, just as also happens in figures. Hence species in position are related almost in the same mode as in figure, since position is related as external figure of body. But because it is taken through comparison to place, which is something extrinsic, therefore denomination of this category is not purely intrinsic, like figure.

COORDINATION OF CATEGORY OF WHERE.

Supreme genus which is where is divided by some into three species: namely circumscriptive, definitive, and supernatural or sacramental. Of sacramental where we know only one species, namely presence of body of Christ in Sacrament. Definitive where is presence of created spirits in place, which according to diverse modes of operating in place will be able to be varied. But we already said that angelic where does not pertain to this category; for it is presence of power, not presence of located and located thing. If however some division belongs to it, it can be into active where by which it is in place by operating, and passive by which it is in place through binding.

Circumscriptive where is probably lowest species, because being at Rome or at Complutum does not vary formality of place, but material distance. Hence nor do local motions varying any place whatever are distinguished in species. But if someone posits it to be subaltern species, he should posit as many species of place as there are distances.

IN CATEGORY OF POSITION.

Albert places under supreme genus two subaltern species: namely to be placed straight, or bent. Under bent position infinite species are contained, as of sitting, lying, genuflection etc.; rough and smooth are also placed, according as they speak equality of parts.

ARTICLE IV.
What is the category of when and habit.

Some take the category of when for any intrinsic duration, by the same reason by which they posit where to be intrinsic presence; and besides because duration is something real and really denominating therefore it should pertain to some category, and not to another than to this. But it denominates intrinsically just as also existence, because duration is continuation of existence. Thus Father Suarez, disputation 50 of Metaphysics, section 12.

This opinion is in no way to be admitted from its very principles. For intrinsic duration of thing is nothing other than continuation of existence therefore it is nothing distinct from existence, otherwise it would not be continuation and perseverance of the same, but succession. But existence does not constitute category per se distinct from thing which exists, in opinion indeed of opposite authors, because they say existence is not really distinguished from produced thing, and real quiddity. But in our opinion, although existence is distinguished from existing thing, nevertheless it is reduced to category of existing thing, as subsistence to substance, because existence per se does not constitute quiddity, but only places constituted quiddities outside causes; and thus one existence is distinguished from another through species of thing, whose existence it is; for it has the same formal effect in all, namely placing outside causes. Nor is it valid to say that duration is not accident metaphysically distinct from enduring thing, but is predicated accidentally of it, and this suffices that it be distinct category. But certainly if this were so, also existence would be distinct category, because it is said accidentally predicably of creatures. And besides all order of categories is confused. For other is order of predicable accident, other of categorical; for substance can be predicated accidentally predicably, as vessel is wooden, is golden, animal is horse; yet it is not categorical accident.

Therefore it must be said that this category is not taken for intrinsic duration of thing which endures, but for mensuration of duration. And thus it is only constituted with respect to mensurating duration, not informing for that mensuration, by which something is said to be in time, places denomination of this category. And therefore when is defined: "that which is left from adjacency of time," that is from mensuration, as St. Thomas explains Opusculum 48, chapter on When. Hence neither time itself, as it is intrinsic duration of motion, is placed in this category, but as it places its adjacency in things subjected to time. And thus St. Thomas perpetually explains notion of this category, in cited place, and in Book 3 of Physics, lecture 5, where he says: "That when is, according as something is denominated from time," and he has the same in Book 5 of Metaphysics, lecture 9. And the reason is because although time is extrinsic measure, nevertheless those things which are subjected to time are no less affected by it, than those things which are subjected to place and clothing, that that is said located, this clothed. But this suffices to constitute in them mode and denomination sufficient for two categories. Therefore also that will suffice for category of when. Nor is it valid to say that time is only coexistent and concomitant to thing, which is in time, which more pertains to relation of coexistence. For against this is because time does not purely accompany things subjected to it, both because it is measure of them, and because it is cause, since from motion of heaven, which in thing is time, these inferior things are changed.

But you will inquire whether all measures of duration, even spiritual and supernatural are placed in this category; or truly only mensuration of time. St. Thomas responds, Opusculum 48, last chapter on When, negatively for neither does invisible duration per se have to when, and to distinguish and divide durations themselves by measuring, so that distinction of one duration and delay is separated from another, by which we distinguish when something was, or is. But if something is indivisibly present, we cannot there ask when it was or will be, because it always is and in the same mode. Therefore when serves for changeable durations. And just as angel is not located by place, because it contains place, it is not contained, so it is not whened (so to speak) by duration, because it is above every duration distinguishable through when.

But double difficulty arises. First: To which category those mensurations of indivisible durations pertain. For why shall we not say that every mensuration of duration pertains to this category, although when is more denominated from measure of time, which is better known to us. Second: How real category is constituted in mensuration of time, since differences of time and its diverse measures are not made except through intellect. For time in thing is something continuous, just as motion itself of heaven with which it is

identified; but it measures according to number and division which is made by intellect alone.

To the first I respond: That measures of other indivisible durations do not leave anything from their adjacency in inferior durations, as time does in those things which are measured by time; for those things which are in time depend on time as on cause, because all inferior things depend on motion of heaven. And thus inferior mobile durations are divided, and noted from adjacency of time, which is motion of heaven, from which they are derived, and to which they are subjected: just as also place insofar as it subjects located thing to itself constitutes place, and where results. But remaining indivisible measures, although one is more uniform than another, for example duration of supreme angel, and its discrete time is more uniform than durations of inferiors; nevertheless inferior durations are not caused by superior, nor subjected, and contained by that, as inferior motions are subjected to motion of heaven and time; because angels do not have natural motions caused by motion of superiors, but only intentional and free ones, more or less uniform, one of which can be measured by another, as cloth by yard, but it is not necessarily subjected to it, and changed by it. Only eternity of God, which is not in category, contains and causes all other measures, but because it is indivisible, it does not when them divisibly, but contains uniformly without succession; which angelic duration cannot with respect to inferiors.

To the second I respond that although division and numeration of time is actually made through intellect, nevertheless fundamentally numerability is given in thing, or prior and posterior of motion. And thus that adjacency of time, which is called when, is left from time itself numerable, and divisible fundamentally, although actual division is made only by intellect.

We shall immediately number species of this category in its coordination.

Concerning the category of habit. Its definition is: "that which is adjacency of bodies, and those things, which are around body." For just as from adjacent and surrounding place thing is rendered located, and from subjection to time whened; so from surrounding clothing it is said clothed. Hence it is false what some say that habit is some mode, which is in human body, by which it is rendered apt to be clothed, which does not belong to other bodies. However this does not render man clothed, but capable to be clothed, but simply naked. But it is established that category of habit removes nakedness, since it renders clothed: therefore it does not consist in that mode, which is compatible with actual nakedness. Therefore habit is left from adjacency of clothing, just as where from

place. Nor does it prevent that clothing is substance in itself. Because since its application is accidental, it makes accidental denomination and accidental category, just as vessel is said golden or wooden denominatively; nor nevertheless is it pure extrinsic denomination, but leaves something from such adjacency in man, just as where is left from place. And thus it is said by St. Thomas "habit intermediate between clothing, and having clothing," Book 5 of Metaphysics, lecture 20, and Part 1-2, question 49, article 1. Hence it happens that animals, even if they are covered with hairs or armed with claws, are not denominated clothed by them, because they are parts of body. But if they are surrounded by some clothing, as horse caparisoned or armed, they are denominated from this category, just as man from clothing.

Properties of these categories can easily be seen in St. Thomas Opusculum 48, treating of individual ones. Almost all do not receive more and less, and do not have contrary, except action and passion, which has both. Habit also is said to receive more and less not according to intension or remission, but according to more or fewer garments, as St. Thomas says, in cited Opusculum, treatise on habit, chapter 3. Yet it does not have contrary, because it does not have intension and remission.

COORDINATION OF CATEGORY OF WHEN.

Those who think this category is created duration, divide it into time, aeviternity, mode of aeviternity, and mode of eternity. Time is divided into continuous and discrete according to continuous motion, or according to diverse operations. Aeviternity belongs to incorruptible things. Mode of aeviternity, to instantaneous things. Mode of eternity, to beatific vision, which is immutable from its nature. But those who think when is only adjacency of time, divide it from Aristotle, in chapter 4 of Categories, according to differences of times into present, past and future, and each into various species of months, years, days, etc. For just as any unity varies species of number, so any difference of time varies species of when, which is successive number. Which divisions are only given in thing fundamentally.

COORDINATION OF CATEGORY OF HABIT.

Habit, which is supreme genus, is divided by St. Thomas, Opusculum 48, into arms, and garments. Arms, into offensive and defensive, each of which has various species. Garments, into garments of men and beasts. As horses are adorned with caparison, bridle, arms etc. Garments, into various modes of clothing according to diverse adjacency, as tunic, footwear, cap etc. Which species are not taken according to matter or art by which

clothes are made, but from diverse mode, by which they clothe and cover. Ornaments of walls are also reduced to this category, which properly are not clothes.

TEXT OF POSTCATEGORIES.

Summary of chapter 10, on opposites.

In this chapter Aristotle does three things. First he explains genera of oppositions. Second he compares them among themselves. Third he explains contraries specially. Concerning the first he places four genera of oppositions: namely relative opposition, contrary, privative, and contradictory. He defines relatives, "which what they are of opposites to be, or in some other mode are said to those." He does not define contraries, but explains by example, as white and black, and divides them into immediate, "of which one necessarily belongs to subject," as health and sickness; and mediate, "of which neither necessarily belongs to subject," as white and black. Privatives are called habit and privation. Contradictories affirmation, and negation. In the second part he proves these opposites to be distinguished among themselves. In the third he places properties of contraries: 1 That to good evil is contrary, but to evil both good and evil. 2 If one of contraries is given, also the other. 3 It is impossible that both contraries belong to the same thing. 4 Contraries are around the same subject. 5 All contraries either are in the same genus, or in contrary genera.

Summary of chapter 11, on prior.

He recites five modes of priority. First is being prior in time. Second, prior according to consequence of subsisting, as it is not valid: Animal exists, therefore horse exists, but conversely, and thus animal is prior to horse. Third is prior in order, as premises are prior in order than conclusion. Fourth, prior in authority, as Prince to plebeian. Fifth, prior by nature, which with something is reciprocated in consequence, and nevertheless is its cause, as happens in sun and light, for sun is prior by nature to light, although simultaneous with it.

Summary of chapter 12, on simultaneous.

He places three modes of simultaneity, being simultaneous in time, i.e. whose generation is in the same time. Second, simultaneous convertibly, or simultaneous by nature as correlatives, which are indeed convertible, but one is not cause of another. Third, simultaneous in order, or division of genus, as two species under the same genus are simultaneous.

Chapter 13, on motion.

He enumerates six species of motion. The first two are substantial changes, namely generation and corruption. The next two are motions of quantity, namely augmentation and diminution. Fifth is according to quality, namely alteration. Sixth, according to place, namely local motion.

Chapter 14, on having.

He enumerates eight more customary modes of having: 1 Having qualities, as virtues or vices. 2 Having quantity, as three-cubit or two-cubit. 3 Having things surrounding us, as clothes. 4 Having something in member, as ring on finger. 5 Having member itself, as hand, or foot. 6 Having something in vessel, as wine, or wheat. 7 Having by possessing, as field, house. 8 By cohabiting, as having wife.

QUESTION XX.
ON POSTCATEGORIES.

ARTICLE I.
Oppositions are explained.

Having omitted contradictory opposition, concerning which we treated much in question 7 of the Summulae, and relative opposition, concerning which enough was said above in question 17, we shall resolve some brief questions concerning the remaining ones.

First therefore you will inquire whether this division of opposition into those four members placed in the chapter on Opposites is adequate and sufficient. I respond affirmatively. And St. Thomas gathers its sufficiency, Book 5 of the Metaphysics, lecture 12, because what is opposed to another, either is opposed by reason of dependence, or removal, because namely it removes that. If by reason of dependence (that is because it cannot be without that, not because it is relatively caused by that), thus they are relatively opposed. If by reason of removal, either one removes another totally by removing, and it is contradictory opposition, which is supreme. If leaving something, either it leaves subject in which they agree, but not entity and genus in which they do not agree, and thus it is privation and habit, because they can belong to the same subject, but among themselves one is lack, another position; or they agree in the same genus and same subject, and thus they are contraries. Others gather thus: Opposition, either is between being and being, or between being and non-being. In the second mode in two ways, either between being and non-being absolutely, and thus it is contradiction, or in determinate

subject capable of both, and thus it is privation. In the first mode also in two ways, either between being and being which mutually expel each other, and thus they are contraries, or which mutually regard each other, and thus it is relative opposition.

Second you will inquire: Whether this division is univocal, or analogous. I respond: St. Thomas, Opusculum 37, makes it analogous, because contradictory is opposition simply since it simply removes what the other posits. But remaining oppositions have so much of opposition insofar as they participate something of contradiction, namely of negation of another, although not so simply as contradictory; for if they did not negate and remove something they would not be opposed. Hence relatives speak minimal opposition, because they do not mutually remove each other, but regard each other, although they require diversity of extremes. Others prove because opposition belongs to things of diverse categories, and some opposites are real, some of reason. But this is related materially to opposition. And often it happens that those things which materially are not univocal in notion of being, are formally univocal in notion of opposite or knowable, or intelligible, or another property following to being. Therefore the first proof is more solid, and true.

Third you will inquire how it is to be understood in these opposites that some have medium, some lack medium. I respond from St. Thomas, cited Opusculum 37, that to lack medium is to agree in no way, and the more some things lack medium, the less they agree. "Medium, St. Thomas says, shows distance of agreement, and therefore diminishes notion of opposition. Since therefore in all other oppositions medium is to be found, therefore all diminish from notion of contradictory opposition." Hence it follows that when we say medium is not given, it is because this so perfectly removes that that it leaves nothing of it, neither formally nor virtually. And therefore with one extreme posited it is necessary that the other be removed, and conversely; and thus some things are said to be immediately opposed. And similarly immediate contraries are those of which one must necessarily be in subject, although in notion of opposite contrariety has medium, insofar as they have some agreement in the same genus, and also can be in the same subject.

Fourth you will inquire in what consists discrimination between privative and contradictory opposition, since in both one extreme is negation, which totally removes opposite. I respond that privation speaks from the part of one extreme negation, but otherwise modified than in contradictory, and therefore constitutes another opposition. But modification is from the part of subject which it connotes, namely that it is in subject apt for form, of which it deprives. Hence although it totally removes form no less than

contradiction, nevertheless because it does not remove aptitude for this form, but leaves capacity for it, therefore although it removes formally whole form, virtually nevertheless it leaves something of it. Just as also privation in becoming, that is, which removes disposing form, and which is related as it were as becoming to further form, although it totally removes disposition opposed to itself, nevertheless never arrives at removing form in completed being, namely to which disposition tends, as privation of health, although it removes health, yet not life, and sin, although it removes virtue, yet not order to good.

Fifth you will inquire: How is the saying of the Philosopher to be understood, that there is no regression from privation to habit, when this is urged in many privations, as from darkness to light, from rest to motion, from ignorance to science regression is given. I respond: St. Thomas in Book 8 of the Metaphysics, lecture 4, and Opusculum 37, chapter 1, distinguishes among privations: that sometimes subject is equally immediately capable of both, namely privation and form; but sometimes there is some order necessarily to be observed in reception of form and privation, for example death cannot be in subject which did not previously live, nor blindness in something which did not previously see, or was constituted in time when sight was owed to it, for which reason puppy before ninth day is not said blind, but not seeing, but afterwards if it lacks sight, it is said blind. But truly that privation of light, or motion, or science be in subject, it is not required that these forms were previously in subject, but it can indifferently begin from form, or privation. In these second ones therefore regression is given from privation to habit, and conversely; but in first ones not, because privation is had in some order after form. Hence with form removed potency to it does not remain, because order does not remain, because order is that after form privation be had, not after privation form. Or second, as St. Thomas says, question 2 on Evil, article 12, ad 3, some privations remove ability, or potency (that is form ordering, or enabling per se primarily to another), as blindness sight, deafness hearing. Some privation only removes act (that is form, which precisely gives act, or convenient habit, not first potency, and per se to act), as is privation of grace, privation of light, privation of motion, and similar. And privations of first genus do not admit regression to habit. But of second genus can admit.

ARTICLE II.
What is to be noted concerning remaining postcategories.

Having left others which lack difficulty, concerning modes of priority and simultaneity note these three things. First, principal modes of priority are reduced to two, namely to priority of time, and nature. And priority of duration is called priority in which, priority of nature is called from which, because that first is called antecedence in being, this in

causing. And although the Philosopher said that prior by nature is said which is convertible with another, yet is cause of it, and thus this priority might seem to be found only in causes adequate to effect, for causes which are not adequate or proper, are not convertible, as heat is not convertible with motion, although it is caused by it because it is not caused by that alone yet this priority is extended to every causality, or to every genus of dependence and antecedence, whether cause is convertible according to adequation with effect, or not, for at least it can be convertible with effect in simultaneity of duration, and production. And sense of Philosopher seems to be that this priority is priority of causality, even if otherwise they are convertible, or have simultaneity cause and effect, whether in duration or in adequation. But if priority of nature is antecedence of cause, since causes are mutually causes in diverse genus of causing, they are mutually prior and posterior in this priority of nature; yet it does not follow that something is prior to itself, or causes itself, because this is concausation in diverse genus, which cannot return to itself, as will be examined more widely in Book 2 of Physics.

Second is that another priority is given, which is called of reason, but this is nothing other than distinction of reason, by which one is conceived without another, or prior to another, and others call signs of reason, that is concepts and significations of reason, which are maximally in use in distinction of divine things through reason. Finally priority of origin is wont to be placed in procession of divine persons, in which without antecedence of duration or causality procession is given. But because in divine things, as faith teaches, nothing is prior or posterior, it is more conveniently called order of origin, than priority. And thus St. Thomas said absolutely, Part 1, question 42, article 3: "That in divine things there must be order of origin, without priority."

Third is that simultaneity is not opposed precisely to priority, for to prior formally is opposed posterior; but simultaneity directly is opposed to succession between prior and posterior. Therefore modes of simultaneous are only three, as we said in text; and yet first mode of simultaneous, which is in time, is opposed to first mode of priority; second is opposed to second and fifth, which are priorities of nature; third, namely simultaneity of order, is opposed to third mode of priority. But to fourth mode of priority, namely dignity, simultaneity is not opposed, because there is no succession there, and yet equal dignity can in this mode be called simultaneity in dignity.

The End.